4577
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There is no necessity higher than natural necessity, and that is just regularity [Quine]
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Full Idea:
In principle I see no higher or more austere necessity than natural necessity; and in natural necessity, or our attribution of it, I see only Hume's regularities
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From:
Willard Quine (Necessary Truth [1963], p.76)
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A reaction:
Presumably this allows logical necessity as a 'lower' necessity, but denies 'metaphysical' necessity, in line with Hume and other tough empiricists. Personally I adore metaphysical necessities, but they are a bit hard to establish conclusively.
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15149
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Properties cluster together, either because of intrinsic relations, or because of an underlying process [Boyd, by Chakravartty]
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Full Idea:
Boyd analyses 'sociability' between properties in terms of 'homeostasis', as causal relations between properties that favour clustering, or underlying processes that favour coinstantiation, or both.
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From:
report of Richard Boyd (Homeostasis, Species and Higher Taxa [1999]) by Anjan Chakravarrty - Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences 3
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A reaction:
Chakravarty criticises this claim, but Boyd is clearly onto something. If, like me, you think natural kinds are overrated, you have to like his view.
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