Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works (all lost)', 'Why Propositions Aren't Truth-Supporting Circumstance' and 'Causality: Reductionism versus Realism'

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4 ideas

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different [Soames]
     Full Idea: There are two senses of 'semantic' - as theory of meaning or as truth-based theory of logical consequence, and they are very different.
     From: Scott Soames (Why Propositions Aren't Truth-Supporting Circumstance [2008], p.78)
     A reaction: This subtle point is significant in considering the role of logic in philosophy. The logicians' semantics (based on logical consequence) is in danger of ousting the broader and more elusive notion of meaning in natural language.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances) [Soames]
     Full Idea: The semantic content of a sentence is not the set of circumstances supporting its truth. It is rather the semantic content of a structured proposition the constituents of which are the semantic contents of the constituents of the sentence.
     From: Scott Soames (Why Propositions Aren't Truth-Supporting Circumstance [2008], p.74)
     A reaction: I'm not sure I get this, but while I like the truth-conditions view, I am suspicious of any proposal that the semantic content of something is some actual physical ingredients of the world. Meanings aren't sticks and stones.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Reductionists can't explain accidents, uninstantiated laws, probabilities, or the existence of any laws [Tooley]
     Full Idea: Reductionist accounts of causation cannot distinguish laws from accidental uniformities, cannot allow for basic uninstantiated laws, can't explain probabilistic laws, and cannot even demonstrate the existence of laws.
     From: Michael Tooley (Causality: Reductionism versus Realism [1990], 2)
     A reaction: I am tempted to say that this is so much the worse for the idea of laws. Extensive regularities only occur for a reason. Probabilities aren't laws. Hypothetical facts will cover uninstantiated laws. Laws are just patterns.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
Quantum physics suggests that the basic laws of nature are probabilistic [Tooley]
     Full Idea: Quantum physics seems to lend strong support to the idea that the basic laws of nature may well be probabilistic.
     From: Michael Tooley (Causality: Reductionism versus Realism [1990], 3.2.1)
     A reaction: Groan. Quantum physics should be outlawed from all philosophical discussions. The scientists don't understand it themselves. I'm certainly not going to build my worldview on it. I don't accept that these probabilities could count as 'laws'.