89 ideas
| 21979 | Wisdom emerges at the end of a process [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: The Owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of dusk. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], Pref p.13), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.4 | |
| A reaction: Hegel explains that this means that wisdom is the product of historical maturity, as the ideal emerges, and illuminates what is real. I think. |
| 22766 | Philosophy is exploration of the rational [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy is exploration of the rational. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], Pref) | |
| A reaction: The only problem is that Hegel (like the Stoics) thought that nature is rational all the way down, so philosophy becomes the study of everything. |
| 12274 | Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The examination must be carried on and begin from the primary classes and then go on step by step until further division is impossible. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 109b17) | |
| A reaction: This is a good slogan for the analytic approach to thought. I take Aristotle (or possibly Socrates) to be the father of analysis, not Frege (though see Idea 9840). (He may be thinking of the tableau method of proof). |
| 22768 | Subjective and objective are not firmly opposed, but merge into one another [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: It is usually believed that the subjective and objective are firmly opposed to one another. But this is not the case; they in fact pass over into one another. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 026 add) | |
| A reaction: I take this to mean that they are on a spectrum, rather than being binary opposites. This seems reasonable to me, since I take there to be degrees of objectivity. |
| 12260 | Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Reasoning is dialectical which reasons from generally accepted opinions. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 100a30) | |
| A reaction: This is right at the heart of Aristotle's philosophical method, and Greek thinking generally. There are nice modern debates about 'folk' understanding, derived from science (e.g. quantum theory) which suggest that starting from normal views is a bad idea. |
| 12291 | There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There cannot possibly be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 154a11) | |
| A reaction: The second half of this is much bolder and more controversial, and plenty of modern thinkers would flatly reject it. Are definitions contextual, that is, designed for some specific human purpose. Must definitions be of causes? |
| 12292 | Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A definition is the easiest of all things to destroy; for, since it contains many assertions, the opportunities which it offers are very numerous, and the more abundant the material, the more quickly the reasoning can set to work. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 155a03) | |
| A reaction: I quote this to show that Aristotle expected many definitions to be very long affairs (maybe even of book length?) |
| 12261 | Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The differentia, being generic in character, should be ranged with the genus. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 101b18) | |
| A reaction: This does not mean that naming the differentia amounts to mere classification. I presume we can only state individual differences by using a language which is crammed full of universals. |
| 12263 | 'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A 'genus' is that which is predicated in the category of essence of several things which differ in kind. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 102a32) | |
| A reaction: Hence a genus is likely to be expressed by a universal, a one-over-many. A particular will be a highly individual collection of various genera, but what ensures the uniqueness of each thing, if they are indiscernible? |
| 12272 | We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We usually isolate the appropriate description of the essence of a particular thing by means of the differentiae which are peculiar to it. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 108b05) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be important for showing the definition is more than mere categorisation. A good definition homes in the particular, by gradually narrowing down the differentiae. |
| 12279 | The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: No differentia indicates the essence [ti estin], but rather some quality, such as 'pedestrian' or 'biped'. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 122b17) | |
| A reaction: We must disentangle this, since essence is what is definable, and definition seems to give us the essence, and yet it appears that definition only requires genus and differentia. Differentiae seem to be both generic and fine-grained. See Idea 12280! |
| 12283 | In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 132a12) | |
| A reaction: We mustn't be deluded into thinking that nothing else is required. I take the increasing refinement of differentiae to be where the real action is. The genus gives you 70% of the explanation. |
| 12289 | The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The genera and the differentiae are predicated in the category of essence. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 153a19) | |
| A reaction: The definition is words, and the essence is real, so our best definition might not fully attain to the essence. Aristotle has us reaching out to the world through our definitions. |
| 12285 | The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The definition ought to be peculiar to one thing, not common to many. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 149b24) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be very important, against those who think that definition is no more than mere categorisation. To explain, you must get down to the level of the individual. We must explain that uniquely docile tiger. |
| 11261 | Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The equality of opposite reasonings is the cause of aporia; for it is when we reason on both [sides of a question] and it appears to us that everything can come about either way, that we are in a state of aporia about which of the two ways to take up. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 145b17), quoted by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.1 | |
| A reaction: Other philosophers give up on the subject in this situation, but I love Aristotle because he takes this to be the place where philosophy begins. |
| 12273 | Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: They say that the unit [monada] is the starting point of number (and the point the starting-point of a line). | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 108b30) | |
| A reaction: Yes, despite Frege's objections in the early part of the 'Grundlagen' (1884). I take arithmetic to be rooted in counting, despite all abstract definitions of number by Frege and Dedekind. Identity gives the unit, which is countable. See also Topics 141b9 |
| 22772 | Personality overcomes subjective limitations and posits Dasein as its own [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: Personality is that which overcomes the limitation of being merely subjective and gives itself reality - or, what amounts to the same thing, to posit that existence [Dasein] as its own. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 039) | |
| A reaction: This looks like the source for Heidegger's distinctive concept of Dasein. The emphasis in Hegel is on creating it out of subjectivity by an act of choice. For Heidegger Dasein seems to be a primitive concept. |
| 12267 | There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The four main types of predicates fall into ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103b20) | |
| A reaction: These are the standard ten categories of Aristotle. He is notable for the divisions not being sharp, and ten being a rough total. He is well aware of the limits of precision in such matters. |
| 12282 | An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If it does not at present exist, or, if it has not existed in the past, or if it is not going to exist in the future, it will not be a property [idion] at all. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 129a27) | |
| A reaction: This seems to cramp our style in counterfactual discussion. Can't we even mention an individual property if we believe that it will never exist. Utopian political discussion will have to cease! |
| 12264 | An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: An 'accident' [sumbebekos] is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to any one and the self-same thing, such as 'sitting posture' or 'whiteness'. This is the best definition, because it tells us the essential meaning of the term itself. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 102b07) | |
| A reaction: Thus a car could be red, or not red. Accidents are contingent. It does not follow that necessary properties are essential (see Idea 12262). There are accidents [sumbebekos], propria [idion] and essences [to ti en einai]. |
| 12280 | Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In assigning the essence [ti estin], it is more appropriate to state the genus than the differentiae; for he who describes 'man' as an 'animal' indicates his essence better than he who describes him as 'pedestrian'. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 128a24) | |
| A reaction: See Idea 12279. This idea is only part of the story. My reading of this is simply that assigning a genus gives more information. We learn more about him when we say he is a man than when we say he is Socrates. |
| 13269 | In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In the case of a house, where the process of compounding the parts is obvious, though the parts exist, there is no reason why the whole should not be non-existent, and so the parts are not the same as the whole. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 150a19) | |
| A reaction: Compare buying a piece of furniture, and being surprised to discover, when it is delivered, that it is self-assembly. This idea is a simple refutation of the claims of classical mereology, that wholes are just some parts. Aristotle uses modal claims. |
| 12284 | Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Everything that is has one single essence [en esti to einai]. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 141a36) | |
| A reaction: Does this include vague objects, and abstract 'objects'? Sceptics might ask what grounds this claim. Does Dr Jeckyll have two essences? |
| 12262 | An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A property [idion] is something which does not show the essence of a thing but belongs to it alone. ...No one calls anything a property which can possibly belong to something else. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 102a18) | |
| A reaction: [See Charlotte Witt 106 on this] 'Property' is clearly a bad translation for such an individual item. Witt uses 'proprium', which is a necessary but nonessential property of something. Necessity is NOT the hallmark of essence. See Idea 12266. |
| 12290 | Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Destruction is a dissolution of essence. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 153b30) | |
| A reaction: [plucked from context!] I can't think of a better way to define destruction, in order to distinguish it from damage. A vase is destroyed when its essential function cannot be recovered. |
| 12286 | If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: When things are absolutely the same, their coming-into-being and destruction are also the same and so are the agents of their production and destruction. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 152a02) | |
| A reaction: Thus Queen Elizabeth II has to be the result of that particular birth, and from those particular parents, as Kripke says? The inverse may not be true. Do twins have a single origin? Things that fission and then re-fuse differently? etc |
| 12266 | 'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: 'The same' is employed in several senses: its principal sense is for same name or same definition; a second sense occurs when sameness is applied to a property [idiu]; a third sense is applied to an accident. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103a24-33) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] 'Property' is better translated as 'proprium' - a property unique to a particular thing, but not essential - see Idea 12262. Things are made up of essence, propria and accidents, and three ways of being 'the same' are the result. |
| 12287 | Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If two things are the same then any accident of one must also be an accident of the other, and, if one of them is an accident of something else, so must the other be also. For, if there is any discrepancy on these points, obviously they are not the same. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 152a36) | |
| A reaction: So what is always called 'Leibniz's Law' should actually be 'Aristotle's Law'! I can't see anything missing from the Aristotle version, but then, since most people think it is pretty obvious, you would expect the great stater of the obvious to get it. |
| 12288 | Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Things which are the same specifically or generically are not necessarily the same or cannot possibly be the same numerically. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 152b32) | |
| A reaction: See also Idea 12266. This looks to me to be a pretty precise anticipation of Peirce's type/token distinction, but without the terminology. It is reassuring that Aristotle spotted it, as that makes it more likely to be a genuine distinction. |
| 12259 | Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Reasoning [sullogismos] is a discussion in which, certain things having been laid down, something other than these things necessarily results through them. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 100a25) | |
| A reaction: This is cited as the standard statement of the nature of logical necessity. One might challenge either the very word 'necessary', or the exact sense of the word employed here. Is it, in fact, metaphysical, or merely analytic? |
| 22780 | It is a rejection of intellectual dignity to say that we cannot know the truth [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: The assertion that human beings cannot know the truth, but have to do only with appearances …deprives the spirit of intellectual dignity. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 132) | |
| A reaction: It is a relief to find Hegel making this assertion. His later followers seem to have slid into an extreme cultural relativism. I'm not sure that 'intellectual dignity' is a very secure foundation for his claim. |
| 12271 | Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Induction is the progress from particulars to universals; if the skilled pilot is the best pilot and the skilled charioteer the best charioteer, then, in general, the skilled man is the best man in any particular sphere. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 105a15) | |
| A reaction: It is a bit unclear whether we are deriving universal concepts, or merely general truths. Need general truths be absolute or necessary truths? Presumably occasionally the best person is not the most skilled, as in playing a musical instrument. |
| 12293 | We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: When it is necessary to establish the universal, people use the expression 'So in all cases of this kind'; but it is one of the most difficult tasks to define which of the terms proposed are 'of this kind' and which are not. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 157a25) | |
| A reaction: It is particularly hard if induction is expressed as the search for universals, since the kind presumably is the universal, so the universal must be known before the induction can apply, which really is the most frightful nuisance for truth-seekers. |
| 22770 | A person is a being which is aware of its own self-directed and free subjectivity [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: A person is a subject which is aware of its subjectivity, for as a person, I am completely for myself: the person is the individuality of freedom in pure being-for-itself. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 035 add) | |
| A reaction: Sartre's being 'pour-soi'. Presumably the freedom is for action as well as thought. He ignores Spinoza's claim that such freedom is just an illusion. |
| 22788 | A human only become a somebody as a member of a social estate [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: When we say that a human being must be somebody, we mean that he must belong to a particular estate. …A human being with no estate is merely a private person and does not possess universality. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 207 add) | |
| A reaction: The first rebellion in Europe against the rising individual liberalism which started with Descartes and was clarified in Kant. Hegel's idea is hugely influential, especially through Marx. I don't believe being a person is a wholly social matter. |
| 22792 | Individuals attain their right by discovering their self-consciousness in institutions [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: Individuals attain their essential right by discovering their essential self-consciousness in social institutions, as that universal aspect of their particular interests which has being in itself. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 264) | |
| A reaction: This is the source of the influential idea made famous by Marx. Hegel seems to have a rather rigid and deterministic view of society, which fixes self-consciousness. The modern view is that self-consciousness is endlessly malleable, by society. |
| 21780 | A free will primarily wills its own freedoom [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| Full Idea: For Hegel, the content or 'object' which any free will wills simply by virtue of being free is nothing other than its own freedom. | |
| From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 027) by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 8 'The Limits' | |
| A reaction: Personally I take the concept of a wholly 'free' will to be vacuous, but this is a very interesting idea. I would delete 'by virtue of being free', and say that what we mean by free will is the will's desperation to be as free as possible. Love it. |
| 22769 | The concept of the will is the free will which wills its freedom [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: The abstract concept of the Idea of the will is in general the free will which wills the free will. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 027) | |
| A reaction: Since Hegel thinks we only have free will because we will to have it, it makes sense that that will precedes the free will. But I don't understand how the will which wills that freedom is itself free. No doubt Hegelians understand this. |
| 21787 | Evil enters a good will when we believe we are doing right, but allow no criticism of our choice [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| Full Idea: The evil Hegel finds at the heart of the good will is not simply the criminal violation of rights, but the evil which lies in believing oneself to be doing what is truly good, while allowing no one but oneself to determine what the good actually is. | |
| From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821]) by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 08 'The Problem' | |
| A reaction: That is not intellectualism, but the implication that intellectualism is a potential source of evil. The interesting thought is that Hegel is contributing a social dimension to the weakness of will problem. |
| 21786 | Conscience is the right of the self to know what is right and obligatory, and thus make them true [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: Conscience is the expression of the absolute title of subjective self-consciousness to know in itself and from within itself what is right and obligatory, to recognise only what it knows as good, and that what is thus known is right and obligatory. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 137), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 08 'The Problem' | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This is the sort of rabbit-out-of-the-hat move that Hegel loves, and I find implausible. Mill made the key point about conscience. |
| 22784 | Love is ethical life in its natural form [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: Love is a feeling, that is, ethical life in its natural form. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 158 add) | |
| A reaction: For Hegel the less natural forms are more abstract - such as the categorical imperative. Does this imply that intellectual beings should extend the feeling of love into more abstract forms, such as virtues or principles or ideals? |
| 12276 | Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Justice [dikaiosune] and self-control [sophrosune] are preferable to courage, for the first two are always useful, but courage only sometimes. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 117a36) | |
| A reaction: One could challenge his criterion. What of something which is absolutely vital on occasions, against something which is very mildly useful all the time? You may survive without justice, but not without courage. Compare Idea 12277. |
| 12277 | Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Friendship is preferable to money; for excess of friendship is preferable to excess of money. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 118b07) | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 12276, which gives a different criterion for choosing between virtues. This idea is an interesting qualification of the doctrine of the mean. |
| 12275 | We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We value friendship for its own sake, even if we are not likely to get anything else from it. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 117a03) | |
| A reaction: In 'Ethics' he distinguishes some friendships which don't meet this requirement. Presumably true friendships survive all vicissitudes (except betrayal), but that makes such things fairly rare. |
| 8029 | You can't have a morality which is supplied by the individual, but is also genuinely universal [Hegel, by MacIntyre] |
| Full Idea: Hegel attacks doctrines which are attempts by the individual to supply his own morality, and at one and the same time, to claim for it a genuine universality. | |
| From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.15 | |
| A reaction: Hegel clearly has Kant in mind. It is a penetrating criticism. Of course, there is no reason why a universal mathematical proof shouldn't be 'provided' by the individual. The Kantian seeks agreement. See Contractualism. |
| 22051 | The categorical imperative lacks roots in a historical culture [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| Full Idea: Hegel criticised the categorical imperative for lacking any roots in the moral habits and practices which develop in actual historical communities. | |
| From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821]) by Andrew Bowie - German Philosophy: a very short introduction 1 | |
| A reaction: This is the gist of Alasdair MacIntyre's defence of virtue theory, against rational Enlightenment ethics. Charles Taylor made the link to Hegel. |
| 22771 | Be a person, and respect other persons [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: The commandment of right is: be a person, and respect other persons | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 036) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be presented as a categorical imperative. He implies that you can choose whether to be a person, which seems wrong. I love making 'respect other persons' the supreme command - but I prefer 'respect everything'. |
