59 ideas
| 9408 | Science studies phenomena, but only metaphysics tells us what exists [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: Science deals with the phenomena, ..but it is metaphysics, and only metaphysics, that tells us what ultimately exists. | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 01.2) |
| 9429 | Many forms of reasoning, such as extrapolation and analogy, are useful but deductively invalid [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: There are many forms of reasoning - extrapolation, interpolation, and other arguments from analogy - that are useful but deductively invalid. | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 04.4) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Molnar for this] |
| 9427 | For Humeans the world is a world primarily of events [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: For Humeans the world is a world primarily of events. | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 03.6) |
| 9446 | Properties are just natural clusters of powers [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: The view of properties I find most attractive is one in which they are natural clusters of, and exhausted by, powers (plus other connections to other properties). | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 10.6) |
| 9435 | A 'porridge' nominalist thinks we just divide reality in any way that suits us [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: A 'porridge' nominalist denies natural kinds, and thinks there are no objective divisions in reality, so concepts or words can be used by a community to divide the world up in any way that suits their purposes. | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 07.3) |
| 9447 | If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: If a cluster of ten powers exhausts property F, and property G differs in respect of just one power, this might explain why properties can resemble other properties and in different degrees. | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 10.6) | |
| A reaction: I love this. The most intractable problem about properties and universals is that of abstract reference - pink resembles red more than pink resembles green. If colours are clusters of powers, red and pink share nine out of ten of them. |
| 12248 | How can we show that a universally possessed property is an essential property? [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: Essentialists fail to show how we ascend from being a property universally possessed, by all kind members, to the status of being an essential property. | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 07.5) | |
| A reaction: This is precisely where my proposal comes in - the essential properties, as opposed to the accidentaly universals, are those which explain the nature and behaviour of each kind of thing (and each individual thing). |
| 4266 | Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: With the concept of belief (e.g. in animals) comes recognition, expectation and surprise. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.15) | |
| A reaction: A good observation. It is always tempting to see mental faculties in isolation, but each one drags along other capacities with it. Looks a bit holistic. |
| 4265 | If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: To say that an animal has beliefs is to imply not just that it can make mistakes, but also that it can learn from them. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.15) | |
| A reaction: A bold claim which is hard to substantiate. Seems right, though. Why would they change a belief? It can't be a belief if it isn't changeable. That would be an instinct. |
| 4264 | Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Perception is a higher state than sensation: it involves not just a response to the outer world, but also an assessment of it. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.14) | |
| A reaction: This seems to me a simple but really important distinction, even though it wickedly uses the word 'higher', which Greeks like but post-Humeans struggle with. But we all know it is higher, don't we? |
| 4271 | There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.23) | |
| A reaction: Not a point that would trouble an eliminativist, as it sounds suspiciously circular or question-begging. |
| 4272 | Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.28) | |
| A reaction: Interesting. I don't believe Roman legislators invented it, so where did it originate? Interesting that it is legalistic - a thing to which rights can accrue. Compare character, to which virtues accrue. |
| 4267 | Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Conditioning involves a change of behaviour, but not necessarily a change of mind. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.16) | |
| A reaction: I am inclined to doubt this. If I was conditioned in some way, I would expect my conscious state to change as well as my behaviour. |
| 4269 | An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.17) | |
| A reaction: What is a motive without feeling? A universalised judgment, perhaps. Which comes first, the motivation or the feeling? |
| 4270 | Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The difficulty of defining reason suggests that while pretending to use it to define the difference between humans and animals, they are actually using that difference to define reason. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.19) | |
| A reaction: Too pessimistic. We are perfectly capable of saying there is no significant difference between us and an alien. We have obvious abilities, which we can partly specify. |
| 4284 | All moral life depends ultimately on piety, which is our recognition of our own dependence [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The three forms of moral life (respect for persons, the pursuit of virtue and natural sympathy) all depend, in the last analysis, on piety, which is the deep-down recognition of our frailty and dependence. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.56) | |
| A reaction: MacIntyre agrees. 'Piety' is an odd word, which attempts to link the point to religious teachings. 'Dependence' seems an adequate term. But can fully independent creatures dispense with morality? I think not. |
| 4273 | Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: We can see the Kantian 'Moral Law' as consisting precisely in those rules which rational beings would accept, when attempting to live by agreement. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.30) | |
