51 ideas
19693 | There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb] |
Full Idea: Aristotle takes wisdom to come in two forms, the practical and the theoretical, the former of which is good judgement about how to act, and the latter of which is deep knowledge or understanding. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Dennis Whitcomb - Wisdom Intro | |
A reaction: The interesting question is then whether the two are connected. One might be thoroughly 'sensible' about action, without counting as 'wise', which seems to require a broader view of what is being done. Whitcomb endorses Aristotle on this idea. |
17641 | Discoveries in mathematics can challenge philosophy, and offer it a new foundation [Russell] |
Full Idea: Any new discovery as to mathematical method and principles is likely to upset a great deal of otherwise plausible philosophising, as well as to suggest a new philosophy which will be solid in proportion as its foundations in mathematics are securely laid. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.283) | |
A reaction: This is a manifesto for modern analytic philosophy. I'm not convinced, especially if a fictionalist view of maths is plausible. What Russell wants is rigour, but there are other ways of getting that. Currently I favour artificial intelligence. |
6118 | Philosophy is logical analysis, followed by synthesis [Russell] |
Full Idea: The business of philosophy, as I conceive it, is essentially that of logical analysis, followed by logical synthesis. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.162) | |
A reaction: I am uneasy about Russell's hopes for the contribution that logic could make, but I totally agree that analysis is the route to wisdom, and I take Aristotle as my role model of an analytical philosopher, rather than the modern philosophers of logic. |
6116 | A logical language would show up the fallacy of inferring reality from ordinary language [Russell] |
Full Idea: We are trying to create a perfectly logical language to prevent inferences from the nature of language to the nature of the world, which are fallacious because they depend upon the logical defects of language. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.159) | |
A reaction: Wittgenstein seems to have rebelled against this idea, so that one strand of his later philosophy leads to 'ordinary language' philosophy, which is exactly what Russell is criticising. Wittgenstein seems to have seen 'logical language' as an oxymoron. |
6117 | Philosophy should be built on science, to reduce error [Russell] |
Full Idea: We would be wise to build our philosophy upon science, because the risk of error in philosophy is pretty sure to be greater than in science. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.160) | |
A reaction: If you do very little, it reduces the 'risk of error'. I agree that philosophers should start from the facts, and be responsive to new facts, and that science is excellent at discovering facts. But I don't think cognitive science is the new epistemology. |
1575 | For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle logos is the ability to speak rationally about, with the hope of attaining knowledge, questions of value. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.26 |
1589 | Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is the great theoretician who articulates a vision of a world in which natural and stable structures can be rationally discovered. His is the most optimistic and richest view of the possibilities of logos | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.95 |
17638 | If one proposition is deduced from another, they are more certain together than alone [Russell] |
Full Idea: Two obvious propositions of which one can be deduced from the other both become more certain than either in isolation; thus in a complicated deductive system, many parts of which are obvious, the total probability may become all but absolute certainty. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.279) | |
A reaction: Thagard picked this remark out, in support of his work on coherence. |
17632 | Non-contradiction was learned from instances, and then found to be indubitable [Russell] |
Full Idea: The law of contradiction must have been originally discovered by generalising from instances, though, once discovered, it was found to be quite as indubitable as the instances. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.274) |
8200 | Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine] |
Full Idea: A real definition, according to the Aristotelian tradition, gives the essence of the kind of thing defined. Man is defined as a rational animal, and thus rationality and animality are of the essence of each of us. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Willard Quine - Vagaries of Definition p.51 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 4385. Personally I prefer the Aristotelian approach, but we may have to say 'We cannot identify the essence of x, and so x cannot be defined'. Compare 'his mood was hard to define' with 'his mood was hostile'. |
4385 | Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, to give a definition one must first state the genus and then the differentia of the kind of thing to be defined. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.157 | |
A reaction: Presumably a modern definition would just be a list of properties, but Aristotle seeks the substance. How does he define a genus? - by placing it in a further genus? |
13282 | Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle proposes to relativise unity and plurality, so that a single object can be both one (indivisible) and many (divisible) simultaneously, without contradiction, relative to different measures. Wholeness has degrees, with the strength of the unity. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.12 | |
A reaction: [see Koslicki's account of Aristotle for details] As always, the Aristotelian approach looks by far the most promising. Simplistic mechanical accounts of how parts make wholes aren't going to work. We must include the conventional and conceptual bit. |
