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9626
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A structure is an abstraction, focussing on relationships, and ignoring other features [Shapiro]
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Full Idea:
A structure is the abstract form of a system, focussing on the interrelationships among the objects, and ignoring any features of them that do not affect how they relate to other objects in the system.
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From:
Stewart Shapiro (Structure and Ontology [1989], 146), quoted by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch.4
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A reaction:
I find this account very attractive, even though it appeals to supposedly outmoded psychological abstractionism. It seems pretty close to Aristotle's view of things. Shapiro's account must face up to Frege's worries about these matters.
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14080
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Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
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Full Idea:
Kaplan notes that the causal theory of reference can be understood in two quite different ways, as part of the semantics (involving descriptions of causal processes), or as metasemantics, explaining why a term has the referent it does.
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From:
report of David Kaplan (Dthat [1970]) by Jonathan Schaffer - Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson 1
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A reaction:
[Kaplan 'Afterthought' 1989] The theory tends to be labelled as 'direct' rather than as 'causal' these days, but causal chains are still at the heart of the story (even if more diffused socially). Nice question. Kaplan takes the meta- version as orthodox.
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