70 ideas
1749 | If all laws were abolished, philosophers would still live as they do now [Aristippus elder] |
Full Idea: If all laws were abolished, philosophers would still live as they do now. | |
From: Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.4 | |
A reaction: Presumably philosophers develop inner laws which other people lack. |
4194 | Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.2) | |
A reaction: I think it is vital to hang on to this big definition, focusing on ontology, and not retreat (like Kant) to the epistemological question of how humans happen to see reality, even if we are stuck with being humans. |
4214 | Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It may well be that after all our attempts at analysis, we have to accept the notions of causality, identity and existence as being primitive and irreducible. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.191) | |
A reaction: They may be irreducible, but it seems possible that the relationships between them might be revealed (as between Platonic Forms). To exist is to have identity and causal powers? |
4222 | If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If we think, in a positivistic spirit, that only measurements and observations exist, this is strikingly naïve. The scientists and their instruments can't be composed merely of measurements. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.234) | |
A reaction: A strong rebuff to crude positivism and 'operationalism'. Such mistakes are the usual confusion of epistemology and ontology. |
4642 | No fact can be real and no proposition true unless there is a Sufficient Reason (even if we can't know it) [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The principle of sufficient reason says no fact can be real or existing and no proposition can be true unless there is a sufficient reason why it should be thus and not otherwise, even though in most cases these reasons cannot be known to us. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §32) | |
A reaction: I think of this as my earliest philosophical perception, a childish rebellion against being told that there was 'no reason' for something. My intuition tells me that it is correct, and the foundation of ontology and truth. Don't ask me to justify it! |
4217 | It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.219) | |
A reaction: Meaning there are stronger principles of thought which can trump Ockham's Razor. A few more entities won't hurt. Sound right. |
2115 | Everything in the universe is interconnected, so potentially a mind could know everything [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Every body is sensitive to everything in the universe, so that one who saw everything could read in each body what is happening everywhere, and even what has happened and will happen. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §61) |
2111 | Falsehood involves a contradiction, and truth is contradictory of falsehood [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We judge to be false that which involves a contradiction, and true that which is opposed or contradictory to the false. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §31) |
4229 | An infinite series of tasks can't be completed because it has no last member [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It appears to be impossible to complete an infinite series of tasks, since such a series has, by definition, no last member. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.290) | |
A reaction: This pinpoints the problem. So are there infinite tasks in a paradox of subdivision like the Achilles? |
4240 | It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.375) | |
A reaction: Intriguing. Sounds wrong to me. At least maths seems to need the idea of the 'correct' answer. If, however, maths is a huge pattern, there is no correctness, just the pattern. We can be wrong, but maths can't be wrong. Ah, I see…! |
4241 | If there are infinite numbers and finite concrete objects, this implies that numbers are abstract objects [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The Peano postulates imply an infinity of numbers, but there are probably not infinitely many concrete objects in existence, so natural numbers must be abstract objects. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.375) | |
A reaction: Presumably they are abstract objects even if they aren't universals. 'Abstract' is an essential term in our ontological vocabulary to cover such cases. Perhaps possible concrete objects are infinite. |
4239 | Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Nominalists tend to deny the existence of abstract objects since, given their purported nature (non-causal), we can have no reason to believe in their existence. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.372) | |
A reaction: A good point. Aristotle worried about the causal inadequacy of the Forms. My mind can conceive of a 'thing' with no causal powers, just sitting there. |
4202 | Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance [Lowe] |
Full Idea: There seem to be three kinds of change: compositional change (of component parts), qualitative change (of properties), or substantial change (when underlying essence begins or ceases). | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.59) | |
A reaction: Notice this gives 'components' a more prominent ontological status than usual. Is this computer a component of my study? |
4201 | Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [Lowe, by PG] |
Full Idea: Qualitative change is seen as either (i) 'Presentism' - 'a is F now', or (ii) 'relational properties' - 'a is F-at-t', or (iii) 'temporal parts' - 'a-at-t is F', or (iv) 'adverbial' - 'a is-a-t F'. | |
From: report of E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.44) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: The traditional view would let a stay the same over time, and change its property (ii). Lewis favours (iii). My suspicion is that thinking collapses if you abandon the tradtional view. |
4219 | Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can plausible coincide in space and time. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.225) | |
A reaction: This is certainly discouraging for anyone who wanted to make events ontologically basic. Physicalist need to be able to individuate events in a reductive way. |
4221 | Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It is sometimes said that modern physics requires us to espouse an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.233) | |
A reaction: It has to be a mistake to build our philosophical ontology on current physics, because even the physicists say they don't understand the latter very well. |
4225 | Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things [Lowe] |
Full Idea: My own preference is for a conception of events which reduces them to changes in the properties of or relations between things. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.245) | |
A reaction: Changes of property and changes of relations are two very different things. Is a 'near miss' an event? If so, is any movement an event? If movement is relative, then so are events. |
4220 | Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.229) | |
A reaction: What exactly would 'exemplify' mean here? This probably turns out to be circular when you attempt to explain what a property is. |
7644 | The monad idea incomprehensibly spiritualises matter, instead of materialising soul [La Mettrie on Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The Leibnizians with their monads have constructed an incomprehensible hypothesis. They have spiritualized matter rather than materialising the soul. | |
From: comment on Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716]) by Julien Offray de La Mettrie - Machine Man p.3 | |
A reaction: I agree with La Mettrie. This disagreement shows, I think, how important the problem of interaction between mind and body was in the century after Descartes. Drastic action seemed needed to bridge the gap, one way or the other. |
11857 | He replaced Aristotelian continuants with monads [Leibniz, by Wiggins] |
Full Idea: In the end Leibniz dethroned Aristotelian continuants, seen as imperfect from his point of view, in favour of monads. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716]) by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance Renewed 3.1 | |
A reaction: I take the 'continuants' to be either the 'ultimate subject of predication' (in 'Categories'), or 'essences' (in 'Metaphysics'). Since monads seem to be mental (presumably to explain the powers of things), this strikes me as a bit mad. |
7843 | Is a drop of urine really an infinity of thinking monads? [Voltaire on Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Can you really maintain that a drop of urine is an infinity of monads, and that each one of these has ideas, however obscure, of the entire universe? | |
From: comment on Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716]) by Francois-Marie Voltaire - works Vol 22:434 | |
A reaction: Monads are a bit like Christian theology - if you meet them cold they seem totally ridiculous, but if you meet them after ten years of careful preliminary study they make (apparently) complete sense. Defenders of panpsychism presumably like them. |
12751 | It is unclear in 'Monadology' how extended bodies relate to mind-like monads. [Garber on Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is never clear in the 'Monadologie' how exactly the world of extended bodies is related to the world of simple substances, the world of non-extended and mind-like monads. | |
From: comment on Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716]) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 9 | |
A reaction: Leibniz was always going to hit the interaction problem, as soon as he started giving an increasingly spiritual account of what a substance, and hence marginalising the 'force' which had held centre-stage earlier on. Presumably they are 'parallel'. |
19363 | Changes in a monad come from an internal principle, and the diversity within its substance [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: A monad's natural changes come from an internal principle, ...but there must be diversity in that which changes, which produces the specification and variety of substances. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §11-12) | |
A reaction: You don't have to like monads to like this generalisation (and Perkins says Leibniz had a genius for generalisations). Metaphysics must give an account of change. Succeeding time-slices etc explain nothing. Principle and substance must meet. |
19352 | A 'monad' has basic perception and appetite; a 'soul' has distinct perception and memory [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The general name 'monad' or 'entelechy' may suffice for those substances which have nothing but perception and appetition; the name 'souls' may be reserved for those having perception that is more distinct and accompanied by memory. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §19) | |
A reaction: It is basic to the study of Leibniz that you don't think monads are full-blown consciousnesses. He isn't really a panpsychist, because the level of mental activity is so minimal. There seem to be degrees of monadhood. |
4196 | The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Some metaphysicians think the fundamental categories of existence are universals and particulars, while other prefer the division between abstract and concrete. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.15) | |
A reaction: Interestingly, in trying to choose between these, it is tempting to think about the capacities of the brain. Which is the cart and which is the horse? |
4234 | Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The trope theorist holds that the blueness of a blue chair really exists as much as the chair, but is not identified with the blueness of anything else, even if it resembles it exactly. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.361) | |
A reaction: You are left with explaining how 'resemblance' works if you cannot spot some 'thing' in common. It is an inviting idea, though, because it avoids the ontological baggage of universals. |
4235 | Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The trope theorist says that a cushion is just a 'bundle' of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.362) | |
A reaction: Certainly if you dispense with the idea of substance (which is clearly bad science even if it is good metaphysics), something like this is what remains of a cushion, though it sounds more epistemological than ontological. Only philosophers care about this |
4236 | Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Tropes seem to be abstract entities because, unlike concrete entities, they are ontologically dependent; ..there are no 'free' tropes, and they must always be bundled with other appropriate tropes to exist. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.367) | |
A reaction: Only a Platonist would think that a universal property could 'exist alone'. I presume Aristotle thought universals were real, though bound up with substances. |
4197 | The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations [Lowe] |
Full Idea: One might want to divide the category of 'universals' into two sub-categories of properties and relations. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.15) | |
A reaction: This means a Platonic form like 'horse' ends up as a cluster of properties and relations. Is a substance not also a universal? |
4232 | Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Nominalists believe that only particulars exist. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.352) | |
A reaction: A neat definition. Hence they deny universals. I suspect that nominalism is incoherent. Rational thought seems easy to create with universals, impossible with just particulars. Robotics is nominalist, which is why it will fail. |
4205 | 'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Not every meaningful predicate expresses an existing property; thus 'is non-self-exemplifying' cannot refer to a property, because the property would contradict the predicate. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.100) | |
A reaction: Needs thought. The example is based on Russell's so-called Barber's Paradox. If it can't be a property, can it be a predicate? |
4233 | If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If sets are particulars, a nominalist may say that 'blueness' is a set of particulars, but which set? If the particulars 'are blue' this threatens circularity - though resemblance is usually appealed to to avoid this. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.355) | |
A reaction: This supports my suspicion that nominalism is superficially attractive and 'scientific', but when you dig deep into it the theory won't get off the ground without universals. |
4206 | Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: For the conventionalist the world is doomed to merge into an amorphous lump with no real individuality or differentiation, ..but we can hardly make our own identity in the world in the way we are supposed to conventionally create identity for objects. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.113) | |
A reaction: Very nice argument! We need to 'cut nature at the joints' (Plato), and one joint is screamingly obvious - that between observer and world. You could try denying this, but it would be a bizarre view. |
7931 | If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity [Leibniz, by Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: For Leibniz, to distinguish between a substance and its properties in order to provide a thing or entity in which properties can inhere leads necessarily to the absurd conclusion that the substance itself must be a truly characterless non-entity. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.3 | |
A reaction: This is obviously one of the basic thoughts in any discussion of substances. It is why physicists ignore them, and Leibniz opted for a 'bundle' theory. But the alternative seems daft too - free-floating properties, hooked onto one another. |
4204 | Statues can't survive much change to their shape, unlike lumps of bronze, which must retain material [Lowe] |
Full Idea: A statue is a kind of object which cannot survive much change to its shape, unlike a lump of bronze, which cannot survive any change to its material composition. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.70) | |
A reaction: Also the statue could survive being hollowed out, changing its material composition. Hence a statue is not just a lump of bronze, but we knew that. |
4198 | If 5% replacement preserves a ship, we can replace 4% and 4% again, and still retain the ship [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If we say that up to 5% of a ship's parts can be replaced without the ship ceasing to exist, we could replace 4% and then 4% again, and it would retain its identity, if identity is transitive. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.26) | |
A reaction: One suspected that all attempts at precision with the ship of Theseus were doomed, but this nicely demonstrates it. |
4199 | A renovation or a reconstruction of an original ship would be accepted, as long as the other one didn't exist [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If a ship is renovated without reconstruction of original parts, we happily identify the renovation with the original; if there was a reconstruction without the renovated version, we would identify the reconstruction with the original. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.27) | |
A reaction: This really shakes our belief in identity as a natural rather than mental phenomenon. The existence of clones undermines our normal idea of personal identity. |
4200 | If old parts are stored and then appropriated, they are no longer part of the original (which is the renovated ship). [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The parts of a ship in a warehouse belong to no ship at all, ..and once they are appropriated by another ship they cease to be parts of the original, ..so it seems that the renovated ship (not the reconstruction) is identified with the original. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.31) | |
A reaction: The parts in the warehouse could belong to the original (they might even labelled), but assigning them to a new ship does indeed look like a crucial break in the continuity. |
17554 | There must be some internal difference between any two beings in nature [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There are never two beings in nature that are perfectly alike, two beings in which it is not possible to discover an internal difference, that is, one founded on an intrinsic denomination. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §09) | |
A reaction: From this it follows that if two things really are indiscernible, then we must say that they are one thing. He says monads all differ from one another. People certainly do. Leibniz must say this of electrons. How can he know this? |
4203 | Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties) [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The Identity of Indiscernibles (no two objects can possess exactly the same properties) is not the same as Leibniz's Law (what is true of a thing is true of what is identical with that thing). | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.62) | |
A reaction: Two things can't be the same because we can't discern the difference, which may be our inadequacy. But if they actually have identical properties, it is hard to see how they could be different. A universe with just two perfect spheres is couterexample. |
4195 | It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Reasoning itself depends upon a grasp of possibilities, because a valid argument is one in which it is not possible for the conclusion to be false if the premises are true. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.11) | |
A reaction: A very valuable corrective to my pessimistic view of philosophers' attempts to understand metaphysical necessity. But if we can only grasp natural necessity, then all reason is naturalistic. |
2112 | Truths of reason are known by analysis, and are necessary; facts are contingent, and their opposites possible [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There are two kinds of truths: of reasoning and of facts. Truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposites impossible. Facts are contingent and their opposites possible. A necessary truth is known by analysis. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §33) |
4207 | We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It may be possible to eliminate the modal operators (in English, 'is possible' and 'is necessary') in favour of quantifier expressions with variables ranging over possible worlds. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.121) | |
A reaction: Hence 'necessary' becomes 'exists/is true in all possible worlds'. Deep problems, but at least we must show that referring to 'possible' worlds isn't a circular explanation of 'is possible'. |
9344 | Mathematical analysis ends in primitive principles, which cannot be and need not be demonstrated [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: At the end of the analytical method in mathematics there are simple ideas of which no definition can be given. Moreover there are axioms and postulates, in short, primitive principles, which cannot be demonstrated and do not need demonstration. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §35) | |
A reaction: My view is that we do not know such principles when we apprehend them in isolation. I would call them 'intuitions'. They only ascend to the status of knowledge when the mathematics is extended and derived from them, and found to work. |
2110 | We all expect the sun to rise tomorrow by experience, but astronomers expect it by reason [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: When we expect it to be day tomorrow, we all behave as empiricists, because until now it has always happened thus. The astronomer alone knows this by reason. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §28) |
4223 | Unfalsifiability may be a failure in an empirical theory, but it is a virtue in metaphysics [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Although unfalsifiability is probably a defect in scientific hypothesis, because it is deprived of empirical content, it seems rather to be a virtue in a metaphysical hypothesis. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.241) | |
A reaction: Presumably nothing could ever be found to count against a necessary truth. A nice point. 'Find me an instance where 2+2 is not 4'. |
4193 | The behaviour of persons and social groups seems to need rational rather than causal explanation [Lowe] |
Full Idea: There are some entities which exist in time and space (such as persons or social groups) of which the behaviour seems to be subject to rational rather than merely causal explanation. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.2) | |
A reaction: This begs of the question of whether 'rational' can be reduced to causal. We can't manage causal explanations of the very complex, so we use broad-brush second-best explanations? |
2109 | Increase a conscious machine to the size of a mill - you still won't see perceptions in it [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If a conscious machine were increased in size, one might enter it like a mill, but we should only see the parts impinging on one another; we should not see anything which would explain a perception. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §17) | |
A reaction: A wonderful image for capturing a widely held intuition. It seems to motivate Colin McGinn's 'Mysterianism'. The trouble is Leibniz didn't think big/small enough. Down at the level of molecules it might become obvious what a perception is. 'Might'. |
19362 | We know the 'I' and its contents by abstraction from awareness of necessary truths [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is through the knowledge of necessary truths and through their abstraction that we rise to reflective acts, which enable us to think of that which is called "I" and enable us to consider that this or that is in us. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §30) | |
A reaction: For Leibniz, necessary truth can only be known a priori. Sense experience won't reveal the self, as Hume observed. We evidently 'abstract' the idea of 'I' from the nature of a priori thought. Animals have no self (or morals) for this reason. |
4238 | The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The centre of mass of the solar system seems to lack causal powers, and so is an abstract object, even though it has a location and movement. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.368) | |
A reaction: Nice example, with rich ramifications. Abstraction is deeply tied into our understanding of the physical world, and our concept of identity. |
4237 | Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Concrete objects possess causal powers and relations, but abstract objects are incapable of having causal powers or relations. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.368) | |
A reaction: Is this an observation or a definition? One might claim that an abstraction (such as a political ideal) can acquire causal power through a conscious mnd. |
3558 | Only the Cyrenaics reject the idea of a final moral end [Aristippus elder, by Annas] |
Full Idea: The Cyrenaics are the most radical ancient moral philosophers, since they are the only school explicitly to reject the importance of achieving an overall final end. | |
From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 11.1 | |
A reaction: This looks like dropping out, but it could also be Keats's 'negative capability', of simply participating in existence without needing to do anything about it. |
5835 | The road of freedom is the surest route to happiness [Aristippus elder, by Xenophon] |
Full Idea: The surest road to happiness is not the path through rule nor through servitude, but through liberty. | |
From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Xenophon - Memorabilia of Socrates 2.1.9 | |
A reaction: The great anarchist slogan. Personally I don't believe it, because I agree a little with Hobbes that authority is required to make cooperation flourish, and that is essential for full happiness. If I were a slave, I would agree with Aristippus. |
1751 | Pleasure is the good, because we always seek it, it satisfies us, and its opposite is the most avoidable thing [Aristippus elder, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Pleasure is the good because we desire it from childhood, when we have it we seek nothing further, and the most avoidable thing is its opposite, pain. | |
From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.8 |
3018 | People who object to extravagant pleasures just love money [Aristippus elder, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: When blamed for buying expensive food he asked "Would you have bought it for just three obols?" When the person said yes, he said,"Then it is not that I am fond of pleasure, but that you are fond of money". | |
From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.4 |
1755 | Errors result from external influence, and should be corrected, not hated [Aristippus elder, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Errors ought to meet with pardon, for a man does not err intentionally, but influenced by some external circumstances. We should not hate someone who has erred, but teach him better. | |
From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.9 |
12707 | The true elements are atomic monads [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Monads are the true atoms of nature and, in brief, the elements of things. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], (opening)), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2 | |
A reaction: Thus in one sentence Leibniz gives us a theory of natural elements, and an account of atoms. This kind of speculation got metaphysics a bad name when science unravelled a more accurate picture. The bones must be picked out of Leibniz. |
4210 | If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition [Lowe] |
Full Idea: You can't include in your concept of causation a clause stipulating that the cause occurred earlier than the effect, because that would rule out backward causation by definition. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.176) | |
A reaction: It may, though, be the case that backward causes can't occur, and time is essential to causes. The problem is our inability to know this for sure. |
4209 | The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.173) | |
A reaction: This is slippery ground because both 'facts' and 'events' have uncertain ontological status, and seem partly conventional rather than natural. Events might be natural surges or transformations of energy? |
4215 | It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It seems proper to say that events of themselves possess no causal powers; only persisting objects (individual substances) possess causal powers. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.211) | |
A reaction: This requires events to be reduced to substances, which invites Aristotle's question of where the movement comes from. In physcis, 'energy' is the key concept. |
4211 | Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe] |
Full Idea: In causation there is 'overdetermination' (c and d occurred, and were both sufficient for e), 'pre-emption' (c and d occurred, and d would have stepped in if c hadn't), or 'fail-safe' (if c hadn't occurred, d would have occurred and done it). | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.179) | |
A reaction: Two safety nets together, two safety nets spaced apart, or a second net which pops in if the first breaks. Nice distinctions. |
4213 | Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Causation relations between events may an instance of a causal law, with laws either interpreted as constant conjunctions (Hume), or as necessitation among universals (Armstrong). | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.190) | |
A reaction: Hume's version is a thin idea of a law, but we can dream about the metaphysical status of laws, even if we don't know much about them. Lowe says a cause without a law is perfectly intelligible. |
4212 | Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe] |
Full Idea: One thing Hume has taught us is that the necessity which causation involves is at most 'natural' or 'physical' necessity, not metaphysical necessity. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.182) | |
A reaction: Given Hume's epistemological scepticism, I don't think he would claim to have shown such a thing. See G.Strawson's book. Metaphysical necessity of causation is possible, but unknowable. |
14581 | The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members [Lowe, by Mumford/Anjum] |
Full Idea: For Lowe law statements are in a sense about what 'ought' to be the case. The 'ought' is not an explicitly moral or anthropomorphic one but instead tells us what is the natural behaviour of kind members. | |
From: report of E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002]) by S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum - Getting Causes from Powers 8.6 | |
A reaction: This is the 'normative' view of laws (as opposed to the intentional, dispositional, or regularity accounts). They cite Lowe 1989 Ch.8. The obvious immediate problem is things which evolved for one purpose and end up being used for another. |
4208 | 'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Counterfactual analyses of event causation don't seem to work, because 'if Napoleon hadn't been born he wouldn't have died' is true, but doesn't mean his birth caused his death. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.161) | |
A reaction: Nice counterexample, which looks pretty conclusive. Birth makes death possible; it creates the necessary conditions within which it can be caused. |
4224 | If motion is change of distance between objects, it involves no intrinsic change in the objects [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If motion just is change of distance between two objects, it does not involve any kind of intrinsic change in the objects in question. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.242) | |
A reaction: It sound respectably relativistic, but I doubt the definition. x is moving relative to y, then y attains x's velocity, so x ceases to move? Maybe. |
4227 | Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space, but 'limits', which are abstract [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space at all, but just 'limits' of certain kinds, and as such 'abstract' entities. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.254) | |
A reaction: This is fairly crucial when dealing with Zeno's paradoxes. How many points in a line? How long to get through a point? |
4228 | If space is entirely relational, what makes a boundary, or a place unoccupied by physical objects? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If space does not exist at all, but is only relations between objects, what could one possibly mean by saying that there is a place which is unoccupied by any material object? And what determines whether space is bounded? | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.264) | |
A reaction: Correct. People who assert that space is only relational have been misled by what we can know about space, not what it is. |
2114 | This is the most perfect possible universe, in its combination of variety with order [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: From all the possible universes God chooses this one to obtain as much variety as possible, but with the greatest order possible; that is, it is the means of obtaining the greatest perfection possible. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §58) |
2113 | God alone (the Necessary Being) has the privilege that He must exist if He is possible [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: God alone (or the Necessary Being) has the privilege that He must exist if He is possible. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §45) |