Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works (all lost)', 'What Price Bivalence?' and 'Can there be Vague Objects?'

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8 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence

19043	Bivalence applies not just to sentences, but that general terms are true or false of each object [Quine]
	Full Idea: It is in the spirit of bivalence not just to treat each closed sentence as true or false; as Frege stressed, each general term must be definitely true or false of each object, specificiable or not.
	From: Willard Quine (What Price Bivalence? [1981], p.36)
	A reaction: But note that this is only the 'spirit' of the thing. If you had (as I do) doubts about whether predicates actually refer to genuine 'properties', you may want to stick to the whole sentence view, and not be so fine-grained.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality

16129	Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe]
	Full Idea: Evans tries to derive a contradiction from the supposition that a given identity statement is of indeterminate truth-value. (As it happens, I consider that this argument is flawed)
	From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 1.3
	A reaction: A priori, I wouldn't expect to be able to settle the question of whether there are any vague objects simply by following some logical derivation. Empirical examination, and conceptual analysis (or stipulation) have to be involved.

16459	Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans]
	Full Idea: Maybe the world is vague, and vagueness is a necessary feature of any true description of it. Also identities may lack a determinate truth value because of their vagueness. Hence it is a fact that some objects have fuzzy boundaries. But is this coherent?
	From: Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978])
	A reaction: [compressed] Lewis quotes this introduction to the famous short paper, to show that Evans wasn't proposing a poor argument, but offering a reductio of the view that vagueness is 'ontic', or a feature of the world.

16460	Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis]
	Full Idea: The correct interpretation is that Evans trusts his reader (unwisely) to take for granted that there are vague identity statements, that a proof of the contrary cannot be right, and that the vagueness-in-describing view affords a diagnosis of the fallacy.
	From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by David Lewis - Vague Identity: Evans misunderstood p.319
	A reaction: [Lowe 199:11 is a culprit!] Lewis put this interpretation to Evans, who replied 'Yes, yes, yes!'.

16457	There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis]
	Full Idea: One problem with Evans's argument that there are no such thing as vague identity statements is that its conclusion is plainly false. Example: 'Princeton = Princeton Borough', where it is unsettled what region 'Princeton' denotes.
	From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by David Lewis - Vague Identity: Evans misunderstood p.319
	A reaction: Lewis endorses the view that vagueness is semantic. I certainly don't endorse Evans's argument, which hinges on a weird example of a property, as applied to Leibniz's Law.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic

19042	Terms learned by ostension tend to be vague, because that must be quick and unrefined [Quine]
	Full Idea: A term is apt to be vague if it is to be learned by ostension, since its applicability must admit of being judged on the spot and so cannot hinge of fine distinctions laboriously drawn.
	From: Willard Quine (What Price Bivalence? [1981], p.32)
	A reaction: [Quine cites C. Wright for this] Presumably precision can steadily increased by repeated ostension. After the first 'dog' it's pretty vague; after hundreds of them we are pretty clear about it. Long observation of borderline 'clouds' could do the same.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

14484	If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson]
	Full Idea: We cannot accept the existence of vague objects, according to Evans's argument that there cannot be indeterminacy of identity. ...From the assumption that it is indeterminate whether a = b, we conclude, determinately, that it's not the case that a = b.
	From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by Amie L. Thomasson - Ordinary Objects 05.6
	A reaction: I think we should keep intrinsic identity separate from identity between entities. A cloud can be clearly identified, while being a bit fuzzy. It is only when you ask whether we saw the same cloud that Evans's argument seems relevant.

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects

16224	There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [Evans, by PG]
	Full Idea: Two things can't be vaguely identical, because then a would have an indeterminacy which b lacks (namely, being perfectly identical to b), so by Leibniz's Law they can't be identical.
	From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978], 4.7) by PG - Db (ideas)
	A reaction: [my summary of Katherine Hawley's summary (2001:118) of Evans] Hawley considers the argument to be valid. I have grave doubts about whether b's identity with b is the sort of property needed for an application of Liebniz's Law.