4 ideas
| 21597 | Logical connectives have the highest precision, yet are infected by the vagueness of true and false [Russell, by Williamson] |
| Full Idea: Russell says the best chance of avoiding vagueness are the logical connectives. ...But the vagueness of 'true' and 'false' infects the logical connectives too. All words are vague. Russell concludes that all language is vague. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (Vagueness [1923]) by Timothy Williamson - Vagueness 2.4 | |
| A reaction: This relies on the logical connectives being defined semantically, in terms of T and F, but that is standard. Presumably the formal uninterpreted syntax is not vague. |
| 9051 | Since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic [Russell, by Keefe/Smith] |
| Full Idea: Russell takes it that logic assumes precision, and since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic at all. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (Vagueness [1923]) by R Keefe / P Smith - Intro: Theories of Vagueness §1 | |
| A reaction: I find this view congenial. It seems to me that the necessary prelude to logic is to do everything you can to eliminate ambiguity and vagueness from the sentences at issue. We want the proposition, or logical form. If there isn't one, forget it? |
| 9054 | Vagueness is only a characteristic of representations, such as language [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Vagueness and precision alike are characteristics which can only belong to a representation, of which language is an example. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Vagueness [1923], p.62) | |
| A reaction: Russell was the first to tackle the question of vagueness, and he may have got it right. If we are unable to decide which set an object belongs in (red or orange) that is a problem for our conceptual/linguistic scheme. The object still has a colour! |
| 21378 | We clearly feel responsible for our deeds, because we are quite certain that we did them [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: Another fact of consciousness ...is the wholly clear and certain feeling of responsibility for what we do, of the accountability of our actions, which rests on the unshakable certainty that we ourselves are the doers of our deeds. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Freedom of the Will [1841], p.93-4), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Freedom' | |
| A reaction: The point is that we have this feeling even if we do not believe in free will. I am struck by the fact that responsibility is very obvious in our own case, even if it is not when we objectively consider other people. Even villains can feel guilty. |