63 ideas
| 21955 | My dogmatic slumber was first interrupted by David Hume [Kant] |
| Full Idea: I freely admit that remembrance of David Hume was the very thing that many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 4:260), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 5.2 | |
| A reaction: A famous declaration. He realised that he had the answer the many scepticisms of Hume, and accept his emphasis on the need for experience. |
| 7834 | Great philosophies are confessions by the author, growing out of moral intentions [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy has hitherto been: a confession on the part of its author, and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir, ...with moral intentions being the real germ of its life. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §006) | |
| A reaction: This attitude is what places Nietzsche as the parent of post-modernism, and is the reason why most 'continental' philosophers seem to have given up the attempt to simply reason about life. It is anti-Enlightenment, and it is wicked. |
| 16931 | Metaphysics is generating a priori knowledge by intuition and concepts, leading to the synthetic [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The generation of knowledge a priori, both according to intuition and according to concepts, and finally the generation of synthetic propositions a priori in philosophical knowledge, constitutes the essential content of metaphysics. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 274) | |
| A reaction: By 'concepts' he implies mere analytic thought, so 'intuition' is where the exciting bit is, and that is rather vague. |
| 7080 | Metaphysics divided the old unified Greek world into two [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
| Full Idea: Nietzsche famously defines metaphysics as the division of one world into two; the unity of the mythical pre-philosophical experience of the world is sundered, with Plato, into being and seeming, reality and appearance, supersensible and sensible. | |
| From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro | |
| A reaction: (Critchley doesn't give a reference; Idea 2860 is close). This is the discredited status that metaphysics gradually acquired after Kant, but I see modern metaphysics as reuniting human thought by digging down to the foundations to reveal roots and links. |
| 11090 | Why do we want truth, rather than falsehood or ignorance? The value of truth is a problem [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: What really is it in us that wants 'the truth'? ...Granted we want truth: why not rather untruth? And uncertainty? Even ignorance? The problem of the value of truth stepped before us. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §001) | |
| A reaction: I think this is one of the great moments in philosophy, when something that has been taken for granted, as a kind of mantra, is suddenly looked in the face and challenged. Truth at all costs? What sacrifices would you make for truth? |
| 16918 | Mathematics cannot proceed just by the analysis of concepts [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Mathematics cannot proceed analytically, namely by analysis of concepts, but only synthetically. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 284) | |
| A reaction: I'm with Kant insofar as I take mathematics to be about the world, no matter how rarefied and 'abstract' it may become. |
| 16930 | Geometry is not analytic, because a line's being 'straight' is a quality [Kant] |
| Full Idea: No principle of pure geometry is analytic. That the straight line beween two points is the shortest is a synthetic proposition. For my concept of straight contains nothing of quantity but only of quality. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 269) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure what his authority is for calling straightness a quality rather than a quantity, given that it can be expressed quantitatively. It is a very nice example for focusing our questions about the nature of geometry. I can't decide. |
| 16919 | Geometry rests on our intuition of space [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Geometry is grounded on the pure intuition of space. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 284) | |
| A reaction: I have the impression that recent thinkers are coming round to this idea, having attempted purely algebraic or logical accounts of geometry. |
| 16920 | Numbers are formed by addition of units in time [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Arithmetic forms its own concepts of numbers by successive addition of units in time. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 284) | |
| A reaction: It is hard to imagine any modern philosopher of mathematics embracing this idea. It sounds as if Kant thinks counting is the foundation of arithmetic, which I quite like. |
| 16929 | 7+5 = 12 is not analytic, because no analysis of 7+5 will reveal the concept of 12 [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The concept of twelve is in no way already thought by merely thinking the unification of seven and five, and though I analyse my concept of such a possible sum as long as I please, I shall never find twelve in it. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 269) | |
| A reaction: It might be more plausible to claim that an analysis of 12 would reveal the concept of 7+5. Doesn't the concept of two collections of objects contain the concept of their combined cardinality? |
| 16910 | Mathematics can only start from an a priori intuition which is not empirical but pure [Kant] |
| Full Idea: We find that all mathematical knowledge has this peculiarity, that it must first exhibit its concept in intuition, and do so a priori, in an intuition that is not empirical but pure. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 281) | |
| A reaction: Later thinkers had grave doubts about this Kantian 'intuition', even if they though maths was known a priori. Personally I am increasing fan of rational intuition, even if I am not sure how to discern whether it is rational on any occasion. |
| 16917 | All necessary mathematical judgements are based on intuitions of space and time [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Space and time are the two intuitions on which pure mathematics grounds all its cognitions and judgements that present themselves as at once apodictic and necessary. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 284) | |
| A reaction: This unlikely proposal seems to be based on the idea that mathematics must arise from the basic categories of our intuition, and these two are the best candidates he can find. I would say that high-level generality is the basis of mathematics. |
| 16928 | Mathematics cannot be empirical because it is necessary, and that has to be a priori [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Mathematical propositions are always judgements a priori, and not empirical, because they carry with them necessity, which cannot be taken from experience. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 268) | |
| A reaction: Presumably there are necessities in the physical world, and we might discern them by generalising about that world, so that mathematics is (by a tortuous abstract route) a posteriori necessary? Just a thought… |
| 7079 | Nietzsche resists nihilism through new values, for a world of becoming, without worship [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
| Full Idea: Nietzsche's work is a resistance to nihilism. This is why he insists that new categories and values are required that would permit us to endure this world of becoming without either falling into despair or inventing some new god and bowing before it. | |
| From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro | |
| A reaction: The trouble is that all Nietzsche offers is the invention of values out of nothing by some wretched Germanic übermensch who is obsessed with militarism and dominance. If values don't grow out of human nature, then 'all is permitted'. |
| 11833 | The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us [Kant] |
| Full Idea: It has long since been noticed that in all substances the subject proper, namely what is left over after all the accidents (as predicates) have been taken away and hence the 'substantial' itself, is unknown to us. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 333) | |
| A reaction: This is the terminus of the process of abstraction (though Wiggins says such removal of predicates is a myth). Kant is facing the problem of the bare substratum, or haecceity. |
| 21957 | 'Transcendental' concerns how we know, rather than what we know [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The word 'transcendental' signifies not a relation of our cognition to things, but only to the faculty of cognition. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 4:293), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 5.4 | |
| A reaction: This is the annoying abduction of a word which is very useful in metaphysical contexts. |
| 16923 | I admit there are bodies outside us [Kant] |
| Full Idea: I do indeed admit that there are bodies outside us. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 289 n.II) | |
| A reaction: This is the end of a passage in which Kant very explicitly denies being an idealist. Of course, he says we can only know the representations of things, and not how they are in themselves. |
| 21441 | 'Transcendental' is not beyond experience, but a prerequisite of experience [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The word 'transcendental' does not mean something that goes beyond all experience, but something which, though it precedes (a priori) all experience, is destined only to make knowledge by experience possible. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 373 n) | |
| A reaction: One of two explanations by Kant of 'transcendental', picked out by Sebastian Gardner. I think the word 'prerequisite' covers the idea nicely, using a normal English word. Or am I missing something? |
| 16916 | A priori synthetic knowledge is only of appearances, not of things in themselves [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Through intuition we can only know objects as they appear to us (to our senses), not as they may be in themselves; and this presupposition is absolutely necessary if synthetic propositions a priori are to be granted as possible. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 283) | |
| A reaction: This idea is basic to understanding Kant, and especially his claim that arithmetic is a priori synthetic. |
| 16915 | A priori intuitions can only concern the objects of our senses [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Intuitions which are possible a priori can never concern any other things than objects of our senses. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 283) | |
| A reaction: Given the Kantian idea that what is known a priori will also be necessary, we might have had great hopes for big-time metaphysics, but this idea cuts it down to size. Personally, I don't think we are totally imprisoned in the phenomena. |
| 16914 | A priori intuition of objects is only possible by containing the form of my sensibility [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The only way for my intuition to precede the reality of the object and take place as knowledge a priori is if it contains nothing else than the form of sensibility which in me as subject precedes all real impressions through which I'm affected by objects. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 283) | |
| A reaction: This may be the single most famous idea in Kant. I'm not really a Kantian, but this is a powerful idea, the culmination of Descartes' proposal to start philosophy by looking at ourselves. No subsequent thinking can ignore the idea. |
| 21447 | I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object [Kant] |
| Full Idea: I can make little sense of the assertion that the sensation of red is similar to the property of the vermilion [cinnabar] which excites this sensation in me. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 290) | |
| A reaction: A sensible remark. In Kant's case it is probably a part of his scepticism that his intuitions reveal anything directly about reality. Locke seems to have thought (reasonably enough) that the experience contains some sort of valid information. |
| 16924 | I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances [Kant] |
| Full Idea: I also count as mere appearances, in addition to [heat, colour, taste], the remaining qualities of bodies which are called primariae, extension, place, and space in general, with all that depends on it (impenetrability or materiality, shape etc.). | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 289 n.II) | |
| A reaction: He sides with Berkeley and Hume against Locke and Boyle. He denies being an idealist (Idea 16923), so it seems to me that Kant might be described as a 'phenomenalist'. |
| 16913 | I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations [Kant] |
| Full Idea: It seems inconceivable how the intuition of a thing that is present should make me know it as it is in itself, for its properties cannot migrate into my faculty of representation. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 282) | |
| A reaction: One might compare this with Locke's distinction of primary and secondary, where the primary properties seem to 'migrate into my faculty of representation', but the secondary ones fail to do so. I think I prefer Locke. This idea threatens idealism. |
| 2878 | We see an approximation of a tree, not the full detail [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: We do not see a tree exactly and entire with regard to its leaves, branches, colour and shape; it is so much easier for us to see an approximation of a tree. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §192) |
| 16925 | Appearance gives truth, as long as it is only used within experience [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Appearance brings forth truth so long as it is used in experience, but as soon as it goes beyond the boundary of experience and becomes transcendent, it brings forth nothing but illusion. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 292 n.III) | |
| A reaction: This is the nearest I have found to Kant declaring for empiricism. It sounds something like direct realism, if experience itself can bring forth truth. |
| 16911 | Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Intuition is a representation, such as would depend on the presence of the object. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 282) | |
| A reaction: This is a distinctively Kantian view of intuition, which arises through particulars, rather than the direct apprehension of generalities. |
| 20140 | We shouldn't object to a false judgement, if it enhances and preserves life [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The falseness of a judgement is to us not necessarily an objection to a judgement. To what extent is it life-advancing, life-preserving, species-preserving. Our fundamental tendency is to assert that our falsest judgements are the most indispensable. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §004) | |
| A reaction: This is the standard objection to pragmatism, that what is false may still be useful, and that clever blighter Nietzsche embraces the idea! |
| 2877 | Morality becomes a problem when we compare many moralities [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The real problems of morality come into view only if we compare many moralities. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §186) |
| 20355 | The ranking of a person's innermost drives reveals their true nature [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: To know 'who he is', we must know the order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand in relative to one another. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §006) | |
| A reaction: This is clearly an essentialist view of a person, as having a 'nature', which is 'inner', and which we can try to specify. Ranking drives and values seems a good proposal for getting at it. I'm also intrigued by what people find interesting. |
| 2291 | A thought comes when 'it' wants, not when 'I' want [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: A thought comes when 'it' wants, not when 'I' want. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §017) | |
| A reaction: A wonderful remark (which I have since found in Schopenhauer). I don't see how the most enthusiastic free will libertarian can deny it. |
| 2871 | Wanting 'freedom of will' is wanting to pull oneself into existence out of the swamp of nothingness by one's own hair [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The desire for 'freedom of will' is nothing less than the desire to pull oneself into existence out of the swamp of nothingness by one's own hair. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §021) |
| 20381 | It is psychology which reveals the basic problems [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Psychology is now once again the road to the fundamental problems. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §023) | |
| A reaction: This may become the epigraph of my great book, which will have as working title 'The Psychology of Metaphysics'. If you trawl through this collection, you will see where I am going! (A tough job, but easier than reading Hegel). |
| 16912 | Some concepts can be made a priori, which are general thoughts of objects, like quantity or cause [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Concepts are of such a nature that we can make some of them ourselves a priori, without standing in any immediate relation to the object; namely concepts that contain the thought of an object in general, such as quantity or cause. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 282) | |
| A reaction: 'Quantity' seems to be the scholastic idea, of something having a magnitude (a big pebble, not six pebbles). |
| 16926 | Analytic judgements say clearly what was in the concept of the subject [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Analytic judgements say nothing in the predicate that was not already thought in the concept of the subject, though not so clearly and with the same consciousness. If I say all bodies are extended, I have not amplified my concept of body in the least. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 266) | |
| A reaction: If I say all bodies are made of atoms, have I extended my concept of 'body'? It would come as a sensational revelation for Aristotle, but it now seems analytic. |
| 16927 | Analytic judgement rests on contradiction, since the predicate cannot be denied of the subject [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Analytic judgements rest wholly on the principle of contradiction, …because the predicate cannot be denied of the subject without contradiction. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 267) | |
| A reaction: So if I say 'gold has atomic number 79', that is a (Kantian) analytic statement? This is the view of sceptics about Kripke's a posteriori necessity. …a few lines later Kant gives 'gold is a yellow metal' as an example. |
| 2860 | The most boring and dangerous of all errors is Plato's invention of pure spirit and goodness [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The worst, most wearisomely protracted and most dangerous of all errors hitherto has been a dogmatist's error, namely Plato's invention of pure spirit and the good in itself. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], Pref) | |
| A reaction: A landmark observation about the history of philosophy. Imagine if all the Aristotle had survived, but all the Plato had been lost. |
| 1568 | Nietzsche felt that Plato's views downgraded the human body and its brevity of life [Nietzsche, by Roochnik] |
| Full Idea: Nietzsche believed that by elevating the importance of the mind, Plato downplayed the wonders of the body, and by searching for a timeless Truth he degraded the indisputable fact of human temporality. | |
| From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], Pref) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason Prol. X | |
| A reaction: Both ideas are very important. The second is widely misunderstood. Nietzsche was not a denier of truth. He asked us to scrutinise the role and value we assign to truth. |
| 2883 | Noble people see themselves as the determiners of values [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The noble type of man feels himself to be the determiner of values. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §260) | |
| A reaction: So do criminals |
| 23440 | Nietzsche's judgement of actions by psychology instead of outcome was poisonous [Foot on Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Nietzsche wants to judge actions not by what is done, but by the nature of the person who does them, and that is poisonous. We have to be horrified by what is done by Hitler and Stalin, without inquiring into their psychology. | |
| From: comment on Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886]) by Philippa Foot - Interview with Philippa Foot p.37 | |
| A reaction: She says morality should focus on social needs, not on spontaneity, energy and passion. Nietzsche was very much a product of romanticism. Some of Nietzsche's heroes are military conquerors, so I think she is right. |
| 2875 | That which is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: That which is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §153) | |
| A reaction: He is referring to the conventional morality of his contemporary society. Nietzsche clearly thought that actions motivated by love are intrinsically good. (Apart from murders by the jealous!). |
| 2868 | Nature is totally indifferent, so you should try to be different from it, not live by it [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: You Stoics want to "live according to nature"? Oh you noble Stoics, what fraudulent words! Nature is prodigal and indifferent beyond measure - how could you live by such indifference? Living is wanting to be other than nature. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §009) | |
| A reaction: I think this is simply indicative of the slide from optimism to pessimism about nature in the intervening centuries. Stoics thought nature rational. See 'King Lear' for the transition. |
| 2882 | Morality originally judged people, and actions only later on [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Designation of moral values was everywhere first applied to human beings, and only later and derivatively to actions. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §260) | |
| A reaction: Nietzsche was a great expert on ethics in the ancient world, so you should trust him on this one. In ordinary life assessment of people is what counts. Actions are for law courts. |
| 2872 | In the earliest phase of human history only consequences mattered [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Throughout the longest part of history ('prehistoric times') the value or non-value of an action was derived from its consequences. …but now men are unanimous that the value of an action is in the intention behind it. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §032) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be Kant's fault. No one thinks that a reckless or malicios action is innocent if no actual harm results. |
| 2885 | The noble soul has reverence for itself [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The noble soul has reverence for itself. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §287) |
| 20134 | Moralities extravagantly address themselves to 'all', by falsely generalising [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: All moralities are baroque and unreasonable ...because they address themselves to 'all', because they generalise where one must not generalise. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §198) | |
| A reaction: 'Particularism' is a recent label, but one finds passing remarks from many earlier philosophers which support that approach to ethics. No one was ever more opposed to strict moral rules than Nietzsche. |
| 2881 | Virtue has been greatly harmed by the boringness of its advocates [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: May I be forgiven for the discovery that 'virtue' has been harmed by nothing more than it has been by the boringness of its advocates. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §228) |
| 20382 | The four virtues are courage, insight, sympathy, solitude [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: To remain master of one's four virtues: courage, insight, sympathy, solitude. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §284) | |
| A reaction: Compare this with 'Daybreak (Dawn)' 556. Solitude is the surprising addition, defended as the urge to 'cleanliness', when since humanity is 'unclean'. |
| 2879 | In ancient Rome pity was considered neither good nor bad [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: An act of pity was during the finest age of Rome considered neither good nor bad. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §201) |
| 2859 | The idea of the categorical imperative is just that we should all be very obedient [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: What does the claim that there exists in us a categorical imperative say of the man who asserts it? …that 'what is worthy of respect in me is that I know how to obey - and things ought to be no different with you'. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §187) |
| 2884 | The morality of slaves is the morality of utility [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Slave morality is essentially the morality of utility. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §261) |
| 2880 | The greatest possibilities in man are still unexhausted [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The greatest possibilities in man are still unexhausted. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §203) |
| 2876 | The thought of suicide is a great reassurance on bad nights [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The thought of suicide is a powerful solace: by means of it one gets through many a bad night. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §157) |
| 7078 | The freedom of the subject means the collapse of moral certainty [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
| Full Idea: In the 1880s Nietzsche diagnosed the concept of nihilism for a whole range of continental thinkers: the recognition of the subject's freedom goes hand in hand with the collapse of moral certainty in the world. | |
| From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro Ch.5 | |
| A reaction: Avoiding this dilemma is just one of the many bonuses offered to those who abandon the idea of free will. The fact that one can decide to be wicked doesn't bring an end to morality. Philosophers should think more concretely about human life. |
| 2874 | Man is the animal whose nature has not yet been fixed [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Man is the animal whose nature has not yet been fixed. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §062) |
| 6869 | Nietzsche thinks the human condition is to overcome and remake itself [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson] |
| Full Idea: Nietzsche thinks that the human condition is precisely to overcome itself; we continually remake ourselves. | |
| From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886]) by Keith Ansell Pearson - Interview with Baggini and Stangroom p.261 | |
| A reaction: This is why I think of Nietzsche as a straightforwardly existentialist philosopher. There is a crucial distinction between 'remaking' ourselves and 'realising all our possibilities'. The latter seems right. Which view did Nietzsche take? |
| 20137 | The great person engages wholly with life, and is happy to endlessly relive the life they created [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: There is an ideal ...of the most exuberant, most living and most world-affirming man, who has not only learned to get on and treat with all that was and is, but who wants to have it again as it was and is to all eternity. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §056) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the main point of the idea of eternal recurrence. Could we inculcate this vision into the teenagers of our nation - that they should each try to design for themselves a life which they would be happy to endlessly repeat? Hm. |
| 20139 | Only aristocratic societies can elevate the human species [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Every elevation of the type 'man' has thitherto been the work of an aristocratic society - and so it will always be: a society which believes in a long scale of orders of rank and differences of worth between man and man, and needs slavery in some sense. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §257) | |
| A reaction: The aim of 'elevating the type "man"' does not figure in works of political philosophy very much! I doubt whether one could base a political party on the idea, and win a general election. Could the people still be sold the idea of aristocracy? |
| 20373 | A healthy aristocracy has no qualms about using multitudes of men as instruments [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: A good and healthy aristocracy ...accepts with a good conscience the sacrifice of innumerable men who for its sake have to be suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §258) | |
| A reaction: Something similar might be said of a democracy - that a slavelike workforce is needed to create the great universal goods we all want and need. Do the aristocrats want sacrifices for great art, or for wild parties and fox hunting? |
| 22394 | Democracy diminishes mankind, making them mediocre and lowering their value [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: To us the democratic movement is ...a form of decay, namely the diminution, of man, making him mediocre and lowering his value. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §203), quoted by Philippa Foot - Nietzsche: the Revaluation of Values p.88 | |
| A reaction: It is not clear how a society of natural aristocrats followed by sheep would increase the value of mankind. Nor if the talented people are given total freedom, and the rest of us are servants. The value of humanity cannot reside in a few individuals. |
| 16922 | Space must have three dimensions, because only three lines can meet at right angles [Kant] |
| Full Idea: That complete space …has three dimensions, and that space in general cannot have more, is built on the proposition that not more than three lines can intersect at right angles in a point. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 285) | |
| A reaction: Modern geometry seems to move, via the algebra, to more than three dimensions, and then battles for an intuition of how that can be. I don't know how they would respond to Kant's challenge here. |
| 16921 | If all empirical sensation of bodies is removed, space and time are still left [Kant] |
| Full Idea: If everything empirical, namely what belongs to sensation, is taken away from the empirical intuition of bodies and their changes (motion), space and time are still left. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 284) | |
| A reaction: This is an exercise in psychological abstraction, which doesn't sound like good evidence, though it is an interesting claim. Physicists want to hijack this debate, but I like Kant's idea. |
| 2867 | Christianity is Platonism for the people [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Christianity is Platonism for the people. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], Pref) |