| 22781 | The categorical imperative is fine if you already have a set of moral principles [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: The proposition 'Consider whether your maxim can be asserted as a universal principle' would be all very well if we already had determinate principles concerning how to act. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 135 add) | |
| A reaction: Excellent! I have always taken this to be the overwhelming problem with Kant's theory. Kant's examples always presume a set of unquestioned conventional values. Kant offers a framework for moral thought, but values are what matter. |
| 22779 | The good is realised freedom [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: The good is realised freedom, the absolute and ultimate end of the world. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 129) | |
| A reaction: This remark could have been made by Sartre. On its own I find it baffling, and can make no sense of an account of ethics that gives no guidance on behaviour at all, other than that freedom should be asserted. |
| 12281 | Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is an essential [kath' auto] property of man to be 'by nature a civilized animal'. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 128b17) | |
| A reaction: I take this, along with man being intrinsically rational, to be the foundation of Aristotelian ethics. Given that we are civilized, self-evident criteria emerge for how to be good at it. A good person is, above all, a good citizen. |
| 22787 | The family is the first basis of the state, but estates are a necessary second [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: While the family is the primary basis of the state, the estates are second. The latter are of special importance, because private persons, despite their selfishness, must have recourse to others. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 201 add) | |
| A reaction: He mentions agriculture as an estate. The implication is that interactions between families requires state institutions, but in simpler societies families can obviously interact and help one another directly. He wants the state to be indispensable. |
| 22790 | We cannot assert rights which are unnatural [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: No one can assert a right against nature. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 244 add) | |
| A reaction: Although the existence of natural rights is dubious (or nonsense, for Bentham), this is a vague but sensible constraint on what can plausibly be asserted as a right. The rights we create in society must respond to natural needs. |
| 22767 | I aim to portray the state as a rational entity [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: This treatise is an attempt to comprehend and portray the state as an inherently rational entity. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], Pref) | |
| A reaction: Right now I see very little sign of that being the case. States contain many institutions which are fairly rational, because they focus efficiently on a clear object, but a state can only be rational if there is a wide consensus on its objective. |
| 22789 | Society draws people, and requires their work, making them wholly dependent on it [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: Civil society is the immense power which draws people to itself and requires them to work for it, to owe everything to it, and to do everything by its means. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 238 add) | |
| A reaction: This is the disturbing side of Hegel's quite attractive communitarian thinking. His general picture is of the state prescribing what is required of its citizens, with little scope for citizens to prescribe what they need from the state. See Popper. |
| 22791 | The state is the march of God in the world [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: The state consists of the march of God in the world, and its basis is the power of reason actualising itself as will. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 258) | |
| A reaction: The most notorious sentence in the whole book. See Wiki article on it. The hair-raising aspect of it is that God won't tell us where the state is going, so those in charge will decide that for us. God gives their preferences maximum authority. |
| 22778 | Individuals can't leave the state, because they are natural citizens, and humans require a state [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: The arbitrary will of individuals cannot break away from the state, because the individual is already by nature a citizen of it. It is the rational destiny of humans to live within a state, and if there is no state reason requires it to be established. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 075 add) | |
| A reaction: The Aristotelian view, in opposition to the social contract idea that individuals must choose to have a state. I agree with Hegel, but find his authoritarian tone disturbing. What else will I be told is my 'rational destiny'? We want liberal communiity. |
| 22794 | A fully developed state is conscious and knows what it wills [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: An essential part of the fully developed state is consciousness or thought; the state accordingly knows what it wills and knows this an a object of thought. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 270 add) | |
| A reaction: The silliest idea by a famous philosopher anywhere in this database. I bet the criterion for being fully developed is being conscious, and the criterion for being conscious is being fully developed, whatever that means. General will run riot. |
| 22799 | The people do not have the ability to know the general will [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: To know what one wills, and even more to know what reason wills, is the fruit of profound cognition and insight, and this the very thing which 'the people' lack. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 301) | |
| A reaction: This is obviously directed at Rousseau, and seems to be specifically anti-democratic. Hegel sees the general will as a mystical fact, only knowable to some elite intellectual priesthood. |
