23655
|
An ad hominem argument is good, if it is shown that the man's principles are inconsistent [Reid]
|
|
Full Idea:
It is a good argument ad hominem, if it can be shewn that a first principle which a man rejects, stands upon the same footing with others which he admits, …for he must then be guilty of an inconsistency.
|
|
From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 6: Judgement [1785], 4)
|
|
A reaction:
Good point. You can't divorce 'pure' reason from the reasoners, because the inconsistency of two propositions only matters when they are both asserted together. …But attacking the ideas isn't quite the same as attacking the person.
|
23659
|
If someone denies that he is thinking when he is conscious of it, we can only laugh [Reid]
|
|
Full Idea:
If any man could be found so frantic as to deny that he thinks, while he is conscious of it, I may wonder, I may laugh, or I may pity him, but I cannot reason the matter with him.
|
|
From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 6: Judgement [1785], 5)
|
|
A reaction:
An example of the influence of Descartes' Cogito running through all subsequent European philosophy. There remain the usual questions about personal identity which then arise, but Reid addresses those.
|
23654
|
In obscure matters the few must lead the many, but the many usually lead in common sense [Reid]
|
|
Full Idea:
In matters beyond the reach of common understanding, the many are led by the few, and willingly yield to their authority. But, in matters of common sense, the few must yield to the many, when local and temporary prejudices are removed.
|
|
From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 6: Judgement [1785], 4)
|
|
A reaction:
Wishful thinking in the 21st century, when the many routinely deny the authority of the expert few, and the expert few occasionally prove that the collective common sense of the many is delusional. I still sort of agree with Reid.
|
23653
|
If you can't distinguish the features of a complex object, your notion of it would be a muddle [Reid]
|
|
Full Idea:
If you perceive an object, white, round, and a foot in diameter, if you had not been able to distinguish the colour from the figure, and both from the magnitude, your senses would only give you one complex and confused notion of all these mingled together
|
|
From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 6: Judgement [1785], 1)
|
|
A reaction:
His point is that if you reject the 'abstraction' of these qualities, you still cannot deny that distinguishing them is an essential aspect of perceiving complex things. Does this mean that animals distinguish such things?
|
20034
|
Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
|
|
Full Idea:
Bratman's three main norms of intention are 'internal consistency' (between a person's intentions), 'means-end coherence' (the means must fit the end), and 'consistency with the agent's beliefs' (especially intending to do and believing you won't do).
|
|
From:
report of Michael Bratman (Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason [1987]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 4
|
|
A reaction:
These are controversial, but have set the agenda for modern non-reductive discussions of intention.
|
20033
|
Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
|
|
Full Idea:
Intentions involve normative commitments. We settle on intended courses, if there is no reason to reconsider them, and intentions put pressure on us to form further intentions in order to more efficiently coordinate our actions.
|
|
From:
report of Michael Bratman (Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason [1987]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 4
|
|
A reaction:
[a compression of their summary] This distinguishes them from beliefs and desires, which contain no such normative requirements, even though they may point that way.
|
20026
|
Intention is either the aim of an action, or a long-term constraint on what we can do [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
|
|
Full Idea:
We need to distinguish intention as an aim or goal of actions, and intentions as a distinctive state of commitment to future action, a state that results from and subsequently constrains our practical endeavours as planning agents.
|
|
From:
report of Michael Bratman (Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason [1987]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 2
|
|
A reaction:
I'm not sure how distinct these are, given the obvious possibility of intermediate stages, and the embracing of any available short-cut. If I could mow my lawn with one blink, I'd do it.
|
20032
|
Bratman rejected reducing intentions to belief-desire, because they motivate, and have their own standards [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
|
|
Full Idea:
Bratman motivated the idea that intentions are psychologically real and not reducible to desire-belief complexes by observing that they are motivationally distinctive, and subject to their own unique standards of rational appraisal.
|
|
From:
report of Michael Bratman (Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason [1987]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 4
|
|
A reaction:
If I thought my belief was a bit warped, and my desire morally corrupt, my higher self might refuse to form an intention. If so, then Bratman is onto something. But maybe my higher self has its own beliefs and desires.
|