Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works (all lost)', 'The Concept of Logical Consequence' and 'Reply to Professor Frankena'

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3 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
14181 Validity is where either the situation or the interpretation blocks true premises and false conclusion [Etchemendy, by Read]
     Full Idea: The Representational account of validity says an argument is valid if there is no situation where the premises are true and the conclusion false. The Interpretation account says the premises are true and conclusion false under no interpretations.
     From: report of John Etchemendy (The Concept of Logical Consequence [1999]) by Stephen Read - Formal and Material Consequence 'Inval'
     A reaction: My immediate instinct is to want logic to be about situations, rather than interpretations. Situations are more about thought, where interpretations are more about language. I think our account of logic should have some applicability to animals.
14180 Etchemendy says fix the situation and vary the interpretation, or fix interpretations with varying situations [Etchemendy, by Read]
     Full Idea: In Etchemendy's Interpretational Semantics (perhaps better called 'Substitutional') we keep the situation fixed and vary the interpretation; in Representational Semantics ('Modal'?) we keep interpretations fixed but consider varying situations.
     From: report of John Etchemendy (The Concept of Logical Consequence [1999]) by Stephen Read - Formal and Material Consequence 'Inval'
     A reaction: [compressed] These are semantic strategies for interpreting logic, so they are two ways you might go about assessing an argument.
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
22395 Moral judgements are hypothetical, because they depend on interests and desires [Foot]
     Full Idea: Moral judgements are hypothetical imperatives in the sense that they give reasons for acting only in conjunction with interests and desires.
     From: Philippa Foot (Reply to Professor Frankena [1975], p.177)
     A reaction: This is a splendid claim, which points to a more sensibly naturalistic ethics. There seem to be occasions for moral behaviour where I have no interests or desires, such as when a stranger asks me for a favour and I'm feeling tired.