63 ideas
| 1749 | If all laws were abolished, philosophers would still live as they do now [Aristippus elder] |
| Full Idea: If all laws were abolished, philosophers would still live as they do now. | |
| From: Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.4 | |
| A reaction: Presumably philosophers develop inner laws which other people lack. |
| 6814 | Instead of prayer and charity, sinners pursue vain disputes and want their own personal scripture [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: The sinners will say 'we never prayed or fed the hungry. We engaged in vain disputes and denied the Day of Reckoning'. Indeed, each one of them demands a scripture of his own to be unrolled before him. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.74) | |
| A reaction: The implication seems to be that most disputes are 'vain'. The charge that everyone wants a 'scripture of his own' is a nice challenge to the world of liberal education, where we are all enjoined to pursue our personalised routes to our own truth. |
| 9449 | The plausible Barcan formula implies modality in the actual world [Bird] |
| Full Idea: Modality in the actual world is the import of the Barcan formula, and there are good reasons for accepting the Barcan formula. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: If you thought logic was irrelevant to metaphysics, this should make you think twice. |
| 9501 | If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects [Bird] |
| Full Idea: If one says that 'everything that exists is causally active', that rules out abstracta (notably sets and numbers), and it rules out objects that are causally isolated. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 5.5) | |
| A reaction: I like the principle. I take abstracta to be brain events, so they are causally active, within highly refined and focused brains, and if your physics is built on the notion of fields then I would think a 'causally isolated' object incoherent. |
| 9500 | If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched [Bird] |
| Full Idea: If one's naturalistic principles are formulated in terms of supervenience, then necessary entities are left untouched. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 5.5) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be part of the reason why some people like supervenience - that it leaves a pure 'space of reasons' which is unreachable from the flesh and blood inside a cranium. Personall I like the space of reasons, but I drop the 'pure'. |
| 9502 | There might be just one fundamental natural property [Bird] |
| Full Idea: The thought that there might be just one fundamental natural property is not that strange. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 6.3) | |
| A reaction: A nice variation on the Parmenides idea that only the One exists. Bird's point would refer to a possible unification of modern physics. We see, for example, the forces of electricity and of magnetism turning out to be the same force. |
| 9477 | Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds [Bird] |
| Full Idea: Categorical properties do not have their dispositional characters modally fixed, but may change their dispositional characters (and their causal and nomic behaviour more generally) across different worlds. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: This is the key ground for Bird's praiseworth opposition to categorical propertie. I take it to be a nonsense to call the category in which we place something a 'property' of that thing. A confusion of thought with reality. |
| 9490 | The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird] |
| Full Idea: In the categoricalist view, the essential properties of a natural property are limited to its essentially being itself and not some distinct property. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 4.1) | |
| A reaction: He associates this view with Lewis (modern regularity view) and Armstrong (nomic necessitation), and launches a splendid attack against it. I have always laughed at the idea that 'being Socrates' was one of the properties of Socrates. |
| 9495 | If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it [Bird] |
| Full Idea: The possibility of abstract definition does not show that we have defined a property that we can know, independently of any theory, that it is physically possible for some object to possess. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 4.2.3.1) | |
| A reaction: This is a naturalist resisting the idea that there is no more to a property than set-membership. I strongly agree. We need a firm notion of properties as features of the actual world; anything else should be called something like 'categorisations'. |
| 9492 | Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them [Bird] |
| Full Idea: The categoricalist conception of properties takes them to be quiddities, which are primitive identities between fundamental qualities, having no difference with regard to their essence. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 4.5) | |
| A reaction: Compare 'haecceitism' about indentity of objects, though 'quidditism' sounds even less plausible. Bird attributes this view to Lewis and Armstrong, and makes it sound well daft. |
| 9503 | To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate [Bird] |
| Full Idea: It isn't clear what it is to name an abundant property. One might reify them, as akin to Fregean concepts, or it might be equivalent to a simple predication. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 7.1.2) | |
| A reaction: 'Fregean concepts' would make them functions that purely link things (hence relational?). One suspects that people who actually treat abundant properties as part of their ontology (Lewis) are confusing natural properties with predicates. |
| 14540 | Only real powers are fundamental [Bird, by Mumford/Anjum] |
| Full Idea: Bird says only real powers are fundamental. | |
| From: report of Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007]) by S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum - Getting Causes from Powers 1.5 | |
| A reaction: They disagree, and want higher-level properties in their ontology. I'm with Bird, except that something must exist to have the powers. Powers are fundamental to all the activity of nature, and are intrinsic to the stuff which constitutes nature. |
| 9450 | If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird] |
| Full Idea: Potencies are characterized in terms of their stimulus and manifestation properties, then if potencies are the only properties then these properties are also potencies, and must be characterized by yet further properties, leading to a vicious regress. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: This is cited as the most popular objection to the dispositional account of properties. |
| 9498 | The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird] |
| Full Idea: The essence of a potency involves a relation to something else; if inertial mass is a potency then its essence involves a relation to a stimulus property (impressed force) and a manifestation property (acceleration). | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 5.3.3) | |
| A reaction: It doesn't seem quite right to say that the relations are part of the essence, if they might not occur, but some other relations might happen in their place. An essence is what makes a relation possible (like being good-looking). |
| 9474 | A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out [Bird] |
| Full Idea: Finkish dispositions arise because the time delay between stimulus and manifestation provides an opportunity for the disposition to go out of existence and so halt the process that would bring about the manifestation. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 2.2.3) | |
| A reaction: This is a problem for the conditional analysis of dispositions; there may be a disposition, but it never reaches manifestation. Bird rightly points us towards actual powers rather than dispositions that need manifestation. |
| 9475 | A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break [Bird] |
| Full Idea: If a robust iron pot is attached to a bomb with a sensitive detonator. If the pot is struck, the bomb will go off, so they counterfactual 'if the pot were struck it would break' is true, but it is not a fragile pot. This is a 'mimic' of the disposition. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 2.2.5.1) | |
| A reaction: A very nice example, showing that a true disposition would have to be an internal feature (a power) of the pot itself, not a mere disposition to behave. The problem is these pesky empiricists, who want to reduce it all to what is observable. |
| 9499 | Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions [Bird] |
| Full Idea: The Megarian actualist denies that a disposition can exist without being manifested. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 5.4) | |
| A reaction: I agree with Bird that this extreme realism seems wrong. As he puts it (p.109), "unrealized possibilities must be part of the actual world". This commitment is beginning to change my understanding of the world I am looking at. |
| 9486 | Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular? [Bird] |
| Full Idea: An instantiation condition seems to be a failure of nerve as regards realism about universals. If universals really are entities in their own right, why should their existence depend upon a relationship with existing particulars? | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.2.2) | |
| A reaction: I like this challenge, which seems to leave fans of universals no option but full-blown Platonism, which most of them recognise as being deeply implausible. |
| 9472 | Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common [Bird] |
| Full Idea: The realist view of resemblance nominalism is that it is resemblance that needs explaining. When there is resemblance it is natural to want to explain it, in terms of something held in common. Explanations end somewhere, but not with resemblance. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 2.1.2) | |
| A reaction: I smell a regress. If a knife and a razor resemble because they share sharpness, you have to see that the sharp phenomenon falls within the category of 'sharpness' before you can make the connection, which is spotting its similarity. |
| 9482 | If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity [Bird] |
| Full Idea: It does not add to the kinds of necessity to say that p is 'nomologically necessary' iff (the laws of nature → p) is metaphysically necessary. That trick of construction could be pulled for 'feline necessity' (true in all worlds that contain cats). | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.1.2) | |
| A reaction: I love it! Bird seems to think that the only necessity is 'metaphysical' necessity, true in all possible worlds, and he is right. The question arises in modal logic, though, of the accessibility between worlds (which might give degrees of necessity?). |
| 9481 | Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility [Bird] |
| Full Idea: I do not regard logical necessitation as a kind of necessity. It is logically possible that George Orwell is not Eric Blair, but in what sense is this any kind of possibility? It arises from having two names, but that confers no genuine possibility. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.1.2) | |
