Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Evidentialism' and 'On the Individuation of Attributes'

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10 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine]
     Full Idea: No two classes have exactly the same members, but two different attributes may be attributes of exactly the same things. Classes are identical when their members are identical. ...On the other hand, attributes have no clear principle of individuation.
     From: Willard Quine (On the Individuation of Attributes [1975], p.100)
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine]
     Full Idea: May we not say that you know an attribute only insofar as you know what things have it?
     From: Willard Quine (On the Individuation of Attributes [1975], p.106)
     A reaction: Simple, and the best defence of class nominalism (a very implausible theory) which I have encountered. Do I have to know all the things? Do I not know 'red' if I don't know tomatoes have it?
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine]
     Full Idea: We have an acceptable notion of class, or physical object, or attribute, or any other sort of object, only insofar as we have an acceptable principle of individuation for that sort of object. There is no entity without identity.
     From: Willard Quine (On the Individuation of Attributes [1975], p.102)
     A reaction: Note that this is his criterion for an 'acceptable' notion. Presumably that is for science. It permits less acceptable notions which don't come up to the standard. And presumably true things can be said about the less acceptable entities.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine]
     Full Idea: Physical objects are identical if and only if coextensive.
     From: Willard Quine (On the Individuation of Attributes [1975], p.101)
     A reaction: The supposed counterexample to this is the statue and the clay it is made of, which are said to have different modal properties (destroying the statue doesn't destroy the clay).
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Involuntary beliefs can still be evaluated [Feldman/Conee]
     Full Idea: Examples confirm that beliefs may be both involuntary and subject to epistemic evaluation.
     From: R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], II)
     A reaction: This is an extremely important point, which summarises the situation with beliefs that arise from (apparent) immediate perception. A belief cannot possibly be knowledge if it has been triggered, but no effort was made to evaluate it.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
Evidentialism is the view that justification is determined by the quality of the evidence [Feldman/Conee]
     Full Idea: What we call 'evidentialism' is the view that the epistemic justification of a belief is determined by the quality of the believer's evidence for the belief.
     From: R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], I)
     A reaction: The immediate question is whether the believer knows the quality of their evidence. A detective might not recognise the crucial clue (like the dog not barking). The definition of 'quality' had better not turn out to be circular. Forgotten evidence?
Beliefs should fit evidence, and if you ought to believe it, then you are justified [Feldman/Conee]
     Full Idea: One epistemically ought to have the doxastic attitudes that fit one's evidence. Being epistemically obligatory is equivalent to being epistemically justified.
     From: R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], III)
     A reaction: It is normal for someone to refuse to accept something, when another person believes the evidence is overwhelming. Evaluation of evidence must include an assessment of what other evidence might turn up.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
If someone rejects good criticism through arrogance, that is irrelevant to whether they have knowledge [Feldman/Conee]
     Full Idea: If an arrogant young physicist refuses to recognise valid criticisms from a senior colleague, his or her character has nothing to do with the epistemic status of their belief in the theory.
     From: R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], III)
     A reaction: This rejects the idea that epistemic justification is essentially a matter of virtues and vices of character. That view is a version of reliabilism, and hence of externalism. I agree with the criticism, but epistemic virtues are still significant.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]
     Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus
     A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea.