6402
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In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling]
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Full Idea:
In his 'Analysis of Matter' (1927), Russell sought to analyse the chief concepts of physics, such as force and matter, in terms of events.
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From:
report of Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Matter [1927]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
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A reaction:
My immediate reaction is that this is not very promising, simply because we can always ask why a particular event occurred, and this seems to point to a deeper level in the analysis. See Idea 4779, for example.
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14733
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An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell]
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Full Idea:
There may be a substance at the centre of an object, but is no reason to think so, since the group of events making up the object will produce exactly the same percepts; so the substance, if there is one, is an abstract possibility irrelevant to science.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Matter [1927], 23)
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A reaction:
All empiricists (as Russell is in this passage) seem to neglect inference to the best explanation. Things can be indirectly testable, and I would say that there are genuine general entities which are too close to abstraction to ever be testable.
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21378
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We clearly feel responsible for our deeds, because we are quite certain that we did them [Schopenhauer]
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Full Idea:
Another fact of consciousness ...is the wholly clear and certain feeling of responsibility for what we do, of the accountability of our actions, which rests on the unshakable certainty that we ourselves are the doers of our deeds.
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From:
Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Freedom of the Will [1841], p.93-4), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Freedom'
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A reaction:
The point is that we have this feeling even if we do not believe in free will. I am struck by the fact that responsibility is very obvious in our own case, even if it is not when we objectively consider other people. Even villains can feel guilty.
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