21 ideas
15134 | The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson] |
Full Idea: The truthmaker principle seems compelling, because if a proposition is true, something must be different from a world in which it is false. The principle makes this specific, by treating 'something' as a quantifier binding a variable in name position. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §2) | |
A reaction: See Williamson for an examination of the logical implications of this. The point is that the principle seems to require some very specific 'thing', which may be asking too much. For a start, it might be the absence of a thing. |
15140 | The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson] |
Full Idea: The converse Barcan formula does not allow any contingent truths at all to have a truthmaker. Once cannot combine the converse Barcan formula with any truthmaker principle worth having. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §3) | |
A reaction: One might reply, so much the worse for the converse Barcan formula, but Williamson doesn't think that. |
15141 | Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson] |
Full Idea: Friends of the truthmaker principle should reject the Kripke semantics of varying domains. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §3) | |
A reaction: See other ideas from this paper to get a sense of what that is about. |
15131 | If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson] |
Full Idea: In S5, necessity and possibility are not themselves contingent matters. This is plausible for metaphysical modality, since metaphysical possibility, unlike practical possibility, does not depend on the contingencies of one's situation. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §1) | |
A reaction: This is the clearest statement I have found of why S5 might be preferable for metaphysics. See Nathan Salmon for the rival view. Williamson's point sounds pretty persuasive to me. |
15135 | If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson] |
Full Idea: If the domain of propositional quantification is constant across worlds, the Barcan formula and its converse hold. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §2) | |
A reaction: So the issue is whether we should take metaphysics to be dealing with a constant or varying domains. Williamson seems to favour the former, but my instincts incline towards the latter. |
15139 | Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson] |
Full Idea: The converse Barcan is at least plausible, since its denial says there is something that could fail to meet a condition when everything met that condition; but how could everything meet that condition if that thing did not? | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §3) | |
A reaction: Presumably the response involves a discussion of domains, since everything in a given domain might meet a condition, but something in a different domain might fail it. |
18492 | Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
Full Idea: We should not assume that all quantification is either objectual or substitutional. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], p.262) | |
A reaction: [see Prior 1971:31-4] He talks of quantifying into sentence position. |
15136 | Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson] |
Full Idea: If quantification into sentence position is substitutional, then it is metaphysically neutral. A substitutionally interpreted 'existential' quantification is semantically equivalent to the disjunction (possibly infinite) of its substitution instances. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §2) | |
A reaction: Is it not committed to the disjunction, just as the objectual reading commits to objects? Something must make the disjunction true. Or is it too verbal to be about reality? |
15138 | Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
Full Idea: We should not assume that all quantification is objectual or substitutional. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §2) |
15137 | If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson] |
Full Idea: If one uses 'fact' as a noun, the question arises why one cannot name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §2 n10) | |
A reaction: What an intriguing thought! Must all nouns pass this test? 'The courage of the regiment was called Alfred'? |
15142 | Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson] |
Full Idea: Consideration of our ability to count objects across possibilities strongly favour both the Barcan formula and its converse. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §3) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that I can understand counting objects across possibilities. The objects themselves are possibilia, and possibilia seem to include unknowns. The unexpected is highly possible. |
22717 | Self-interest can fairly divide a cake; first person cuts, second person chooses [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: To fairly divide a cake between two children, the first divides it and the second chooses. …Even division is best, as it anticipates the second child will take the largest piece. Fairness is enforced by the children's self-interests. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 03 'Cake') | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is introduced as the basic principle of game theory. There is an online video of two cats sharing a dish of milk; each one drinks a bit, then pushes the dish to the other one. I'm sure two children could manage that. |
22718 | Formal game theory is about maximising or minimising numbers in tables [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: At the most abstract level, game theory is about tables with numbers in them - numbers that entities are are efficiently acting to maximise or minimise. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 03 'Curve') | |
A reaction: A brilliant idea. The question is the extent to which real life conforms to the numberical tables. The assumption that everyone is entirely self-seeking is blatantly false. Numbers like money have diminishing marginal utility. |
22719 | The minimax theorem says a perfect game of opposed people always has a rational solution [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: The minimax theorem says that there is always a rational solution to a precisely defined conflict between two people whose interests are completely opposite. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 03 'Minimax') | |
A reaction: This is Von Neumann's founding theorem of game theory. It concerns maximising minimums, and minimising maximums. Crucially, I would say that it virtually never occurs that two people have completely opposite interests. There is a common good. |
22721 | The tragedy in prisoner's dilemma is when two 'nice' players misread each other [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: The tragedy is when two 'nice' players defect because they misread the other's intentions. The puzzle of the prisoner's dilemma is how such good intentions pave the road to hell. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 11 'Howard's') | |
A reaction: I really wish these simple ideas were better known. They more or less encapsulate the tragedy of the human race, with its inability to prioritise the common good. |
22720 | Two prisoners get the best result by being loyal, not by selfish betrayal [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: Prisoners A and B can support or betray one another. If both support, they each get 1 year in prison. If one betrays, the betrayer gets 0 and the betrayed gets 3. If they both betray they get 2 each. The common good is to support each other. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 06 'Tucker's') | |
A reaction: [by Albert Tucker, highly compressed] The classic Prisoner's Dilemma. It is artificial, but demonstrates that selfish behaviour gets a bad result (total of four years imprisonment), but the common good gets only two years. Every child should study this! |
22723 | Do unto others as you would have them do unto you - or else! [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: TIT FOR TAT threatens 'Do unto others as you would have them do unto you - or else!'. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 12 'TIT') | |
A reaction: Essentially human happiness arises if we are all nice, but also stand up firmly for ourselves. 'Doormats' (nice all the time) get exploited. TIT FOR TAT is weak, because it doesn't exploit people who don't respond at all. |
22722 | TIT FOR TAT says cooperate at first, then do what the other player does [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: The successful TIT FOR TAT strategy (for the iterated prisoner's dilemma) says cooperate on the first round, then do whatever the other player did in the previous round. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 12 'TIT') | |
A reaction: There are also the tougher TWO TITS FOR A TAT, and the more forgiving TIT FOR TWO TATS. The one-for-one seems to be the main winner, and is commonly seen in animal life (apparently). I recommend this to school teachers. |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |
15133 | A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson] |
Full Idea: That there is just one necessary existent is surely false, for if x is a necessary, {x} is a distinct necessary existent. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §1) | |
A reaction: You would have to believe that sets actually 'exist' to accept this, but it is a very neat point. |