3 ideas
| 13099 | Analysing right down to primitive concepts seems beyond our powers [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: An analysis of concepts such that we can reach primitive concepts...does not seem to be within human power. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia [1679], C513-14), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz | |
| A reaction: Leibniz is nevertheless fully committed, I think, to the existence of such primitives, and is in the grip of the rationalist dream that thoughts can become completely clear, and completely well-founded. |
| 5022 | We hold a proposition true if we are ready to follow it, and can't see any objections [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: A proposition is held to be true by us when our mind is ready to follow it and no reason for doubting it can be found. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia [1679], p.7) | |
| A reaction: This follows on from Descartes' view, but it now sounds more like psychology than metaphysics. Clearly a false proposition could fit this desciption. Personally I follow propositions to which I can see no objection, without actually holding them true. |
| 18702 | Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: The simple thesis that names and descriptions often refer to things, and that predicates often have an extension in the world of things, is obvious, and essential to the most elementary appreciation of both language and the thoughts we express. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Replies to Critics [1998], p.323) | |
| A reaction: In 1983 Davidson had been a rare modern champion of the coherence theory of truth, but this is his clearest later renunciation of that view (and quite right too). |