88 ideas
12274 | Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The examination must be carried on and begin from the primary classes and then go on step by step until further division is impossible. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 109b17) | |
A reaction: This is a good slogan for the analytic approach to thought. I take Aristotle (or possibly Socrates) to be the father of analysis, not Frege (though see Idea 9840). (He may be thinking of the tableau method of proof). |
2474 | It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Lots of philosophers fear that if concepts don't have analyses, justification breaks down. My own guess is that concepts don't have analyses and that justification will survive all the same. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 3 n2) |
2481 | Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The general truth is that nothing ever reduces to anything, however hard philosophers may try. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 6) |
2505 | Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The most important thing that has happened in cognitive science was Turing's invention of the notion of mechanical rationality (because some inferences are rational in virtue of the syntax of their sentences). | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.17) |
12260 | Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Reasoning is dialectical which reasons from generally accepted opinions. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 100a30) | |
A reaction: This is right at the heart of Aristotle's philosophical method, and Greek thinking generally. There are nice modern debates about 'folk' understanding, derived from science (e.g. quantum theory) which suggest that starting from normal views is a bad idea. |
12291 | There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There cannot possibly be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 154a11) | |
A reaction: The second half of this is much bolder and more controversial, and plenty of modern thinkers would flatly reject it. Are definitions contextual, that is, designed for some specific human purpose. Must definitions be of causes? |
12292 | Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A definition is the easiest of all things to destroy; for, since it contains many assertions, the opportunities which it offers are very numerous, and the more abundant the material, the more quickly the reasoning can set to work. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 155a03) | |
A reaction: I quote this to show that Aristotle expected many definitions to be very long affairs (maybe even of book length?) |
12272 | We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We usually isolate the appropriate description of the essence of a particular thing by means of the differentiae which are peculiar to it. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 108b05) | |
A reaction: I take this to be important for showing the definition is more than mere categorisation. A good definition homes in the particular, by gradually narrowing down the differentiae. |
12279 | The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: No differentia indicates the essence [ti estin], but rather some quality, such as 'pedestrian' or 'biped'. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 122b17) | |
A reaction: We must disentangle this, since essence is what is definable, and definition seems to give us the essence, and yet it appears that definition only requires genus and differentia. Differentiae seem to be both generic and fine-grained. See Idea 12280! |
12283 | In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 132a12) | |
A reaction: We mustn't be deluded into thinking that nothing else is required. I take the increasing refinement of differentiae to be where the real action is. The genus gives you 70% of the explanation. |
12289 | The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The genera and the differentiae are predicated in the category of essence. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 153a19) | |
A reaction: The definition is words, and the essence is real, so our best definition might not fully attain to the essence. Aristotle has us reaching out to the world through our definitions. |
12261 | Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The differentia, being generic in character, should be ranged with the genus. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 101b18) | |
A reaction: This does not mean that naming the differentia amounts to mere classification. I presume we can only state individual differences by using a language which is crammed full of universals. |
12263 | 'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A 'genus' is that which is predicated in the category of essence of several things which differ in kind. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 102a32) | |
A reaction: Hence a genus is likely to be expressed by a universal, a one-over-many. A particular will be a highly individual collection of various genera, but what ensures the uniqueness of each thing, if they are indiscernible? |
12285 | The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The definition ought to be peculiar to one thing, not common to many. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 149b24) | |
A reaction: I take this to be very important, against those who think that definition is no more than mere categorisation. To explain, you must get down to the level of the individual. We must explain that uniquely docile tiger. |
2470 | Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Transcendental arguments ran: "If it weren't that P, we couldn't know (now 'say' or 'think' or 'judge') that Q; and we do know (now…) that Q; therefore P". Old and new arguments tend to be equally unconvincing, because of their empiricist preconceptions. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 3) |
11261 | Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The equality of opposite reasonings is the cause of aporia; for it is when we reason on both [sides of a question] and it appears to us that everything can come about either way, that we are in a state of aporia about which of the two ways to take up. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 145b17), quoted by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.1 | |
A reaction: Other philosophers give up on the subject in this situation, but I love Aristotle because he takes this to be the place where philosophy begins. |
12273 | Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: They say that the unit [monada] is the starting point of number (and the point the starting-point of a line). | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 108b30) | |
A reaction: Yes, despite Frege's objections in the early part of the 'Grundlagen' (1884). I take arithmetic to be rooted in counting, despite all abstract definitions of number by Frege and Dedekind. Identity gives the unit, which is countable. See also Topics 141b9 |
12267 | There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The four main types of predicates fall into ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103b20) | |
A reaction: These are the standard ten categories of Aristotle. He is notable for the divisions not being sharp, and ten being a rough total. He is well aware of the limits of precision in such matters. |
12282 | An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If it does not at present exist, or, if it has not existed in the past, or if it is not going to exist in the future, it will not be a property [idion] at all. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 129a27) | |
A reaction: This seems to cramp our style in counterfactual discussion. Can't we even mention an individual property if we believe that it will never exist. Utopian political discussion will have to cease! |
12264 | An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: An 'accident' [sumbebekos] is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to any one and the self-same thing, such as 'sitting posture' or 'whiteness'. This is the best definition, because it tells us the essential meaning of the term itself. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 102b07) | |
A reaction: Thus a car could be red, or not red. Accidents are contingent. It does not follow that necessary properties are essential (see Idea 12262). There are accidents [sumbebekos], propria [idion] and essences [to ti en einai]. |
2469 | The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Damn near everything we know about the world (e.g. a mountain) suggests that unimaginably complicated to-ings and fro-ings of bits and pieces at the extreme microlevel manage somehow to converge on stable macrolevel properties. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: This is clearly true, and is a vital part of the physicalist picture of the mind. Personally I prefer the word 'processes' to 'properties', since no one seems to really know what a property is. A process is an abstraction from events. |
2475 | Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor] |
Full Idea: It's a mistake to try to construe the notion of an instance in terms of the notion of a good instance (e.g. Platonic Forms); the latter is patently a special case of the former, so the right order of exposition is the other way round. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 4) |
12132 | Indiscernibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for identity [Brody] |
Full Idea: Enduring objects should be taken as fundamental in an ontology, and for all such objects indiscernibility is both a necessary and sufficient condition for identity. | |
From: Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980], 3) | |
A reaction: Brody offers a substantial defence, but I don't find it plausible. Apart from Black's well known twin spheres example (Idea 10195), discernibility is relative to the powers of the observer. Two similar people in the mist aren't thereby identical. |
12280 | Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In assigning the essence [ti estin], it is more appropriate to state the genus than the differentiae; for he who describes 'man' as an 'animal' indicates his essence better than he who describes him as 'pedestrian'. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 128a24) | |
A reaction: See Idea 12279. This idea is only part of the story. My reading of this is simply that assigning a genus gives more information. We learn more about him when we say he is a man than when we say he is Socrates. |
15834 | Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: Brody bases sortal essentialism on the notion of a property that an individual must possess throughout its existence if it possesses it at any time in its existence. | |
From: report of Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 7.1 | |
A reaction: Brody tends to treat categories as properties, which I dislike. How do you assess 'must' here? A person may possess a mole throughout life without it being essential. |
12140 | Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody] |
Full Idea: The modern emphasis has been on the connection between essential properties and the properties that an object must have essentially. But traditionally there is also the connection between essential properties and the sort of thing that it is. | |
From: Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980], 5.6) | |
A reaction: These are the modal essence and the definitional essence. My view is that he has missed out a crucial third (Aristotelian) view, which is that essences are explanatory. This third view can subsume the other two. |
13269 | In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In the case of a house, where the process of compounding the parts is obvious, though the parts exist, there is no reason why the whole should not be non-existent, and so the parts are not the same as the whole. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 150a19) | |
A reaction: Compare buying a piece of furniture, and being surprised to discover, when it is delivered, that it is self-assembly. This idea is a simple refutation of the claims of classical mereology, that wholes are just some parts. Aristotle uses modal claims. |
12284 | Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Everything that is has one single essence [en esti to einai]. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 141a36) | |
A reaction: Does this include vague objects, and abstract 'objects'? Sceptics might ask what grounds this claim. Does Dr Jeckyll have two essences? |
11895 | A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: Brody bases sortal essentialism on the notion of a property that an individual must possess throughout its existence if it possesses it at any time in its existence. ...'Once an F, always an F'. ...Being a parrot is not a temporary occupation. | |
From: report of Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 7.1 | |
A reaction: Hm. Would being less than fifty metres tall qualify as a sortal essence, for a giraffe or a uranium rod? If there is one thing an essential property should be, it is important. How do we assess importance? By explanatory power! Watch this space. |
12141 | Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind? [Brody] |
Full Idea: We can advance the thesis that all essential properties either determine a natural kind or are part of an essential property that does determine a natural kind. | |
From: Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980]) | |