| 22801 | The great man of the ages is the one who reveals and accomplishes the will of his time [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: He who expresses the will of his age, tells it what its will is, and accomplishes this will, is the great man of the age. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 318 add) | |
| A reaction: The great man of Hegel's age had obviously been Napoleon, who may have accomplished the will of part of the French people, but went massively against the will of the rest of Europe. For Hegel this seems to be the reality of the General Will. |
| 22796 | A constitution embodies a nation's rights and condition [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: The constitution of a nation must embody the nation's feeling for its rights and present condition. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 274 add) | |
| A reaction: Most constitutions also specify the institutions needed to maintain its principles and values. If it specifies its 'present' condition, that is a licence to change it from time to time. Hegel endorses such flexibility. |
| 22777 | Individuals must dedicate themselves to the ethical whole, and give their lives when asked [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: The individual person is a subordinate entity who must dedicate himself to the ethical whole. Consequently, if the state demands his life, the individual must surrender it. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 070 add) | |
| A reaction: The obvious problem is a war which is perceived to be unjust. Vietnam draft dodgers. We should always consider the common good, but 'dedicate himself to the ethical whole'? It depends whether the ethical whole is dedicated to us. |
| 21791 | Social groups must focus on the state, which must in turn respect their inclusion and their will [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: The interests of family and civil society must concentrate themselves on the state, although the universal end cannot be advanced without the personal knowledge and will of its particular members, whose own rights must be maintained. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 260), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 08 'Freedom' | |
| A reaction: Hegel's emphasis on the state has sometimes allowed him to be presented as a proto-fascist, so the second half of this is important - especially the remark about citizens having 'knowledge' of what is going on. Is citizen commitment conditional on this? |
| 22795 | People can achieve respect for their state by insight into its essence [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: The best way for humans to achieve respect for the state as that whole of which they are branches is through philosophical insight into its essence. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 270 add) | |
| A reaction: Although Hegel on the state can be quite alarming, I rather approve of this Aristotelian thought. States do not, of course, have ready made essences awaiting the insights of philosophers, but discussion can converge on a concept of what the state is. |
| 21988 | In the 1840s Hegel seemed to defend society being right as it is, as a manifestation of Mind [Hegel, by Singer] |
| Full Idea: In the 1840s the orthodox interpretation of Hegel was that since human society is the manifestation of Mind [Geist] in the world, everything is right and rational as it is. | |
| From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821]) by Peter Singer - Marx 2 | |
| A reaction: This orthodoxy provoked the rebellion of Marx and the Young Hegelians. Modern Communitarians like Hegel, but that view seems to hover between right-wing authoritarianism and left-wing egalitarianism. |
| 22800 | Majority rule means obligations can be imposed on me [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: Majority decisions are at variance with the principle that I should be personally present in anything which imposes an obligation on me. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 309 add) | |
| A reaction: The big democratic problem of my time is sharp binary decisions made by a democracy, such as UK leaving the EU, or Scotland leaving the UK. A very large minority in such cases has their will entirely thwarted, whichever way it goes. |
| 21792 | The state should reflect all interests, and not just popular will, or a popular party [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| Full Idea: The best guarantee of freedom is for the state to be organised in such a way that the legislature reflects all the substantial interests within civil society, and not just the 'will of the majority', or the parties which happen to find popular support. | |
| From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 311) by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 08 'Freedom' | |
| A reaction: In our first-past-the-post system innumerable interests fail to be represented, and parliament is crushed by dull plodders with ossified views who smugly hang on to safe seats. IMHO. |
| 22797 | In modern states an individual's actions should be their choice [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: It is inherent in the principle of the modern state that all of an individual's actions should be mediated by his will. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 299 add) | |
| A reaction: This is the liberal side of Hegel's thinking. It is a corrective to his reverential attitude to the state. He criticise Plato for assigning citizens their jobs. |
| 21790 | Moral individuals become ethical when they see the social aspect of a matter [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| Full Idea: The moral individual becomes an ethical individual when he recognises that his own voice need not always utter the last word on a given matter, but should be understood as participating in ongoing social and political practices. | |
| From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821]) by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 08 'Freedom' | |
| A reaction: This is a key idea in Hegel, and is seen (by Charles Taylor etc) as the foundations of modern communitarianism. |
| 8030 | For Hegel, the moral life can only be led within a certain type of community [Hegel, by MacIntyre] |
| Full Idea: Hegel's final standpoint is that the moral life can only be led within a certain type of community. | |
| From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.15 | |
| A reaction: This (together with Aristotle) is the basis of modern communitarianism. There is the problem of saintly people who kept their integrity through the Nazi period. I agree with the proposal, in a loose sort of way. |
| 22785 | Even educated women are unsuited to science, philosophy, art and government [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: Women may well be educated, but they are not made for the higher sciences, for philosophy and certain artistic productions which require a universal element. …When women are in charge of government the state is in danger. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 166 add) | |
| A reaction: This makes unpleasant reading. Women have recently played a leading role in creating the Covid vaccines which may well have saved millions of lives. There were plenty of good women novelists around in Hegel's time. |
| 22776 | Slaves are partly responsible for their own condition [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: If someone is a slave, his own will is responsible. The wrong of slavery is not only the fault of those who enslave people, but of the slaves themselves. …[66 add: The slave has an absolute right to free himself] | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 057 add) | |
| A reaction: He accepts that enslaving people is wrong. Are the slaves at fault for losing their struggle? Would Hegel approve of someone giving modern weapons to the slaves? |
| 21789 | Slaves have no duties because they have no rights [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: Slaves have no duties because they have no rights. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 261), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 08 'Freedom' | |
| A reaction: Does this correlation go all the way up society? Do I only have duties insofar as I have correlative rights? Monarchs seem to have maximum duties and maximum rights. Democratic leaders seem thereby to get a raw deal. |
| 21778 | True liberal freedom is to pursue something, while being free to cease the pursuit [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| Full Idea: The third moment of liberal freedom for Hegel is the unity of the first two - the freedom to engage in some specific pursuit, but in so doing to preserve the sense that one is not irrevocably committed to that pursuit. | |
| From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 005) by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 08 'The Limits' | |
| A reaction: Not too surprising, but Hegel is interesting for thinking that we shouldn't just rabbit on about having 'freedom', but should investigate more closely what this is exactly supposed to mean. |
| 21779 | People assume they are free, but the options available are not under their control [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: The ordinary man believes himself to be free ...to act as he wants, but this arbitrariness entails that he is not free, because what it is that he wills is not intrinsic to self-determining activity, ...and depends on a given content and material. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 015), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 08 'The Limits' | |
| A reaction: [a bit compressed] I take this to be an extraordinarily influential idea (especially for Marx). Hitherto philosophers just wanted some vague metaphysical 'free will', making moral responsibility and pure reason possible. But who controls the options? |
| 22085 | Freedom requires us to submit to a family, or a corporation, or a state [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| Full Idea: Hegel thinks that political and social freedom involves letting one's actions be guided by those institutional structures (such as the family, corporations and the state) which secure rights, welfare, and mutual respect. | |
| From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821]) by Stephen Houlgate - Hegel 102 | |
| A reaction: Since there are some hideous families, corporations and states, we will need more than that. He may have a point, though, that the rights we desire can only exist in healthy examples of such institutions. Popper loved institutions. |
| 22798 | Money is the best way to achieve just equality [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: The justice of equality can be achieved most effectively by money. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 299) | |
| A reaction: There are also important equalities such as access to education and to superior jobs. Money is more tangible, but you can fob poor people off with quite small sums of money. |
| 22783 | Rights imply duties, and duties imply rights [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: A human being has rights in so far as he has duties, and duties in so far as he has rights. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 155) | |
| A reaction: I would express this as 'why we should we be loyal to the state if the state is not loyal to us'. The state must not only provide us with nominal rights, but must also enforce them. Without that the citizens are alienated, and the sense of duty fades. |
| 21782 | Man has an absolute right to appropriate things [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: A person has as his substantive end the right of putting his will into any and every thing and thereby making it his ...This is the absolute right of appropriation which man has over all things. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 044), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 08 'Rights' | |
| A reaction: Houlgate shows this is not a defence of theft. Hegel thinks the right to property stems from our freedom, not from our natural needs. Did Hegel know Locke? It is not obvious that if I pocket a stone I thereby 'own' it. Do birds own their nests? |
| 22773 | Because only human beings can own property, everything else can become our property [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: All things can become the property of human beings, because the human being is free will, and exists in and for himself, whereas that which confronts him does not have this quality. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 044 add) | |
| A reaction: Note that the human 'is' free will, rather than 'has' free will. He explicitly includes animals. From a modern ecological view this is a sinister idea. The default position is that if you own something you can do whatever you like with it. |
| 22774 | A community does not have the property-owning rights that a person has [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: Many states have rightly dissolved the monasteries, because a community does not ultimately have the same right to property as a person does. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 046) | |
| A reaction: Trinity College, Cambridge, owns vast amounts of land. A lot of property seems to be owned by legal trusts. Hegel sees the basis of property ownership in a person's will. He allows some exceptions. |
| 22775 | The owner of a thing is obviously the first person to freely take possession of it [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: That a thing belongs to a person who happens to be the first to take possession of it is immediately self-evident. …This is not because he is the first, but because he is a free will. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 050) | |
| A reaction: At this time they were very conscious of the native Americans. They seem to have lost their lands because they had no institution of private property, and had not asserted their ownership. I suspect Hegel of endorsing this. |
| 22802 | Wars add strength to a nation, and cure internal dissension [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: Not only do peoples emerge from wars with added strength, but nations troubled by civil dissension gain internal peace as a result of wars with their external enemies. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 324 add) | |
| A reaction: I suspect that Hegel quite likes wars because they accelerate the development of history. I don't think he would have written nonsense like this after WW1 and WW2. Leaders facing internal dissent like small external wars. |
| 22786 | Children need discipline, to break their self-will and eradicate sensuousness [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: One of the chief moments in a child's upbringing is discipline, the purpose of which is to break the child's self-will in order to eradicate the merely sensuous and natural. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 174 add) | |
| A reaction: A standard view for his time, no doubt. No sensible parent doubts that children need to be civilised, and taught to recognise the needs of others. I hope the general aspiration in our society to 'break' a child's self-will has now faded away. |
| 12265 | All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Any water is said to be specifically the same as any other water because it has a certain similarity to it. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103a20) | |
| A reaction: (Cf. Idea 8153) It take this to be the hallmark of a natural kind, and we should not lose sight of it in the midst of discussions about rigid designation and essential identity. Tigers are only a natural kind insofar as they are indistinguishable. |
| 7829 | God no more has human perfections than we have animal perfections [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: To ascribe to God those attributes which make a man perfect would be as wrong as to ascribe to a man the attributes that make perfect an elephant or an ass. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Letters to Blijenburgh [1665], 1665), quoted by Matthew Stewart - The Courtier and the Heretic Ch.10 | |
| A reaction: This would be a difficulty for Aquinas's Fourth Way (Idea 1432), and one which I think Aquinas might acknowledge, given his desire that we should be humble when trying to comprehend God (Idea 1410). It leaves us struggling to grasp the concept of God. |
| 12278 | 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 121a18) | |
| A reaction: Is 'oneness' predicated of water? So existence always was a predicate, it seems, until Kant told us it wasn't. That existence is a quantifier, not a predicate, seems to be up for question again these days. |
| 7830 | A talking triangle would say God is triangular [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: If a triangle could speak it would say that God is eminently triangular. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Letters to Blijenburgh [1665], 1665), quoted by Matthew Stewart - The Courtier and the Heretic Ch.10 | |
| A reaction: Spinoza had a rather appealing waspish wit. This nicely dramatises an ancient idea (Idea 407). You can, of course, if you believe in God, infer some of His characteristics from His creation. But then see Hume: Ideas 1439, 6960, 6967, 1440. |
| 22793 | Some religions lead to harsh servitude and the debasement of human beings [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: It should not be a forgotten that can take on a from which leads to the harshest servitude within the fetters of superstition, and to the debasement of human beings to a level below that of animals. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 270) | |
| A reaction: Hegel was a Christian, though a very unorthodox one. He cities ancient Egypt and India as examples. If you want to assess a religion, see how it behaves when it has political power. |
| 22782 | To have pagan beliefs and be a pagan are quite different [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: To believe in pagan religion and to be a pagan are two different things. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 147) | |
| A reaction: A nice general truth about all religions, and one not often understood by atheists. |