| A reaction: How refreshing. All kinds of concepts like this are just accepted by philosophers as obvious, until someone challenges them. The whole undergrowth of modal thinking needs a good flamethrower taken to it. |
| 9505 | Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote [Bird] |
| Full Idea: Whereas the link between imaginability and possibility was once held, under the influence of empiricism, to be close, it is now widely held to be very remote. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 8) | |
| A reaction: Tim Williamson nicely argues the opposite - that assessment of possibility is an adjunct of our ability to think counterfactually, which is precisely an operation of the imagination. Big error is possible, but how else could we do it? |
| 9491 | Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence [Bird] |
| Full Idea: The core of haecceitism is the view that the transworld identity of particulars does not supervene on their qualitative features. ...The simplest expression of it is that particulars lack essential properties. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 4.2.1) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be something the 'bare substratum' account of substance (associated with Locke). You are left with the difficulty of how to individuate an instance of the haecceity, as opposed to the bundle of properties attached to it. |
| 9487 | We can't reject all explanations because of a regress; inexplicable A can still explain B [Bird] |
| Full Idea: Some regard the potential regress of explanations as a reason to think that the very idea of explanation is illusory. This is a fallacy; it is not a necessary condition on A's explaining B that we have an explanation for A also. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.2.4) | |
| A reaction: True, though to say 'B is explained by A, but A is totally baffling' is not the account we are dreaming of. And the explanation would certainly fail if we could say nothing at all about A, apart from naming it. |
| 3558 | Only the Cyrenaics reject the idea of a final moral end [Aristippus elder, by Annas] |
| Full Idea: The Cyrenaics are the most radical ancient moral philosophers, since they are the only school explicitly to reject the importance of achieving an overall final end. | |
| From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 11.1 | |
| A reaction: This looks like dropping out, but it could also be Keats's 'negative capability', of simply participating in existence without needing to do anything about it. |
| 5835 | The road of freedom is the surest route to happiness [Aristippus elder, by Xenophon] |
| Full Idea: The surest road to happiness is not the path through rule nor through servitude, but through liberty. | |
| From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Xenophon - Memorabilia of Socrates 2.1.9 | |
| A reaction: The great anarchist slogan. Personally I don't believe it, because I agree a little with Hobbes that authority is required to make cooperation flourish, and that is essential for full happiness. If I were a slave, I would agree with Aristippus. |
| 3018 | People who object to extravagant pleasures just love money [Aristippus elder, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: When blamed for buying expensive food he asked "Would you have bought it for just three obols?" When the person said yes, he said,"Then it is not that I am fond of pleasure, but that you are fond of money". | |
| From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.4 |
| 1751 | Pleasure is the good, because we always seek it, it satisfies us, and its opposite is the most avoidable thing [Aristippus elder, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Pleasure is the good because we desire it from childhood, when we have it we seek nothing further, and the most avoidable thing is its opposite, pain. | |
| From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.8 |
| 6823 | Repay evil with good and your enemies will become friends (though this is hard) [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: Requite evil with good, and he who is your enemy will become your dearest friend; but none will attain this save those who endure with fortitude and are greatly favoured by Allah. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.41) | |
| A reaction: This seems opposed to some of the more vengeful remarks in the Koran. It strikes me as good common sense, since vengeance only seems to breed counter-vengeance. It doesn't carry the full altruistic commitment, though, of unrewarded love. |
| 6828 | You may break off a treaty if you fear treachery from your ally [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: If you fear treachery from any of your allies, you may retaliate by breaking off your treaty with them; Allah does not love the treacherous. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.8) | |
| A reaction: I do not think this is good advice. Everybody fears treachery, but if we all acted on that fear human relationships and society would immediately collapse. If anyone thought this was good advice, I would not want to make a treaty with them. |
| 6826 | Allah rewards those who are devout, sincere, patient, humble, charitable, chaste, and who fast [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: Allah will bestow forgiveness and a rich reward on those, both men and women, who are devout, sincere, patient, humble, charitable and chaste; who fast and are ever mindful of Allah. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.33) | |
| A reaction: Most people would still agree that all of these are virtues, though other lists will show interesting virtues that are not mentioned here, and many on this list seem overrated in the modern pantheon of virtues. |
| 6822 | Those who avenge themselves when wronged incur no guilt [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: Those who avenge themselves when wronged incur no guilt. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.42) | |
| A reaction: Compare Ideas 1659 (Protagoras), 346 (Socrates), 6288 (Jesus), and 4286 (Scruton!). In the light of those ideas, this comment in the Koran strikes me as coming from an older and less civilized world. |
| 1755 | Errors result from external influence, and should be corrected, not hated [Aristippus elder, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Errors ought to meet with pardon, for a man does not err intentionally, but influenced by some external circumstances. We should not hate someone who has erred, but teach him better. | |
| From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.9 |
| 6833 | Punish theft in men or women by cutting off their hands [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: As for the man or woman who is guilty of theft, cut off their hands to punish them for their crimes. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: I find this shocking because it is irrevocable and offers no hope of redemption. It is particularly shocking that the text does not enjoin any caution about inflicting the punishment on the young, most of whom reform from thieving in later life. |
| 6825 | Do not kill except for a just cause [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: Do not kill except for a just cause. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.25) | |
| A reaction: Slippery slope! I can see that pleasure would not be a just cause, and ensuring the entry of all humanity to paradise might be one, but I find the area in between a little unclear. The Koran seems to allow you to decide for yourself. |
| 6832 | Killing a human, except as just punishment, is like killing all mankind [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: We laid it down for the Israelites that whoever killed a human being, except as a punishment for murder or other wicked crimes, should be looked upon as though he had killed all mankind. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: It seems inconceivable that the Koran could be used to justify indiscriminate terrorism, in the light of remarks such as this. |
| 9493 | We should explain causation by powers, not powers by causation [Bird] |
| Full Idea: The notion of 'causal power' is not to be analysed in terms of causation; if anything, the relationship is the reverse. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 4.2.1 n71) | |
| A reaction: It is a popular view these days to take causation as basic (as opposed to the counterfactual account), but I prefer this view. If anything is basic in nature, it is the dynamic force in the engine room, which is the active powers of substances. |
| 9494 | Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws [Bird] |
| Full Idea: While singularists about causation might think that a particular has its causal powers independently of law, it is difficult to see how a universal could have or confer causal powers without generating what we would naturally think of as a law. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 4.2.1 n71) | |
| A reaction: This is a middle road between the purely singularist account (Anscombe) and the fully nomological account. We might say that a caused event will be 'involved in law-like behaviour', without attributing the cause to a law. |
| 9507 | Laws are explanatory relationships of things, which supervene on their essences [Bird] |
| Full Idea: The laws of a domain are the fundamental, general explanatory relationships between kinds, quantities, and qualities of that domain, that supervene upon the essential natures of those things. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 10.1) | |
| A reaction: This is the scientific essentialist view of laws [see entries there, in 'Laws of Nature']. There seems uncertainty between 'kinds' and 'qualities' (with 'quantities' looking like a category mistake). I vote, with Ellis, for natural kinds as the basis. |
| 9488 | Laws are either disposition regularities, or relations between properties [Bird] |
| Full Idea: Instead of viewing laws as regular relationships between dispositional properties and stimulus-manifestation, they can be conceived of as a relation between properties. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.4) | |
| A reaction: Bird offers these as the two main views, with the first coming from scientific essentialism, and the second from Armstrong's account of universals. Personally I favour the first, but Bird suggests that powers give the best support for both views. |
| 9496 | That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is [Bird] |
| Full Idea: The fact that some other diamonds are hard does not explain why this diamond is hard. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 4.3.2) | |
| A reaction: A very nice aphorism! It pinpoints the whole error of trying to explain the behaviour of the world by citing laws. Why should this item obey that law? Bird prefers 'powers', and so do I. |
| 9479 | Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities [Bird] |
| Full Idea: For the regularity version of dispositional essentialism about laws, laws are those regularities whose truth is guaranteed by the essential dispositional nature of one or more of the constituents. Regularities that supervene on such laws are also laws. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.1.2) | |
| A reaction: Even if you accept necessary behaviour resulting from essential dispositions, you still need to distinguish the important regularities from the accidental ones, so the word 'guarantee' is helpful, even if it raises lots of difficulties. |
| 9473 | Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals [Bird] |
| Full Idea: Laws, or what flow from them, are supposed to provide a unified explanation of the behaviours of particulars. Without universals the explanation of the behaviours of things lacks the required unity. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 2.1.2) | |
| A reaction: Sounds a bit question-begging? Gravity seems fairly unified, whereas the frequency of London buses doesn't. Maybe I could unify bus-behaviour by positing a few new universals? The unity should first be in the phenomena, not in the explanation. |
| 9484 | If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law [Bird] |
| Full Idea: If universals exist only where and when they are instantiated, this make serious trouble for the universals view of laws. It would be most odd if a particular, merely by changing its properties, could cause a law to go out of existence. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.2.2) | |
| A reaction: This sounds conclusive. He notes that this is probably why Armstrong does not adopt this view (though Lowe seems to favour it). Could there be a possible property (and concomitant law) which was never ever instantiated? |
| 9506 | Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible [Bird] |
| Full Idea: We cannot have a world where it is true both that salt exists (which requires Coulomb's Law to be true), and that it fails to dissolve in water (which requires Coulomb's Law to be false). So the dissolving is necessary even if the Law is contingent. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 8.2) | |
| A reaction: Excellent. It is just like the bonfire on the Moon (imaginable through ignorance, but impossible). People who assert that the solubility of salt is contingent tend not to know much about chemistry. |
| 23713 | Most laws supervene on fundamental laws, which are explained by basic powers [Bird, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| Full Idea: According to Bird, non-fundamental laws supervene on fundamental laws, and so are ultimately explained by fundamental powers. | |
| From: report of Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007]) by Friend/Kimpton-Nye - Dispositions and Powers 3.6.1 | |
| A reaction: This looks like the picture I subscribe to. Roughly, fundamental laws are explained by powers, and non-fundamental laws are explained by properties, which are complexes of powers. 'Fundamental' may not be a precise term! |
| 9489 | Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions [Bird] |
| Full Idea: The straightforward dispositional essentialist account of laws by subjunctive conditionals is false because dispositions typically suffer from finks and antidotes. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.4) | |
| A reaction: [Finks and antidotes intervene before a disposition can take effect] This seems very persuasive to me, and shows why you can't just explain laws as counterfactual or conditional claims. Explanation demands what underlies them. |
| 9504 | The relational view of space-time doesn't cover times and places where things could be [Bird] |
| Full Idea: The obvious problem with the simple relational view of space and time is that it fails to account for the full range of spatio-temporal possibility. There seem to be times and places where objects and events could be, but are not. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 7.3.2) | |
| A reaction: This view seems strongly supported by intuition. I certainly don't accept the views of physicists and cosmologists on the subject, because they seem to approach the whole thing too instrumentally. |
| 6811 | Allah is lord of creation, compassionate, merciful, king of judgement-day [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: Praise be to Allah, Lord of Creation, The Compassionate, the Merciful, King of Judgement-day! | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Exord) | |
| A reaction: The Muslim concept of God confronts directly a clear theological difficulty, a difficulty faced by any judge: the conflict between mercy and justice. Christianity seems to emphasise mercy, and Islam emphasises justice. |
| 6819 | True believers see that Allah made the night for rest and the day to give light [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: Do they not see how We have made the night for them to rest in and the day to give them light? Surely there are signs in this for true believers. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.27) | |
| A reaction: The main traditional argument for God implied in the Koran is the design argument. It is clear from this that Islam will not be comfortable with Darwinian evolution, which implies we are 'designed' for the Earth, not the Earth for us. |
| 6818 | Allah cannot have begotten a son, as He is self-sufficient [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: They say: 'Allah has begotten a son.' Allah forbid! Self-sufficient is He. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: This is quite persuasive, except that the point of Jesus is that he suffers a cruel death, and we are required to identify with God's parental feelings here, His involvement, which would not occur with the death of one of His prophets. |
| 6829 | There shall be no compulsion in religion [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: There shall be no compulsion in religion. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: This seems to contradict some of the more aggressive remarks in the Koran, such as Idea 6827. As I read it, the three non-compelling ideas that lead to true religion in the Koran are desire for paradise, fear of punishment, and worship of divine design. |
| 6834 | Unbelievers try to interpret the ambiguous parts of the Koran, simply to create dissension [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: Some of the verses of the Koran are precise in meaning - they are the foundations of the Book - and others are ambiguous. Disbelievers follow the ambiguous part, to create dissension by seeking to explain it. No one knows its meaning except Allah. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: It is tempting to ask why some of the verses are ambiguous. The implication here is that they are a deliberate test for believers, like the apple in the garden of Eden. |
| 6817 | The Koran is certainly composed by Allah; no one could compose a chapter like it [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: This Koran could not have been composed by any but Allah. It is beyond doubt from the Lord of the Creation. If they say: 'It is your own invention', say: 'Compose one chapter like it. Call on your false gods to help you!' | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: I find this unpersuasive, firstly because I couldn't imitate the sonnets of Shakespeare either, and secondly because the authority of a text must be asserted outside the text, not within it. Scribble "this is a ten pound note" on a scrap of paper. |
| 6824 | Do not split into sects, exulting in separate beliefs [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: Do not split up your religion into sects, each exulting in its own beliefs. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.30) | |
| A reaction: This seems like good advice to a religion, but it is very difficult to retrace steps and reunite once it has happened. Which sect should make the greatest concessions? Must they both admit to being somewhat wrong? |
| 6821 | I created mankind that it might worship Me [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: I created mankind and the jinn in order that they might worship Me. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.51) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a view common to all the monotheistic religions, with monasticism as its clearest (and most logical) outcome. Nietzsche is the most obvious opponent of this idea that the abasement of mankind is its highest ideal. |
| 6815 | Be patient with unbelievers, and leave them to the judgement of Allah [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: Bear patiently with what the unbelievers say, and leave their company without recrimination; leave to Me those that deny the truth. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.73) | |
| A reaction: This explicitly says Muslims should not attack infidels simply for their unbelief in Allah. |
| 6831 | He that kills a believer by design shall burn in Hell for ever [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: He that kills a believer by design shall burn in Hell for ever. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: This would appear to make modern indiscriminate urban terrorism a damning sin for a Muslim. |
| 6827 | Make war on the unbelievers until Allah's religion reigns supreme [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: Make war on the unbelievers until idolatry is no more and Allah's religion reigns supreme. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.8) | |
| A reaction: This should presumably be seen in context, as a war speech written during a conflict, like Churchill 'fighting them on the beaches', which does not apply to modern German tourists. However, one worries about how fundamentalists might read it. |
| 6820 | The righteous shall dwell on couches in gardens, wedded to dark-eyed houris [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: In fair gardens the righteous shall dwell in bliss, rejoicing in what their Lord will give them. They shall recline on couches ranged in rows. To dark-eyed houris We shall wed them. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.52) | |
| A reaction: What I find distressing about this is that we have gradually worked out how young men can recline on couches in gardens with dark-eyed houris before death, and the Koran seems to depict it as the highest form of living. |
| 6812 | Heaven will be reclining on couches, eating fruit, attended by virgins [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: All who dwell in heaven shall recline on couches lined with thick brocade, and within their reach will hang the fruits of gardens; they shall dwell with bashful virgins whom neither men nor jinnee will have touched before. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.55) | |
| A reaction: In the seventh century this was more impressive than it seems now. I still find it sad (though understandable) that paradise must always be depicted in terms of physical pleasure. Aristotle wouldn't have yearned for such an immortality. |
| 6830 | Unbelievers will have their skin repeatedly burned off in hell [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: Those that deny Our revelations We will burn in Hell-fire. No sooner will their skins be consumed that We shall give them other skins, so that they may truly taste Our scourge. Allah is mighty and wise. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: Of all the accounts of hell in the Koran, this strikes me as the most alarming. I cannot think of a worse infliction, because here every nerve which can experience pain will suffer it (though the drinking of boiling water, Idea 6816, will make it worse). |
| 6816 | The unbelievers shall drink boiling water [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: As for the unbelievers, they shall drink boiling water. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be presented not only as a threat to unbelievers, but also as a satisfaction to believers. |