11965
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Could possible Adam gradually transform into Noah, and vice versa? [Chisholm]
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Full Idea:
If Adam lived for 931 years in a possible world, instead of his actual 930 years, ..then Adam and Noah could gradually exchange their ages and other properties...and we could trace Adam in a world back to the actual Noah, and vice versa.
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From:
Roderick Chisholm (Identity through Possible Worlds [1967], p.81-2)
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A reaction:
[very compressed] Chisholm was one of the first to raise this problem for possible worlds, though it had been Quine's objection to modal logic all along. Only Adam having essential properties seems to stop this slippery slope, says Chisholm.
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5687
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For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker]
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Full Idea:
Some writers distinguish introspection from a pre-introspective awareness of mental phenomena, saying one is not properly introspecting unless one is not only aware of the phenomena, but aware that one is aware of them.
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From:
Sydney Shoemaker (Introspection [1994], p.395)
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A reaction:
The test question might be what we think animals do. I think I agree with the 'writers'. You are either just aware of the contents or qualia or images of thought, which is not introspection, or you become introspectively aware that you are having them.
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5688
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Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker]
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Full Idea:
Foundationalist epistemology takes all empirical knowledge to be grounded in the introspective knowledge each mind has of its own states, …holding that introspective judgements are 'incorrigible' or 'infallible', and mental states are 'self-intimating'.
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From:
Sydney Shoemaker (Introspection [1994], p.396)
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A reaction:
Descartes' foundationalist Cogito also seems to be based on introspection, making introspection the essence of all foundationalism. The standard modern view is that introspective states are incorrigible, but not infallible.
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