A reaction: A useful clear statement of the view. I am opposed to it, because I take it to be of the essence of Socrates that he is philosophical, but humans are not essentially philosophical, and philosophers are unlikely to be a natural kind. |
12137 | De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties [Brody] |
Full Idea: To say that an object a has a property P essentially is to say that it has P, and in all of certain worlds (all possible, all in which something identical with it exists, ...) the object identical with it has P. This is the standard de re interpretation. | |
From: Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980], 5.4) | |
A reaction: This view always has to be qualified by excluding trivially necessary properties, but that exclusion shows clearly that the notion of essential is more concerned with non-triviality than it is with necessity. |
12142 | Essentially, a has P, always had P, must have had P, and has never had a future without P [Brody] |
Full Idea: 'a has property P essentially' means 'a has P, a always had P, there is no possible past in which P exists without P, and there is no moment of time at which a has had P and at which there is a possible future in which a exists without P' | |
From: Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980], 6) | |
A reaction: This is Brody's own final account of essentialism. This is a carefully qualified form of the view that essential properties are, on the whole, the necessary properties, which view I take to be fundamentally mistaken. |
12143 | An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily [Brody] |
Full Idea: An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily. | |
From: Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980], 6.1) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as blatantly false. Personally I am toying with the very unorthodox view that essential properties are not at all necessary, and that something can retain its identity while changing its essential character. A philosopher with Alzheimers. |
12262 | An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A property [idion] is something which does not show the essence of a thing but belongs to it alone. ...No one calls anything a property which can possibly belong to something else. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 102a18) | |
A reaction: [See Charlotte Witt 106 on this] 'Property' is clearly a bad translation for such an individual item. Witt uses 'proprium', which is a necessary but nonessential property of something. Necessity is NOT the hallmark of essence. See Idea 12266. |
12144 | Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody] |
Full Idea: The reasonableness of the essentialist hypothesis will be proportional to the extent that we can, as a result, use a's possession of P to explain a's other properties, ...and there is an inability to explain otherwise why a has P. | |
From: Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980], 6.3) | |
A reaction: Brody as a rather liberal notion of properties. I would hope that we can do rather more than explain a's non-essential properties. If the non-essential properties were entailed by the essential ones, would they not then also be essential? |
12139 | Mereological essentialism says that every part that ensures the existence is essential [Brody] |
Full Idea: Mereological essentialism (whose leading advocate is Chisholm) says that for every x and y, if x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists. | |
From: Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980], 5.6) | |
A reaction: This sounds implausible, especially given the transitivity of parthood. Not only are the planks that constitute Theseus's Ship now essential to it, but all the parts of the planks, every last chip, are as well. |
12290 | Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Destruction is a dissolution of essence. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 153b30) | |
A reaction: [plucked from context!] I can't think of a better way to define destruction, in order to distinguish it from damage. A vase is destroyed when its essential function cannot be recovered. |
12286 | If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: When things are absolutely the same, their coming-into-being and destruction are also the same and so are the agents of their production and destruction. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 152a02) | |
A reaction: Thus Queen Elizabeth II has to be the result of that particular birth, and from those particular parents, as Kripke says? The inverse may not be true. Do twins have a single origin? Things that fission and then re-fuse differently? etc |
12135 | Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings [Brody] |
Full Idea: If 'beginning of existence' meant 'first moment of existence after a period of nonexistence', then objects with interrupted existence have two beginnings of existence. | |
From: Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980], 4.1) | |
A reaction: One might still maintain that the first beginning was essential to the object, since that is the event that defined it - and that would clarify the reason why we are supposed to think the origins are essential. I say the origin explains it. |
12130 | a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody] |
Full Idea: Suppose that a and b have all of their properties in common. a certainly has the property of-being-identical-with-a. So, by supposition, does b. Then a = b. | |
From: Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980], 1.2) | |
A reaction: Brody defends this argument, and seems to think that it proves the identity of indiscernibles. As far as I can see it totally begs the question, since we can only assume that both have the property of being-identical-with-a if we have assumed a = b. |
12266 | 'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: 'The same' is employed in several senses: its principal sense is for same name or same definition; a second sense occurs when sameness is applied to a property [idiu]; a third sense is applied to an accident. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103a24-33) | |
A reaction: [compressed] 'Property' is better translated as 'proprium' - a property unique to a particular thing, but not essential - see Idea 12262. Things are made up of essence, propria and accidents, and three ways of being 'the same' are the result. |
12287 | Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If two things are the same then any accident of one must also be an accident of the other, and, if one of them is an accident of something else, so must the other be also. For, if there is any discrepancy on these points, obviously they are not the same. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 152a36) | |
A reaction: So what is always called 'Leibniz's Law' should actually be 'Aristotle's Law'! I can't see anything missing from the Aristotle version, but then, since most people think it is pretty obvious, you would expect the great stater of the obvious to get it. |
12288 | Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Things which are the same specifically or generically are not necessarily the same or cannot possibly be the same numerically. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 152b32) | |
A reaction: See also Idea 12266. This looks to me to be a pretty precise anticipation of Peirce's type/token distinction, but without the terminology. It is reassuring that Aristotle spotted it, as that makes it more likely to be a genuine distinction. |
12259 | Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Reasoning [sullogismos] is a discussion in which, certain things having been laid down, something other than these things necessarily results through them. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 100a25) | |
A reaction: This is cited as the standard statement of the nature of logical necessity. One might challenge either the very word 'necessary', or the exact sense of the word employed here. Is it, in fact, metaphysical, or merely analytic? |
12138 | Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation [Brody] |
Full Idea: Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation. | |
From: Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980], 5.4) | |
A reaction: An interesting view. We might stipulate that any possible Aristotle is 'our Aristotle', but you would still need criteria for deciding which possible Aristotle's would qualify. Long-frozen Aristotles, stupid Aristotles, alien Aristotle's, deformed... |
2502 | How do you count beliefs? [Fodor] |
Full Idea: There is no agreed way of counting beliefs. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.16) |
2501 | Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Berkeley seems to have believed that tables and chairs are logically homogeneous with afterimages. I assume that he was wrong to believe this. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.16) |
2465 | Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Why mightn't fleshing out the standard psychological account of perception itself count as learning what perceptual justification amounts to? | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 1) |
2504 | Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Pinker's rationalism involves four main ideas: mind is a computational system, which is massively modular with a lot of innate structure resulting from evolution. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.17) |
2493 | According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor] |
Full Idea: According to empiricists, the fundamental mental process is not theory construction but abstraction. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.12) |
2494 | Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor] |
Full Idea: That there is more in the content of a concept than there is in the experiences that prompt us to form it is the burden of the traditional rationalist critique of empiricism (as worked out by Leibniz and Kant). | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.12) |
12271 | Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Induction is the progress from particulars to universals; if the skilled pilot is the best pilot and the skilled charioteer the best charioteer, then, in general, the skilled man is the best man in any particular sphere. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 105a15) | |
A reaction: It is a bit unclear whether we are deriving universal concepts, or merely general truths. Need general truths be absolute or necessary truths? Presumably occasionally the best person is not the most skilled, as in playing a musical instrument. |
12293 | We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: When it is necessary to establish the universal, people use the expression 'So in all cases of this kind'; but it is one of the most difficult tasks to define which of the terms proposed are 'of this kind' and which are not. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 157a25) | |
A reaction: It is particularly hard if induction is expressed as the search for universals, since the kind presumably is the universal, so the universal must be known before the induction can apply, which really is the most frightful nuisance for truth-seekers. |
2503 | Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Empirical approaches to cognition say the human mind is a blank slate at birth; experiences write on the slate, and association extracts and extrapolates trends from the record of experience. The mind is an image of statistical regularities of the world. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.17) | |
A reaction: The 'blank slate' is an exaggeration. The mind at least has the tools to make associations. He tries to make it sound implausible, but the word 'extrapolates' contains a wealth of possibilities that could build into a plausible theory. |
2508 | The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Like hands, you don't have to know how the mind evolved to make a pretty shrewd guess at what it's for; for example, that it's to think with. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.17) | |
A reaction: I like this. This is one of the basic facts of philosophy of mind, and it frequently gets lost in the fog. It is obvious that the components of the mind (say, experience and intentionality) will be better understood if their function is remembered. |
2485 | Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Intentional Realism is the idea that our intentional mental states causally explain our behaviour; so holistic semantics (which says no two people have the same intentional states, or share generalisations) is irrealistic about intentional mental states. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: ...presumably because two people CAN have the same behaviour. The key question would be whether the intentional states have to be conscious. |
2506 | If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If there is a community of computers living in my head, there had also better be somebody who is in charge; and, by God, it had better be me. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.17) | |
A reaction: Dennett quotes this as a quaintly old-fashioned view. I agree quite strongly with Fodor, for reasons that Dennett should like - evolutionary ones. A mind is a useless tool without central co-ordination. What makes my long-term plans? It isn't anarchy! |
