8 ideas
5040 | Necessary truths can be analysed into original truths; contingent truths are infinitely analysable [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Derivative truths are of two sorts: some are analysed into original truths, others admit of an infinite process of analysis. The former are necessary, the latter are contingent. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.108) | |
A reaction: An intriguing proposal. Hume would presumably see contingent truths as being analysed until you reach 'impressions'. Analysis of necessary truths soon comes to the blinding light of what is obvious, but analysis of contingency never gets there. |
13159 | Only God sees contingent truths a priori [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Only God sees contingent truths a priori. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.95) | |
A reaction: This because everything is interconnected, and the whole picture must be seen to understand a contingent truth. |
5039 | If non-existents are possible, their existence would replace what now exists, which cannot therefore be necessary [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If certain possibles never exist, then existing things are not always necessary; otherwise it would be impossible for other things to exist instead of them, and so all things that never exist would be impossible. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.106) | |
A reaction: A neat argument, though it is not self-evident that when possibles came into existence they would have to replace what is already there. Can't something be possible, but only in another world, because this one is already booked? |
7260 | If there are intuited moral facts, why should we care about them? [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Critics asked (of intuitionism) why, if moral facts are as the intuitionists say, we should care about them at all. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991]) | |
A reaction: It is a good question, as we don't care much about other a priori truths, such as the square root of 169. |
7261 | Internalists say that moral intuitions are motivating; externalist say a desire is also needed [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: There is an internalist view of intuitionism, saying that to accept that one's action is wrong is itself to be motivated not to do it. Externalists (like Ross) say that moral judgements need the help of an independent desire to motivate us. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991]) | |
A reaction: The internalists would be closer to Kant or Plato (for whom reason or pure ideas motivate), while externalist would favour Hume's belief/desire account of human actions. I like Kant and Plato, but Hume is more plausible. Dancy disagrees (Idea 7262). |
7262 | Obviously judging an action as wrong gives us a reason not to do it [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: It is ludicrous to say that we might accept an action is outrageously wrong and still think of this as not in itself giving us good reason to hold back. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991]) | |
A reaction: If we think of some dreadful man-made famine in a remote continent, our judgement may well give a reason to act, but apathy usually intervenes. We are discussing a purely theoretical motive on the one hand, and an actual motivator on the other. |
7265 | Moral facts are not perceived facts, but perceived reasons for judgements [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: I intend to suggest that moral facts are best thought of not as facts perceived but as reasons recognised in the exercise of practical moral judgement. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991]) | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced by this modified version. Why should the fact that someone is in pain be, in itself, a reason to prevent it? There are different cultural traditions for response to the pain of others. We are the squeamish tradition. |
5041 | God does everything in a perfect way, and never acts contrary to reason [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We can regard it as certain that everything is done by God in the most perfect way, that he does nothing which is contrary to reason. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.109) | |
A reaction: The famous optimism which Voltaire laughed at in 'Candide'. I can't help thinking that there is an ideal of God being ABOVE reason. We reason, and give reasons, because we are unsure, and life is a struggle. The highest ideal is mystically self-evident. |