6110 | Subject-predicate logic (and substance-attribute metaphysics) arise from Aryan languages [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is doubtful whether the subject-predicate logic, with the substance-attribute metaphysic, would have been invented by people speaking a non-Aryan language. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.151) | |
A reaction: This is not far off the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis (e.g. Idea 3917), which Russell would never accept. I presume that Russell would see true logic as running deeper, and the 'Aryan' approach as just one possible way to describe it. |
6107 | It is logic, not metaphysics, that is fundamental to philosophy [Russell] |
Full Idea: I hold that logic is what is fundamental in philosophy, and that schools should be characterised rather by their logic than by their metaphysics. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.143) | |
A reaction: Personally I disagree. Russell seems to have been most interested in the logical form underlying language, but that seems to be because he was interested in the ontological implications of what we say, which is metaphysics. |
4730 | For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Aristotle apparently believed that the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected the substance-accident nature of reality. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.4 | |
A reaction: We need not assume that Aristotle is wrong. It is a chicken-and-egg. There is something obvious about subject-predicate language, if one assumes that unified objects are part of nature, and not just conventional. |
6115 | Vagueness, and simples being beyond experience, are obstacles to a logical language [Russell] |
Full Idea: The fact that we do not experience simples is one obstacle to the actual creation of a correct logical language, and vagueness is another. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.159) | |
A reaction: The dream of creating a perfect logical language looks doomed from the start, but it is a very interesting project to try to pinpoint why it is unlikely to be possible. I say a perfect language cuts nature exactly at the joints, so find the joints. |
17629 | Which premises are ultimate varies with context [Russell] |
Full Idea: Premises which are ultimate in one investigation may cease to be so in another. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.273) |
17630 | The sources of a proof are the reasons why we believe its conclusion [Russell] |
Full Idea: In mathematics, except in the earliest parts, the propositions from which a given proposition is deduced generally give the reason why we believe the given proposition. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.273) |
17640 | Finding the axioms may be the only route to some new results [Russell] |
Full Idea: The premises [of a science] ...are pretty certain to lead to a number of new results which could not otherwise have been known. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.282) | |
A reaction: I identify this as the 'fruitfulness' that results when the essence of something is discovered. |
6109 | Some axioms may only become accepted when they lead to obvious conclusions [Russell] |
Full Idea: Some of the premisses (of my logicist theory) are much less obvious than some of their consequences, and are believed chiefly because of their consequences. This will be found to be always the case when a science is arranged as a deductive system. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.145) | |
A reaction: We shouldn't assume the model of self-evident axioms leading to surprising conclusions, which is something like the standard model for rationalist foundationalists. Russell nicely points out that the situation could be just the opposite |
17627 | It seems absurd to prove 2+2=4, where the conclusion is more certain than premises [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is an apparent absurdity in proceeding ...through many rather recondite propositions of symbolic logic, to the 'proof' of such truisms as 2+2=4: for it is plain that the conclusion is more certain than the premises, and the supposed proof seems futile. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.272) | |
A reaction: Famously, 'Principia Mathematica' proved this fact at enormous length. I wonder if this thought led Moore to his common sense view of his own hand - the conclusion being better than the sceptical arguments? |
17628 | Arithmetic was probably inferred from relationships between physical objects [Russell] |
Full Idea: When 2 + 2 =4 was first discovered, it was probably inferred from the case of sheep and other concrete cases. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.272) |
6108 | Maths can be deduced from logical axioms and the logic of relations [Russell] |
Full Idea: I think that no one will dispute that from certain ideas and axioms of formal logic, but with the help of the logic of relations, all pure mathematics can be deduced. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.145) | |
A reaction: It has been said for a long time that Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems of 1930 disproved this claim, though recently there have been defenders of logicism. Beginning with 'certain ideas' sounds like begging the question. |
10968 | Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read] |
Full Idea: Russell preceded Wittgenstein in deciding that the reduction of all propositions to atomic propositions could not be achieved. The problem cases were negative propositions, general propositions, and belief propositions. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.1 |
6113 | To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell] |
Full Idea: The way to mean a fact is to assert it; the way to mean a simple is to name it. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.156) | |
A reaction: Thus logical atomism is a linguistic programme, of reducing our language to a foundation of pure names. The recent thought of McDowell and others is aimed at undermining any possibility of a 'simple' in perception. The myth of 'The Given'. |
6114 | 'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell] |
Full Idea: When I speak of 'simples' I am speaking of something not experienced as such, but known only inferentially as the limits of analysis. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.158) | |
A reaction: He claims that the simples are 'known', so he does not mean purely theoretical entities. They have something like the status of quarks in physics, whose existence is inferred from experience. |
21722 | Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell] |
Full Idea: Whenever possible, substitute constructions out of known entities for inferences to unknown entities. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.161), quoted by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 7 | |
A reaction: In 1919 he said that the alternative, of 'postulating' new entities, has 'all the advantages of theft over honest toil' [IMP p.71]. This is Russell's commitment to 'constructing' everything, even his concept of matter. Arithmetic as PA is postulation. |
6111 | As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell] |
Full Idea: Since any proposition can be put into a form with a subject and a predicate, united by a copula, it is natural to infer that every fact consists in the possession of a quality by a substance, which seems to me a mistake. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.152) | |
A reaction: This disagrees with McGinn on facts (Idea 6075). I approve of this warning from Russell, which is a recognition that we can't just infer our metaphysics from our language. I think of this as the 'Frege Fallacy', which ensnared Quine and others. |
13276 | The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's discussion of the unmoved mover and of the soul confirms the suspicion that form, when it is not thought of as the object represented in a definition, plays the role of the ultimate mereological atom within his system. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 6.6 | |
A reaction: Aristotle is concerned with which things are 'divisible', and he cites these two examples as indivisible, but they may be too unusual to offer an actual theory of how Aristotle builds up wholes from atoms. He denies atoms in matter. |
13277 | The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Thus in Aristotle we may think of an object's formal components as a sort of recipe for how to build wholes of that particular kind. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.5 | |
A reaction: In the elusive business of pinning down what Aristotle means by the crucial idea of 'form', this analogy strikes me as being quite illuminating. It would fit DNA in living things, and the design of an artifact. |
5991 | For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code] |
Full Idea: Aristotle thinks that in general we have knowledge or understanding when we grasp causes, and he distinguishes three fundamental types of knowledge - theoretical, practical and productive. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Alan D. Code - Aristotle | |
A reaction: Productive knowledge we tend to label as 'knowing how'. The centrality of causes for knowledge would get Aristotle nowadays labelled as a 'naturalist'. It is hard to disagree with his three types, though they may overlap. |
17637 | The most obvious beliefs are not infallible, as other obvious beliefs may conflict [Russell] |
Full Idea: Even where there is the highest degree of obviousness, we cannot assume that we are infallible - a sufficient conflict with other obvious propositions may lead us to abandon our belief, as in the case of a hallucination afterwards recognised as such. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.279) | |
A reaction: This approach to fallibilism seems to arise from the paradox that undermined Frege's rather obvious looking axioms. After Peirce and Russell, fallibilism has become a secure norm of modern thought. |
11239 | The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of a priori truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11240. |
23312 | Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is a rationalist …but reason for him is a disposition which we only acquire over time. Its acquisition is made possible primarily by perception and experience. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Rationalism p.173 | |
A reaction: I would describe this process as the gradual acquisition of the skill of objectivity, which needs the right knowledge and concepts to evaluate new experiences. |
16111 | Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Since Aristotle generally prefers a metaphysical theory that accords with common intuitions, he frequently relies on facts about language to guide his metaphysical claims. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.5 | |
A reaction: I approve of his procedure. I take intuition to be largely rational justifications too complex for us to enunciate fully, and language embodies folk intuitions in its concepts (especially if the concepts occur in many languages). |
17639 | Believing a whole science is more than believing each of its propositions [Russell] |
Full Idea: Although intrinsic obviousness is the basis of every science, it is never, in a fairly advanced science, the whole of our reason for believing any one proposition of the science. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.279) |
16971 | Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik] |
Full Idea: Plato's unity of science principle states that all - legitimate - sciences are ultimately about the Forms. Aristotle's principle states that all sciences must be, ultimately, about substances, or aspects of substances. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], 1) by Julius Moravcsik - Aristotle on Adequate Explanations 1 |
17631 | Induction is inferring premises from consequences [Russell] |
Full Idea: The inferring of premises from consequences is the essence of induction. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.274) | |
A reaction: So induction is just deduction in reverse? Induction is transcendental deduction? Do I deduce the premises from observing a lot of white swans? Hm. |
11243 | Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle things which explain (the explanantia) are facts, which should not be associated with the modern view that says explanations are dependent on how we conceive and describe the world (where causes are independent of us). | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.1 | |
A reaction: There must be some room in modern thought for the Aristotelian view, if some sort of robust scientific realism is being maintained against the highly linguistic view of philosophy found in the twentieth century. |
3320 | Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: The standard Aristotelian doctrine of species and genus in the theory of anything whatever involves specifying what the thing is in terms of something more general. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.10 |
12000 | Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung] |
Full Idea: The view that essential properties are those in virtue of which other significant properties of the subjects under investigation can be explained is encountered repeatedly in Aristotle's work. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation IV | |
A reaction: What does 'significant' mean here? I take it that the significant properties are the ones which explain the role, function and powers of the object. |
23300 | Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
Full Idea: Aristotle, and also the Stoics, denied rationality to animals. …The Platonists, the Pythagoreans, and some more independent Aristotelians, did grant reason and intellect to animals. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Denial' | |
A reaction: This is not the same as affirming or denying their consciousness. The debate depends on how rationality is conceived. |
6112 | Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types [Russell] |
Full Idea: There is not one relation of meaning between words and what they stand for, but as many relations of meaning, each of a different logical type, as there are logical types among the objects for which there are words. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.153) | |
A reaction: This might be a good warning for those engaged in the externalist/internalist debate over the meaning of concepts such as natural kind terms like 'water'. I could have an external meaning for 'elms', but an internal meaning for 'ferns'. |
11240 | The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of analytic truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11239. |
6559 | Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge (and somewhat to my surprise), Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal; however, he all but says it. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1 | |
A reaction: When I read this I thought that this database would prove Fogelin wrong, but it actually supports him, as I can't find it in Aristotle either. Descartes refers to it in Med.Two. In Idea 5133 Aristotle does say that man is a 'social being'. But 22586! |
11150 | It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it. | |
From: Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) | |
A reaction: The epigraph on a David Chalmers website. A wonderful remark, and it should be on the wall of every beginners' philosophy class. However, while it is in the spirit of Aristotle, it appears to be a misattribution with no ancient provenance. |
3037 | Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Aristotle was asked how much educated men were superior to those uneducated; "As much," he said, "as the living are to the dead." | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 05.1.11 |
8660 | There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Aristotle developed his own distinction between potential infinity (never running out) and actual infinity (there being a collection of an actual infinite number of things, such as places, times, objects). He decided that actual infinity was incoherent. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 1.3 | |
A reaction: Friend argues, plausibly, that this won't do, since potential infinity doesn't make much sense if there is not an actual infinity of things to supply the demand. It seems to just illustrate how boggling and uncongenial infinity was to Aristotle. |
12058 | Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's conception of matter permits any kind of matter to become any other kind of matter. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Wiggins - Substance 4.11.2 | |
A reaction: This is obviously crucial background information when we read Aristotle on matter. Our 92+ elements, and fixed fundamental particles, gives a quite different picture. Aristotle would discuss form and matter quite differently now. |
17633 | The law of gravity has many consequences beyond its grounding observations [Russell] |
Full Idea: The law of gravitation leads to many consequences which could not be discovered merely from the apparent motions of the heavenly bodies. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.275) |
22729 | The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Aristotle said that the conception of gods arose among mankind from two originating causes, namely from events which concern the soul and from celestial phenomena. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], Frag 10) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Physicists (two books) I.20 | |
A reaction: The cosmos suggests order, and possible creation. What do events of the soul suggest? It doesn't seem to be its non-physical nature, because Aristotle is more of a functionalist. Puzzling. (It says later that gods are like the soul). |