2467 | Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Functionalists claim that pains and the like are higher-order, relational properties that things have in virtue of the pattern of causal interactions that they (can or do) enter into. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: The whole idea of a property being purely 'relational' strikes me as dubious (or even nonsense). "Is north of" is a relation, but it is totally derived from more basical physical geographical properties. |
2489 | Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Compare Churchland's strategy rooted in neurological modelling with "if it's flight you want to understand, what you need to look at is feathers". | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: Sounds good, but may be a false analogy. You learn a lot about snake movement if you examine their scales. |
2468 | Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor] |
Full Idea: "Type" physicalism is supposed, by general consensus, to be stronger than "token" physicalism; stronger, that is, than the mere claim that all mental states are necessarily physically instantiated. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: Such philosopher's terminology always seems cut-and-dried, until you ask exactly what is identical to what. The word 'type' is a very broad concept. Are trees the same type of thing as roses? A thought always requires the same 'type' of brain event? |
2490 | Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Churchland is pushing a version of connectionism ….in which if you think of the elements as "ideas" and call the connections between them "associations", you've got a psychology that is no great advance on David Hume. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: See Fodor's book 'Humean Variations' on how Hume should be improved. This idea strikes me as important for understanding Hume, who is very reticent about what his real views are on the mind. |
2476 | The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The question whether there are recognitional concepts is really the question what thought is for - for directing action, or for discerning truth. And Descartes was right on this: the goal of thought is to understand the world, not to sort it. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 4) |
2499 | Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The thinking involved in "figuring out" what to do is a quite different kind of mental process than the stimulus analysis that modules perform. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: My PA theory fits this perfectly. My inner assistant keeps providing information about needs, duties etc., but takes no part in my decisions. Psychology must include the Will. |
2496 | Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Blind children are not, in general, linguistically impaired; not even in their talk about space. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: This is offered to demonstrate that spatial concepts are innate, even in the blind. But then we would expect anyone who has to move in space to develop spatial concepts from experience. |
2497 | Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor] |
Full Idea: It is not plausible that the mind could be made only of modules; one does sometimes manage to balance one's checkbook, and there can't be an innate, specialized intelligence for doing that. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: I agree strongly with this. My own mind strikes me as being highly modular, but as long as I am aware of the output of the modules, I can pass judgement. The judger is more than a 'module'. |
2509 | Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Modules contain lots of specialized information about the problem domains that they compute in. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.17) | |
A reaction: At this point we must be cautious about modularity. I doubt whether 'information' is the right word. I think 'specialized procedures' might make more sense. |
2491 | Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The four essential properties of modules are: encapsulation (information doesn't flow, as in the persistence of illusions); inaccessibility (unreportable); domain specificity (they have private concepts); innateness (genetically preprogrammed). | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: If they have no information flow, and are unreportable and private, this makes empirical testing of Fodor's hypothesis a little tricky. He must be on to something, though. |
2495 | Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The best candidates for the status of mental modules are language (the first one, put there by Chomsky), commonsense biology, commonsense physics, commonsense psychology, and aspects of visual form perception. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: My favourite higher level module is my Personal Assistant, who keeps nagging me to do sundry things, only some of which I agree to. It is an innate superego, but still a servant of the Self. |
2498 | Modules make the world manageable [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Modules function to present the world to thought under descriptions that are germane to the success of behaviour. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: "Descriptions" might be a bold word to use about something so obscure, but this pinpoints the evolutionary nature of modularity theory, to which I subscribe. |
2500 | Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor] |
Full Idea: "Who Mummy love?" is recognizably baby talk; but "love Mummy who?" is not. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: Not convincing. If she is embracing Daddy, and asking baby, she might get the answer "Daddy", after a bit of coaxing. Who knows what babies up the Amazon respond to? |
2507 | Rationality rises above modules [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Probably, modular computation doesn't explain how minds are rational; it's just a sort of precursor. You work through it to get a view of how horribly hard our rationality is to understand. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.17) | |
A reaction: The choice is between a Self which weighs and judges the inputs, or merely decisions that automatically result from the balance of inputs. The latter seems unlikely. Vetoes are essential. |
2480 | Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Thinking can't just be in sequences of English words since, notoriously, thought needs to be ambiguity-free in ways that mere word sequences are not. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: I think this is a strong argument in favour of (at least) propositions. Thoughts are unambiguous, but their expression need not be. Sentences could be expanded to achieve clarity. |
2487 | Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor] |
Full Idea: I don't think it is true that all thought is in Mentalese. It is quite likely (e.g. in arithmetic algorithms) that Mentalese co-opts bits of natural language. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: Presumably language itself would have to be coded in mentalese. If there is some other way for thought to work, the whole mind could use it, and skip mentalese. |
2483 | Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Mentalese doesn't need Grice's theory of natural-language meaning, or indeed any theory of natural-language meaning whatsoever. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: Presumably what is represented by mentalese is a quite separate question from whether there exists a mentalese that does some sort of representing. Sounds plausible. |
2486 | Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Functional role semantics wants to analyze the content of a belief in terms of its inferential (causal) relations; but that seems the wrong way round. The content of a belief determines its causal role. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: This is one of my favourite ideas, which keeps coming to mind when considering functional accounts of mental life. The buck of explanation must, however, stop somewhere. |
2492 | Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Experience can't explain itself; eventually, some of the concepts that explaining experience requires have to come from outside it. Eventually, some of them have to be built in. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.12) |
2471 | Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Virtually all modern theorists about philosophy, mind or language tend to agree that concepts are capacities, in particular concepts are epistemic capacities. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: This view seems to describe concepts in functional terms, which generates my perennial question: what is it about concepts that enables them to fulfil that particular role? |
2472 | For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor] |
Full Idea: It's a paradigmatically Pragmatist idea that having a concept consists in being able to do something. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: If you defined a bicycle simply by what you could do with it, you wouldn't explain much. I wonder if pragmatism and functionalism come from the same intellectual stable? |
2482 | It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Nobody now thinks that the reduction of the meaning of English sentences to facts about the communicative intentions of English speakers - or to any facts about mental states - is likely to go through. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: Most attempts at 'reduction' of meaning seem to go rather badly. I assume it would be very difficult to characterise 'intentions' without implicit reference to meaning. |
2477 | If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If learning that fish typically live in streams is part of learning "fish", typical utterances of "pet fish" (living in bowls) are counterexamples. This argument iterates (e.g "big pet fish"). So learning where they live can't be part of learning "fish". | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: Using 'typical' twice is rather misleading here. Town folk can learn 'fish' as typically living in bowls. There is no one way to learn a word meaning. |
2473 | Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If there is no analytic/synthetic distinction then there are no analyses. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: There are no precise analyses. I see no reason why a holistic view of language prohibits the careful elucidation of key concepts in the system. It's just a bit fluid. |
2484 | The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If the Mentalese story about the content of thought is true, then there couldn't be a Private Language Argument. Good. That explains why there isn't one. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: Presumably Mentalese implies that all language is, in the first instance, intrinsically private. Dogs, for example, need Mentalese, since they self-evidently think. |
12277 | Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Friendship is preferable to money; for excess of friendship is preferable to excess of money. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 118b07) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 12276, which gives a different criterion for choosing between virtues. This idea is an interesting qualification of the doctrine of the mean. |
12276 | Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Justice [dikaiosune] and self-control [sophrosune] are preferable to courage, for the first two are always useful, but courage only sometimes. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 117a36) | |
A reaction: One could challenge his criterion. What of something which is absolutely vital on occasions, against something which is very mildly useful all the time? You may survive without justice, but not without courage. Compare Idea 12277. |
12275 | We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We value friendship for its own sake, even if we are not likely to get anything else from it. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 117a03) | |
A reaction: In 'Ethics' he distinguishes some friendships which don't meet this requirement. Presumably true friendships survive all vicissitudes (except betrayal), but that makes such things fairly rare. |
12281 | Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is an essential [kath' auto] property of man to be 'by nature a civilized animal'. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 128b17) | |
A reaction: I take this, along with man being intrinsically rational, to be the foundation of Aristotelian ethics. Given that we are civilized, self-evident criteria emerge for how to be good at it. A good person is, above all, a good citizen. |
12265 | All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Any water is said to be specifically the same as any other water because it has a certain similarity to it. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103a20) | |
A reaction: (Cf. Idea 8153) It take this to be the hallmark of a natural kind, and we should not lose sight of it in the midst of discussions about rigid designation and essential identity. Tigers are only a natural kind insofar as they are indistinguishable. |
12278 | 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 121a18) | |
A reaction: Is 'oneness' predicated of water? So existence always was a predicate, it seems, until Kant told us it wasn't. That existence is a quantifier, not a predicate, seems to be up for question again these days. |