4 ideas
4262 | If the only aim was consistent beliefs then new evidence and experiments would be irrelevant [Goldman] |
Full Idea: If mere consistency is our aim in achieving a coherent set of beliefs, then new evidence and experiments are irrelevant. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (The Internalist Conception of Justification [1980], §VIII) | |
A reaction: An important reminder. What epistemic duty requires us to attend to anomalous observations, instead of sweeping them under the carpet? |
13007 | Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Archimedes gave a sort of definition of 'straight line' when he said it is the shortest line between two points. | |
From: report of Archimedes (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Gottfried Leibniz - New Essays on Human Understanding 4.13 | |
A reaction: Commentators observe that this reduces the purity of the original Euclidean axioms, because it involves distance and measurement, which are absent from the purest geometry. |
3157 | T.H.Huxley gave the earliest clear statement of epiphenomenalism [Huxley, by Rey] |
Full Idea: T.H.Huxley gave the earliest clear statement of epiphenomenalism. | |
From: report of T.H. Huxley (Method and Results [1893]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 3.1.1 | |
A reaction: This is, of course, impossible, because there can't be a clear statement of epiphenomenalism. |
3154 | Brain causes mind, but it doesn't seem that mind causes actions [Huxley] |
Full Idea: All states of consciousness are caused by molecular changes of brain substance. It seems to me there is no proof that any state of consciousness is the cause of change in the motion of the matter of the organism. | |
From: T.H. Huxley (Method and Results [1893], p.244), quoted by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 3.1.1 | |
A reaction: This sounds odd. Most people would say there is nothing more obvious than mental events causing actions. It certainly seems undeniable that actions are cause by the contents of thoughts, so a molecular account of intentional states is needed. |