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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Defeasibility Theory' and 'Lectures on the Philosophy of Right'

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12 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann]
     Full Idea: Infallibility does not follow from indefeasibility.
     From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'Significance')
     A reaction: If very little evidence exists then this could clearly be the case. It is especially true of historical and archaeological evidence.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann]
     Full Idea: Can the original justification of a belief be regained through a successful defeat of a defeater?
     From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'Defeater-Defs')
     A reaction: [Jäger 2005 addresses this] I would have thought the answer is yes. I aspire to coherent justifications, so I don't see justifications as a chain of defeat and counter-defeat, but as collective groups of support and challenge.
Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann]
     Full Idea: An unmodified reliabilism does not accommodate defeaters, and surely there can be defeaters against reliably produced beliefs?
     From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'Defeaters')
     A reaction: [He cites Bonjour 1980] Reliabilism has plenty of problems anyway, since a generally reliable process can obviously occasionally produce a bad result. 20:20 vision is not perfect vision. Internalist seem to like defeaters.
You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann]
     Full Idea: There are 'rebutting' defeaters against the truth of a previously justified belief, 'undercutting' defeaters against the power of the evidence, and 'reason-defeating' defeaters against the truth of the reason for the belief.
     From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'How')
     A reaction: That is (I think) that you can defeat the background, the likelihood, or the truth. He cites Pollock 1986, and implies that these are standard distinctions about defeaters.
Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann]
     Full Idea: Advocates of the defeasibility theory have tried to exclude true pieces of information that are misleading defeaters.
     From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'What')
     A reaction: He gives as an example the genuine news of a claim that the suspect has a twin.
Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann]
     Full Idea: The 'defeasibility theory' of knowledge claims that knowledge is only present if there are no facts that - if they were known - would be genuine defeaters of the relevant justification.
     From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'What')
     A reaction: Something not right here. A genuine defeater would ensure the proposition was false, so it would simply fail the truth test. So we need a 'defeater' for a truth, which must therefore by definition be misleading. Many qualifications have to be invoked.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann]
     Full Idea: Theories that combine basic justification with the defeasibility of this justification are referred to as 'moderate' foundationalism.
     From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'Significance')
     A reaction: I could be more sympathetic to this sort of foundationalism. But it begins to sound more like Neurath's boat (see Quine) than like Descartes' metaphor of building foundations.
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
We are only free, with rights, if we claim our freedom, and there are no natural rights [Hegel, by Houlgate]
     Full Idea: Hegel says we are only truly free, and so bearers of rights, in so far as we claim our freedom. ...So there are no merely natural rights, and animal's have no rights.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of Right [1819], p.78) by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 08 'Rights'
     A reaction: If there are no natural rights, then it is hard to see how claiming a right will create it. I can't create a right to drink the best champagne. It seems particularly unjust to deny rights to people so enslaved that freedom has never occurred to them.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
Representatives by region ignores whether they care about the national interest [Hegel, by Pinkard]
     Full Idea: Selecting representatives on the basis of geography means selecting people without any regard to whether they represent the basic and important interests of the 'whole' of society.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of Right [1819]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 11
     A reaction: Proportional representation seems to get away from this, but that can still be arranged according to large regions. Some means is needed to prevent the whole nation from exploitation a regional minority (such as Welsh speakers).
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
The absolute right is the right to have rights [Hegel]
     Full Idea: The absolute right is the right to have rights.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of Right [1819], p.127), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 08 'Rights'
     A reaction: What a beautifully succinct and important idea! Does a foetus, or a dog, or a person in a vegetative state, or a slave, qualify?
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]
     Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus
     A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea.