Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Intentionality and the Physical: reply to Mumford' and 'Metaphysics: a very short introduction'

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8 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substances, unlike aggregates, can survive a change of parts [Mumford]
     Full Idea: Substances can survive a change in their parts in a way that a mere aggregate of parts.
     From: Stephen Mumford (Metaphysics: a very short introduction [2012], 3)
     A reaction: A simple but very important idea. If we then distinguish between 'substances' and 'aggregates' we get a much clearer grip on things. Is the Ship of Theseus a substance or an aggregate? There is no factual answer to that. What do you want to explain?
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
Maybe possibilities are recombinations of the existing elements of reality [Mumford]
     Full Idea: It has been suggested that we could think of possibilities as recombinations of all the existing elements of reality.
     From: Stephen Mumford (Metaphysics: a very short introduction [2012], 8)
     A reaction: [Armstrong 1989 is the source] The obvious problem would be that the existence of an entirely different reality would be impossible, if this was all possibility could be. It seems to cramp the style of the possible too much. Are properties elements?
Combinatorial possibility has to allow all elements to be combinable, which seems unlikely [Mumford]
     Full Idea: The combinatorial account only works if you allow that the elements are recombinable. ...But could Lincoln really have been green? It seems possible that you could jump to the moon, unless we impose some restrictions.
     From: Stephen Mumford (Metaphysics: a very short introduction [2012], 8)
     A reaction: Mumford suggests different combination rules for logical and natural possibility. The general objection is that combinatorial possibility is too permissive - which it clearly is.
Combinatorial possibility relies on what actually exists (even over time), but there could be more [Mumford]
     Full Idea: Can combinatorial possibility deliver enough possibilities? It uses the existing elements, but there might have been one more particular or one more property. Even extended over time, the elements seem finite, yet there could have been more.
     From: Stephen Mumford (Metaphysics: a very short introduction [2012], 8)
     A reaction: [compressed] One objection is that the theory allows too much, and now the objection is that it allows too little. Both objections are correct, so that's the end of that. But I admire the attempt to base modality on actuality.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Intentionality is the mark of dispositions, not of the mental [Place]
     Full Idea: My thesis is that intentionality is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional.
     From: Ullin T. Place (Intentionality and the Physical: reply to Mumford [1999], 1)
     A reaction: An idea with few friends, but I really like it, because it offers the prospect of a unified account of physical nature and the mind/brain. It seems reasonable to say my mind is essentially a bunch of dispositions. Mind is representations + dispositions.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Dispositions are not general laws, but laws of the natures of individual entities [Place]
     Full Idea: Dispositions are the substantive laws, not, as for Armstrong, of nature in general, but of the nature of individual entities whose dispositional properties they are.
     From: Ullin T. Place (Intentionality and the Physical: reply to Mumford [1999], 6)
     A reaction: [He notes that Nancy Cartwright 1989 agrees with him] I like this a lot. I tend to denegrate 'laws', because of their dubious ontological status, but this restores laws to the picture, in the place where they belong, in the stuff of the world.
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]
     Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus
     A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea.