Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works (all lost)', 'In Defense of Absolute Essentialism' and 'Whitehead: process and cosmology'

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14 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
If all laws were abolished, philosophers would still live as they do now [Aristippus elder]
     Full Idea: If all laws were abolished, philosophers would still live as they do now.
     From: Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.4
     A reaction: Presumably philosophers develop inner laws which other people lack.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Metaphysics attempts to give an account of everything, in terms of categories and principles [Simons]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics, the noblest of philosophic enterprises, is an attempt to give an account of everything. ...Its job is to provide a universal framework (of categories and principles) within which anything whatever can take its place.
     From: Peter Simons (Whitehead: process and cosmology [2009], 'Speculative')
     A reaction: Bravo! I take metaphysics to be entirely continuous with science, but operating entirely at the highest level of generality. See Westerhoff on categories, though. The enterprise may not be going too well.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: A property P is an essential property of an object x iff x could not exist and lack P, that is, as they say, iff x has P at every world at which x exists.
     From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 1)
     A reaction: This immediately places the existence of x outside the normal range of its properties, so presumably 'existence is not a predicate', but that dictum may be doubted. As it stands this definition will include trivial and vacuous properties.
Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: Essential properties may be trivial or nontrivial. It is characteristic of P's being trivially essential to x that x's possession of P is not grounded in the specific nature of x.
     From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 2)
     A reaction: This is where my objection to the modal view of essence arises. How is he going to explain 'grounded' and 'specific nature' without supplying an entirely different account of essence?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: A relation R is essential to x and y (in that order) iff Rxy holds at every world where x and y both exist.
     From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 2)
     A reaction: I find this bizarre. Not only does this seem to me to have nothing whatever to do with essence, but also the relation might hold even though it is a purely contingent matter. All rabbits are a reasonable distance from the local star. Essence of rabbit?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: The main groups of trivially essential properties are (a) existence, self-identity, or their consequences in S5; and (b) properties possessed in virtue of some de dicto necessary truth.
     From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 2)
     A reaction: He adds 'extraneously essential' properties, which also strike me as being trivial, involving relations. 'Is such that 2+2=4' or 'is such that something exists' might be necessary, but they don't, I would say, have anything to do with essence.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: P is 'extraneously essential' to x iff it is possessed by x at any world w only in virtue of the possession at w of certain properties by other objects.
     From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 2)
     A reaction: I would say that these are the sorts of properties which have nothing to do with being essential, even if they are deemed to be necessary.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: In the case of artefacts, there is an essentialism about original matter; for instance, it would be said of any particular bronze statue that it could not have been cast from a totally different quantity of bronze.
     From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 3)
     A reaction: Forbes isn't endorsing this, and it doesn't sound convincing. He quotes the thought 'I wish I had made this pot from a different piece of clay'. We might corrupt a statue by switching bronze, but I don't think the sculptor could do so.
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: It is widely held that the source of de dicto necessity is in concepts, ..but I deny this... even with simple de dicto necessities, the source of the necessity is to be found in the properties to which the predicates of the de dicto truth refer.
     From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 3)
     A reaction: It is normal nowadays to say this about de re necessities, but this is more unusual.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
Only the Cyrenaics reject the idea of a final moral end [Aristippus elder, by Annas]
     Full Idea: The Cyrenaics are the most radical ancient moral philosophers, since they are the only school explicitly to reject the importance of achieving an overall final end.
     From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 11.1
     A reaction: This looks like dropping out, but it could also be Keats's 'negative capability', of simply participating in existence without needing to do anything about it.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
The road of freedom is the surest route to happiness [Aristippus elder, by Xenophon]
     Full Idea: The surest road to happiness is not the path through rule nor through servitude, but through liberty.
     From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Xenophon - Memorabilia of Socrates 2.1.9
     A reaction: The great anarchist slogan. Personally I don't believe it, because I agree a little with Hobbes that authority is required to make cooperation flourish, and that is essential for full happiness. If I were a slave, I would agree with Aristippus.
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 3. Cyrenaic School
People who object to extravagant pleasures just love money [Aristippus elder, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: When blamed for buying expensive food he asked "Would you have bought it for just three obols?" When the person said yes, he said,"Then it is not that I am fond of pleasure, but that you are fond of money".
     From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.4
Pleasure is the good, because we always seek it, it satisfies us, and its opposite is the most avoidable thing [Aristippus elder, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Pleasure is the good because we desire it from childhood, when we have it we seek nothing further, and the most avoidable thing is its opposite, pain.
     From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.8
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Errors result from external influence, and should be corrected, not hated [Aristippus elder, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Errors ought to meet with pardon, for a man does not err intentionally, but influenced by some external circumstances. We should not hate someone who has erred, but teach him better.
     From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.9