57 ideas
| 13736 | Quinean metaphysics just lists the beings, which is a domain with no internal structure [Schaffer,J on Quine] |
| Full Idea: The Quinean task in metaphysics is to say what exists. What exists forms the domain of quantification. The domain is a set (or class, or plurality) - it has no internal structure. In other words, the Quinean task is to list the beings. | |
| From: comment on Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Jonathan Schaffer - On What Grounds What 1.1 | |
| A reaction: I really warm to this thesis. The Quinean version is what you get when you think that logic is the best tool for explicating metaphysics. Schaffer goes on to say that the only real aim for Quine is the cardinality of what exists! |
| 9542 | The best known axiomatization of PL is Whitehead/Russell, with four axioms and two rules [Russell/Whitehead, by Hughes/Cresswell] |
| Full Idea: The best known axiomatization of PL is Whitehead/Russell. There are four axioms: (p∨p)→p, q→(p∨q), (p→q)→(q∨p), and (q→r)→((p∨q)→(p∨r)), plus Substitution and Modus Ponens rules. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by GE Hughes/M Cresswell - An Introduction to Modal Logic Ch.1 |
| 3302 | Set theory is full of Platonist metaphysics, so Quine aimed to keep it separate from logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
| Full Idea: Quine has showed us how set theory - now recognised to be positively awash in Platonistic metaphysics - can and should be prevented from infecting logic proper. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Intro |
| 10211 | Quine wants V = L for a cleaner theory, despite the scepticism of most theorists [Quine, by Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: Quine suggests that V = L be accepted in set theory because it makes for a cleaner theory, even though most set theorists are skeptical of V = L. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: Shapiro cites it as a case of a philosopher trying to make recommendations to mathematicians. Maddy supports Quine. |
| 21720 | Russell saw Reducibility as legitimate for reducing classes to logic [Linsky,B on Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: The axiom of Reducibility ...is crucial in the reduction of classes to logic, ...and seems to be a quite legitimate logical notion for Russell. | |
| From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 6.4 | |
| A reaction: This is an unusual defence of the axiom, which is usually presumed to have been kicked into the long grass by Quine. If one could reduce classes to logic, that would destroy the opposition to logicism in a single neat coup. |
| 10044 | Russell denies extensional sets, because the null can't be a collection, and the singleton is just its element [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: Russell adduces two reasons against the extensional view of classes, namely the existence of the null class (which cannot very well be a collection), and the unit classes (which would have to be identical with their single elements). | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Stewart Shapiro - Structure and Ontology p.459 | |
| A reaction: Gödel believes in the reality of classes. I have great sympathy with Russell, when people start to claim that sets are not just conveniences to help us think about things, but actual abstract entities. Is the singleton of my pencil is on this table? |
| 18208 | We regard classes as mere symbolic or linguistic conveniences [Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: Classes, so far as we introduce them, are merely symbolic or linguistic conveniences, not genuine objects. | |
| From: B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.72), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics III.2 |
| 3336 | Two things can never entail three things [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
| Full Idea: Two things can never entail three things. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.17 |
| 8204 | Lewis's 'strict implication' preserved Russell's confusion of 'if...then' with implication [Quine on Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: Russell call 'if...then' implication, when the material conditional is a much better account; C.I.Lewis (in founding modern modal logic) preserved Russell's confusion by creating 'strict implication', and called that implication. | |
| From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Willard Quine - Reply to Professor Marcus p.177 | |
| A reaction: [A compession of Quine's paragraph]. All of this assumes that logicians can give an accurate account of what if...then means, when ordinary usage is broad and vague. Strict implication seems to drain all the normal meaning out of 'if...then'. |
| 9359 | Russell's implication means that random sentences imply one another [Lewis,CI on Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: In Mr Russell's idea of implication, if twenty random sentences from a newspaper were put in a hat, and two of them drawn at random, one will certainly imply the other, and it is an even bet the implication will be mutual. | |
| From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by C.I. Lewis - A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori p.366 | |
| A reaction: This sort of lament leads modern logicians to suggest 'relevance' as an important criterion. It certainly seems odd that so-called 'classical logic' should contain a principle so at variance with everyday reasoning. |
| 21707 | Russell unusually saw logic as 'interpreted' (though very general, and neutral) [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B] |
| Full Idea: Russell did not view logic as an uninterpreted calculus awaiting interpretations [the modern view]. Rather, logic is a single 'interpreted' body of a priori truths, of propositions rather than sentence forms - but maximally general and topic neutral. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 1 | |
| A reaction: This is the view which Wittgenstein challenged, saying logic is just conventional. Linsky claims that Russell's logicism is much more plausible, once you understand his view of logic. |
| 10036 | In 'Principia' a new abstract theory of relations appeared, and was applied [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel] |
| Full Idea: In 'Principia' a young science was enriched with a new abstract theory of relations, ..and not only Cantor's set theory but also ordinary arithmetic and the theory of measurement are treated from this abstract relational standpoint. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Kurt Gödel - Russell's Mathematical Logic p.448 | |
| A reaction: I presume this is accounting for relations in terms of ordered sets. |
| 8453 | If we had to name objects to make existence claims, we couldn't discuss all the real numbers [Quine] |
| Full Idea: Since one wants to say that real numbers exist and yet one cannot name each of them, it is not unreasonable to relinquish the connection between naming an object and making an existence claim about it. | |
| From: Willard Quine (works [1961]), quoted by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: One could say that same about people, such as 'the most recent citizen of Brazil'. Some sort of successful reference seems to be needed, such as 'the next prime beyond the biggest so far found'. Depends what your predicate is going to be. |
| 10311 | No sense can be made of quantification into opaque contexts [Quine, by Hale] |
| Full Idea: Quine says that no good sense can be made of quantification into opaque contexts. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Bob Hale - Abstract Objects Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: This is because poor old Quine was trapped in a world of language, and had lost touch with reality. I can quantify over the things you are thinking about, as long as you are thinking about things that can be quantified over. |
| 10538 | Finite quantification can be eliminated in favour of disjunction and conjunction [Quine, by Dummett] |
| Full Idea: Quine even asserts that where we have no infinite domains, quantification can be eliminated in favour of finite disjunction and conjunction. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Michael Dummett - Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) Ch.14 | |
| A reaction: Thus ∃x is expressed as 'this or this or this...', and ∀ is expressed as 'this and this and this...' Dummett raises an eyebrow, but it sounds OK to me. |
| 10793 | Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal [Quine, by Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: Quine at first regarded substitutional quantification as incoherent, behind which there lurked use-mention confusions, but has over the years, given his nominalist dispositions, come to notice its appeal. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Ruth Barcan Marcus - Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers p.166 |
| 18248 | A real number is the class of rationals less than the number [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: For Russell the real number 2 is the class of rationals less than 2 (i.e. 2/1). ...Notice that on this definition, real numbers are classes of rational numbers. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 5.2 |
| 18152 | Russell takes numbers to be classes, but then reduces the classes to numerical quantifiers [Russell/Whitehead, by Bostock] |
| Full Idea: Although Russell takes numbers to be certain classes, his 'no-class' theory then eliminates all mention of classes in favour of the 'propositional functions' that define them; and in the case of the numbers these just are the numerical quantifiers. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 9.B.4 |
| 10025 | Russell and Whitehead took arithmetic to be higher-order logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Hodes] |
| Full Idea: Russell and Whitehead took arithmetic to be higher-order logic, ..and came close to identifying numbers with numerical quantifiers. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Harold Hodes - Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic p.148 | |
| A reaction: The point here is 'higher-order'. |
| 8683 | Russell and Whitehead were not realists, but embraced nearly all of maths in logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend] |
| Full Idea: Unlike Frege, Russell and Whitehead were not realists about mathematical objects, and whereas Frege thought that only arithmetic and analysis are branches of logic, they think the vast majority of mathematics (including geometry) is essentially logical. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 3.1 | |
| A reaction: If, in essence, Descartes reduced geometry to algebra (by inventing co-ordinates), then geometry ought to be included. It is characteristic of Russell's hubris to want to embrace everything. |
| 10037 | 'Principia' lacks a precise statement of the syntax [Gödel on Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: What is missing, above all, in 'Principia', is a precise statement of the syntax of the formalism. | |
| From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Kurt Gödel - Russell's Mathematical Logic p.448 |
| 10093 | The ramified theory of types used propositional functions, and covered bound variables [Russell/Whitehead, by George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: Russell and Whitehead's ramified theory of types worked not with sets, but with propositional functions (similar to Frege's concepts), with a more restrictive assignment of variables, insisting that bound, as well as free, variables be of lower type. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: I don't fully understand this (and no one seems much interested any more), but I think variables are a key notion, and there is something interesting going on here. I am intrigued by ordinary language which behaves like variables. |
| 8691 | The Russell/Whitehead type theory was limited, and was not really logic [Friend on Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: The Russell/Whitehead type theory reduces mathematics to a consistent founding discipline, but is criticised for not really being logic. They could not prove the existence of infinite sets, and introduced a non-logical 'axiom of reducibility'. | |
| From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 3.6 | |
