4 ideas
15575 | Knowledge is not a static set of correct propositions, but a continuing search for better interpretations [Polt] |
Full Idea: Thanks to Heidegger, hermeneutics has gained wider acceptance - that knowledge is not a static set of correct propositions, but a continuing search for better interpretations. | |
From: Richard Polt (Heidegger: an introduction [1999], 3.§7) | |
A reaction: I am not sure if I understand the notion of a search that has a refusal to actually find anything as one of its basic principles. |
3338 | Numbers have been defined in terms of 'successors' to the concept of 'zero' [Peano, by Blackburn] |
Full Idea: Dedekind and Peano define the number series as the series of successors to the number zero, according to five postulates. | |
From: report of Giuseppe Peano (works [1890]) by Simon Blackburn - Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy p.279 |
5897 | 0 is a non-successor number, all successors are numbers, successors can't duplicate, if P(n) and P(n+1) then P(all-n) [Peano, by Flew] |
Full Idea: 1) 0 is a number; 2) The successor of any number is a number; 3) No two numbers have the same successor; 4) 0 is not the successor of any number; 5) If P is true of 0, and if P is true of any number n and of its successor, P is true of every number. | |
From: report of Giuseppe Peano (works [1890]) by Antony Flew - Pan Dictionary of Philosophy 'Peano' | |
A reaction: Devised by Dedekind and proposed by Peano, these postulates were intended to avoid references to intuition in specifying the natural numbers. I wonder if they could define 'successor' without reference to 'number'. |
15568 | When we consider possibilities, there must be something we are considering [Polt] |
Full Idea: We would hardly want to say that a possibility is nothing, since surely we are considering something when we consider possibilities. | |
From: Richard Polt (Heidegger: an introduction [1999], 1) | |
A reaction: A nice contribution to the issue of whether modality is a feature of actuality. I would prefer to say that we can self-evidently utter truths and falsehoods about what is or is not possible, in nature, in logic, and maybe in metaphysics. |