Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works (all lost)', 'The iterative conception of Set' and 'works'

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2 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / h. Axiom of Replacement VII
18192 Do the Replacement Axioms exceed the iterative conception of sets? [Boolos, by Maddy]
     Full Idea: For Boolos, the Replacement Axioms go beyond the iterative conception.
     From: report of George Boolos (The iterative conception of Set [1971]) by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics I.3
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
6672 Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false' [Moore,GE, by Lowe]
     Full Idea: Moore's Paradox says it makes no sense to assert 'I believe that p, but p is false', even though it makes perfectly good sense to assert 'I used to believe p, but p is false' or 'You believe p, but p is false'.
     From: report of G.E. Moore (works [1905]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.10
     A reaction: I'm not sure if this really deserves the label of 'paradox'. I take it as drawing attention to the obvious fact that belief is commitment to truth. I think my assessment that p is true is correct, but your assessment is wrong. ('True' is not redundant!)