| A reaction: To have reduced most of mathematics to a founding discipline sounds like quite an achievement, and its failure to be based in pure logic doesn't sound too bad. However, it seems to reduce some maths to just other maths. |
| 10305 | In 'Principia Mathematica', logic is exceeded in the axioms of infinity and reducibility, and in the domains [Bernays on Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: In the system of 'Principia Mathematica', it is not only the axioms of infinity and reducibility which go beyond pure logic, but also the initial conception of a universal domain of individuals and of a domain of predicates. | |
| From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.267) by Paul Bernays - On Platonism in Mathematics p.267 | |
| A reaction: This sort of criticism seems to be the real collapse of the logicist programme, rather than Russell's paradox, or Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems. It just became impossible to stick strictly to logic in the reduction of arithmetic. |
| 8684 | Russell and Whitehead consider the paradoxes to indicate that we create mathematical reality [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend] |
| Full Idea: Russell and Whitehead are particularly careful to avoid paradox, and consider the paradoxes to indicate that we create mathematical reality. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 3.1 | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as quite a good argument. It is certainly counterintuitive that reality, and abstractions from reality, would contain contradictions. The realist view would be that we have paradoxes because we have misdescribed the facts. |
| 8466 | For Quine, intuitionist ontology is inadequate for classical mathematics [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: Quine feels that the intuitionist's ontology of abstract objects is too slight to serve the needs of classical mathematics. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: Quine, who devoted his life to the application of Ockham's Razor, decided that sets were an essential part of the ontological baggage (which made him, according to Orenstein, a 'reluctant Platonist'). Dummett defends intuitionism. |
| 8467 | Intuitionists only admit numbers properly constructed, but classical maths covers all reals in a 'limit' [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: Intuitionists will not admit any numbers which are not properly constructed out of rational numbers, ...but classical mathematics appeals to the real numbers (a non-denumerable totality) in notions such as that of a limit | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: (See Idea 8454 for the categories of numbers). This is a problem for Dummett. |
| 8746 | To avoid vicious circularity Russell produced ramified type theory, but Ramsey simplified it [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: Russell insisted on the vicious circle principle, and thus rejected impredicative definitions, which resulted in an unwieldy ramified type theory, with the ad hoc axiom of reducibility. Ramsey's simpler theory was impredicative and avoided the axiom. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 5.2 | |
| A reaction: Nowadays the theory of types seems to have been given up, possibly because it has no real attraction if it lacks the strict character which Russell aspired to. |
| 10667 | A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible [Quine, by Hossack] |
| Full Idea: Quine's test of ontological commitment says that anything that can be said truly at all must be capable of being said in a logically perfect language, so there must be a paraphrase of every truth into the language of logic. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Keith Hossack - Plurals and Complexes 2 | |
| A reaction: A very nice statement of the Quinean view, much more persuasive than other statements I have encountered. I am suddenly almost converted to a doctrine I have hitherto despised. Isn't philosophy wonderful? |
| 16021 | Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology) [Quine, by Noonan] |
| Full Idea: The highly intuitive methodological programme enunciated by Quine says that as our knowledge expands we should unhesitatingly expand our ideology, our stock of predicables, but should be much more wary about ontology, the name variables. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Harold Noonan - Identity §3 | |
| A reaction: I suddenly embrace this as a crucial truth. This distinction allows you to expand on truths without expanding on reality. I would add that it is also crucial to distinguish properties from predicates. A new predicate isn't a new property. |
| 3325 | For Quine everything exists theoretically, as reference, predication and quantification [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
| Full Idea: Theoretical entities (which is everything, according to Quine) are postulated by us in a threefold fashion as an object (1) to which we refer, (2) of which we predicate, and (3) over which we quantify. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.12 |
| 8534 | Quine says the predicate of a true statement has no ontological implications [Quine, by Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Quine's doctrine is that the predicate of a true statement carries no ontological implications. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by David M. Armstrong - Properties §1 | |
| A reaction: Quine is ontologically committed to the subject of the statement (an object). The predicate seems to be an inseparable part of that object. Quine is, of course, a holist, so ontological commitment isn't judged in single statements. |
| 10295 | Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets [Quine, by Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: Quine doubts the existence of properties, and, trying to be helpful, suggests that variables ranging over properties be replaced with variables ranging over respectable extensional entities like sets, so we can 'identify' a property with a singleton set. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Stewart Shapiro - Higher-Order Logic 2.1 | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a classic modern heresy, a slippery slope that loses all grip on what a property is, replacing it with entities that mean nothing, but make the logic work. |
| 3322 | Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
| Full Idea: Quine assures us that if the specific mission of second-order logic is quantifying over properties, the task can readily be performed by first-order predicate logic, as in (Ex) x is a property, and (y) y has x. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.10 |
| 6078 | Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties [Quine, by McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Quine brought classes into semantics in order to oust properties. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Colin McGinn - Logical Properties Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: Quine's view has always struck me as odd, as I don't see how you can decide what set something belongs to if you haven't already decided its properties. But then I take it that nature informs you of most properties, and set membership is not arbitrary. |
| 8479 | Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things' [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: Quine proposes that 'red is a colour' does not require analysis, such as 'there is an x which is the property of being red and it is a colour' which needs an ontology of properties. We can just say that all red things are coloured things. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: The question of the ontology of properties is here approached, in twentieth century style, as the question 'what is the logical form of property attribution sentences?' Quine's version deals in sets of prior objects, rather than abstract entities. |
| 3751 | Universals are acceptable if they are needed to make an accepted theory true [Quine, by Jacquette] |
| Full Idea: Abstract entities (universals) are admitted to an ontology by Quine's criterion if they must be supposed to exist (or subsist) in order to make the propositions of an accepted theory true. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Dale Jacquette - Abstract Entity p.3 |
| 7970 | Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist [Quine, by Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: Armstrong dubs Quine an 'Ostrich Nominalist' (what problem??), but Quine calls himself a Platonist, because he is committed to classes or sets as well as particulars. He is not an extreme nominalist, and might best be called a Class Nominalist. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961], Ch.6 n15) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things | |
| A reaction: For someone as ontologically austere as Quine to show 'commitment' to sets deserves some recognition. If he wants to be a Platonist, I say that's fine. What on earth is a set, apart from its members? |
| 15783 | Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist [Lycan on Quine] |
| Full Idea: Meinong characteristically refers to his Objects using definite descriptions, such as 'the golden mountain'. But on his view there are many golden mountains, with different features. How can 'the golden mountain' then succeed in denoting a single Object? | |
| From: comment on Willard Quine (works [1961]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 01 | |
| A reaction: Use of definite descriptions doesn't seem obligatory in this situation. 'Think of a golden mountain' - 'which one?' - 'never mind which one!'. |
| 12033 | An object is identical with itself, and no different indiscernible object can share that [Russell/Whitehead, by Adams,RM] |
| Full Idea: Trivially, the Identity of Indiscernibles says that two individuals, Castor and Pollux, cannot have all properties in common. For Castor must have the properties of being identical with Castor and not being identical with Pollux, which Pollux can't share. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], I p.57) by Robert Merrihew Adams - Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity 2 | |
| A reaction: I suspect that either the property of being identical with itself is quite vacuous, or it is parasytic on primitive identity, or it is the criterion which is actually used to define identity. Either way, I don't find this claim very illuminating. |
| 15782 | Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia [Quine, by Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Quine notoriously demands identity and individuation-conditions for mere possibilia. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 01 | |
| A reaction: Demanding individuation before speaking of anything strikes me as dubious. 'Whoever did this should own up'. 'There must be something we can do'. Obviously you need some idea of what you are talking about - but not much. |
| 2796 | For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically [Quine, by Dancy,J] |
| Full Idea: Quine argues that no necessity can be known other than empirically. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 14.6 |
| 8450 | Quine's empiricism is based on whole theoretical systems, not on single mental events [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: Traditional empiricism takes impressions, ideas or sense data as the basic unit of empirical thought, but Quine takes account of the theoretical as well as the observational; the unit of empirical significance is whole systems of belief. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: This invites either the question of what components make up the whole systems, or (alternatively) what sort of mental events decide to accept a system as a whole. Should Quine revert either to traditional empiricism, or to rationalism? |
| 10040 | Russell showed, through the paradoxes, that our basic logical intuitions are self-contradictory [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel] |
| Full Idea: By analyzing the paradoxes to which Cantor's set theory had led, ..Russell brought to light the amazing fact that our logical intuitions (concerning such notions as truth, concept, being, class) are self-contradictory. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Kurt Gödel - Russell's Mathematical Logic p.452 | |
| A reaction: The main intuition that failed was, I take it, that every concept has an extension, that is, there are always objects which will or could fall under the concept. |
| 3868 | To proclaim cultural relativism is to thereby rise above it [Quine, by Newton-Smith] |
| Full Idea: Truth, says the cultural relativist, is culture-bound. But if it were, then he, within his own culture, ought to see his own culture-bound truth as absolute. He cannot proclaim cultural relativism without rising above it. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by W.H. Newton-Smith - The Rationality of Science VII.10 |
| 4713 | For Quine, theories are instruments used to make predictions about observations [Quine, by O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: Quine's epistemological position is instrumentalist. Our theories are instruments we use to make predictions about observations. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: This is the pragmatist in Quine. It fits the evolutionary view to think that the bottom line is prediction. My theory about the Pelopponesian War seems an exception. |
| 21725 | The multiple relations theory says assertions about propositions are about their ingredients [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B] |
| Full Idea: The multiple relations theory of judgement proposes that assertions about propositions are dependent upon genuine facts involving belief and other attitude relations, subjects of those attitudes, and the constituents of the belief. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 7.2 | |
| A reaction: This seems to require a commitment to universals (especially relations) with which we can be directly acquainted. I prefer propositions, but as mental entities, not platonic entities. |
| 23474 | A judgement is a complex entity, of mind and various objects [Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: When a judgement occurs, there is a certain complex entity, composed of the mind and the various objects of the judgement. | |
| From: B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.44) | |
| A reaction: This is Russell's multiple-relation theory of judgement, which replaced his earlier belief in unified propositions (now 'false abstractions'). He seems to have accepted Locke's view, that the act of judgement produces the unity. |
| 23455 | The meaning of 'Socrates is human' is completed by a judgement [Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: When I judge 'Socrates is human', the meaning is completed by the act of judging. | |
| From: B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.44), quoted by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus | |
| A reaction: Morris says this is Russell's multiple-relations theory of judgement. The theory accompanies the rejection of the concept of the unified proposition. When I hear 'Socrates had a mole on his shoulder' I get the meaning without judging. |
| 23480 | The multiple relation theory of judgement couldn't explain the unity of sentences [Morris,M on Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: When Russell moved to his multiple relation theory of judgement …he then faced difficulties making sense of the unity of sentences. | |
| From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.44) by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus 3A | |
| A reaction: Roughly, he seems committed to saying that there is only unity if you think there is unity; there is no unity in a sentence prior to the act of judgement. |
| 18275 | Only the act of judging completes the meaning of a statement [Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: When I judge 'Socrates is human', the meaning is completed by the act of judging, and we no longer have an incomplete symbol. | |
| From: B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.44), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap | |
| A reaction: Personally I would have thought that you needed to know the meaning properly before you could make the judgement, but then he is Bertrand Russell and I'm not. |
| 4712 | Quine says there is no matter of fact about reference - it is 'inscrutable' [Quine, by O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: Quine holds the doctrine of the 'inscrutability of reference', which means there is no fact of the matter about reference. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: Presumably reference depends on conventions like pointing, or the functioning of words like "that", or the ambiguities of descriptions. If you can't define it, it doesn't exist? I don't believe him. |
| 23453 | Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one [Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: A 'proposition', in the sense in which a proposition is supposed to be the object of a judgement, is a false abstraction, because a judgement has several objects, not one. | |
| From: B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.44), quoted by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus 2E | |
| A reaction: This is the rejection of the 'Russellian' theory of propositions, in favour of his multiple-relations theory of judgement. But why don't the related objects add up to a proposition about a state of affairs? |
| 7330 | The principle of charity only applies to the logical constants [Quine, by Miller,A] |
| Full Idea: Quine takes to the principle of charity to apply only to the translation of the logical constants. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 8.7 | |
| A reaction: Given how weird some people's view of the world seems to be, this very cautious approach has an interesting rival appeal to Davidson't much more charitable view, that people mostly speak truth. It depends whether you are discussing lunch or the gods. |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
| 17862 | Essence gives an illusion of understanding [Quine, by Almog] |
| Full Idea: Essence engenders a mere illusion of understanding | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Joseph Almog - Nature Without Essence Intro | |
| A reaction: [Almog quotes Quine, but doesn't give a reference] This is roughly the same as Popper's criticism of essentialism. |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |