62 ideas
19693 | There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb] |
Full Idea: Aristotle takes wisdom to come in two forms, the practical and the theoretical, the former of which is good judgement about how to act, and the latter of which is deep knowledge or understanding. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Dennis Whitcomb - Wisdom Intro | |
A reaction: The interesting question is then whether the two are connected. One might be thoroughly 'sensible' about action, without counting as 'wise', which seems to require a broader view of what is being done. Whitcomb endorses Aristotle on this idea. |
6267 | A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The acknowledgement that the sphere of knowledge is wider than the sphere of 'science' seems to me to be a cultural necessity if we are to arrive at a sane and human view of ourselves or of science. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Intro) | |
A reaction: A very nice remark, with which I intuitively agree, but then you are left with the problem of explaining how something can qualify as knowledge when it can't pass the stringent tests of science. How wide to we spread, and why? |
6272 | 'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Some non-scientific knowledge is presupposed by science; for example, I have been arguing that 'refers' and 'true' cannot be made scientifically precise; yet truth is a fundamental term in logic - a precise science. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec VI) | |
A reaction: We might ask whether we 'know' what 'true' and 'refers' mean, as opposed to being able to use them. If their usage doesn't count as knowledge, then we could still end up with all actual knowledge being somehow 'scientific'. |
1575 | For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle logos is the ability to speak rationally about, with the hope of attaining knowledge, questions of value. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.26 |
1589 | Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is the great theoretician who articulates a vision of a world in which natural and stable structures can be rationally discovered. His is the most optimistic and richest view of the possibilities of logos | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.95 |
8200 | Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine] |
Full Idea: A real definition, according to the Aristotelian tradition, gives the essence of the kind of thing defined. Man is defined as a rational animal, and thus rationality and animality are of the essence of each of us. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Willard Quine - Vagaries of Definition p.51 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 4385. Personally I prefer the Aristotelian approach, but we may have to say 'We cannot identify the essence of x, and so x cannot be defined'. Compare 'his mood was hard to define' with 'his mood was hostile'. |
4385 | Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, to give a definition one must first state the genus and then the differentia of the kind of thing to be defined. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.157 | |
A reaction: Presumably a modern definition would just be a list of properties, but Aristotle seeks the substance. How does he define a genus? - by placing it in a further genus? |
6276 | 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam] |
Full Idea: 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Three) | |
A reaction: The word 'warranted' seems to be ambiguous in modern philosophy. See Idea 6150. There seem to be internalist and externalist versions. It seems clear to say that a belief could be well-justified and yet false. |
6266 | We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam] |
Full Idea: A correspondence theory of truth is needed to understand how language works, and how science works. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Intro) | |
A reaction: Putnam retreated from this position to a more pragmatic one later on, but all my sympathies are with the present view, despite being repeatedly told by modern philosophers that I am wrong. See McGinn (Idea 6085) and Searle (Idea 3508). |
6277 | Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The great nineteenth century argument against the correspondence theory of truth was that one cannot think of truth as correspondence to facts (or 'reality') because one would need to compare concepts directly with unconceptualised reality. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Three) | |
A reaction: Presumably the criticism was offered by idealists, who preferred a coherence theory. The defence is to say that there is a confusion here between a concept and the contents of a concept. The contents of a concept are designed to be facts. |
6264 | In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Anyone who accepts the notions of whatever object language is in question - and this can be chosen arbitrarily - can also understand 'true' as defined by Tarski for that object language. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Intro) | |
A reaction: Thus if we say "'snow is white' is true iff snow is white", then if you 'accept the notion' that snow is white in English, you understand what 'true' means. This seems to leave you with the meaning of 'snow is white' being its truth conditions. |
6265 | Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam] |
Full Idea: What Tarski has done is to give us a perfectly correct account of the formal logic of the concept 'true', but the formal logic of the concept is not all there is to the notion of truth. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Intro) | |
A reaction: I find this refreshing. A lot of modern philosophers seem to think that truth is no longer an interesting philosophical topic, because deflationary accounts have sidelined it, but I take the concept to be at the heart of metaphysics. |
6269 | Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam] |
Full Idea: There is only one way anyone knows how to define 'true' and that is Tarski's way. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec II.5) | |
A reaction: However, Davidson wrote a paper called 'On the Folly of Trying to Define Truth', which seems to reject even Tarski. Also bear in mind Putnam's earlier remark (Idea 6265) that there is more to truth than Tarski's definition. Just take 'true' as primitive. |
11060 | Aristotelian syllogisms are three-part, subject-predicate, existentially committed, with laws of thought [Aristotle, by Hanna] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's logic is based on the triadic syllogism, the distinction between subject and one-place predicates, that universal claims have existential commitment, and bivalence, excluded middle and noncontradiction. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Robert Hanna - Rationality and Logic 2.2 |
22271 | Aristotle was the first to use schematic letters in logic [Aristotle, by Potter] |
Full Idea: It was Aristotle who initiated the use of the letter of the (Greek) alphabet 'schematically', to stand for an unspecified piece of language of some appropriate grammatical type. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Aris' | |
A reaction: Did he invent it from scratch, or borrow it from the mathematicians? Euclid labels diagrams with letters. |
18909 | Aristotelian sentences are made up by one of four 'formative' connectors [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle there are four formatives for sentences: 'belongs to some', 'belongs to every', 'belongs to no', and 'does not belong to every'. These are 'copulae'. Aristotle would have written 'wise belongs to some man'. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by George Engelbretsen - Trees, Terms and Truth 3 | |
A reaction: A rather set-theoretic reading. This invites a Quinean scepticism about whether wisdom is some entity which can 'belong' to a person. It makes trope theory sound attractive, offering a unique wisdom that is integrated into that particular person. |
8080 | Aristotelian identified 256 possible syllogisms, saying that 19 are valid [Aristotle, by Devlin] |
Full Idea: Aristotle identified four 'figures' of argument, based on combinations of Subject (S) and Predicate (P) and Middle term (M). The addition of 'all' and 'some', and 'has' and 'has not' got the property, resulted in 256 possible syllogisms, 19 of them valid. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2 | |
A reaction: [Compressed version of Devlin] What Aristotle did was astonishing, and must be one of the key ideas of western civilization, even though a lot of his assumptions have been revised or rejected. |
13912 | Aristotle replaced Plato's noun-verb form with unions of pairs of terms by one of four 'copulae' [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
Full Idea: Aristotle replaced the Platonic noun-verb account of logical syntax with a 'copular' account. A sentence is a pair of terms bound together logically (not necessarily grammatically) by one of four 'logical copulae' (every, none, some, not some). | |
From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C - Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics 8 | |
A reaction: So the four copulas are are-all, are-never, are-sometimes, and are-sometime-not. Consider 'men' and 'mortal'. Alternatively, Idea 18909. |
8071 | Aristotle listed nineteen valid syllogisms (though a few of them were wrong) [Aristotle, by Devlin] |
Full Idea: Aristotle listed a total of nineteen syllogisms involved in logical reasoning, though some of the ones on his list were subsequently shown to be invalid. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE], Ch.1) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes | |
A reaction: It is quite upsetting to think that the founding genius got some of it wrong, but that just shows how subtle and complex the analysis of rational thought can be. |
13819 | Aristotle's said some Fs are G or some Fs are not G, forgetting that there might be no Fs [Bostock on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's system accepted as correct some laws which nowadays we reject, for example |= (Some Fs are G) or (some Fs are not G). He failed to take into account the possibility of there being no Fs at all. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by David Bostock - Intermediate Logic 8.4 |
9403 | There are three different deductions for actual terms, necessary terms and possible terms [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Since to belong, to belong of necessity, and to be possible to belong are different, ..there will be different deductions for each; one deduction will be from necessary terms, one from terms which belong, and one from possible terms. | |
From: Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE], 29b29-35) | |
A reaction: Fitting and Mendelsohn cite this as the earliest thoughts on modal logic. but Kneale and Kneale say that Aristotle got into a muddle, and so was unable to create a workable system. |
13282 | Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle proposes to relativise unity and plurality, so that a single object can be both one (indivisible) and many (divisible) simultaneously, without contradiction, relative to different measures. Wholeness has degrees, with the strength of the unity. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.12 | |
A reaction: [see Koslicki's account of Aristotle for details] As always, the Aristotelian approach looks by far the most promising. Simplistic mechanical accounts of how parts make wholes aren't going to work. We must include the conventional and conceptual bit. |
11148 | Deduction is when we suppose one thing, and another necessarily follows [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A deduction is a discourse in which, certain things having been supposed, something different from the things supposed results of necessity because these things are so. | |
From: Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE], 24b18) | |
A reaction: Notice that it is modal ('suppose', rather than 'know'), that necessity is involved, which is presumably metaphysical necessity, and that there are assumptions about what would be true, and not just what follows from what. |
4730 | For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Aristotle apparently believed that the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected the substance-accident nature of reality. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.4 | |
A reaction: We need not assume that Aristotle is wrong. It is a chicken-and-egg. There is something obvious about subject-predicate language, if one assumes that unified objects are part of nature, and not just conventional. |
18896 | Aristotle places terms at opposite ends, joined by a quantified copula [Aristotle, by Sommers] |
Full Idea: Aristotle often preferred to formulate predications by placing the terms at opposite ends of the sentence and joining them by predicating expressions like 'belongs-to-some' or 'belongs-to-every'. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Fred Sommers - Intellectual Autobiography 'Conceptions' | |
A reaction: This is Sommers's picture of Aristotle, which led Sommers to develop his modern Term Logic. |
3300 | Aristotle's logic is based on the subject/predicate distinction, which leads him to substances and properties [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Basic to Aristotle's logic is the grammatical distinction between subject and predicate, which he glosses in terms of the contrast between a substance and its properties. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Intro | |
A reaction: The introduction of quantifiers and 'logical form' can't disguise the fact that we still talk about (and with) objects and predicates, because no one can think of any other way to talk. |
11149 | Affirming/denying sentences are universal, particular, or indeterminate [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Affirming/denying sentences are universal, particular, or indeterminate. Belonging 'to every/to none' is universal; belonging 'to some/not to some/not to every' is particular; belonging or not belonging (without universal/particular) is indeterminate. | |
From: Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE], 24a16) |
8079 | Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some') [Aristotle, by Devlin] |
Full Idea: Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some'), and two ways to combine the subject with the predicate ('have', and 'have not'), giving four propositions: all-s-have-p, all-s-have-not-p, some-s-have-p, and some-s-have-not-p. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2 | |
A reaction: Frege seems to have switched from 'some' to 'at-least-one'. Since then other quantifiers have been proposed. See, for example, Ideas 7806 and 6068. |
6280 | Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Realism is an empirical theory; it explains the convergence of scientific theories, where earlier theories are often limiting cases of later theories (which is why theoretical terms preserve their reference); and it explains the success of language. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Four) | |
A reaction: I agree. Personally, I think of Plato's Theory of Forms and all religions as empirical theories. The response from anti-realists is generally to undermine confidence in the evidence which these 'empirical theories' are said to explain. |
13276 | The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's discussion of the unmoved mover and of the soul confirms the suspicion that form, when it is not thought of as the object represented in a definition, plays the role of the ultimate mereological atom within his system. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 6.6 | |
A reaction: Aristotle is concerned with which things are 'divisible', and he cites these two examples as indivisible, but they may be too unusual to offer an actual theory of how Aristotle builds up wholes from atoms. He denies atoms in matter. |
13277 | The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Thus in Aristotle we may think of an object's formal components as a sort of recipe for how to build wholes of that particular kind. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.5 | |
A reaction: In the elusive business of pinning down what Aristotle means by the crucial idea of 'form', this analogy strikes me as being quite illuminating. It would fit DNA in living things, and the design of an artifact. |
14641 | A deduction is necessary if the major (but not the minor) premise is also necessary [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It sometimes results that the deduction becomes necessary when only one of the premises is necessary (not whatever premise it might be, however, but only the premise in relation to the major extreme [premise]). | |
From: Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE], 30a15) | |
A reaction: The qualification is brackets is said by Plantinga (1969) to be a recognition of the de re/ de dicto distinction (later taken up by Aquinas). Plantinga gives two examples to illustrate his reading. |
5991 | For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code] |
Full Idea: Aristotle thinks that in general we have knowledge or understanding when we grasp causes, and he distinguishes three fundamental types of knowledge - theoretical, practical and productive. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Alan D. Code - Aristotle | |
A reaction: Productive knowledge we tend to label as 'knowing how'. The centrality of causes for knowledge would get Aristotle nowadays labelled as a 'naturalist'. It is hard to disagree with his three types, though they may overlap. |
11239 | The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of a priori truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11240. |
6284 | If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam] |
Full Idea: If we held, say, 'All unmarried men are unmarried' as absolutely immune from revision, why would this make it true? | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Four) | |
A reaction: A very nice question. Like most American philosophers, Putnam accepts Quine's attack on the unrevisability of analytic truths. His point here is that defenders of analytic truths are probably desperate to preserve basic truths, but it won't work. |
23312 | Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is a rationalist …but reason for him is a disposition which we only acquire over time. Its acquisition is made possible primarily by perception and experience. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Rationalism p.173 | |
A reaction: I would describe this process as the gradual acquisition of the skill of objectivity, which needs the right knowledge and concepts to evaluate new experiences. |
16111 | Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Since Aristotle generally prefers a metaphysical theory that accords with common intuitions, he frequently relies on facts about language to guide his metaphysical claims. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.5 | |
A reaction: I approve of his procedure. I take intuition to be largely rational justifications too complex for us to enunciate fully, and language embodies folk intuitions in its concepts (especially if the concepts occur in many languages). |
6273 | Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Our ability to picture how people are likely to respond may well be innate; indeed, our disposition to believe what other people tell us (which is fundamental to knowledge) could hardly be an inference, as that isn’t good enough for knowledge. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec VI) | |
A reaction: An interesting claim. There could be an intermediate situation, which is a hard-wired non-conscious inference. When dismantled, the 'innate' brain circuits for assessing testimony could turn out to work on logic and evidence. |
6274 | Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Empathy with others may give less than 'Knowledge', but it gives more than mere logical or physical possibility; it gives plausibility, or (to revive Platonic terminology) it provides 'right opinion'. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec VI) | |
A reaction: See Ideas 174 and 2140 for Plato. Putnam is exploring areas of knowledge outside the limits of strict science. Behind this claim seems to lie the Principle of Charity (3971), but a gang of systematic liars (e.g. evil students) would be a problem case. |
16971 | Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik] |
Full Idea: Plato's unity of science principle states that all - legitimate - sciences are ultimately about the Forms. Aristotle's principle states that all sciences must be, ultimately, about substances, or aspects of substances. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], 1) by Julius Moravcsik - Aristotle on Adequate Explanations 1 |
11243 | Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle things which explain (the explanantia) are facts, which should not be associated with the modern view that says explanations are dependent on how we conceive and describe the world (where causes are independent of us). | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.1 | |
A reaction: There must be some room in modern thought for the Aristotelian view, if some sort of robust scientific realism is being maintained against the highly linguistic view of philosophy found in the twentieth century. |
3320 | Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: The standard Aristotelian doctrine of species and genus in the theory of anything whatever involves specifying what the thing is in terms of something more general. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.10 |
12000 | Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung] |
Full Idea: The view that essential properties are those in virtue of which other significant properties of the subjects under investigation can be explained is encountered repeatedly in Aristotle's work. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation IV | |
A reaction: What does 'significant' mean here? I take it that the significant properties are the ones which explain the role, function and powers of the object. |
17084 | You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Explanation is an interest-relative notion …explanation has to be partly a pragmatic concept. To regard the 'pragmatics' of explanation as no part of the concept is to abdicate the job of figuring out what makes an explanation good. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], p. 41-2), quoted by David-Hillel Ruben - Explaining Explanation Ch 1 | |
A reaction: I suppose this is just obvious, depending on how far you want to take the 'interest-relative' bit. If a fool is fobbed off with a trivial explanation, there must be some non-relative criterion for assessing that. |
18911 | Linguistic terms form a hierarchy, with higher terms predicable of increasing numbers of things [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen] |
Full Idea: According to Aristotle, the terms of a language form a finite hierarchy, where the higher terms are predicable of more things than are lower terms. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by George Engelbretsen - Trees, Terms and Truth 3 | |
A reaction: I would be a bit cautious about placing something precisely in a hierarchy according to how many things it can be predicated of. It is a start, though, in trying to give a decent account of generality, which is a major concept in philosophy. |
23300 | Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
Full Idea: Aristotle, and also the Stoics, denied rationality to animals. …The Platonists, the Pythagoreans, and some more independent Aristotelians, did grant reason and intellect to animals. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Denial' | |
A reaction: This is not the same as affirming or denying their consciousness. The debate depends on how rationality is conceived. |
6282 | Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Four) | |
A reaction: How can you have a theory of understanding without a meaning that requires to be understood? Personally I think about the minds of small animals when pondering this, and that seems to put reference and truth at the front of the queue. |
6281 | Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam] |
Full Idea: You can't treat understanding a sentence as knowing its truth conditions, because it then becomes unintelligible what that knowledge in turn consists in. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Four) | |
A reaction: The implication, I take it, is circularity; how can you specify truth conditions if you don't understand sentences? Putnam here agrees with Dummett that verification must be involved. Something has to be taken as axiomatic in all this. |
6278 | We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam] |
Full Idea: I am suggesting that we reject the view that truth (based on the semantic theory) is prior to meaning. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Three) | |
A reaction: It is a nice question which of truth or meaning has logical priority. One might start by speculating about how and why animals think. A moth attracted to flame is probably working on truth without much that could be called 'meaning'. |
6271 | How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam] |
Full Idea: A theory of how reference is specified isn't a theory of what reference is. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec V) | |
A reaction: A simple and important point. We may achieve reference by naming, describing, grunting or pointing, but the question is, what have we achieved when we get there? |
6268 | The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The line of reasoning of Kuhn and Feyerabend can be blocked by arguing (as I have in various places, and as Saul Kripke has) that scientific terms are not synonymous with descriptions. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec II.2) | |
A reaction: A nice clear statement of the motivation for creating the causal theory of reference. See Idea 6162. We could still go back and ask whether we could block scientific relativism by rethinking how descriptions work, instead of abandoning them. |
11240 | The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of analytic truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11239. |
6279 | A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam] |
Full Idea: A language made up and used by a being who belonged to no community would have no need for such a concept as the 'meaning' of a term. To state the reference of each term and what the language speaker believes is to tell the whole story. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Three) | |
A reaction: A subtle response to Wittgenstein's claim (e.g. Ideas 4152,4158), but I am not sure what Putnam means. I would have thought that beliefs had to be embodied in propositions. They may not need 'meaning' quite as urgently as sentences, but still… |
6270 | The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam] |
Full Idea: What it is to be a correct translation is to be the translation that best explains the behaviour of the speaker. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec III) | |
A reaction: This seems fairly close to Quine, but rather puzzlingly uses the word 'correct'. If our criteria of translation are purely behavioural, there is no way we can be correct after one word ('gavagai'), so at what point does it become 'correct'? |
6283 | Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam] |
Full Idea: We could say that the language has more than one correct way of being mapped onto the world (it must, since it has more than one way of being correctly mapped onto a language which is itself correctly mapped onto the world). | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Four) | |
A reaction: This spells out nicely the significance of Quine's 'indeterminacy of translation'. Others have pointed out that the fact that language maps onto world in many ways need not be anti-realist; the world is endless, and language is limited. |
6275 | You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The maxim that 'most of a speaker's beliefs are true' as an a priori principle governing radical translation seems to me to go too far; first, I don't know how to count beliefs; second, most people's beliefs on some topics (philosophy) are probably false. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Three) | |
A reaction: Putnam prefers a pragmatic view, where charity is applicable if behaviour is involved. Philosophy is too purely theoretical. The extent to which Charity should apply in philosophy seminars is a nice question, which all students should test in practice. |
6559 | Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge (and somewhat to my surprise), Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal; however, he all but says it. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1 | |
A reaction: When I read this I thought that this database would prove Fogelin wrong, but it actually supports him, as I can't find it in Aristotle either. Descartes refers to it in Med.Two. In Idea 5133 Aristotle does say that man is a 'social being'. But 22586! |
11150 | It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it. | |
From: Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) | |
A reaction: The epigraph on a David Chalmers website. A wonderful remark, and it should be on the wall of every beginners' philosophy class. However, while it is in the spirit of Aristotle, it appears to be a misattribution with no ancient provenance. |
3037 | Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Aristotle was asked how much educated men were superior to those uneducated; "As much," he said, "as the living are to the dead." | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 05.1.11 |
8660 | There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Aristotle developed his own distinction between potential infinity (never running out) and actual infinity (there being a collection of an actual infinite number of things, such as places, times, objects). He decided that actual infinity was incoherent. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 1.3 | |
A reaction: Friend argues, plausibly, that this won't do, since potential infinity doesn't make much sense if there is not an actual infinity of things to supply the demand. It seems to just illustrate how boggling and uncongenial infinity was to Aristotle. |
12058 | Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's conception of matter permits any kind of matter to become any other kind of matter. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Wiggins - Substance 4.11.2 | |
A reaction: This is obviously crucial background information when we read Aristotle on matter. Our 92+ elements, and fixed fundamental particles, gives a quite different picture. Aristotle would discuss form and matter quite differently now. |
22729 | The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Aristotle said that the conception of gods arose among mankind from two originating causes, namely from events which concern the soul and from celestial phenomena. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], Frag 10) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Physicists (two books) I.20 | |
A reaction: The cosmos suggests order, and possible creation. What do events of the soul suggest? It doesn't seem to be its non-physical nature, because Aristotle is more of a functionalist. Puzzling. (It says later that gods are like the soul). |