7 ideas
19044 | Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The notion of fitting the totality of experience ...adds nothing intelligible to the simple concept of being true. ....Nothing, ...no thing, makes sentences and theories true: not experience, not surface irritations, not the world. | |
From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.11), quoted by Willard Quine - On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma p.39 | |
A reaction: If you don't have a concept of what normally makes a sentence true, I don't see how you go about distinguishing what is true from what is false. You can't just examine the sentence to see if it has the 'primitive' property of truth. Holism is involved.... |
15130 | If a property is possible, there is something which can have it [Williamson] |
Full Idea: Barcan's axiom says if there can be something that has a certain property, then there is something that can have that property. It and its converse are not obviously correct or incorrect. They claim that it is non-contingent what individuals there are. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Laudatio: Prof Ruth Barcan Marcus [2011], p.1) | |
A reaction: Williamson defends the two Barcan formulas, but the more I understand them the less plausible they sound to me. |
6400 | Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The third dogma of empiricism is the dualism of scheme and content, of organizing system and something waiting to be organized, which cannot be made intelligible and defensible. If we give it up, it is not clear that any distinctive empiricism remains. | |
From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.189) | |
A reaction: The first two dogmas were 'analyticity' and 'reductionism', as identified by Quine in 1953. Presumably Hume's Principles of Association (Idea 2189) would be an example of a scheme. A key issue is whether there is any 'pure' content. |
6398 | Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Different points of view make sense, but only if there is a common co-ordinate system on which to plot them. | |
From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.184) | |
A reaction: This seems right to me. I am very struck by the close similarities between people from wildly differing cultural backgrounds, as seen, for example, at the Olympic Games. |
6399 | Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Studying the criteria of translation is a way of focusing on criteria of identity for conceptual schemes. | |
From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.184) | |
A reaction: This is why it was an inspired idea of Quine's to make translation a central topic in philosophy. We must be cautious, though, about saying that the language is the conceptual scheme, as that leaves animals with no scheme at all. |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |