14 ideas
13804 | A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: A property P is an essential property of an object x iff x could not exist and lack P, that is, as they say, iff x has P at every world at which x exists. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 1) | |
A reaction: This immediately places the existence of x outside the normal range of its properties, so presumably 'existence is not a predicate', but that dictum may be doubted. As it stands this definition will include trivial and vacuous properties. |
13805 | Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: Essential properties may be trivial or nontrivial. It is characteristic of P's being trivially essential to x that x's possession of P is not grounded in the specific nature of x. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 2) | |
A reaction: This is where my objection to the modal view of essence arises. How is he going to explain 'grounded' and 'specific nature' without supplying an entirely different account of essence? |
13808 | A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: A relation R is essential to x and y (in that order) iff Rxy holds at every world where x and y both exist. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 2) | |
A reaction: I find this bizarre. Not only does this seem to me to have nothing whatever to do with essence, but also the relation might hold even though it is a purely contingent matter. All rabbits are a reasonable distance from the local star. Essence of rabbit? |
13806 | Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: The main groups of trivially essential properties are (a) existence, self-identity, or their consequences in S5; and (b) properties possessed in virtue of some de dicto necessary truth. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 2) | |
A reaction: He adds 'extraneously essential' properties, which also strike me as being trivial, involving relations. 'Is such that 2+2=4' or 'is such that something exists' might be necessary, but they don't, I would say, have anything to do with essence. |
13807 | A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: P is 'extraneously essential' to x iff it is possessed by x at any world w only in virtue of the possession at w of certain properties by other objects. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 2) | |
A reaction: I would say that these are the sorts of properties which have nothing to do with being essential, even if they are deemed to be necessary. |
13809 | One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: In the case of artefacts, there is an essentialism about original matter; for instance, it would be said of any particular bronze statue that it could not have been cast from a totally different quantity of bronze. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 3) | |
A reaction: Forbes isn't endorsing this, and it doesn't sound convincing. He quotes the thought 'I wish I had made this pot from a different piece of clay'. We might corrupt a statue by switching bronze, but I don't think the sculptor could do so. |
13810 | The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: It is widely held that the source of de dicto necessity is in concepts, ..but I deny this... even with simple de dicto necessities, the source of the necessity is to be found in the properties to which the predicates of the de dicto truth refer. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 3) | |
A reaction: It is normal nowadays to say this about de re necessities, but this is more unusual. |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |
21275 | Unlike a stone, the parts of a watch are obviously assembled in order to show the time [Paley] |
Full Idea: When we come to inspect a watch we perceive (what we could not discover in a stone) that its several parts are put together for a purpose, to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day. | |
From: William Paley (Natural Theology [1802], Ch 1) | |
A reaction: Microscopic examination of the stone would have surprised Paley. Should we infer a geometer because the sun is spherical? Crytals look designed, but are explained by deeper chemistry. |
21276 | From the obvious purpose and structure of a watch we must infer that it was designed [Paley] |
Full Idea: The inference is inevitable that the watch had a maker; that there must have existed, at some time, an artificer or artificers who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer, who designed its use. | |
From: William Paley (Natural Theology [1802], Ch 1) | |
A reaction: It rather begs the question to refer to an ordered structure as a 'design'. Why do we think it is absurd to think the the 'purpose' of the sun is to benefit mankind? Suppose we found a freakish natural sundial in the woods. |
21277 | Even an imperfect machine can exhibit obvious design [Paley] |
Full Idea: It is not necessary that a machine be perfect, in order to show with what design it was made. | |
From: William Paley (Natural Theology [1802], Ch 1) | |
A reaction: This encounters Hume's point that you will then have to infer that the designer contains similar imperfections. If you look at plagues, famines and mothers dying in childbirth (see Mill), you might wish the designer had never started. |
21278 | All the signs of design found in a watch are also found in nature [Paley] |
Full Idea: Every indication of contrivance, every manifestation of design, which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature. | |
From: William Paley (Natural Theology [1802], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This is far from obvious. It was crucial to the watch analogy that we immediately see its one self-evident purpose. No one looks at nature and says 'Aha, I know what this is all for'. |
21357 | No organ shows purpose more obviously than the eyelid [Paley] |
Full Idea: The eyelid defends the eye; it wipes it; it closes it in sleep. Are there, in any work of art whatever, purposes more evident than those which this organ fulfils? | |
From: William Paley (Natural Theology [1802], p.24), quoted by Armand Marie LeRoi - The Lagoon: how Aristotle invented science 031 | |
A reaction: Nice to have another example, in addition to the watch. He is not wholly wrong, because it is impossible to give an evolutionary account of the development of the eyelid without referring to some sort of teleological aspect. The eyelid has a function. |