10 ideas
20768 | Like spiderswebs, dialectical arguments are clever but useless [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: He said that dialectical arguments were like spiderswebs: although they seem to indicate craftsmanlike skill, they are useless. | |
From: report of Ariston (fragments/reports [c.250 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.161 | |
A reaction: Useful for the spider, but useless to Ariston. |
9456 | Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds [Jacquette] |
Full Idea: Modal logic by its very nature is not monolithic, but fragmented into multiple systems of modal qualifications, reflected in the plurality of accessibility relations on modal model structures or logically possible worlds. | |
From: Dale Jacquette (Intro to 'Philosophy of Logic' [2002], §3) | |
A reaction: He implies the multiplicity is basic, and is only 'reflected' in the relations, but maybe the multiplicity is caused by incompetent logicians who can't decide whether possible worlds really are reflexive or symmetrical or transitive in their relations. |
9457 | The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism [Jacquette] |
Full Idea: Philosophy of logic has (roughly) two camps: extensionalists and intensionalists, with the former view dominant. ...There is a close connection between this and eliminativist or reductivist versus folk psychological and intentionalist philosophy of mind. | |
From: Dale Jacquette (Intro to 'Philosophy of Logic' [2002], §4) | |
A reaction: Hm. I think I favour intensionalism in the logic, and reductivism about the mind, so I may have a bit of bother here. I'm convinced that this jigsaw can be completed, despite all appearances. |
9458 | Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects [Jacquette] |
Full Idea: Extensionalists hold that quantifiers in predicate logic presuppose the existence of whatever objects can be referred to by constants or bound variables, or enter into true predication of properties. | |
From: Dale Jacquette (Intro to 'Philosophy of Logic' [2002], §4) | |
A reaction: I have strong sales resistance to this view. Why should a procedure for correctly reasoning from one proposition to another have anything whatever to do with ontology? A false world picture can be interconnected by perfect logic. |
9461 | Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties [Jacquette] |
Full Idea: According to intensionalist semantics the meaning of a proposition is determined by the properties an object possesses. | |
From: Dale Jacquette (Intro to 'Philosophy of Logic' [2002], §4) | |
A reaction: This sounds good to me. Extensionalist don't seem to care what sets they put things in, but if property possession comes first, then things will fall into their own sets without any help for us. We can add silly sets afterwards, if we fancy. |
9460 | Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects [Jacquette] |
Full Idea: In extensionalist semantics only existent objects can be referred to, ...but in everyday thought and discourse we regularly and apparently without undue confusion speak about nonexistent objects. | |
From: Dale Jacquette (Intro to 'Philosophy of Logic' [2002], §4) | |
A reaction: This is the reason why Meinong, whose views are presented by Russell as absurd, are undergoing a revival. The full-blown view will even treat 'round squares' as objects about which we can reason - and why not? Don't open a shop which sells them. |
9459 | Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa' [Jacquette] |
Full Idea: Extensional semantics is blatantly circular. For 'Fa' to be interpreted as true, we must know that object a belongs to the extension of the predicate F, so we must already know which objects belong to the extension. | |
From: Dale Jacquette (Intro to 'Philosophy of Logic' [2002], §4) | |
A reaction: I'm delighted to read this, because it was the first thought that occurred to me when I encountered the theory. Presumably this leads Quine to take predication as basic, because you can't break into the circle. Or, vote for intensionalism? |
20074 | We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Davidson's original account of intentions might still stand if we could accept that prior intentions are different in kind from intentions with which one acts. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Problems in the Explanation of Action [1987]) by Rowland Stout - Action 8 'Davidson's' | |
A reaction: Davidson says prior intention is all-out judgement of desirability. Prior intentions are more deliberate, with the other intentions as a presumed background to action. Compare Sartre's dual account of the self. |
3049 | The chief good is indifference to what lies midway between virtue and vice [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The chief good is to live in perfect indifference to all those things which are of an intermediate character between virtue and vice. | |
From: report of Ariston (fragments/reports [c.250 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.2.1 |
3549 | Ariston says rules are useless for the virtuous and the non-virtuous [Ariston, by Annas] |
Full Idea: Ariston says that rules are useless if you are virtuous, and useless if you are not. | |
From: report of Ariston (fragments/reports [c.250 BCE]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 2.4 |