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All the ideas for 'works (all lost)', 'Letters to De Vries' and 'Lecture on Nominalism'

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4 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
21697 The Struthionic Fallacy is that of burying one's head in the sand [Quine]
     Full Idea: The Struthionic Fallacy is that of burying one's head in the sand [which I name from the Greek for 'ostrich']
     From: Willard Quine (Lecture on Nominalism [1946], §4)
     A reaction: David Armstrong said this is the the fallacy involved in a denial of universals. Quine is accusing Carnap and co. of the fallacy.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
21698 All relations, apart from ancestrals, can be reduced to simpler logic [Quine]
     Full Idea: Much of the theory of relations can be developed as a virtual theory, in which we seem to talk of relations, but can explain our notation in terms {finally] of just the logic of truth-functions, quantification and identity. The exception is ancestrals.
     From: Willard Quine (Lecture on Nominalism [1946], §8)
     A reaction: The irreducibility of ancestrals is offered as a reason for treating sets as universals.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
21696 Nominalism rejects both attributes and classes (where extensionalism accepts the classes) [Quine]
     Full Idea: 'Nominalism' is distinct from 'extensionalism'. The main point of the latter doctrine is rejection of properties or attributes in favour of classes. But class are universals equally with attributes, and nominalism in the defined sense rejects both.
     From: Willard Quine (Lecture on Nominalism [1946], §3)
     A reaction: Hence Quine soon settled on labelling himself as an 'extensionalist', leaving proper nominalism to Nelson Goodman. It is commonly observed that science massively refers to attributes, so they can't just be eliminated.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
4869 Experience does not teach us any essences of things [Spinoza]
     Full Idea: Experience does not teach us any essences of things.
     From: Baruch de Spinoza (Letters to De Vries [1664], 1664?)
     A reaction: This, along with Leibniz's claim that experience cannot reveal necessities, may constitute a striking criticism of empiricism, but it invites the obvious reply 'so much the worse for essences'. An essence seems to be a theoretical concept, not a priori.