3398
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Epiphenomenalism makes the mind totally pointless [Alexander,S]
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Full Idea:
Epiphenomenalism supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do and no purpose to serve.
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From:
Samuel Alexander (works [1927]), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.129
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A reaction:
An objection, but not, I think, a strong one. The fact, for example, that sweat is shiny is the result of good evolutionary reasons, but I cannot think of any purpose which it serves. All events which are purposeful are likely to have side-effects.
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20082
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Bodily movements are not actions, which are really the tryings within bodily movement [Hornsby, by Stout,R]
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Full Idea:
Hornsby claims the basic description of action is in terms of trying, that all actions (even means of doing other actions) are actions of trying, and that tryings (and therefore actions) are interior to bodily movements (which are thus not essential).
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From:
report of Jennifer Hornsby (Actions [1980]) by Rowland Stout - Action 9 'Trying'
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A reaction:
[compression of his summary] There is no regress with explaining the 'action' of trying, because it is proposed that trying is the most basic thing in all actions. If you are paralysed, your trying does not result in action. Too mentalistic?
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