13 ideas
| 8859 | The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae [Yablo] |
| Full Idea: Lewis's different systems of modal logic differed about such formulae as □P implies □□P; ◊□P implies □P; and ◊S implies □◊S | |
| From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §06) | |
| A reaction: Yablo's point is that the various version don't seem to make much difference to our practices in logic, mathematics and science. The problem, says Yablo, is deciding exactly what you mean by 'necessarily' and 'possibly'. |
| 8865 | If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise? [Yablo] |
| Full Idea: If someone says 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', he or she wants to focus on Democrats, not numbers. If the number is 50 million, is 50 million really on the rise? | |
| From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §14) | |
| A reaction: This is a very nice warning from Yablo, against easy platonism, or any sort of platonism at all. We routinely say that numbers are 'increasing', but the real meaning needs entangling. Here it refers to people joining a party. |
| 8863 | We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets [Yablo] |
| Full Idea: It is only by making as if to countenance numbers that one can give expression in English to a fact having nothing to do with numbers, a fact about stars and planets and how they are numerically proportioned. | |
| From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §13) | |
| A reaction: To avoid the phrase 'numerically proportioned', he might have alluded to the 'pattern' of the stars and planets. I'm not sure which -ism this is, but it seems to me a good approach. The application is likely to precede the theory. |
| 8862 | Platonic objects are really created as existential metaphors [Yablo] |
| Full Idea: The means by which platonic objects are simulated is existential metaphor. Numbers are conjured up as metaphorical measures of cardinality. | |
| From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §12) | |
| A reaction: 'Fictional' might be a better word than 'metaphorical', since the latter usually implies some sort of comparison. |
| 8864 | We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer [Yablo] |
| Full Idea: It is not that the contents of sentences are inexpressible without quantifying over events, worlds, etc. (they aren't). But the logical relations become much more tractable if we represent them quantificationally. | |
| From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §13) | |
| A reaction: Yablo is explaining why we find ourselves committed to abstract objects. It is essentially, as I am beginning to suspect, a conspiracy of logicians. What on earth is 'the empty set' when it is at home? What's it made of? |
| 8858 | Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties [Yablo] |
| Full Idea: There's a tradition in philosophy of finding 'unexpected objects' in truth-conditions, such as countermodels, possible worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets and properties. | |
| From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §02) | |
| A reaction: This is a very nice perspective on the whole matter of abstract objects. If we find ourselves reluctantly committed to the existence of something which is ontologically peculiar, we should go back to the philosophical drawing-board. |
| 8861 | Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential [Yablo] |
| Full Idea: There is hardly a word in the language - be it an adverb, preposition, conjunction, or what have you - that is devoid of metaphorical potential. | |
| From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §12) | |
| A reaction: Yablo goes on to claim that metaphor is at the heart of all of our abstract thinking. 'Dead metaphors' (like the "mouth" of a river) sink totally into literal language. I think Yablo is on the right lines. |
| 7260 | If there are intuited moral facts, why should we care about them? [Dancy,J] |
| Full Idea: Critics asked (of intuitionism) why, if moral facts are as the intuitionists say, we should care about them at all. | |
| From: Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991]) | |
| A reaction: It is a good question, as we don't care much about other a priori truths, such as the square root of 169. |
| 7261 | Internalists say that moral intuitions are motivating; externalist say a desire is also needed [Dancy,J] |
| Full Idea: There is an internalist view of intuitionism, saying that to accept that one's action is wrong is itself to be motivated not to do it. Externalists (like Ross) say that moral judgements need the help of an independent desire to motivate us. | |
| From: Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991]) | |
| A reaction: The internalists would be closer to Kant or Plato (for whom reason or pure ideas motivate), while externalist would favour Hume's belief/desire account of human actions. I like Kant and Plato, but Hume is more plausible. Dancy disagrees (Idea 7262). |
| 7262 | Obviously judging an action as wrong gives us a reason not to do it [Dancy,J] |
| Full Idea: It is ludicrous to say that we might accept an action is outrageously wrong and still think of this as not in itself giving us good reason to hold back. | |
| From: Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991]) | |
| A reaction: If we think of some dreadful man-made famine in a remote continent, our judgement may well give a reason to act, but apathy usually intervenes. We are discussing a purely theoretical motive on the one hand, and an actual motivator on the other. |
| 7265 | Moral facts are not perceived facts, but perceived reasons for judgements [Dancy,J] |
| Full Idea: I intend to suggest that moral facts are best thought of not as facts perceived but as reasons recognised in the exercise of practical moral judgement. | |
| From: Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991]) | |
| A reaction: I'm not convinced by this modified version. Why should the fact that someone is in pain be, in itself, a reason to prevent it? There are different cultural traditions for response to the pain of others. We are the squeamish tradition. |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |