8 ideas
| 2385 | If a man suddenly develops an intention of doing something, the cause is out of his control, not in his will [Hobbes] |
| Full Idea: When first a man hath an appetite or will to something, to which immediately before he had no appetite or will, the cause of his will is not the will itself, but something else not in his own disposing. | |
| From: Thomas Hobbes (Letters to the Lord Marquis of Newcastle [1652]) |
| 2384 | Those actions that follow immediately the last appetite are voluntary [Hobbes] |
| Full Idea: Those actions that follow immediately the last appetite are voluntary. | |
| From: Thomas Hobbes (Letters to the Lord Marquis of Newcastle [1652]) |
| 23674 | If an attempted poisoning results in benefits, we still judge the agent a poisoner [Reid] |
| Full Idea: If a man should give to his neighbour a potion which he really believes will poison him, but which, in the event, proves salutary, and does much good; in moral estimation, he is a poisoner, and not a benefactor. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5) | |
| A reaction: I take Reid to mean that morality concerns how we assess the agent, and not the results of his actions. Mill and Bentham concede that we judge people this way, but don't think morality mainly concerns judging people. |
| 23675 | We shouldn't do to others what would be a wrong to us in similar circumstances [Reid] |
| Full Idea: It is a first principle of morals, that we ought not to do to another what we should think wrong to be done to us in like circumstances. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 6) | |
| A reaction: This negative form of the rule is more plausible than the positive form, presumably because there is more consensus about what we all dislike than what we all prefer. But presents for people that they would like, not that you like. |
| 23672 | To be virtuous, we must care about duty [Reid] |
| Full Idea: A man cannot be virtuous, if he has no regard to duty. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5) | |
| A reaction: Thus are Aristotle and Kant united in a simple sentence. Aristotle thinks that a virtuous person thereby sees what is the right thing to do, but I take 'duty' to imply a requirement which comes not from good character but from external society. |
| 23673 | Every worthy man has a principle of honour, and knows what is honourable [Reid] |
| Full Idea: I presume it will be granted, that, in every man of real worth, there is a principle of honour, a regard to what is honourable or dishonourable, very distinct from a regard to his interest. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5) | |
| A reaction: Note that there is a 'principle' of honour in a person's character, and there are also actions which are intrinsically honourable or not. I fear that only the worthy are honourable, and only the honourable are worthy! |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |