232 ideas
| 7504 | Modern science comes from Descartes' view that knowledge doesn't need moral purity [Descartes, by Foucault] |
| Full Idea: Before Descartes, one could not be impure, immoral, and know the truth. After Descartes, direct evidence is enough, and we have a nonascetic subject of knowledge; this change makes possible the institutionalisation of modern science. | |
| From: report of René Descartes (Meditations [1641]) by Michel Foucault - On the Genealogy of Ethics | |
| A reaction: I would have thought Gassendi and the British Empiricists would be a more plausible source for this shift of attitude. Plato would relegate modern science to a lower level of knowledge. |
| 2845 | Free and great-souled men do not keep asking "what is the use of it?" [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: To be constantly asking 'what is the use of it?' is unbecoming to those of great soul, and unworthy of free men. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1338b01) | |
| A reaction: Love this one! It is not just philosophers who keep hearing this question. Pure mathematics, history, literature, even carpentry if you are not going to be a carpenter. |
| 22521 | Our method of inquiry is to examine the smallest parts that make up the whole [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The method of inquiry that has guided us elsewhere is … that a composite must be analyzed until we reach things that are incomposite, since these are the smallest parts of the whole. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252a18) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle studies things, and aims to reveal their essential natures, so this is part of his method. You still have to grasp the essential natures of the atoms that compose the whole, however. To understand a city, understand people. |
| 1570 | Human beings, alone of the animals, have logos [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Human beings, alone of the animals, have logos. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a09) | |
| A reaction: This may be a grand claim that we are the only animals that can think rationally, or a more obvious observation that we are the only ones that talk. Aristotle was well aware that logos is a very resonant word. |
| 1569 | Descartes impoverished the classical idea of logos, and it no longer covered human experience [Roochnik on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Descartes attacked and fundamentally altered classical logos. The result is an impoverished conception of reason, one that is unable to do justice to the significance and value of human experience. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason Prol. Xii |
| 2248 | Reason says don't assent to uncertain principles, just as much as totally false ones [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Reason now persuades me that I should withhold my assent no less carefully from opinions that are not completely certain and indubitable than I would from those that are patently false. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §1.18) |
| 1574 | Reasoning distinguishes what is beneficial, and hence what is right [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Logos is for the purpose of clarifying the beneficial and the harmful and as a result the right and the wrong. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a12) | |
| A reaction: I don't think this is asserting that reason can perceive values. Logos perceives the essential nature (and hence purpose) of each thing (including people), which indicates which are its good and bad states. |
| 2801 | Intelligence which looks ahead is a natural master, while bodily strength is a natural slave [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The element that can use its intelligence to look ahead is by nature ruler and master, while that which has the bodily strength to do the actual work is by nature a slave. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252a30) | |
| A reaction: I claim that the two distinguishing features of humanity are prescience and meta-thought, so I can't really disagree with this. |
| 2857 | Since Plato all philosophers have followed the herd, except Descartes, stuck in superficial reason [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Since Plato all philosophers have followed moral 'instinct', or 'faith', or (as I call it) 'the herd'. One might exclude Descartes, the father of rationalism, who recognised only reason - but reason is only an instrument, and Descartes was superficial. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Beyond Good and Evil §191 |
| 22529 | Men are natural leaders (apart from the unnatural ones) [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A male, unless he is somehow formed contrary to nature, is by nature more capable of leading than a female. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1259b01) | |
| A reaction: Beautiful! The greatest of all philosophers offers us a perfect perpetration of the No True Scotsman Fallacy! If the question is 'are men natural leaders?', this seems to beg it. |
| 3641 | It is circular to make truth depend on believing God's existence is true [Arnauld on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: How does the author avoid reasoning in a circle when he says that we are sure that what we clearly and distinctly perceive is true only because God exists? But we can be sure that God exists only because we clearly and distinctly perceive this. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §5.71) by Antoine Arnauld - Objections to 'Meditations' (Fourth) 214 |
| 4524 | Descartes is right that in the Christian view only God can guarantee the reliability of senses [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Even Descartes had a notion that in a Christian mode of thought (where God is a good creator), only God's veracity guarantees to us the judgements of our senses. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §5.71) by Friedrich Nietzsche - The Will to Power (notebooks) §436 | |
| A reaction: An unusual defence of the notorious Cartesian Circle. Of course, Descartes claims that God guarantees reason (as 'clear and distinct conception'), not senses, and only reason led Descartes to God. |
| 2290 | Once it is clear that there is a God who is no deceiver, I conclude that clear and distinct perceptions must be true [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Once I perceived that there is a God,…and that he is no deceiver, I then concluded that everything that I clearly and distinctly perceived is necessarily true. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §5.70) | |
| A reaction: spotted by Arnauld |
| 22571 | 'If each is small, so too are all' is in one way false, for the whole composed of all is not small [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The sophistical argument 'if each is small, so too are all' is in one way true and in another false. For the whole composed of all the parts is not small, but it is composed of small parts. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1307b36) | |
| A reaction: If neurons can't think, then brains can't think. |
| 2266 | My general rule is that everything that I perceive clearly and distinctly is true [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: I now seem able to posit as a general rule that everything I very clearly and distinctly perceive is true. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §3.35) |
| 4301 | Someone may think a thing is 'clear and distinct', but be wrong [Leibniz on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Leibniz objected to Descartes' theory of truth, saying that people may think something is clear and distinct, and yet be wrong. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §3.36) by Gottfried Leibniz - works | |
| A reaction: Quite so. Descartes has misunderstood what sort of concept 'truth' is meant to be. It's the usual confusion of epistemology and metaphysics. Truth is not a feature of the human mind. |
| 10054 | Arithmetic and geometry achieve some certainty without worrying about existence [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Arithmetic, geometry and sciences of that kind only treat of things without taking any great trouble to ascertain whether they are actually existent or not, and contain some measure of certainty. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §1), quoted by Alan Musgrave - Logicism Revisited §4 | |
| A reaction: This is Musgrave's earliest quotation which seems to take the if-thenist view. |
| 2252 | Surely maths is true even if I am dreaming? [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Surely whether I am asleep or awake, two plus three makes five, and a square does not have more than four sides. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §1.20) |
| 2430 | I can learn the concepts of duration and number just from observing my own thoughts [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: When I think that I exist now, and recollect that I existed in the past, and when I conceive various thoughts, the number of which I know, then I acquire the ideas of duration and number which I can thereafter transfer to all the other objects I wish. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §3.44) |
| 2297 | If I can separate two things in my understanding, then God can separate them in reality [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: My ability clearly and distinctly to understand one thing without another suffices to make me certain that the one thing is different from the other, since they can be separated from each other (at least by God). | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §6.78) |
| 3628 | Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: The alleged naked, or rather hidden, substance of wax is something that we can neither ourselves conceive nor explain to others. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.31) by Pierre Gassendi - Objections to 'Meditations' (Fifth) 273 |
| 16631 | If we remove surface qualities from wax, we have an extended, flexible, changeable thing [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: After taking away what does not belong to the wax, let us see what is left: surely, it is nothing other than a thing that is extended, flexible and changeable. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], (VII:30-1)), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 08.2 | |
| A reaction: Aristotle worried about nothing being left when you 'stripped' an object, so this could be seen as a positive contribution to scholastic philosophy. Why is the substrate 'flexible'? He talks elsewhere of taking the clothes off the wax and seeing it naked. |
| 22525 | The whole is prior to its parts, because parts are defined by their role [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is necessary for the whole to be prior to the part. For if the whole body is put to death, there will no longer be a foot or a hand. For everything is defined by its function and by its capacity (so the hands and feet would no longer be the same). | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a20) | |
| A reaction: It may be a mistake to ask which of these is 'prior'. If bricks make a wall, the whole depends on the parts, but the parts can exist without the whole. They continue to be possible parts of a wall (unlike severed feet). |
| 17865 | Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula [Descartes, by Almog] |
| Full Idea: For Descartes in providing an essence for an item [such as God, wax, or a mathematical kind] we provide an encapsulating formula defining the phenomenon. | |
| From: report of René Descartes (Meditations [1641]) by Joseph Almog - Nature Without Essence I | |
| A reaction: I argue that this is not what Aristotle intended be an essentialist definition, which can be quite long, like a scientific monograph. Descartes firmly rejected Aristotle's 'substantial form' as essence. |
| 2301 | We know by thought that what is done cannot be undone [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Some ideas belong exclusively to the mind, such as perceiving that what has been done cannot be undone, and everything else that is known by the light of nature. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §6.82) |
| 3642 | Pythagoras' Theorem doesn't cease to be part of the essence of triangles just because we doubt it [Arnauld on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: You can't reason 'I know the triangle is right-angled, but I doubt Pythagoras' Theorem, therefore it does not belong to the essence of right-angled triangles that the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides'. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §6.78) by Antoine Arnauld - Objections to 'Meditations' (Fourth) 202 |
| 22587 | Understanding is the aim of our nature [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Reason and understanding are our nature's end. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1334b16) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be purpose of philosophy, and we should distinguish understanding from the mere accumulation of knowledge. |
| 20190 | Belief is not an intellectual state or act, because propositions are affirmed or denied by the will [Descartes, by Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: Descartes claimed that belief is not purely an intellectual state or act, since it is not the intellect that affirms or denies a proposition proposed for its consideration, but the will. | |
| From: report of René Descartes (Meditations [1641], IV) by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - Virtues of the Mind 4.2 | |
| A reaction: This is the canonical idea of 'doxastic voluntarism' - that we choose what to believe or not believe. In modern times this view has become deeply unfashionable. I don't we should wholly reject the possibility of choosing to believe something. |
| 1585 | Descartes tried to model reason on maths instead of 'logos' [Roochnik on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Descartes rejects logos because it does not achieve the certainty he craves. He replaces it with his own model of rationality, one modelled essentially on mathematics. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §1) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.76 |
| 1582 | Labelling slightly doubtful things as false is irrational [Roochnik on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: To declare that which is the least bit dubious as absolutely false is to declare war on logos. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §1.17) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.72 |
