3 ideas
| 13965 | Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different [Soames] |
| Full Idea: There are two senses of 'semantic' - as theory of meaning or as truth-based theory of logical consequence, and they are very different. | |
| From: Scott Soames (Why Propositions Aren't Truth-Supporting Circumstance [2008], p.78) | |
| A reaction: This subtle point is significant in considering the role of logic in philosophy. The logicians' semantics (based on logical consequence) is in danger of ousting the broader and more elusive notion of meaning in natural language. |
| 13964 | Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances) [Soames] |
| Full Idea: The semantic content of a sentence is not the set of circumstances supporting its truth. It is rather the semantic content of a structured proposition the constituents of which are the semantic contents of the constituents of the sentence. | |
| From: Scott Soames (Why Propositions Aren't Truth-Supporting Circumstance [2008], p.74) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure I get this, but while I like the truth-conditions view, I am suspicious of any proposal that the semantic content of something is some actual physical ingredients of the world. Meanings aren't sticks and stones. |
| 20930 | The existence of law is one thing, its merits and demerits another [Austin,J] |
| Full Idea: The existence of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another. Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard is a different enquiry. | |
| From: John Austin (Lectures on Jurisprudence [1858], p.214), quoted by Jens Zimmermann - Hermeneutics: a very short introduction 6 'Positivism' | |
| A reaction: It is impossible to contest this point, but the issue is whether there is nothing more to law than its written existence. |