Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works (all lost)', 'On Sensations (frags)' and 'Elbow Room: varieties of free will'

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17 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
An overexamined life is as bad as an unexamined one [Dennett]
     Full Idea: The unexamined life may not be worth living, but the overexamined life is nothing to write home about either.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §4.2)
     A reaction: Presumably he means a life which is all theory and no practice. Compare Idea 343.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
If all laws were abolished, philosophers would still live as they do now [Aristippus elder]
     Full Idea: If all laws were abolished, philosophers would still live as they do now.
     From: Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.4
     A reaction: Presumably philosophers develop inner laws which other people lack.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Rationality requires the assumption that things are either for better or worse [Dennett]
     Full Idea: We must assume that something matters - that some things are for better and some things are for worse, for without that our assumed rationality would have nothing on which to get a purchase.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §7.1)
     A reaction: It does seem that rationality wouldn't exist as an activity without some value to motivate it.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
Why pronounce impossible what you cannot imagine? [Dennett]
     Full Idea: You say you cannot imagine that p, and therefore declare that p is impossible. Mightn't that be hubris?
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §7.3)
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified) [Dennett]
     Full Idea: In causal theories of knowledge and reference, the causal chain between object and thought must be of the "right" sort - the nature of rightness to be specified later, typically.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §3.3 n14)
     A reaction: This is now the standard objection to a purely causal account of reference. Which of the many causal chains causes the meaning? Knowledge of maths is a further problem for it.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
That honey is sweet I do not affirm, but I agree that it appears so [Timon]
     Full Idea: That honey is sweet I do not affirm, but I agree that it appears so.
     From: Timon (On Sensations (frags) [c.285 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.104-5
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
I am the sum total of what I directly control [Dennett]
     Full Idea: Control is the ultimate criterion of the self: I am the sum total of the parts I control directly.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §4.2)
     A reaction: This looks awfully like a flagrant self-contradiction, and I think it is. It seems pretty obvious that there is at least a distinction between the bit or bits that do the controlling, and the bits that get controlled.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
You can be free even though force would have prevented you doing otherwise [Dennett, by PG]
     Full Idea: If a brain implant would compel you to perform an action which you in fact freely choose, then you are free, but couldn't have done otherwise.
     From: report of Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §6.1) by PG - Db (ideas)
Can we conceive of a being with a will freer than our own? [Dennett]
     Full Idea: Can I even conceive of beings whose wills are freer than our own?
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §7.3)
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Awareness of thought is a step beyond awareness of the world [Dennett]
     Full Idea: The creature who is not only sensitive to patterns in its environment, but also sensitive to patterns in its own reactions to patterns in its environment, has taken a major step.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §2.2)
Foreknowledge permits control [Dennett]
     Full Idea: Foreknowledge is what permits control.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §3.2)
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
The active self is a fiction created because we are ignorant of our motivations [Dennett]
     Full Idea: Faced with our inability to 'see' where the centre or source of our free actions is,…we exploit the gaps in our self-knowledge by filling it with a mysterious entity, the unmoved mover, the active self.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §4.1)
     A reaction: I am convinced that there is no such things as free will; its origins are to be found in religion, where it is a necessary feature of a very supreme God. I don't believe for a moment that we need to believe in free will.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
Only the Cyrenaics reject the idea of a final moral end [Aristippus elder, by Annas]
     Full Idea: The Cyrenaics are the most radical ancient moral philosophers, since they are the only school explicitly to reject the importance of achieving an overall final end.
     From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 11.1
     A reaction: This looks like dropping out, but it could also be Keats's 'negative capability', of simply participating in existence without needing to do anything about it.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
The road of freedom is the surest route to happiness [Aristippus elder, by Xenophon]
     Full Idea: The surest road to happiness is not the path through rule nor through servitude, but through liberty.
     From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Xenophon - Memorabilia of Socrates 2.1.9
     A reaction: The great anarchist slogan. Personally I don't believe it, because I agree a little with Hobbes that authority is required to make cooperation flourish, and that is essential for full happiness. If I were a slave, I would agree with Aristippus.
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 3. Cyrenaic School
People who object to extravagant pleasures just love money [Aristippus elder, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: When blamed for buying expensive food he asked "Would you have bought it for just three obols?" When the person said yes, he said,"Then it is not that I am fond of pleasure, but that you are fond of money".
     From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.4
Pleasure is the good, because we always seek it, it satisfies us, and its opposite is the most avoidable thing [Aristippus elder, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Pleasure is the good because we desire it from childhood, when we have it we seek nothing further, and the most avoidable thing is its opposite, pain.
     From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.8
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Errors result from external influence, and should be corrected, not hated [Aristippus elder, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Errors ought to meet with pardon, for a man does not err intentionally, but influenced by some external circumstances. We should not hate someone who has erred, but teach him better.
     From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.9