| 2256 | Maybe there is only one certain fact, which is that nothing is certain [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: If I suppose that everything I see is false. Nothing I remember actually existed. I have no senses, and body, shape, extension, movement and place are all chimeras. What then is true? Perhaps just the single fact that nothing is certain. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.24) |
| 6914 | Descartes transformed 'God is thinkable, so he exists' into 'I think, so I exist' [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
| Full Idea: Descartes transformed the proposition 'because God is thinkable, therefore he exists' into the proposition 'I think, therefore I am'. | |
| From: report of René Descartes (Meditations [1641], 2) by Ludwig Feuerbach - Principles of Philosophy of the Future §18 | |
| A reaction: This implies that Descartes' foundation is the Ontological Argument rather than the Cogito. It certainly shows how a priori synthetic thinking is basic in Descartes - that views of existence derive from pure thought. Was Descartes an idealist? |
| 4641 | In the Meditations version of the Cogito he says "I am; I exist", which avoids presenting it as an argument [Descartes, by Baggini /Fosl] |
| Full Idea: Descartes may have been aware of the danger of begging the question (in claiming "I think therefore I am") because in 'Meditations' he says "I am; I exist", which is not presented in the form of an argument. | |
| From: report of René Descartes (Meditations [1641], 2) by J Baggini / PS Fosl - The Philosopher's Toolkit §3.22 | |
| A reaction: Certainly the word 'therefore' cries out for a strict analysis of what is being inferred from what, but presenting the Cogito as a self-evident intuition for the 'natural light' has its own problems. |
| 6929 | Modern philosophy set the self-conscious ego in place of God [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
| Full Idea: Modern philosophy set the thinking being, the ego, and the self-conscious mind in the place of the merely ideated being, in place of God. | |
| From: report of René Descartes (Meditations [1641]) by Ludwig Feuerbach - Principles of Philosophy of the Future §37 | |
| A reaction: Descartes would be shocked by this interpretation, but God comes third in his logical priorities, after the existence of his ego, and its reliance on what is clear and distinct. |
| 3849 | "I think therefore I am" is the absolute truth of consciousness [Sartre on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: "I think therefore I am" is the absolute truth of consciousness as it attains to itself. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2) by Jean-Paul Sartre - Existentialism and Humanism p.44 |
| 2258 | I must even exist if I am being deceived by something [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Doubtless I exist if I persuade myself of something. But there is some powerful and cunning deceiver who is deliberately deceiving me. Then too there is no doubt that I exist, if he is deceiving me. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.25) |
| 2259 | "I am, I exist" is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: "I am, I exist" is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.25) |
| 3160 | The Cogito is a transcendental argument, not a piece of a priori knowledge [Rey on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: The Cogito is a transcendental argument; Descartes doesn't claim that it is a priori that he exists, but that any doubt or denial that he exists would presuppose his existence. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.26) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 3.2.1 |
| 2260 | If I don't think, there is no reason to think that I exist [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: It could be that if I were to cease all thinking I would then utterly cease to exist. …I am therefore precisely nothing but a thinking thing; that is, a mind, or intellect, or understanding, or reason. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.27) |
| 1117 | The Cogito proves subjective experience is basic, but makes false claims about the Self [Russell on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: The Cogito argument proves that subjective experience is the most reliable, but it makes unjustified claims about the certainty of the Self. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.26) by Bertrand Russell - Problems of Philosophy Ch 2 |
| 2873 | Maybe 'I' am not the thinker, but something produced by thought [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: In the past one said 'I' is the condition, 'think' is the predicate and conditioned - thinking is an activity which the subject causes; but maybe the reverse is true - and 'I' is only a synthesis produced by thinking. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.26) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Beyond Good and Evil §54 |
| 3623 | The Cogito only works if you already understand what thought and existence are [Mersenne on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: In order to be certain that you are thinking you must know what thought or thinking is, and what your existence is; but since you do not yet know what these things are, how can you know that you are thinking or that you exist? | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.26) by Marin Mersenne - Objections to 'Meditations' (Sixth) 413 |
| 1369 | It is a precondition of the use of the word 'I' that I exist [Ayer on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: In the Cogito the work is all done by the demonstrative word 'I', because it is a precondition of the use of such a word that the thing to which it points has to exist. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.26) by A.J. Ayer - The Problem of Knowledge Ch 2 (iii) |
| 5360 | The thing which experiences may be momentary, and change with the next experience [Russell on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: It might be that the something which sees a brown colour is quite momentary, and not the same thing which has some different experience the next moment. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.26) by Bertrand Russell - Problems of Philosophy Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: This has become one of the standard objections to the Cogito. Note that Descartes himself was aware of the problem (Idea 1400). Sometimes experiences make no sense if there isn't something connecting them to previous experiences. |
| 2870 | 'I think' assumes I exist, that thinking is known and caused, and that I am doing it [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: The sentence "I think" contains a series of unprovable assertions; for example, it is I who think, that it must be something at all which thinks, that thinking is by an entity thought of as a cause, that an 'I' exists, and that I know what thinking is. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.26) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Beyond Good and Evil §16 |
| 5188 | A thought doesn't imply other thoughts, or enough thoughts to make up a self [Ayer on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: The fact that a thought occurs at a given moment does not entail that any other thought has occurred at any other moment, still less that there has occurred a series of thoughts sufficient to constitute a single self. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.26) by A.J. Ayer - Language,Truth and Logic Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the main objection to the Cogito. It doesn't refute it, but simply recommends cautious restraint in what is being claimed as its conclusion. I can't make much sense of a thought which has no thinker at all. |
| 3624 | That I perform an activity (thinking) doesn't prove what type of thing I am [Hobbes on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: From the fact that I am thinking it follows that I exist, since that which thinks is not nothing. But when he adds 'that is, I am a mind, or intelligence, or intellect', a doubt arises. ..You might as well say 'I am walking, therefore I am a walk'. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.26) by Thomas Hobbes - Objections to 'Meditations' (Third) 172 |
| 3120 | Autistic children seem to use the 'I' concept without seeing themselves as thinkers [Segal on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: It really does not seem (as a result of research into autism) that when one thinks of oneself with one's 'I' concept, one must thereby represent oneself as a thinker. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.26) by Gabriel M.A. Segal - A Slim Book about Narrow Content 4.2 |
| 4526 | The Cogito assumes a priori the existence of substance, when actually it is a grammatical custom [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Descartes' Cogito posits as 'true a priori' our belief in the concept of substance, but the idea that when there is a thought there has to be something 'that thinks' is simply a formulation of our grammatical custom that adds a doer to every deed. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.26) by Friedrich Nietzsche - The Will to Power (notebooks) §484 | |
| A reaction: This anticipates the sort of thing Ayer and the logical positivists said. It is not clear that Descartes does think the mind is a substance, but this pinpoints a possible presupposition in Descartes. |
| 5579 | How can we infer that all thinking involves self-consciousness, just from my own case? [Kant on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: It seems strange that the condition under which I think is to be valid for everything that thinks, and that on an empirical-seeming proposition we can presume to ground a universal judgement, that everything that thinks has self-consciousness. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.26) by Immanuel Kant - Critique of Pure Reason A346 | |
| A reaction: Kant is not bothered by this, and says we know it a priori. If it is indeed an empirical proposition, it becomes an induction with one instance, which is the notorious weakness of the 'argument from analogy' to other minds. The Cogito is not empirical. |
| 5580 | My self is not an inference from 'I think', but a presupposition of it [Kant on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: The simplicity of my self is not inferred from the proposition "I think", but rather the former lies in every thought. 'I am simple' is an immediate apperception, just as the Cogito is tautological, since 'cogito' immediately asserts the reality. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.26) by Immanuel Kant - Critique of Pure Reason A355 | |
| A reaction: This is why Kant thinks the self is the result of a transcendental deduction, rather than of a direct observation of the self-evident. Personally I side with Descartes. I do not 'observe' my self, but I am acutely aware of its presence and actions. |
| 5587 | We cannot give any information a priori about the nature of the 'thing that thinks' [Kant on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: If anyone asks me: What is the constitution of a thing that thinks? I do not know how to answer a priori, because the answer ought to be synthetic (for an analytic answer explains thinking, but gives no cognition of that on which thinking rests). | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.26) by Immanuel Kant - Critique of Pure Reason A398 | |
| A reaction: This has always seemed a problem with Descartes' very thin account of his 'res cogitans', but then what exactly does Kant want to know? Is it a metaphysical disaster if we think of the self as having no more identity than a geometrical point? |
| 5588 | The fact that I am a subject is not enough evidence to show that I am a substantial object [Kant on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: The fact that I am a subject ..does not signify that as object I am a self-subsisting being or substance; the latter goes too far, and hence demands data that are not encountered at all in thinking. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.26) by Immanuel Kant - Critique of Pure Reason B407 | |
| A reaction: This is a key problem with the Cogito - that so little can be said about the 'I' of which the existence has been proved that it is not clear that anything has been proved at all - certainly not that there is a continuous and stable Ego. |
| 13923 | Descartes' claim to know his existence before his essence is misleading or absurd [Descartes, by Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Descartes claimed to know that he existed before he knew what he was - before he grasped his own essence. This is either disingenuous or intended non-literally, if it is not to be dismissed as incomprehensible. | |
| From: report of René Descartes (Meditations [1641], 2) by E.J. Lowe - Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence 2 n32 | |
| A reaction: If something comes at you from the mist, you can know that it exists before you know what it is. How could you understand the essence of something if you hadn't first encountered its existence? Lowe has it the wrong way round. |
| 6930 | Modern self-consciousness is a doubtful abstraction; only senses and feelings are certain [Feuerbach on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: The self-consciousness of modern philosophy is only a being ideated and mediated through abstraction and thus a doubtful being; certain and immediately assured is only that which is an object of the senses, perception and feeling. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], 2) by Ludwig Feuerbach - Principles of Philosophy of the Future §37 | |
| A reaction: This seems to agree with Hume's empirical doubts about the self (Idea 1316). The comment that 'abstraction' is involved in the Cogito argument is interesting. Descartes said the Cogito was a 'simply intuition of the mind' (Idea 3622). |
| 2261 | My perceiving of things may be false, but my seeming to perceive them cannot be false [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: I now see a light, I hear a noise, I feel heat. Perhaps these things are false, since I am asleep. Yet I certainly do seem to see, hear, and feel warmth. This cannot be false. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.29) |
| 2257 | I myself could be the author of all these self-delusions [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: I myself could be the author of all these self-delusions. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.24) |
| 2279 | A triangle has a separate non-invented nature, shown by my ability to prove facts about it [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: A triangle has a determinate nature, which I did not fabricate, and which does not depend on my mind. This is evident from the fact that various properties can be demonstrated regarding it, such as that its three angles are equal to two right angles. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §5.64) |
| 6490 | For Descartes, objects have one primary quality, which is geometrical [Descartes, by Robinson,H] |
| Full Idea: Descartes denies any similarity between the physical world and ideas, as matter possesses only geometrical properties; Locke allows more primary qualities, but follows Boyle and the atomists in treating secondary qualities as creations of sense. | |
| From: report of René Descartes (Meditations [1641]) by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.5 | |
| A reaction: The interesting point to note here is that Descartes' geometrical view of objects (they are defined purely by 'extension') is the view that they have one minimal primary quality. I prefer Locke's view, of which the history (given here) is interesting. |
| 2295 | Why does pain make us sad? [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Why should a certain sadness of spirit arise from a sensation of pain? | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §6.76) |
| 3627 | Dogs can make the same judgements as us about variable things [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: A dog certainly makes similar kinds of judgement to your perceiving men by their hats and cloaks when they see their master's hat or clothes, …and they can recognise their master even if he is standing, sitting, lying down, or crouching. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.32) by Pierre Gassendi - Objections to 'Meditations' (Fifth) 272 |
| 2265 | We perceive objects by intellect, not by senses or imagination [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Bodies are not, properly speaking, perceived by the senses or by the faculty of imagination, but by the intellect alone. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.34) |
| 2263 | The wax is not perceived by the senses, but by the mind alone [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: The perception of the wax is neither a seeing, nor a touching, nor an imagining. Rather, it is an inspection on the part of the mind alone. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.31) |
| 2264 | We don't 'see' men in heavy clothes, we judge them to be men [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Were I to look out of my window and observe men crossing the square, I would ordinarily say that I see the men themselves. But what do I see but hats and clothes, which could conceal automata? Yet I judge them to be men. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.32) |
| 2247 | To achieve good science we must rebuild from the foundations [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Once in my life I had to raze everything to the ground and begin again from the original foundations, if I wanted to establish anything firm and lasting in the sciences. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §1.17) | |
| A reaction: This sentence is the beginning of the Enlightenment. The project of proving absolutely everything, and in a foundational way, is now met with much scepticism. I will never abandon the project! |
| 2255 | Only one certainty is needed for progress (like a lever's fulcrum) [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Archimedes sought but one firm and immovable point in order to move the entire earth. Just so, great things are to be hoped for if I succeed in finding just one thing, however slight, that is certain and unshaken. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.24) | |
| A reaction: The classic foundationalist difficulty is that you may find something totally certain, but is it a fulcrum? Or is it just minimal, boring and useless? |
| 2251 | Even if my body and objects are imaginary, there may be simpler things which are true [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Perhaps even though general things like eyes could be imaginary, still one must admit that certain other things that are even more simple and universal are true. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §1.20) |
| 6347 | Descartes can't begin again, because sceptics doubt cognitive processes as well as beliefs [Pollock/Cruz on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Descartes' strategy of starting over will not work, because the skeptic is not just questioning our beliefs, he is also questioning the cognitive processes by which we arrive at our beliefs, and if we start all over again we use the same processes. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §1) by J Pollock / J Cruz - Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) | |
| A reaction: Scepticism comes in degrees, so there is not one strategy employed by sceptics. It is certainly true, though, that nothing can resist extreme scepticism. The most extreme view is to refuse to accept the meaningfulness of all belief language. |
| 2296 | If pain is felt in a lost limb, I cannot be certain that a felt pain exists in my real limbs [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: I have heard it said by people whose arm or leg has been amputated that they still sensed pain in the lost limb. Thus it does not seem certain that one of my bodily members causes me pain, even though I sense pain in it. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §6.77) |
| 3620 | We correct sense errors with other senses, not intellect [Mersenne on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Owing to refraction a stick which is in fact straight appears bent in water. What corrects the error? The intellect? Not at all; it is the sense of touch. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §1.18) by Marin Mersenne - Objections to 'Meditations' (Sixth) 418 |
| 3619 | The senses can only report, so perception errors are in the judgment [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Although there is deception or falsity, it is not to be found in the senses; for the sense are quite passive and report only appearances, which must appear the way they do owing to their causes. The error or falsity is in the judgement or the mind. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §1.18) by Pierre Gassendi - Objections to 'Meditations' (Fifth) 332 |
| 2249 | It is prudent never to trust your senses if they have deceived you even once [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: The senses are sometimes deceptive, and it is a mark of prudence never to place our complete trust in those who have deceived us even once. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §1.18) |
| 2253 | God may have created nothing, but made his creation appear to me as it does now [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: How do I know that God did not bring it about that there is no earth or heavens, no extension, shape, size or place, and yet that all these things appear to me precisely as they do now? | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §1.21) |
| 2254 | To achieve full scepticism, I imagine a devil who deceives me about the external world and my own body and senses [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: I will suppose an evil genius, supremely powerful and clever, who has directed his entire effort at deceiving me. I will regard all external things as devilish hoaxes, and myself as not possessed of a body or senses, but falsely believing these things. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §1.22) |
| 2305 | Waking actions are joined by memory to all our other actions, unlike actions of which we dream [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Dreams are never joined by the memory with all the actions of life, as is the case with those actions that occur when one is awake. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §6.89) |
| 2294 | I can only sense an object if it is present, and can't fail to sense it when it is [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Perceptions come upon me without my consent, to the extent that, wish as I may, I could not sense any object unless it was present to a sense organ, nor could I fail to sense it when it was present. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §6.75) |
| 22522 | To grasp something, trace it back to its natural origins [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If we see how things grow naturally from the start, we would in this way, as in other cases, get the best theoretical grasp of them. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252a24) | |
| A reaction: Observing the natural origins of a tulip doesn't help much (without microbiology), but he is discussing the nature of cities, and his suggestion seems good. |
| 22524 | The nature of each thing is its mature state [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What each thing is when its coming to be has been complete, this we say is the nature of each - for example, of a human, or of a horse, or of a household. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252b32) | |
| A reaction: This works better for animate than for inanimate things. Aristotle is much clearer when we talk of the 'nature' of each thing, rather than its 'essence', because the latter has been blurred. I like 'essential nature'. |
| 4862 | Can the pineal gland be moved more slowly or quickly by the mind than by animal spirits? [Spinoza on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: I am in ignorance whether the pineal gland can be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the animal spirits. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §6.82) by Baruch de Spinoza - The Ethics V Pref | |
| A reaction: Is this the earliest statement of the problem of double causation? It is a classic difficulty for dualists, highlighted by Ryle, among others. Avoidance of double causation is a classic reason for moving to monism about mind. |
| 3850 | We discovers others as well as ourselves in the Cogito [Sartre on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: It is not only oneself that one discovers in the Cogito, but those of others too. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2) by Jean-Paul Sartre - Existentialism and Humanism p.45 | |
| A reaction: The analytical tradition requires a bit more than an instant perception of others in oneself. The problem of 'other minds' must at least be mentioned. However, the way to get to know a universal is to fully study a single instance. |
| 2302 | Faculties of the mind aren't parts, as one mind uses them [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: The faculties of willing, sensing, understanding and so on cannot be called "parts" of the mind, since it is one and the same mind that wills, senses and understands. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §6.86) | |
| A reaction: It is best here to say that Descartes has confused the 'mind' with the 'person'. These faculties make (I think) no sense without a person to perform them, but the 'mind' surely includes these conscious activities, and many fringe events as well. |
| 3151 | Descartes put thought at the centre of the mind problem, but we put sensation [Rey on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Descartes confined his dualism to problems of reason and language. Sensation and even imagination seemed to him physically unproblematic. Nowadays it is the reverse: thinking seems easy - but feeling? | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], 2) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 2 n16 | |
| A reaction: Thinking only 'seems easy' if it can be done without consciousness, and that is beginning to look like a dubious assumption. The most interesting and promising area is the borderline between a chess-playing machine and a human chess player. |
| 21800 | Descartes mentions many cognitive faculties, but reduces them to will and intellect [Descartes, by Schmid] |
| Full Idea: Although Descartes accepted a variety of cognitive faculties like the intellect, will, power of judgement, imagination, memory, and perception, he took them all to be ultimately reducible to different operations of the will and intellect. | |
| From: report of René Descartes (Meditations [1641], 4) by Stephan Schmid - Faculties in Early Modern Philosophy 2 | |
| A reaction: In Med 4, it is most clear, when he reduces 'judgement' to will and intellect, which enable his to assent to an idea. Nietzsche saw Descartes' view as simplistic. |
| 1399 | Imagination and sensation are non-essential to mind [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: This power of imagination which is in me, in so far as it differs from the power of conceiving, is in no way necessary to my nature or essence. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §6.73) | |
| A reaction: This is my candidate for the biggest blunder ever made by a great philosopher. But it was thanks to his mistake that I began to realise how totally central imagination is to the very act of thinking. Thank you, René. |
| 1400 | Some cause must unite the separate temporal sections of a person [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Because the entire span of one's life can be divided into countless parts, each one wholly independent of the rest, it does not follow from the fact that I existed a short time ago that I exist now, unless some cause creates and preserves me each moment. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §3.49) | |
| A reaction: How could I 'prove' that this computer is the same computer as it was five minutes ago, even after I have accepted the straightforward existence of the computer? This is the Enlightenment Project, the mad desire to prove absolutely everything. |
| 22528 | The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Whatever is composed of a number of things, and becomes one communal thing, a ruler and a ruled are always seen, and this is present in animate things on the basis of their entire nature. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1254a28) | |
| A reaction: I'm assuming he is referring to animals, rather than plants. I'm not sure if this is a universal truth (e.g. in the case of slime moulds), but it is how I see human beings. The organism could not possibly function (esp. navigate) without central control. |
| 1401 | Since I only observe myself to be thinking, I conclude that that is my essence [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Since I do not observe that any other thing belongs necessarily to my nature or essence except that I am a thinking thing, I rightly conclude that my essence consists in this alone, that I am a thinking thing, or substance whose essence is thinking. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §6.78) | |
| A reaction: This actually appears to be my favourite confusion - of episemology with ontology. Compare 'whenever I see him he is smiling, so he must be happy'. Personally I am happy to say that my essence is thinking, as long as it needn't be conscious. |
| 2299 | I can exist without imagination and sensing, but they can't exist without me [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: I can understand myself without the faculties of imagining and sensing, but not vice versa; I cannot understand them without me - a substance endowed with understanding. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §6.78) | |
| A reaction: I think this is a fundamental and important error on Descartes' part. The idea that understanding is possible without imagination (and even sensation) is wrong, and it leads to the misleading concept of 'pure' reason. |
| 6907 | For Descartes a person's essence is the mind because objects are perceived by mind, not senses [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
| Full Idea: For Descartes the essence of corporeal things is not an object of the senses, but only of the mind; and hence it is not the senses but the mind that is the essence of the perceiving subject, that is, of man. | |
| From: report of René Descartes (Meditations [1641], 2) by Ludwig Feuerbach - Principles of Philosophy of the Future §17 | |
| A reaction: This, of course, is why Descartes' approach can lead to idealism and solipsism, whereas the other approach leads to empiricism and animalism (Idea 6669). |
| 2283 | Our 'will' just consists of the feeling that when we are motivated to do something, there are no external pressures [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: The will consists solely in the fact that when something is proposed to us by our intellect either to affirm or deny, we are moved in such a way that we sense we are determined to it by no external force. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §4.57) |
| 2282 | My capacity to make choices with my free will extends as far as any faculty ever could [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: I experience that the will or free choice I have received from God is limited by no boundaries whatever, …indeed it is so great in me that I cannot grasp the idea of any greater faculty. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §4.56) |
| 2276 | The mind is a non-extended thing which thinks [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: My concept of the human mind is a thinking thing, not extended in length, breadth or depth, and having nothing else from the body. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §4.53) | |
| A reaction: But he admits (in Med 6) that the mind is so closely integrated with the body that they seem inseparable. Perhaps he shouldn't trust his own concept of the thing, because he is too close to the subject matter. You can't count a crowd if you are in it. |
| 2298 | Mind is not extended, unlike the body [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Since I am clearly a thinking thing and not an extended thing, and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of a body, as merely an extended thing and not a thinking thing, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §6.78) | |
| A reaction: How can he be 'certain' for this reason? This is a classic confusion of ontology and epistemology. Given that the mind is a special case, he should be asking WHY his thinking is clear to him, but his body isn't. Maybe it is because of his viewpoint. |
| 3423 | Descartes is a substance AND property dualist [Descartes, by Kim] |
| Full Idea: Descartes' dualism combines substance dualism and property dualism; two disparate domains of substances, and two mutually exclusive families of properties. | |
| From: report of René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §6.78) by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.211 | |
| A reaction: I would have thought that substance dualism entailed property dualism. How would you distinguish two substances from one another except by their properties? There seems a merely logical possibility that God gives two substances the same properties. |
| 2303 | The mind is utterly indivisible [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: There is a great difference between a mind and a body, in that a body, by its very nature, is always divisible, but the mind is utterly indivisible. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §6.85) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as being simply false. I don't just mean that surgeons can split the mind in half. We should think of the mind as a team of conscious and non-conscious processes, which are held together by a self in normal healthy people. Selves change. |
| 6153 | Interaction between mental and physical seems to violate the principle of conservation of energy [Rowlands on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: It is often argued that any interaction between the physical and the mental - as defined by Descartes - would require a violation of the first law of thermodynamics, the principle of conservation of energy. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641]) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: This would be because consciousness is adding energy to the system (in order to generate movement) without it having come from anywhere else in the physical system. A good objection, which only a miracle could overcome. |
| 3625 | The 'thinking thing' may be the physical basis of the mind [Hobbes on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: It may be that the thing that thinks is the subject to which mind, reason or intellect belong; and this subject may thus be something corporeal. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.27) by Thomas Hobbes - Objections to 'Meditations' (Third) 173 | |
| A reaction: Of course, Descartes goes on to reject this view. Presumably he is suggesting that mind etc. might be properties of something corporeal, rather than being identical with it. Descartes was well aware of materialism in Hobbes and Gassendi. |
| 2552 | Knowing different aspects of brain/mind doesn't make them different [Rorty on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Why should an epistemic distinction reflect an ontological distinction? Why should our epistemic privilege of being incorrigible about how things seem to us reflect a distinction between two realms of being? | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §6.78) by Richard Rorty - Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 1.2 | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as being one of the most important ideas in philosophy, mainly as a corrective to a lot of bad philosophy, rather than as wisdom offered to non-philosophers (for whom Rorty's thought is probably common sense. How is it? How do we know? |
| 4305 | Descartes gives no clear criterion for individuating mental substances [Cottingham on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Descartes gives no clear criterion for individuating mental substances. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §6.78) by John Cottingham - The Rationalists p.86 | |
| A reaction: Presumably I can individuate my own mind by the 'natural light' of reason, and the implications of the Cogito. The minds of others do seem to be a problem. Why should they coincide with bodies, and not overlap or blend or swap? |
| 4861 | Does Descartes have a clear conception of how mind unites with body? [Spinoza on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: What does Descartes understand by the union of the mind and the body? What clear and distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union with a certain particle of extended matter? | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §6.82) by Baruch de Spinoza - The Ethics V Pref | |
| A reaction: This is the classic, original and strongest objection to Cartesian dualism - that mind and body are held to be too different to interact. Spinoza may have overreacted a bit when he saw the only solution as the total identity of the two things. |
| 6540 | Even Descartes may concede that mental supervenes on neuroanatomical [Lycan on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Even Descartes may have conceded that the mental supervenes on the neuroanatomical. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], 6) by William Lycan - Consciousness 5.2 | |
| A reaction: This is true (early in Meditation Six) despite his later suggestion of the pineal gland as the linking point. It proves nothing, but I have heard John Cottingham suggest that Descartes might well be a materialist if he came back today. |
| 7733 | Superman's strength is indubitable, Clark Kent's is doubtful, so they are not the same? [Maslin on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Descartes's claim that mind and body are separate because the first is necessary when thinking and the second isn't, is like arguing 'Superman's strength is indubitable; Clark Kent's strength is widely doubted; so Clark Kent is not Superman'. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], p.156) by Keith T. Maslin - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind 2.7.1 | |
| A reaction: I've heard people defend Descartes on this, and Kripke is interesting on the subject, but Descartes had better not be following this pattern of argument, or else a great philosopher would really be presenting an absurdity. |
| 5686 | In some thoughts I grasp a subject, but also I will or fear or affirm or deny it [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Other thoughts are different from ideas, as when I will, or fear, or affirm, or deny, there is always some thing that I grasp as the subject of my thought, yet I embrace in my thought something more than the likeness of that thing. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §3.37) | |
| A reaction: Note that the class of mental events we call 'propositional attitudes' had already been identified by Descartes. His categories of thinking in Med. Three might be one of his most important contributions, because that is what matters in the mind. |
| 4017 | Descartes created the modern view of rationality, as an internal feature instead of an external vision [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: Rationality is now an internal property of subjective thinking, rather than its consisting in (according to Plato) its vision of reality. This view of Descartes' has become the standard modern view. | |
| From: report of René Descartes (Meditations [1641]) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §8 | |
| A reaction: Greek 'logos' actually seemed to be both internal and external. We have certainly lost the idea that the universe is rational, even though it is ordered. |
| 2284 | I make errors because my will extends beyond my understanding [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: My errors are owing simply to the fact that, since the will extends further than the intellect, I do not contain the will within the same boundaries, but extend it to things I do not understand. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §4.58) |
| 5685 | True ideas are images, such as of a man, a chimera, or God [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Some of my thoughts are like images of things; to these alone does the word 'idea' properly apply, as when I think of a man, or a chimera, or the sky, or an angel, or God. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §3.37) | |
| A reaction: Descartes is obviously aware of a problem with the application of the word 'idea'. This definition seems rather narrow (and visual), but it is certainly confined to concepts, and does not expand to include propositions. |
| 3629 | All ideas are adventitious, and come from the senses [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: I would go further than you and note that all our ideas seem to be adventitious - to proceed from things which exist outside the mind and come under one of our senses. ..The idea of a giant is a man of ordinary size which the mind enlarges at will. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §3.38) by Pierre Gassendi - Objections to 'Meditations' (Fifth) 280 | |
| A reaction: A classic early statement of modern empiricism. Gassendi needed to think about logic, maths, and necessities to make his case more secure. Where did his idea to 'enlarge' the giant come from? |
| 2273 | The ideas of God and of my self are innate in me [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: The idea of God is innate in me, just as the idea of myself is innate in me. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §3.51) |
| 2285 | I can think of innumerable shapes I have never experienced [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: I can think of countless geometrical figures, concerning which there can be no suspicion of their ever having entered me through the senses. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §5.64) |
| 2286 | The idea of a supremely perfect being is within me, like the basic concepts of mathematics [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: The idea of God, that is, the idea of a supremely perfect being, is one discovered to be no less within me than the idea of any figure or number. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §5.65) |
| 22570 | Rhetoric now enables good speakers to become popular leaders [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Now, with the development of rhetoric, those who are able public speakers become popular leaders. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1305a12) | |
| A reaction: Demosthenes was an exact contemporary of Aristotle. Nowadays we are conscious of the 'dumbing down' by popular speakers, which is not the same as rhetoric. |
| 22574 | A community can lack self-control [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If lack of self-control exists at the level of a single individual, it also exists at the level of a city. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1310a17) | |
| A reaction: A nice extension of the problem of akrasia. Was Britain declaring war in 1914 an act of akrasia? With hindsight it looks that way. Strong emotions about Belgium overcame sensible concern for the young men of Britain. |
| 2837 | Nothing contrary to nature is beautiful [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Nothing that is contrary to nature is fine. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1325b09) | |
| A reaction: This seems a rather conservative view, since it rules out submarines, mountaineering and heart transplants.. It depends what we count as 'natural'. |
| 2824 | The collective judgement of many people on art is better than that of an individual [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The many are the best judges of poetry and music; some judge some parts, some judge others, but their collective judgement is a verdict on all the parts. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1281b08) | |
| A reaction: No one seems to believe this in modern times, but it was a lot easier to spot good art before the invention of the camera, and Duchamp's wretched Fountain. |
| 2846 | Music can mould the character to be virtuous (just as gymnastics trains the body) [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We must regard music as a stimulus to virtue, capable of making a certain kind of character (just as gymnastic training produces a body of a certain type). | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1339a20) | |
| A reaction: He makes a sustained claim for this, but without explicit justification. I am totally convinced that the music of Bach improves us, but I have no idea why. |
| 2807 | Some say slavery is unnatural and created by convention, and is therefore forced, and unjust [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Some say the distinction between slave and free is one of convention only, and in nature there is no difference, so that this form of rule is based on force and is therefore not just. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253b20) | |
| A reaction: Note that Aristotle gives good expression to the main view opposed to his own. History has clearly proved Aristotle wrong, and the present idea to be correct. Ditto the subjugation of women. |
| 22582 | Spirit [thumos] is the capacity by which we love [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Spirit [thumos] is what produces friendliness [philetikon], since it is the capacity of the soul by which we love [philoumen]. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1327b39) | |
| A reaction: This is the same 'spirit' which Plato adds to reason and emotion for this three-part soul. There it seems more to denote fighting ability. Aristotle says it produces both fierceness and love. 'For the man de sword, for the woman de kiss'. |
| 2810 | Selfishness is wrong not because it is self-love, but because it is excessive [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Selfishness is condemned, and justly, but selfishness is not simply to be fond of oneself, but to be excessively fond. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263b03) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle is one of the main defendents of the idea that self-concern is an important part of morality. Stay fit! Improve your character! The mean between self-hatred and narcissism. |
| 22555 | The function of good men is to confer benefits [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Conferring benefits is just what it is the function of good men to do. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1286b10) | |
| A reaction: Kant cannot ignore consequences (when assessing the maxim), and the great virtue theorist can't ignore them when judging virtuous behaviour. |
| 2841 | People become good because of nature, habit and reason [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Men become sound and good because of three things: these are nature, habit and reason. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1332a38) | |
| A reaction: 'Habit' is the distinctively Aristotelian idea, but the most attractive part of his account is that habit and reason should combine. |
| 22557 | Virtuous people are like the citizens of the best city [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The virtue of a man must be identical to that of a citizen of the best city. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1288a38) | |
| A reaction: Earlier he separated virtuous people from the best citizens, but here he reverses it. The interesting part is the role of the city in moulding the virtuous person. |
| 2829 | The law is the mean [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The law is the mean. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1287b04) | |
| A reaction: He probably intends to say that the law should be the mean. Since virtue is always the mean (i.e. what is appropriate), then it is almost tautological (for him) that the law is the mean. |
| 22590 | Virtue is concerned with correct feelings [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Virtue is concerned with enjoying, loving, and hating in the correct way. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1340a14) | |
| A reaction: The context is a defence of music as a training of right feelings. |
| 2813 | It is quite possible to live a moderate life and yet be miserable [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is quite possible to live a moderate life and yet be miserable. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1265a32) | |
| A reaction: That's a relief. Presumably this would achieve the correct mean in terms of indulgence, but all ruined by excesses in other areas. |
| 22553 | Justice is a virtue of communities [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Justice is a virtue relating to communities. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1283a38) | |
| A reaction: Interesting, given that we can also think of justice as between two individuals - in a contract, for example. Betrayal is an injustice. But for Aristotle the focus is on the constitution. |
| 22561 | The rich are seen as noble, because they don't need to commit crimes [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The rich seem to possess already the things for the sake of which unjust people do injustice, which is why the rich are called both noble and good and notable. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1293b38) | |
| A reaction: This doesn't seem (at least in popular lore) to apply to those who acquired their wealth by unjust means, because by then injustice has become a habit. |
| 2808 | Master and slave can have friendship through common interests [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There is an interest in common and a feeling of friendship between master and slave, wherever they are fitted for this relationship. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1255b12) | |
| A reaction: Very striking. His view that there are natural slaves, who are incapable of the good life, seems to count against this, but I suspect that he is forced to confront the facts in his own city. |
| 2803 | Man is by nature a political animal [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Man is by nature a political animal. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a01) | |
| A reaction: It might be clearer if we said 'social animal'. We are certainly gregarious. Anyone who fails to be social is dismissed by Aristotle as not truly human. |
| 2820 | People want to live together, even when they don't want mutual help [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Men have a desire for live together, even when they have no need to seek each other's help. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1278b20) | |
| A reaction: He says that someone who doesn't want to live in community because they are wholly self-sufficient doesn't count as a normal human. |
| 22586 | Only humans have reason [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The human being alone has reason. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1332b04) | |
| A reaction: Only in the last fifty years have we begun to grasp how clever larger animals are, and I would say that they consistently make rational choices, even if they can't articulate them. |
| 22523 | The community (of villages) becomes a city when it is totally self-sufficient [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The community, coming from several villages, when it is complete, is the city, once it has already reached (one might almost say) the limit of total self-sufficiency. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252b27) | |
| A reaction: I suppose a group of villages might be self-sufficient, provided water supply and defences were secure. In a city it is all within easy reach. Each village can't have a full set of specialists. |
| 2805 | A community must share a common view of good and justice [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is sharing a common view in good and evil, justice and injustice, that makes a household and a state. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a17) | |
| A reaction: This idea comes up against the modern idea of pluralism (e.g. in Isaiah Berlin), which is inevitable in huge states with a lot of migration. |
| 22526 | People who are anti-social or wholly self-sufficient are no part of a city [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Anyone who cannot live in a community with others, or who does not need to because of his self-sufficiency, is no part of a city, so that he is either a wild beast or a god. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a27) | |
| A reaction: Civil people should try hard to accommodate those who are anti-social. I'm not convinced that there is anyone who is wholly self-sufficient. |
| 22535 | Friendship is the best good for cities, because it reduces factions [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We think friendship is the greatest good for cities, since this way people are least likely to engage in faction. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1262b07) | |
| A reaction: Earlier philosophers were deeply worried about 'faction', but we now accept the gangs of secretive hoodlums called political parties. I suspect the old view was right, but it's a bit late now. You can't engineer friendships (can you?). |
| 22532 | A city can't become entirely one, because its very nature is to be a multitude [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Socrates adopts the hypothesis that it is best for a city to be as far as possible entirely one. …But it is evident that the more a city becomes one the less of a city it will be. For a city is in its nature a sort of multitude. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1261a14) | |
| A reaction: [He is referring to Plato's Republic] He says if a city wholly unifies it becomes like a household, and then a human being, rather than a city. A very interesting commitment to diversity in a city, based on its essential nature. Athens was very diverse. |
| 22584 | A community should all share to some extent in something like land or food [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Communities should have some one thing that is common and the same for all the members, whether they share in it equally or unequally - for example, food, a quantity of territory, or something else of this sort. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1328a27) | |
| A reaction: In modern societies vast numbers of people own no land at all, and common land has dwindled. Maybe it is roads, buses and trains? |
| 22581 | The size of a city is decided by the maximum self-sufficient community that can be surveyed [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The best defining mark of a city is the greatest excess of multitude with a view to self-sufficiency in living that can easily be surveyed as a whole. Let the size of the city, then, be determined in this way. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1326b23) | |
| A reaction: Modern states have presumably far exceeded to self-sufficiency test. The requirement to be 'surveyed' presumably implies that the state can be controlled. Modern technology means almost no limit to such a size. |
| 22548 | A city aims at living well [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The end of the city is living well. …It is for the sake of noble actions, not for the sake of living together. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1280b38) | |
| A reaction: So the aim is not glory, conquest, colonisation, great buildings or other works. It is all of the citizens living well in their own way. This is the liberal ideal, from a long time ago. Spinoza is in tune with this. Fulfilling capabilities? |
| 2431 | Every state is an association formed for some good purpose [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Observation tells us that every state is an association; and that every state is formed with a view to some good purpose. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252a01) | |
| A reaction: Not so much a historical speculation, I think, as an assertion that it should be obvious what binds a state together, and hence has allowed it to endure. |
| 22578 | The happiest city is the one that acts most nobly [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The happy city is the one that is best and acts nobly. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323b29) | |
| A reaction: He applies almost identical criteria to the eudaimon individual and the eudaimon city. It is not the possession of virtuous qualities but the performing of fine deeds which matters. I want to be proud of what my country does. |
| 22577 | What is the best life for everyone, and is that a communal or an individual problem? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There should first be agreement about what the most choiceworthy life is for (one might almost say) everyone, and then determine whether it is the same or distinct for all communally as for each separately. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323a19) | |
| A reaction: Presumably 'almost' because slaves don't make the cut. But the inclusiveness is hugely important, and I take his second question to be the debate between communitarians and liberals. Communists and libertarians might get a look in. |
| 22579 | The same four cardinal virtues which apply to individuals also apply to a city [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The courage, justice, practical wisdom, and temperance of a city have the same capacity and form [morphé] as those in which each human being who is said to be courageous, just, practically-wise, and temperate would share. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323b33) | |
| A reaction: These are the four traditional Cardinal Virtues of ancient Greek culture. Aristotle defers to them, even though his account of the virtues is much broader. |
| 2832 | The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1295b25) | |
| A reaction: He knows that this cannot be fully achieved. It gets worrying when misfits are pressured into conformity. This sounds like Aristotle's less liberal side - though he accepts diversity. |
| 2821 | The six constitutions are monarchy/tyranny, aristocracy/oligarchy, and polity/democracy [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The names for right constitutions (with their deviations) are monarchy (tyranny), aristocracy (oligarchy), and polity (democracy). | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1279b04) | |
| A reaction: I found it hard to pin down the meaning of 'polity', even though he makes it sound like the best constitution. Something like 'teamwork'. |
| 22546 | A city is a community of free people, and the constitution should aim at the common advantage [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Those constitutions that aim at the common advantage are correct, whereas those that aim only at the advantage of the rulers are erroneous ones. For they are like the rule of a master, whereas a city is a community of free people. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1279a17) | |
| A reaction: He is very keen on the full equality of all citizens (even if his concept of a citizen is narrow). This must be connected to his eudaimonist account of ethics. Everyone must flourish. I'm struck by his liberal values. |
| 22558 | Constitutions specify distribution of offices, the authorities, and the community's aim [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A constitution is the way that cities order their offices, how they are distributed, what element is in control in the constitution, and what the end of each community is. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1289a15) | |
| A reaction: Liberal constitutions tend to avoid stating what the end of the city is, because that is for the free citizens to decide. Nothing is said, it seems, about the territory or the population. |
| 22566 | The greed of the rich is more destructive than the greed of the people [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What the rich do to get more does more to destroy the constitution than what the people do. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1297a10) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this is because the wealthy have more power. In our society they have more control over the media and public opinions. The law should maintain the constitution, and the poor have no influence on the law. |
| 2973 | We must decide the most desirable human life before designing a constitution [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If we wish to investigate the best constitution appropriately, we must first decide what is the most desirable life. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323a14) | |
| A reaction: He takes this for granted, and it sounds right, but it is firmly contradicted by modern liberals (e.g. Rawls), who say the good life is for individuals to decide. |
| 2835 | Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1319b35) | |
| A reaction: An important issue for Aristotle, which we no longer seem to worry about. A constitution should aim, when it is created, to be acceptable enough to be durable. |
| 22580 | The best constitution enables everyone to live the best life [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is evident that the best constitution is necessarily that order in accord with which anyone might be able to do best and live blessedly. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1324a23) | |
| A reaction: So what would Aristotle make of the modern welfare state, or the idea of a safety net for those who struggle? Should the state help the best life, and not just facilitate it? Education, infrastructure, health, communal activity…. |
| 2818 | The virtues of a good citizen are relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The virtue of the citizen must be in relation to the constitution; and as there are many constitutions, there cannot be just one single and perfect virtue of the sound citizen. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1276b28) | |
| A reaction: This is very striking support for the view that Aristotle's account of the virtues in 'Ethics' is merely a description of conventions (Athenian, presumably), rather than an appeal to nature. However, see his account of the soul, and human function. |
| 22545 | A person can be an excellent citizen without being an excellent man [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is possible for someone to be an excellent citizen without having acquired the virtue in accord with which someone is an excellent man. …[1278b02] In one sort of city the good man and the excellent citizen are the same. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1276b33) | |
| A reaction: Thus confutes my simple summary of Aristotelian ethics as 'be a good citizen!'. He thinks leaders of communities must be excellent men. You can fulfil a role in the city (soldier, doctor, cleaner) without all-round excellence (see 1276b39). |
| 22563 | The middle classes are neither ambitious nor anarchic, which is good [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Those in the middle [in wealth] are least inclined either to avoid rule or to be eager to rule, both of which things are harmful to cities. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1295b12) | |
| A reaction: How nice to hear something good about the poor old middle classes - the hated bourgeoisie of the marxists, looked down on by the snobbish elite. They avoid the black market, and bribery for offices. |
| 22544 | A citizen is someone who is allowed to hold official posts in a city [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Whoever is authorised to share in deliberative or judicial office …is a citizen of the relevant city. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1275b18) | |
| A reaction: Interesting, and perhaps a bit surprising for us. We tend to assume that in a democracy the citizens are those allowed to vote, but he says what matters is being allowed to hold an office. Log cabin to White House. He's right. |
| 22541 | Kings should be selected according to character [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is surely better to choose each new king not as now but rather in accord with his own life. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1271a20) | |
| A reaction: When the British monarch was very powerful, the hereditary system was fairly disastrous. I get a thrill when a highly esteemed citizen is voted president of a country, such as Vaclav Havel in Czechia. British monarchs could be elected. |
| 2819 | The only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1277b27) | |
| A reaction: If a person with wide social powers is to have practical wisdom, that will require extensive knowledge, in a way that local practical wisdom does not. |
| 22542 | People who buy public office will probably expect to profit from it [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is reasonable to expect that those who have bought office, that is, when they rule by having spent money, will become habituated to making a profit from it. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1273b01) | |
| A reaction: Probably true, though money-grubbers are even happier if they can achieve office without expenditure. |
| 22552 | The rich can claim to rule, because of land ownership, and being more trustworthy [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The rich have a claim because they own a larger share of the land, and the land is something communal, and furthermore because they are for the most part more trustworthy when it comes to treaties. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1283a32) | |
| A reaction: It seems right that the rich give a stability and hence reliability to a society, which the more mobile poor cannot offer. But it is a minor point. |
| 22583 | The guardians should not be harsh to strangers, as no one should behave like that [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is not correct to claim that guardians are to be harsh to those they do not know, since one should not treat anyone in this way. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1328a07) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a criticism of Plato. Aristotle thinks people should be nice to one another! The ancient tradition of hospitality to strangers. |
| 22543 | In large communities it is better if more people participate in the offices [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Where the city is not small, it is more political and more democratic, if more people participate in the offices. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1273b11) | |
| A reaction: Not sure what 'more political' means. This is not to avoid corruption, but because it is best to have specialists in everything. All of the state functions should be of the highest standard. |
| 22539 | Election of officials by the elected is dangerous, because factions can control it [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Where the election of officials is concerned, electing from the elected is dangerous. For if some are willing to combine, even if they are a relatively small number, the election will always turn out according to their wish. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1266a25) | |
| A reaction: The British Prime Minister is elected by the elected members of parliament of the majority party. (Boris Johnson is the current PM…). This idea reflects the great concern that earlier thinkers had about factions in politics. |
| 22572 | Officers should like the constitution, be capable, and have appropriate virtues and justice [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Those holding the controlling offices should possess friendship towards the constitution, great capacity for that office, and the virtue and justice required by that constitution. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1309a33) | |
| A reaction: We need to remember that all officers in our democracy need to be fully committed to that system of government (which does not always seem to me to be the case). |
| 2826 | Like water, large numbers of people are harder to corrupt than a few [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: As a larger amount of water is less easily polluted, so the multitude is less easily corrupted than the few. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1286a30) | |
| A reaction: This was before the arrival of modern mass media, starting with tabloid newspapers. When many people are corrupted, it is much harder for society to recover its sanity. |
| 22567 | Democracy arises when people who are given equal freedom assume unconditional equality [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Democracy arose from those who are equal in some respect thinking themselves to be unconditionally equal, since, because they are equally free, they think they are unconditionally equal. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1301a28) | |
| A reaction: An interesting speculation. In Britain the origins of democracy seem tied to the granting of religious equality and freedom. |
| 22560 | Popular leaders only arise in democracies that are not in accord with the law [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In cities under democracies that are in accord with law, popular leaders do not arise, but rather it is the best citizens who take the front seats. Where the laws are not in control, however, there popular leaders arise. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1292a07) | |
| A reaction: This remark is, unfortunately, highly relevant to western politics in 2020. He says that flatterers rise to the top in these regimes. |
| 22562 | Choosing officials by lot is democratic [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It seems to be democratic for officials to be chosen by lot. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1294b07) | |
| A reaction: This idea has dropped out of modern politics, but is not ridiculous if the official is offered thorough civil service support. Presumably the term of office is fairly short. |
| 2823 | The many may add up to something good, even if they are inferior as individuals [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is possible that the many, not one of whom taken singly is a sound man, may yet, taken all together, be better than the few, not individually but collectively. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1281b01) | |
| A reaction: They may also crush everything that is good, if the many are gripped by absurd ideas (which they often are). Computer programmers are a good advert for this idea. |
| 22533 | If the people are equal in nature, then they should all share in ruling [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Where it is not possible for the same people always to rule, because all are in nature equal, it is also just for all to share in ruling. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1261a38) | |
| A reaction: This derives from his principle that the naturally superior should always rule the naturally inferior - though it sometimes looks as if ruling is the distinguishing mark of who is 'superior'. Democracy needs to equalise its citizens, where possible. |
| 2817 | It is wrong that a worthy officer of state should seek the office [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is all wrong that a person who is going to be deemed worthy of an office should solicit it. …One worthy of the office should hold it whether he wishes to or does not wish to. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1271a10) | |
| A reaction: I love this idea, and think it should be immediately implemented in the modern world, at every level of society. All leaders should be pushed to the front. The ambitious should be pulled to the back. |
