5 ideas
13007 | Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Archimedes gave a sort of definition of 'straight line' when he said it is the shortest line between two points. | |
From: report of Archimedes (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Gottfried Leibniz - New Essays on Human Understanding 4.13 | |
A reaction: Commentators observe that this reduces the purity of the original Euclidean axioms, because it involves distance and measurement, which are absent from the purest geometry. |
4304 | Descartes says there are two substance, Spinoza one, and Leibniz infinitely many [Cottingham] |
Full Idea: Descartes was a dualist about substance, Spinoza was a monist, and Leibniz was a pluralist (an infinity of substances). | |
From: John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.76) | |
A reaction: Spinoza is appealing. We posit a substance, as the necessary basis for existence, but it is unclear how more than one substance can be differentiated. If mind is a separate substance, why isn't iron? Why aren't numbers? |
21516 | We want certainty in order to achieve secure results for action [Dewey] |
Full Idea: The ultimate ground of the quest for cognitive certainty is the need for security in the results for action. | |
From: John Dewey (The Quest for Certainty [1929], p.39), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 10.5 | |
A reaction: Just what a pragmatist should say. This may be true within an evolutionary account of human nature, but seems unlikely when doing a sudoku. The 'ground' of the quest may not be the same as its 'source'. |
4303 | The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics [Cottingham] |
Full Idea: The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics. | |
From: John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.75) | |
A reaction: The idea of 'substance' has had an interesting revival in modern philosophy (though not, obviously, in physics). Maybe physics and philosophy have views of reality which are not complementary, but are rivals. |
4306 | For rationalists, it is necessary that effects be deducible from their causes [Cottingham] |
Full Idea: The rationalist view of causation takes it that to make effects intelligible, it must be shown that they are in principle deducible from their causes. | |
From: John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.92) | |
A reaction: This has intuitive appeal, but deduction is only possible with further premises, such as the laws of physics. The effects of human behaviour look a bit tricky, even if we cause them. |