7068
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If infatuation with science leads to bad scientism, its rejection leads to obscurantism [Critchley]
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Full Idea:
If what is mistaken in much contemporary philosophy is its infatuation with science, which leads to scientism, then the equally mistaken rejection of science leads to obscurantism.
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From:
Simon Critchley (Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro [2001], Ch.1)
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A reaction:
Clearly a balance has to be struck. I take philosophy to be a quite separate discipline from science, but it is crucial that philosophy respects the physical facts, and scientists are the experts there. Scientists are philosophers' most valued servants.
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7075
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To meet the division in our life, try the Subject, Nature, Spirit, Will, Power, Praxis, Unconscious, or Being [Critchley]
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Full Idea:
Against the Kantian division of a priori and empirical, Fichte offered activity of the subject, Schelling offered natural force, Hegel offered Spirit, Schopenhauer the Will, Nietzsche power, Marx praxis, Freud the unconscious, and Heidegger offered Being.
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From:
Simon Critchley (Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro [2001])
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A reaction:
The whole of Continental Philosophy summarised in a sentence. Fichte and Schopenhauer seem to point to existentialism, Schelling gives evolutionary teleology, Marx abandons philosophy, the others are up the creek.
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7535
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If all beliefs are propositional, then belief and judgement are the same thing [Monk]
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Full Idea:
Whether the words 'belief' and 'judgement' mean the same thing is a moot point. Traditionally, a judgement is the assent of mind to a proposition. If one thinks that all beliefs are propositional, then beliefs and judgements are the same thing.
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From:
Ray Monk (Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude [1996], Ch.19 n6)
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A reaction:
If I think I have put a bit too much toothpaste on my brush, that strikes me as a non-propositional judgement, even though it could be spelled out as a proposition. But it also strikes me as a belief.
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