| 22576 | No office is permanent in a democracy [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is democratic to have no office be permanent. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1317b42) | |
| A reaction: Modern exceptions seem to be judges and civil servants. |
| 22549 | In many cases, the claim that the majority is superior would apply equally to wild beasts [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Whether in every people this superiority of the majority to the few excellent people can exist is not clear. In some of them this cannot possibly be so, since the same argument would apply to wild beasts. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1281b18) | |
| A reaction: He also gives reasons why it is plausible to think that the judgement of the majority is superior. It seems crucial that the majority have some education. Education is pointless if it is always overruled by the uneducated. |
| 22575 | Ultimate democracy is tyranny [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The ultimate democracy is a tyranny. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1312b05) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this is rule by a majority which has been corrupted by a populist leader, resulting in things like witch hunts. |
| 22531 | We aim to understand the best possible community for free people [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Our project is to get a theoretical grasp on which political community is superior to all others for people who are able to live as far as possible in the way they would pray to live. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1260b28) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a manifesto for liberalism. Presumably a community of free people starts from a superior position, and so the ideal community is the best that can be achieved from that starting point. A utopia of slaves is of no interest. |
| 22564 | Community is based on friends, who are equal and similar, and share things [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Community is fitted to friendship, since enemies do not wish to share even a road in common. But a city tends to consist as much as possible of people who are equal and similar, which especially holds of those in the middle. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1295b24) | |
| A reaction: The surprising emphasis on friendship in 'Ethics' turns out to have great importance in 'Politics'. Friendship is the cement of a community, and the constitution must maximise good conditions for friendships. |
| 22585 | Look at all of the citizens before judging a city to be happy [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A city must not be called happy by looking at just a part of it, but by looking at all of the citizens. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1329a22) | |
| A reaction: For example, it is wrong for a state to exult for being on the winning side in a major war, if it has meant misery for much of their own population. The Field of the Cloth of Gold (1520) does not excuse the misery of vagrants. |
| 22565 | The best communities rely on a large and strong middle class [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The political community that is due to those in the middle class is best, and cities can be well governed where the middle class is numerous and strong. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1295b34) | |
| A reaction: He specifically connects this to the doctrine of the mean in 'Ethics'. It seems easier for rulers from the middle classes to command universal respect, as the extremes tend to despise one another. What does he mean by 'strong'? |
| 22589 | Citizens do not just own themselves, but are also parts of the city [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One should in no way think that any citizen belongs to himself alone, but that all of them belong to the city, each being part of the city. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1337a27) | |
| A reaction: Note that they do not belong entirely to the city. I take this as an expression of his liberalism, which reminds liberals that we are also parts of a community, with a common good, and can't just go our own way. |
| 22534 | People care less about what is communal, and more about what is their own [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What is held communally by the most people gets the least care. For people give most thought to what is their own, less to what is communal, or only as much as falls to each of them to give. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1261b33) | |
| A reaction: That is, they care about the bit they contributed (I think). On a train, would people with feet on the seats do the same in their own home? Yes, probably! Caring about what is communal must be a cultural consensus. Pride in the NHS. |
| 22538 | Owning and sharing property communally increases disagreements [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Those who own and share property communally have far more disagreements than those who own their property separately. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263b23) | |
| A reaction: The reduction of disagreements is not a trivial matter, when designing a constitution for a happy community. 'Good fences make good neighbours'. |
| 22536 | There could be private land and public crops, or public land and private crops, or both public [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The land might be held separately, while the crops grown on it are brought into a communal store, …or the land might he held and farmed communally, while the crops are divided for private use, …or they could both be held communally. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263a02) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle says that examples exist of both of the first two cases. I would go for public land and privately divided crops. Capitalists end up with private land and private crops. |
| 22530 | Both women and children should be educated, as this contributes to a city's excellence [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is necessary to look to the constitution in educating both women and children, if indeed it makes any difference to the excellence of a city that its children be excellent, and its women too. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1260b14) | |
| A reaction: He consistently classes women as inferior, so it is a bit surprising to find that women need to be educated. They are not full citizens, but are part of the community, of which all parts need to be excellent. |
| 21358 | Natural slaves are those naturally belonging to another, or who can manage no more than labouring [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A human being who belongs, by nature, not to himself but to another is, by nature, a slave. ...Those whose function happens to be the use of their bodies (when this is the best that can be achieved) are slaves by nature. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1254a09-), quoted by Armand Marie LeRoi - The Lagoon: how Aristotle invented science 099 | |
| A reaction: A nice example of Aristotle trying to derive what ought to be from the 'nature' of each thing. Clearly, though, this was not the best that can be achieved. And why are labourers slaves, but not computer programmers or economists? |
| 20092 | One principle of liberty is to take turns ruling and being ruled [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One sort of freedom is ruling and being ruled in turn. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1317b1) | |
| A reaction: This is a lovely challenge to our modern idea of liberty, which largely consists of being left alone. |
| 2833 | Equality is obviously there to help people who do not get priority in the constitution [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In an oligarchy or a democracy it pays to give equality, or even preference, to those who participate in the constitution less, to the rich in a democracy, to the poor in an oligarchy. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1309a27) | |
| A reaction: A very nice idea. Every constitution will give priority to some group, even if it is all of the adults. So it should therefore have clauses supporting the others (e.g. children). |
| 2834 | It is always the weak who want justice and equality, not the strong [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is always the weaker who go in search of justice and equality; the strong reck nothing of them. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1318b05) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be merely an observation of the facts. He certainly doesn't want to deny them justice and equality, merely because that motivates them. |
| 2830 | We can claim an equal right to aristocratic virtue, as well as to wealth or freedom [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Virtue is the definitive principle of aristocracy, as wealth is of oligarchy, and freedom of democracy. …each of these is grounds for claiming equality. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1294a11) | |
| A reaction: By 'aristocratic' Aristotle means living at a high level of virtue (unlike oligarchs, who are just rich). Hence we can all aspire to be aristocrats. |
| 22569 | The Heraeans replaced election with lot, to thwart campaigning [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The people of Heraea replaced election with selection by lot because those who electioneered were getting elected. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1303a14) | |
| A reaction: Maybe electioneering can distort sensible choices, but good choices need good knowledge of the candidates. It is much harder in large communities. |
| 22550 | It is dreadful to neither give a share nor receive a share [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Neither to give a share nor to receive a share is a fearful thing. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1281b28) | |
| A reaction: It is striking that he includes equality in giving, as well as in receiving. Paying taxes is a privilege, because it shows your equality as a citizen. |
| 22568 | Faction is for inferiors to be equal, and equals to become superior [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Inferiors engage in faction in order to be equal, while equals do so in order to be superior. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1302a30) | |
| A reaction: In Britain that seems to trade unions in the first case, and the Conservative Party in the second case. Aristotle dislikes faction, but he's stuck with it because he insists on freedom. |
| 2814 | Phaleas proposed equality of property, provided there is equality of education [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Phaleas of Chalcedon was the first to propose that the property of the citizens should be equal. … but there should also be equality of education. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1266a38) | |
| A reaction: Not sure how you achieve full equality in education, if some of the blighters work harder. A useful reminder that achieving 'equality' is far from a simple matter. |
| 22540 | Wealth could be quickly leveled by only the rich giving marriage dowries [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A leveling could be very quickly achieved by the rich giving but not receiving dowries, and the poor receiving but not giving them. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1266b02) | |
| A reaction: Consequence: the daughters of the rich are never again allowed to marry (or even speak to) poor people. The modern approach is graduated income tax, presumably because there are reasonably accurate records of income. |
| 2828 | Law is intelligence without appetite [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Law is intelligence without appetite. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1287a31) | |
| A reaction: Neat, but no laws would be needed if there were no appetites. The idea has a nice Kantian feeling to it, though - of rising into the space of pure reason. |
| 22537 | Property should be owned privately, but used communally [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is better for property to be private, but for its use to be made communal. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263a38) | |
| A reaction: This is because people take more care of what is private. Modern large land owners usually allow hikers, but not gardeners. |
| 22573 | The virtue of justice may be relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If what is just is not the same in all constitutions, there must be differences in the virtue of justice as well. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1309a37) | |
| A reaction: This problem has recently arisen when the state of China took full control of the westernised colony of Hong Kong. Liberals look for a more absolute concept of justice. What is justice in a slave colony? |
| 22527 | Justice is the order in a political community [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Justice is a political community's order. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a36) | |
| A reaction: This seems to agree with Plato, who identifies justice with harmony (in individuals as well as in communities). Fascism, however, tries to impose order without justice. Maybe justice is the health of the community. |
| 22547 | Justice is equality for equals, and inequality for unequals [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Justice seems to be equality - not for everyone, but for equals. Justice also seems to be inequality - not for everyone, but for unequals. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1280a11) | |
| A reaction: He is specific that slaves, women and children are unequals, but I'm not sure how much inequality there is among the free men. In virtue theory, some men are clearly greatly superior to others. Is there a cut off point for equality? |
| 2825 | The good is obviously justice, which benefits the whole community, and involves equality in some sense [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In a state the good aimed at is justice; and that means what is for the benefit of the whole community; and all men believe that justice means equality in some sense. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1282b17) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle's idea of justice seems closer to finding what is appropriate than it does to mere equality of treatment. |
| 2816 | If it is easy to change the laws, that makes them weaker [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Easy change from established laws to new laws means weakening the power of the law. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1269a23) | |
| A reaction: This is a reasonable justification for sometimes insisting on the letter of the law, even though some degree of injustice results. |
| 2806 | Man is the worst of all animals when divorced from law and justice [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Man is the worst of all animals when divorced from law and justice. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a31) | |
| A reaction: Sounds true, but it is extraordinary that the virtues of mankind only emerge when we are artificially contrained. Rousseau disagreed with this. |
| 22556 | Laws that match people's habits are more effective than mere written rules [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Laws that are in accord with habits have more control and deal with things that have more control than do written laws. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1287b05) | |
| A reaction: This is the problem of bringing the law into disrepute, by insisting on behaviour that goes against the grain. But there are laws, such as those against racism, which are designed to break bad habits. |
| 2827 | It is preferable that law should rule rather than any single citizen [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is preferable that law should rule rather than any single citizen. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1287a19) | |
| A reaction: This assumes that the law is sensible. An exception would be when a wise ruler takes over a very corrupted state, which has passed evil laws. Nelson Mandela. |
| 22551 | Correct law should be in control, with rulers only deciding uncertain issues [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The laws, when correctly laid down, should be in control, and the ruler, whether one or many, should have control only of those matters on which the laws cannot pronounce with exactness. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1282b01) | |
| A reaction: It is obvious that general laws cannot cover each individual cases. Aristotle doesn't yet have the concept of an independent judiciary to handle this problem, so this is not true separation of powers. |
| 22554 | It is said that we should not stick strictly to written law, as it is too vague [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is said that laws speak only of the universal, and do not prescribe with a view to particular circumstances, so that it is foolish to rule in any craft in accord with what is written down. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1286a10) | |
| A reaction: To say we shouldn't follow laws because they are all vague would be crazy. A vague border is still a border. Laws need interpretation, and judgement of appropriate application. |
| 2840 | The whole state should pay for the worship of the gods [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Another thing that should be a common charge on the whole state is the worship of the gods. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1330a08) | |
| A reaction: If religion ceases to be a priority, is there some equivalent which should replace it? National sports teams? National theatre, or orchestras? National parks? |
| 2811 | A state is plural, and needs education to make it a community [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A state is a plurality which must depend on education to bring about its common unity. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263b33) | |
| A reaction: He also says that diversity is an essential aspect of a city, so I don't think he expects education to achieve perfect unity. |
| 22588 | A city has a single end, so education must focus on that, and be communal, not private [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Since the end of the whole city is a single end, it is evident that education too must be one and the same for all, and that its supervision must be communal, not private as it is at present. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1337a21) | |
| A reaction: But the end of the city is for all individual citizens to flourish, not for the group to flourish. So presumably education must be tuned to individual capacities and needs, and not just focus on some communal good. |
| 2847 | The aim of serious childhood play is the amusement of the complete adult [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One might perhaps suppose that serious activity in childhood may have for its aim the amusement of the complete and adult man. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1339a30) | |
| A reaction: It is very Aristotelian to have a concept of 'serious' childhood play. I doubt whether Nichomachus had much fun. Aristotle thinks the good amusement of adults is very important. |
| 2842 | Men learn partly by habit, and partly by listening [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Men learn partly by habituation and partly by listening. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1332b10) | |
| A reaction: Habit is almost an education of the body rather than of the mind, like a pianist making their fingers learn to play a piece. |
| 2844 | Abortions should be procured before the embryo has acquired life and sensation [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If an unwanted child is conceived, abortion should be procured before the embryo has acquired life and sensation. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1335b24) | |
| A reaction: A salient reminder that ancient people also had to think about the question of abortion. Some cultures seem unbothered by concerns, but not Arfistotle. |
| 2809 | If nature makes everything for a purpose, then plants and animals must have been made for man [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If nature makes nothing without some end in view, nothing to no purpose, it must be that nature has made plants and animals for the sake of man. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1256b20) | |
| A reaction: That was a rather fast move! If a tiger eats a man, how do we explain that? Why are some plants poisonous? Pebbles on a beach seem to have no purpose. |
| 2280 | Many causes are quite baffling, so it is absurd to deduce causes from final purposes [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: God can make unnumerable things whose cause escapes me, and for this reason alone the entire class of causes which people customarily derive from a thing's "end", I judge to be utterly useless in physics. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §4.55) | |
| A reaction: anti-Aristotle |
| 2800 | The best instruments have one purpose, not many [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Every instrument will be made best if it serves not many purposes but one. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252b03) | |
| A reaction: Sound like a good general truth, but not a universal truth. Swiss army knife. Ship in a bottle. Pins. Wrapping paper. |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
| 2272 | There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §3.49) |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |
| 2836 | God is not blessed and happy because of external goods, but because of his own nature [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: God himself is not blessed and happy on account of any of the external goods but because of himself and what he is by his own nature. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323b24) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle was famous for saying that external goods are important for the virtuous human life, so this idea is his corrective, which shows that they are of limited importance. |
| 2289 | Nothing apart from God could have essential existence, and such a being must be unique and eternal [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: I cannot think of anything aside from God alone to whose essence existence belongs, and I cannot conceive of two or more such Gods. I also perceive that God must be eternal, and have other perfect qualities. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §5.68) |
| 2269 | God the creator is an intelligent, infinite, powerful substance [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: I understand by the name "God" a certain substance that is infinite, independent, supremely intelligent and supremely powerful, and created me along with everything that exists. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §3.45) |
| 2275 | It is self-evident that deception is a natural defect, so God could not be a deceiver [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: It is quite obvious that a perfect God cannot be a deceiver, for it is manifest by the light of nature that all fraud and deception depend on some defect. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §3.52) |
| 2287 | Existence and God's essence are inseparable, like a valley and a mountain, or a triangle and its properties [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Existence can no more be separated from God's essence than its having three angles equal to two right angles can be separated from the essence of a triangle, or than the idea of a valley can be separated from the idea of a mountain. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §5.66) |
| 2274 | The idea of God in my mind is like the mark a craftsman puts on his work [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: In creating me, God has endowed me with the idea of God, so that it would be like the mark of the craftsman impressed upon his work, although this mark need not be something distinct from the work itself. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §3.51) |
| 2288 | I cannot think of a supremely perfect being without the supreme perfection of existence [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: I am not free to think of God without existence, that is, a supremely perfect being without a supreme perfection. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §5.67) |
| 2268 | One idea leads to another, but there must be an initial idea that contains the reality of all the others [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Although one idea can perhaps issue from another, nevertheless no infinite regress is permitted here; eventually some first idea must be reached whose cause is a sort of archetype that contains formally all the reality that is in the idea. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §3.42) |
| 3632 | We mustn't worship God as an image because we have no idea of him [Hobbes on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: We are forbidden to worship God in the form of an image, for otherwise we might think that we were conceiving of him who is incapable of being conceived. It seems, then, that there is no idea of God in us. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §5.65) by Thomas Hobbes - Objections to 'Meditations' (Third) 180 |
| 3633 | We can never conceive of an infinite being [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: The human intellect is not capable of conceiving of infinity, and hence it neither has nor can contemplate any idea representing an infinite thing. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §5.65) by Pierre Gassendi - Objections to 'Meditations' (Fifth) 286 |
| 5036 | Descartes cannot assume that a most perfect being exists without contradictions [Leibniz on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Descartes' error is in assuming without proof that a most perfect being does not involve a contradiction. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §5.67) by Gottfried Leibniz - A Specimen of Discoveries p.76 | |
| A reaction: Certainly Descartes seems obliged to grasp the concept of God 'clearly and distinctly', so there must be an absence of contradictions. But does Descartes have to prove that there are no contradictions in his concept of a triangle? Is self-evidence enough? |
| 3638 | Existence is not a perfection; it is what makes perfection possible [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Existence is not a perfection in God or in anything else; it is that without which no perfections can be present. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §5.67) by Pierre Gassendi - Objections to 'Meditations' (Fifth) 323 |
| 2802 | Men imagine gods to be of human shape, with a human lifestyle [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Just as men imagine gods in human shape, so they imagine their way of life to be like that of men. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252b26) | |
| A reaction: A common Greek observation. It is more significant that we anthropomorphise the thinking of the gods, as well as their physiques and banquets. |
| 3636 | God didn't give us good judgement even about our own lives [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: God is not to be blamed for giving puny man a faculty of judging that is too small to cope with everything, but we may still wonder why our judgement is uncertain, confused and inadequate even for the few matters he did want us to decide upon. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §4.58) by Pierre Gassendi - Objections to 'Meditations' (Fifth) 314 |
| 2278 | Error arises because my faculty for judging truth is not infinite [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: I make mistakes because the faculty of judging the truth, which I got from God, is not, in my case, infinite. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §4.54) |
| 2277 | Since God does not wish to deceive me, my judgement won't make errors if I use it properly [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Since God does not wish to deceive me, he assuredly has not given me a faculty of judgement with which I could never make a mistake, when I use it properly. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §4.54) |
| 2281 | If we ask whether God's works are perfect, we must not take a narrow viewpoint, but look at the universe as a whole [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Whenever we ask whether the works of God are perfect, we should keep in view not simply some one creature in isolation from the rest, but the universe as a whole. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §4.55) |