Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works (all lost)', 'Propositions' and 'The Actual and the Possible'

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6 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive

9455	Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer]
	Full Idea: Some say that proper names have no descriptive content, but others think that although a name does not have the right sort of descriptive content which fixes a unique referent, it has a content which fixes the sort or category to which it belongs.
	From: George Bealer (Propositions [1998], §7)
	A reaction: Presumably 'Mary', and 'Felix', and 'Rover', and 'Smallville' are cases in point. There is a well known journalist called 'Manchester', a famous man called 'Hilary', a village in Hertfordshire called 'Matching Tie'... Interesting, though.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions

9454	The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer]
	Full Idea: The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's, ...of which to many Frege's is the most intuitive of the four. Frege says they refer to the unique item (if it exists) which satisfies the predicate.
	From: George Bealer (Propositions [1998], §5)
	A reaction: He doesn't expound the other three, but I record this a corrective to the view that Russell has the only game in town.

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality

12468	A state of affairs is only possible if there has been an actual substance to initiate it [Pruss]
	Full Idea: Non-actual states of affairs are possible if there actually was a substance capable of initiating a causal chain, perhaps non-deterministic, that could lead to the state of affairs that we claim is possible.
	From: Alexander R. Pruss (The Actual and the Possible [2002]), quoted by Jonathan D. Jacobs - A Powers Theory of Modality §4.2
	A reaction: This is roughly my view. There are far fewer possibilities in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy, Horatio. Logical possibilities and fantasy possibilities are not real possibilities.

19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions

9453	Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer]
	Full Idea: The propositions behind 'Cicero is emulated more than Tully' seems to differ somehow from 'Tully is emulated more than Cicero', despite the proper names being rigid designators.
	From: George Bealer (Propositions [1998], §1)
	A reaction: Interesting, because this isn't a directly propositional attitude situation like 'believes', though it depends on such things. Bealer says this is a key modern difficulty with propositions.

9452	Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer]
	Full Idea: The reductionist view of propositions sees them as either extensional functions from possible worlds to truth values, or as ordered sets of properties, relations, and perhaps particulars.
	From: George Bealer (Propositions [1998], §1)
	A reaction: The usual problem of all functional accounts is 'what is it about x that enables it to have that function?' And if they are sets, where does the ordering come in? A proposition isn't just a list of items in some particular order. Both wrong.

19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense

9451	Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer]
	Full Idea: Philosophers have been skeptical about abstract objects, and so have been skeptical about propositions,..but with the rise of modal logic and metaphysics, and cognitive science's realism about intentional states, traditional propositions are now dominant.
	From: George Bealer (Propositions [1998], §1)
	A reaction: I personally strongly favour belief in propositions as brain states, which don't need a bizarre ontological status, but are essential to explain language, reasoning and communication.