12 ideas
2526 | Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett] |
Full Idea: The besetting foible of philosophers is mistaking failures of imagination for insights into necessity. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.25) |
2523 | That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Naturalistic philosophers should look with favour on the finite regress that peters out without foundations or thresholds or essences. That every mammal has a mother does not imply an infinite regress. Mammals have secure reality without foundations. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.25) | |
A reaction: I love this thought, which has permeated my thinking quite extensively. Logicians are terrified of regresses, but this may be because they haven't understood the vagueness of language. |
2528 | Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett] |
Full Idea: You can't have consciousness until you have the concept of consciousness. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: If you read enough Dennett this begins to sound vaguely plausible, but next day it sounds like an absurd claim. 'You can't see a tree until you have the concept of a tree?' When do children acquire the concept of consciousness? Are apes non-conscious? |
2525 | Maybe language is crucial to consciousness [Dennett] |
Full Idea: I continue to argue for a crucial role of natural language in generating the central features of consciousness. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.25) | |
A reaction: 'Central features' might beg the question. Dennett does doubt the consciousness of animals (1996). As I stare out of my window, his proposal seems deeply counterintuitive. How could language 'generate' consciousness? Would loss of language create zombies? |
2527 | Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind [Dennett] |
Full Idea: It is on the foundation of unconscious intentionality that the higher-order complexities developed that have culminated in what we call consciousness. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.25) | |
A reaction: Sounds right to me. Pace Searle, I have no problem with unconscious intentionality, and the general homuncular picture of low levels building up to complex high levels, which suddenly burst into the song and dance of consciousness. |
2530 | Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett] |
Full Idea: How could you make a robot conscious? The answer, I think, is to be found in software. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a commitment to strong AI, though Dennett is keen to point out that brains are the only plausible implementation of such software. Most find his claim baffling. |
2524 | A language of thought doesn't explain content [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Postulating a language of thought is a postponement of the central problems of content ascription, not a necessary first step. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.25) | |
A reaction: If the idea of content is built on the idea of representation, then you need some account of what the brain does with its representations. |
2529 | Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees) [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Concepts do not require consciousness. As Jaynes says, the bee has a concept of a flower, but not a conscious concept. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: Does the flower have a concept of rain? Rain plays a big functional role in its existence. It depends, alas, on what we mean by a 'concept'. |
12156 | Aesthetics has risen and fallen with Romanticism [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The rise and fall (as we presently perceive them) of aesthetics have been contemporaneous with the rise and fall of Romanticism. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Recent Aesthetics in England and America [1980], p.3) | |
A reaction: Maybe it started a little before Romanticism, as part of the Englightenment aim of being rational about everything, and maybe it survives Romanticism because we want to be scientific about everything. |
12158 | Aesthetic experience informs the world with the values of the observer [Scruton] |
Full Idea: It is possible to conclude that aesthetic experience has a peculiar practical significance: it represents the world as informed by the values of the observer. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Recent Aesthetics in England and America [1980], p.13) | |
A reaction: An excellent remark. If you look at, or listen to, anything, you can make a conscious effort to drain away your personal values (objectivity; science?), or you can consciously flood them with values. But moral and aesthetic vision must differ... |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |