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All the ideas for 'works (all lost)', 'Phil of Mathematics and Natural Science' and 'Models'

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14 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
If all laws were abolished, philosophers would still live as they do now [Aristippus elder]
     Full Idea: If all laws were abolished, philosophers would still live as they do now.
     From: Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.4
     A reaction: Presumably philosophers develop inner laws which other people lack.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 7. Scientific Models
Theoretical models can represent, by mapping onto the data-models [Portides]
     Full Idea: The semantic approach contends that theoretical models ...are candidates for representing physical systems by virtue of the fact that they stand in mapping relations to corresponding data-models.
     From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Current')
     A reaction: Sounds like a neat and satisfying picture.
In the 'received view' models are formal; the 'semantic view' emphasises representation [Portides, by PG]
     Full Idea: The 'received view' of models is that they are Tarskian formal axiomatic calculi interpreted by meta-mathematical models. The 'semantic' view of models gives equal importance to their representational capacity.
     From: report of Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'background') by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: The Tarskian view is the one covered in my section on Model Theory. Portides favours the semantic account, and I am with him all the way. Should models primarily integrate with formal systems, or with the world? Your choice...
Representational success in models depends on success of their explanations [Portides]
     Full Idea: Models are representational, independently of the strength of their relation to theory, depending on how well they achieve the purpose of providing explanations for what occurs in physical systems.
     From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Current')
     A reaction: This doesn't sound quite right. It seems possible to have a perfect representation of a system which remains quite baffling (because too complex, or with obscure ingredients). Does the stylised London tube map explain well but represent badly?
The best model of the atomic nucleus is the one which explains the most results [Portides]
     Full Idea: The unified model can be considered a better representation of the atomic nucleus in comparison to the liquid-drop and shell models, because it explains most of the known results about the nucleus.
     From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Current')
     A reaction: The point here is that models are evaluated not just by their accuracy, but by their explanatory power. Presumably a great model is satisfying and illuminating. Do the best models capture the essence of a thing?
'Model' belongs in a family of concepts, with representation, idealisation and abstraction [Portides]
     Full Idea: A better understanding of 'model', as used in science, could be achieved if we examine it as a member of the triad of concepts of representation, idealisation and abstraction.
     From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Intro')
     A reaction: Abstraction seems to have a bad name in philosophy, and yet when you come to discuss things like models, you can't express it any other way.
Models are theory-driven, or phenomenological (more empirical and specific) [Portides]
     Full Idea: 'Theory-driven' models are constructed in a systematic theory-regulated way by supplementing the theoretical calculus with locally operative hypotheses. 'Phenomenological' models deploy semi-empirical results, with ad hoc hypotheses, and extra concepts.
     From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Intro')
     A reaction: [compressed] I am not at all clear about this distinction, even after reading his whole article. The first type of model seems more general, while the second seems tuned to particular circumstances. He claims the second type is more explanatory.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
General theories may be too abstract to actually explain the mechanisms [Portides]
     Full Idea: If theoretical models are highly abstract and idealised descriptions of phenomena, they may only represent general features, and fail to explain the specific mechanisms at work in physical systems.
     From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Current')
     A reaction: [compressed] While there may be an ideal theory that explains everything, it sounds right capturing the actual mechanism (such as the stirrup bone in the ear) is not at all theoretical.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
Only the Cyrenaics reject the idea of a final moral end [Aristippus elder, by Annas]
     Full Idea: The Cyrenaics are the most radical ancient moral philosophers, since they are the only school explicitly to reject the importance of achieving an overall final end.
     From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 11.1
     A reaction: This looks like dropping out, but it could also be Keats's 'negative capability', of simply participating in existence without needing to do anything about it.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
The road of freedom is the surest route to happiness [Aristippus elder, by Xenophon]
     Full Idea: The surest road to happiness is not the path through rule nor through servitude, but through liberty.
     From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Xenophon - Memorabilia of Socrates 2.1.9
     A reaction: The great anarchist slogan. Personally I don't believe it, because I agree a little with Hobbes that authority is required to make cooperation flourish, and that is essential for full happiness. If I were a slave, I would agree with Aristippus.
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 3. Cyrenaic School
Pleasure is the good, because we always seek it, it satisfies us, and its opposite is the most avoidable thing [Aristippus elder, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Pleasure is the good because we desire it from childhood, when we have it we seek nothing further, and the most avoidable thing is its opposite, pain.
     From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.8
People who object to extravagant pleasures just love money [Aristippus elder, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: When blamed for buying expensive food he asked "Would you have bought it for just three obols?" When the person said yes, he said,"Then it is not that I am fond of pleasure, but that you are fond of money".
     From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.4
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Errors result from external influence, and should be corrected, not hated [Aristippus elder, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Errors ought to meet with pardon, for a man does not err intentionally, but influenced by some external circumstances. We should not hate someone who has erred, but teach him better.
     From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.9
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
The limit of science is isomorphism of theories, with essences a matter of indifference [Weyl]
     Full Idea: A science can determine its domain of investigation up to an isomorphic mapping. It remains quite indifferent as to the 'essence' of its objects. The idea of isomorphism demarcates the self-evident boundary of cognition.
     From: Hermann Weyl (Phil of Mathematics and Natural Science [1949], 25-7), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics
     A reaction: Shapiro quotes this in support of his structuralism, but it is a striking expression of the idea that if there are such things as essences, they are beyond science. I take Weyl to be wrong. Best explanation reaches out beyond models to essences.