| A reaction: If this combines Kantian notions of duty with the obligations of contracts, it is the core of a very powerful moral theory. See the work of Tim Scanlon. Classic problems are still the weak, animals and free riders. |
| 4274 | The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The antique virtues of courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance and justice, amplified by Christian charity and pagan loyalty, still form the core idea of human excellence. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.33) | |
| A reaction: I always think sense of humour has become a key modern virtue. Where did that come from? Maybe a sense of irony is a good thing. How about efficiency (which is Plato's idea of justice!)? |
| 4286 | Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Only just people will act on the impartial verdict when their own interests conflict with it. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.61) | |
| A reaction: The Kantian account of the virtues. Virtues are seen in the acceptance of a range of obvious human duties. Very helpful point if one is aiming for one unified theory of morality. |
| 4283 | Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: A person who lives by sympathy may undermine the moral order as effectively as the one who lives by crime. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.54) | |
| A reaction: A slightly chilling remark. Presumably one should not feel too much for suffering which is deserved. What about unavoidable suffering? It is certainly important to see that some suffering is morally good (e.g. grief or remorse). |
| 4290 | That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.86) | |
| A reaction: The problem cases all arise in wartime. Ideally we want to show sympathy even when being necessarily ruthless, but in practice we send the callous ones to do the horrible deed. |
| 4285 | As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: As soon as we set our own interests aside and look on human relations with the eye of the impartial judge, we find ourselves agreeing over the rights and wrongs of any conflict. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.59) | |
| A reaction: A nice, and fairly plausible, defence of Kantian ethics. Maybe the UN should actually settle all disputes, instead of just peace-keeping. The idea merely describes the function of the law, and especially an independent judiciary. |
| 4287 | Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Utilitarian thinking does not replace or compete with the moral law, but guides us when the moral law is silent and only sympathy speaks. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.63) | |
| A reaction: If the moral law is silent, it is not quite clear why we should follow sympathy rather than contempt. There is the well-known danger here of the moral law turning out to lack content. |
| 4280 | Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: It was precisely the inability of utilitarianism to explain the distinction between animals and people which led to its rejection. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.50) | |
| A reaction: A nice turning of the tables, rejecting the utilitarian pride in incorporating animals into their theory where others (like Kant) reject them. Yet in one respect (suffering) they are inescapably very like us. |
| 4281 | Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Stalin and Hitler justified their actions in utilitarian terms, ..and no one can accuse them, for who knows what the long-term effects of their actions might be? But a morality which can't pass final judgement on Hitler or Stalin is a kind of sick joke. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.52) | |
| A reaction: A powerful argument against simplistic consequentialism. We can judge an action at any time, even beforehand, and that must be part of morality, which can't just observe the unfolding consequences. |
| 4282 | Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: It is nearer the truth to see morality as setting the limits to practical reasoning, rather than being a species of it. Moral principles tell us precisely that we must go no further along the path of calculation. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.52) | |
| A reaction: Well said. If you are assessing whether an act of vicious brutality is required, you have probably already gone morally astray. It is not hard, though, to think of counterexamples, especially in wartime. |
| 4296 | Brutal animal sports are banned because they harm the personality of the watcher [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Dog-fights and bear-baiting are naturally forbidden by law, because they threaten the personality of those who attend them. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.107) | |
| A reaction: Hm. If this is so, it is mainly because it takes place in a closed pen, where we can get a close look at the brutality and blood. It could be said to be more honest than hunting with gun or hounds. 'Go on eyes, look your worst'. |
| 4263 | Many of the stranger forms of life (e.g. worms) interest us only as a species, not as individuals [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Most of the stranger forms of life (worms, fleas, locusts etc.) are not really suitors for our moral concern, and interest us primarily as species, and only rarely as individuals. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.13) | |
| A reaction: Interesting, but that seems to reflect on us, rather than cutting nature at the joints. As soon as you look closely, you recognise an individual rather than a member of a species. |
| 4268 | Animals command our sympathy and moral concern initially because of their intentionality [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: It seems to me that the concept of intentionality introduces the first genuine claim of animals upon our sympathies and our moral concern. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.16) | |
| A reaction: Good. If one's approach to morality is Humean (via sympathy) this seems right. Utilitarianism bases animal rights on qualia (pleasures and pains). |
| 4276 | An animal has individuality if it is nameable, and advanced animals can respond to their name [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: An animal has acquired individuality if the gift of a proper name seems appropriate, the high point being reached with animals such as dogs which actually respond to their own name. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.39) | |
| A reaction: Interesting, even though it is rather chauvinistic. I might name the fleas in my circus, but regard a whole section of the human race as indistinguishable and not worth naming. |
| 4288 | Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.75) | |
| A reaction: He is talking about race horses and St Bernards. This doesn't avoid the moral dilemma, because we could race horses die out if we thought we had created a bad life for them. |
| 4277 | I may avoid stepping on a spider or flower, but fellow-feeling makes me protect a rabbit [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: I instinctively recoil from stepping on a spider or a forget-me-knot in my path, but neither of these responses expresses the fellow-feeling that forbids me to step on a rabbit or a mouse. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.41) | |
| A reaction: It is fellow-feeling that makes us prefer mammals to reptiles. It seems wrong to build a moral system purely on empathy, because psychopaths don't even empathise with nice human beings. Externalism in morality. |
| 4278 | Lucky animals are eaten by large predators, the less lucky starve, and worst is death by small predators [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Lucky animals die in the jaws of a large predator; predators themselves are less lucky, when they die of lingering starvation; least fortunate are those killed by smaller creatures, such as maggots and bacteria. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.43) | |
| A reaction: A nice insight, even if it does slide into claiming that we are simply large predators, and that therefore fox-hunting is a virtue… |
| 4279 | We can easily remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but we shouldn't do it [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: It is easy to remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but the result is not a life which an animal should lead. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.44) | |
| A reaction: I'm not clear where the "should" derives from here. You can't save them all, and large interventions would destroy the ecosystem. But should we never, say, put a victim out of its misery? |
| 4289 | Sheep and cattle live comfortable lives, and die an enviably easy death [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Sheep and beef cattle live a quiet and comfortable life among their companions, and are despatched in ways which human beings, if they are rational, must surely envy. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.81) | |
| A reaction: No rational person could envy a premature death, and we don't wait for cattle to be old before eating them. A quick death is little consolation for being murdered, and many people would prefer a slower death (without agony, of course). |
| 4291 | Letting your dog kill wild rats, and keeping rats for your dog to kill, are very different [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: There is a difference between the person who allows his terrier to kill wild rats, and the person who keeps tame rats for his terrier to kill. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.87) | |
| A reaction: There are areas in the middle, where I encourage pheasants to breed 'wild' on my land. The purchase of a Rottweiller also tests the moral boundaries here. |
| 4292 | Concern for one animal may harm the species, if the individual is part of a bigger problem [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Too much concern for individual animals may in fact harm the species, by promoting diseased or degenerate members, or preventing population control. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.87) | |
| A reaction: Okay till we reach human beings, where this principle won't go away, even if further principles about personhood, rationality and deep sympathy enter the picture. We can't be utilitarian about animals, and something else about humans. |
| 4293 | Introducing a natural means of controlling animal population may not be very compassionate [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: It is hard to believe that those who would introduce wolves as a means of controlling the deer population have much sympathy for deer. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.91) | |
| A reaction: Good point. If we assume that culling is required at all, then the decisive human actions which shock us on television may be nicer than the natural deaths that occur during the night. |
| 4294 | Animals are outside the community of rights, but we still have duties towards them [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Animals exist outside the web of reciprocal rights and obligations, created by dialogue, but because they have no rights it does not mean that we have no duties towards them. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.97) | |
| A reaction: The modern Kantian view of animals, though Kant struggled to show why we might have any duties to animals. Is mere compassion enough to produce a duty, or is it a luxurious indulgence of our nature? |
| 4295 | We favour our own animals over foreign ones because we see them as fellow citizens [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: We don't give help to British animals (through the RSPCA) rather than foreign animals because of their nearness or needs, but because of our sense of them as fellow citizens. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.104) | |
| A reaction: A bit strong. It may, in fact, be because we look after them the way we look after the rest of our property. Even Kantians can be sentimental sometimes. |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
| 9430 | Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: One might have a singularist view of causation in which a cause necessitates its effect, but they need not be subsumed under a law, ..and there are identities which are metaphysically necessary without being laws of nature. | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 04.5) |
| 9445 | We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: If we take causal language at face value and give up reducing causal concepts to non-causal, non-modal concepts, we can give up the counterfactual dependence account. | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 10.5) |
| 9443 | It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: If laws do not give the world necessity, what does? I argue the positive case for it being properties, and properties alone, that do the job (so we might call them 'modal properties'). | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 10.1) |
| 9444 | There are four candidates for the logical form of law statements [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: The contenders for the logical form of a law statement are 1) a universally quantified conditional, 2) a second-order relation between first-order universals, 3) a functional equivalence, and 4) a dispositional characteristic of a natural kind. | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 10.3) |
| 9415 | Would it count as a regularity if the only five As were also B? [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: While it might be true that for all x, if Ax then Bx, would we really want to count it as a genuine regularity in nature if only five things were A (and all five were also B)? | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 03.3) |
| 9416 | Regularities are more likely with few instances, and guaranteed with no instances! [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: It seems that the fewer the instances, the more likely it is that there be a regularity, ..and if there are no cases at all, and no S is P, that is a regularity. | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 03.3) | |
| A reaction: [He attributes the second point to Molnar] |
| 9431 | Pure regularities are rare, usually only found in idealized conditions [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: Pure regularities are not nearly as common as might have been thought, and are usually only to be found in simplified or idealized conditions. | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 05.3) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Nancy Cartwright 1999 for this view] |
| 9441 | Regularity laws don't explain, because they have no governing role [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: A regularity-law does not explain its instances, because such laws play no role in determining or governing their instances. | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 09.7) | |
| A reaction: Good. It has always seemed to me entirely vacuous to explain an event simply by saying that it falls under some law. |
| 9422 | If the best system describes a nomological system, the laws are in nature, not in the description [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: If the world really does have its own nomological structure, that a systematization merely describes, why are the laws not to be equated with the nomological structure itself, rather than with the system that describes it? | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 03.4) |
| 9421 | The best systems theory says regularities derive from laws, rather than constituting them [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: The best systems theory (of Mill-Ramsey-Lewis) says that laws are not seen as regularities but, rather, as those things from which regularities - or rather, the whole world history including the regularities and everything else - can be derived. | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 03.4) | |
| A reaction: Put this way, the theory invites questions about ontology. Regularities are just patterns in physical reality, but axioms are propositions. So are they just features of human thought, or do these axioms actuallyr reside in reality. Too weak or too strong. |
| 9433 | If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: If there are laws that are instantiated in no particulars, then this would seem to favour the theory that laws connect universals rather than particulars. | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 06.4) | |
| A reaction: There is a dispute here between the Platonic view of uninstantiated universals (Tooley) and the Aristotelian instantiated view (Armstrong). Mumford and I prefer the dispositional account. |
| 9432 | Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: The core of the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong view of the late 70s is that we have a law of nature when we have a relation of natural necessitation between universals. ..The innovation was that laws are about properties, and only indirectly about particulars. | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 06.2) | |
| A reaction: It sounds as if we should then be able to know the laws of nature a priori, since that was Russell's 1912 definition of a priori knowledge. |
| 9434 | Laws of nature are just the possession of essential properties by natural kinds [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: If dispositional essentialism is granted, then there is a law of nature wherever there is an essential property of a natural kind; laws are just the havings of essential properties by natural kinds. | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 07.2) | |
| A reaction: [He is expounding Ellis's view] |
| 9437 | To distinguish accidental from essential properties, we must include possible members of kinds [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: Where properties are possessed by all kind members, we must distinguish the accidental from essential ones by considering all actual and possible kind members. | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 07.5) | |
| A reaction: This is why we must treat possibilities as features of the actual world. |
| 9439 | The Central Dilemma is how to explain an internal or external view of laws which govern [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: The Central Dilemma about laws of nature is that, if they have some governing role, then they must be internal or external to the things governed, and it is hard to give a plausible account of either view. | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 09.2) | |
| A reaction: This dilemma is the basis of Mumford's total rejection of 'laws of nature'. I think I agree. |
| 9412 | You only need laws if you (erroneously) think the world is otherwise inert [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: Laws are a solution to a problem that was misconceived. Only if you think that the world would be otherwise inactive or inanimate, do you have the need to add laws to your ontology. | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 01.5) | |
| A reaction: This is a bold and extreme view - and I agree with it. I consider laws to be quite a useful concept when discussing nature, but they are not part of the ontology, and they don't do any work. They are metaphysically hopeless. |
| 9411 | There are no laws of nature in Aristotle; they became standard with Descartes and Newton [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: Laws do not appear in Aristotle's metaphysics, and it wasn't until Descartes and Newton that laws entered the intellectual mainstream. | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 01.5) | |
| A reaction: Cf. Idea 5470. |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |