51 ideas
| 19693 | There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle takes wisdom to come in two forms, the practical and the theoretical, the former of which is good judgement about how to act, and the latter of which is deep knowledge or understanding. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Dennis Whitcomb - Wisdom Intro | |
| A reaction: The interesting question is then whether the two are connected. One might be thoroughly 'sensible' about action, without counting as 'wise', which seems to require a broader view of what is being done. Whitcomb endorses Aristotle on this idea. |
| 14027 | If we are to use words in enquiry, we need their main, unambiguous and uncontested meanings [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: It is necessary that we look to the primary conception corresponding to each word and that it stand in no need of demonstration, if, that is, we are going to have something to which we can refer the object of search or puzzlement and opinion. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 38) | |
| A reaction: This either points to definition or to consensus, and since definition seems in danger of some sort of Quinean circularity, I favour consensus. Philosophy is, after all, people discussing things, not inscriptions sent to the gods. |
| 1575 | For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: For Aristotle logos is the ability to speak rationally about, with the hope of attaining knowledge, questions of value. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.26 |
| 1589 | Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle is the great theoretician who articulates a vision of a world in which natural and stable structures can be rationally discovered. His is the most optimistic and richest view of the possibilities of logos | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.95 |
| 8200 | Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine] |
| Full Idea: A real definition, according to the Aristotelian tradition, gives the essence of the kind of thing defined. Man is defined as a rational animal, and thus rationality and animality are of the essence of each of us. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Willard Quine - Vagaries of Definition p.51 | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 4385. Personally I prefer the Aristotelian approach, but we may have to say 'We cannot identify the essence of x, and so x cannot be defined'. Compare 'his mood was hard to define' with 'his mood was hostile'. |
| 4385 | Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
| Full Idea: For Aristotle, to give a definition one must first state the genus and then the differentia of the kind of thing to be defined. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.157 | |
| A reaction: Presumably a modern definition would just be a list of properties, but Aristotle seeks the substance. How does he define a genus? - by placing it in a further genus? |
| 14040 | Observation and applied thought are always true [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: Everything that is observed or grasped by the intellect in an act of application is true. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 62) | |
| A reaction: Not quite clear what he means, but Epicurus is committed to perception as the source of knowledge, with the intellect extending the findings of the senses. He might subscribe to Descartes's 'clear and distinct' perceptions. |
| 13282 | Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle proposes to relativise unity and plurality, so that a single object can be both one (indivisible) and many (divisible) simultaneously, without contradiction, relative to different measures. Wholeness has degrees, with the strength of the unity. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.12 | |
| A reaction: [see Koslicki's account of Aristotle for details] As always, the Aristotelian approach looks by far the most promising. Simplistic mechanical accounts of how parts make wholes aren't going to work. We must include the conventional and conceptual bit. |
| 4730 | For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle apparently believed that the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected the substance-accident nature of reality. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: We need not assume that Aristotle is wrong. It is a chicken-and-egg. There is something obvious about subject-predicate language, if one assumes that unified objects are part of nature, and not just conventional. |
| 14028 | Nothing comes to be from what doesn't exist [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: Nothing comes into being from what is not. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 38) | |
| A reaction: King Lear puts it better: Nothing will come of nothing [1.i]. There seems to be an underlying assumption that coming into being out of nothing is much weirder than just existing, but I am not convinced about that. It's all equally weird. |
| 14029 | If disappearing things went to nothingness, nothing could return, and it would all be gone by now [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: If that which disappears were destroyed into what is not, all things would have been destroyed, since that into which they were dissolved does not exist. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 39) | |
| A reaction: This follows on from Idea 14028. Theologians will immediately spot that this is the underlying principle cited by Aquinas in his Third Way for proving God's existence (Idea 1431). |
| 14030 | The totality is complete, so there is no room for it to change, and nothing extraneous to change it [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: The totality of things has always been just like it is now and always will be. For there is nothing for it to change into. For there exists nothing in addition to the totality, which could enter into it and produce the change. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 39) | |
| A reaction: This smacks of the sort of dubious arguments that the medieval theologians fell in love with. I never thought I'd say this, but I think Epicurus needs a comprehensive course in set theory before he makes remarks like this. |
| 14048 | Astronomical movements are blessed, but they don't need the help of the gods [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: Movements, turnings, risings, settings, and related phenomena occur without any god helping out and ordaining or being about to ordain things, and at the same time have complete blessedness and indestructibility. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 76) | |
| A reaction: Epicurus is sometimes accused of atheism for remarks like these, but he is always trying to show piety in his attitudes. We might now call this attitude 'deism' (see alphabetical themes). |
| 14044 | The perceived accidental properties of bodies cannot be conceived of as independent natures [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: The shapes, colours, sizes and weights which are predicated of body as accidents, ...and are known by sense-perception, must not be thought of as independent natures (for that is inconceivable). | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 68) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be an anti-platonist remark, though he is not denying that the accidental properties may have some universal character. I'm struck by how close the basic metaphysics of Epicurus is to that of Aristotle. |
| 14045 | Accidental properties give a body its nature, but are not themselves bodies or parts of bodies [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: Accidental qualities are not non-existent, nor are they distinct corporeal entities inhering in the body, nor parts of it. We should think that the whole body throughout derives its permanent nature from these properties, though not as a compound of them. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 69) | |
| A reaction: 'Permanent' nature sounds more like essential than accidental properties. This is uncomfortably negative in its attempt to pin down what accidental properties are. The last bit seems to deny the bundle view of objects. Would he like tropes? |
| 14046 | A 'body' is a conception of an aggregate, with properties defined by application conditions [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: Properties are known by their peculiar forms of application and comprehension, in close accompaniment with the aggregate [of atoms], which is given the predicate 'body' by reference to the aggregate conception. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 69) | |
| A reaction: There is an interesting hint here of how to think of properties (as both applying and comprehended in some distinctive way), and a suggestion that there is something conventional about bodies, depending on how we conceive them. |
| 13276 | The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle's discussion of the unmoved mover and of the soul confirms the suspicion that form, when it is not thought of as the object represented in a definition, plays the role of the ultimate mereological atom within his system. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 6.6 | |
| A reaction: Aristotle is concerned with which things are 'divisible', and he cites these two examples as indivisible, but they may be too unusual to offer an actual theory of how Aristotle builds up wholes from atoms. He denies atoms in matter. |
| 13277 | The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Thus in Aristotle we may think of an object's formal components as a sort of recipe for how to build wholes of that particular kind. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.5 | |
| A reaction: In the elusive business of pinning down what Aristotle means by the crucial idea of 'form', this analogy strikes me as being quite illuminating. It would fit DNA in living things, and the design of an artifact. |
| 14047 | Bodies have impermanent properties, and permanent ones which define its conceived nature [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: Impermanent properties do not have the nature of an entire thing, which we call a body when we grasp it in aggregate, nor the nature of permanent accompaniments without which it is not possible to conceive of a body. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 70) | |
| A reaction: Epicurus doesn't discuss essences, but this seems to commit to the basic Aristotelian idea, that there there are some properties which actually bestow identity, and then others which are optional for that thing. The 'conception' is always mentioned. |
| 14039 | Above and below us will never appear to be the same, because it is inconceivable [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: What is over our heads ...or what is below any point which we think of ...will never appear to us as being at the same time and in the same respect both up and down. For it is impossible to conceive of this. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 60) | |
| A reaction: Note that he says it will 'never appear to us' as both - not that it absolutely cannot be both. Both Aristotle and Epicurus are much more focused on how our humanity shapes our metaphysics than the modern pure metaphysicians are. |
| 5991 | For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle thinks that in general we have knowledge or understanding when we grasp causes, and he distinguishes three fundamental types of knowledge - theoretical, practical and productive. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Alan D. Code - Aristotle | |
| A reaction: Productive knowledge we tend to label as 'knowing how'. The centrality of causes for knowledge would get Aristotle nowadays labelled as a 'naturalist'. It is hard to disagree with his three types, though they may overlap. |
| 14050 | We aim to dissolve our fears, by understanding their causes [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: If we give a correct and complete causal account of the source of our disturbance and fears, we will dissolve them, by accounting for the phenomena to which we are constantly exposed, and which terrify other men most severely. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 82) | |
| A reaction: Notice 'other' men! This eudaimonist aim lies at the heart of Epicurus's physical account of the world. He was primarily interested in living better, rather than in physical science. He seeks 'tranquillity' and 'freedom from disturbance'. |
| 11239 | The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| Full Idea: The notion of a priori truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
| A reaction: Cf. Idea 11240. |
| 14037 | Atoms only have shape, weight and size, and the properties which accompany shape [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: One must believe that the atoms bring with them none of the qualities of things which appear except shape, weight, and size and the properties which necessarily accompany shape. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 54) | |
| A reaction: This appears to be fairly precisely a claim that atoms only have primary qualities, though that terminology only came in in the seventeenth century. I take the view to be more or less correct. |
| 23312 | Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle is a rationalist …but reason for him is a disposition which we only acquire over time. Its acquisition is made possible primarily by perception and experience. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Rationalism p.173 | |
| A reaction: I would describe this process as the gradual acquisition of the skill of objectivity, which needs the right knowledge and concepts to evaluate new experiences. |
| 16111 | Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| Full Idea: Since Aristotle generally prefers a metaphysical theory that accords with common intuitions, he frequently relies on facts about language to guide his metaphysical claims. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.5 | |
| A reaction: I approve of his procedure. I take intuition to be largely rational justifications too complex for us to enunciate fully, and language embodies folk intuitions in its concepts (especially if the concepts occur in many languages). |
| 6010 | Illusions are not false perceptions, as we accurately perceive the pattern of atoms [Epicurus, by Modrak] |
| Full Idea: Epicurus says illusions are not false perceptions, because the senses accurately report the pattern of atoms; for instance, the edges are worn off the pattern produced by a square tower, so its perception as a round tower is true. | |
| From: report of Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 47-53) by Deborah K.W. Modrak - Classical theories of Mind | |
| A reaction: As so often, Epicurus got it right, because Democritus got it right, thus demonstrating that good philosophy must be preceded by good physics. However, good physics must be preceded and followed by good philosophy. |
| 16971 | Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik] |
| Full Idea: Plato's unity of science principle states that all - legitimate - sciences are ultimately about the Forms. Aristotle's principle states that all sciences must be, ultimately, about substances, or aspects of substances. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], 1) by Julius Moravcsik - Aristotle on Adequate Explanations 1 |
| 11243 | Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| Full Idea: For Aristotle things which explain (the explanantia) are facts, which should not be associated with the modern view that says explanations are dependent on how we conceive and describe the world (where causes are independent of us). | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.1 | |
| A reaction: There must be some room in modern thought for the Aristotelian view, if some sort of robust scientific realism is being maintained against the highly linguistic view of philosophy found in the twentieth century. |
| 3320 | Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA] |
| Full Idea: The standard Aristotelian doctrine of species and genus in the theory of anything whatever involves specifying what the thing is in terms of something more general. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.10 |
| 12000 | Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung] |
| Full Idea: The view that essential properties are those in virtue of which other significant properties of the subjects under investigation can be explained is encountered repeatedly in Aristotle's work. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation IV | |
| A reaction: What does 'significant' mean here? I take it that the significant properties are the ones which explain the role, function and powers of the object. |
| 14041 | The soul is fine parts distributed through the body, resembling hot breath [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: The soul is a body made up of fine parts distributed throught the entire aggregate, most closely resembling breath with a certain admixture of heat, in one way resembling breath and in another resembling heat | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 63) | |
| A reaction: Remember that 'psuché' refers as much to the life within a creature as it does to the consciousness. The stoics seem to have held a similar view. |
| 14042 | The soul cannot be incorporeal, because then it could neither act nor be acted upon [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: Those who say that the soul is incorporeal are speaking to no point; for if it were of that character, it could neither act nor be acted upon at all. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 67) | |
| A reaction: This just is the causal argument, which is espoused by Papineau and other modern physicalists. Personally I am inclined to agree with Papineau, that it is so simple and conclusive that it is hardly worth discussing further. Dualism needs a miracle. |
| 23300 | Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle, and also the Stoics, denied rationality to animals. …The Platonists, the Pythagoreans, and some more independent Aristotelians, did grant reason and intellect to animals. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Denial' | |
| A reaction: This is not the same as affirming or denying their consciousness. The debate depends on how rationality is conceived. |
| 11240 | The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| Full Idea: The notion of analytic truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
| A reaction: Cf. Idea 11239. |
| 6559 | Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin] |
| Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge (and somewhat to my surprise), Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal; however, he all but says it. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: When I read this I thought that this database would prove Fogelin wrong, but it actually supports him, as I can't find it in Aristotle either. Descartes refers to it in Med.Two. In Idea 5133 Aristotle does say that man is a 'social being'. But 22586! |
| 11150 | It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it. | |
| From: Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) | |
| A reaction: The epigraph on a David Chalmers website. A wonderful remark, and it should be on the wall of every beginners' philosophy class. However, while it is in the spirit of Aristotle, it appears to be a misattribution with no ancient provenance. |
| 3037 | Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle was asked how much educated men were superior to those uneducated; "As much," he said, "as the living are to the dead." | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 05.1.11 |
| 7907 | Human killing is worse if the victim is virtuous [Buddhaghosa] |
| Full Idea: In the case of humans killing is the more blameworthy the more virtuous the victim is. | |
| From: Buddhaghosa (Papancasudani [c.400], 9.7-10) | |
| A reaction: This sentiment has almost become a taboo in western society, and yet it is present all the time. The greatest outcry is about murders of really good citizens. Occasionally the murder of a villain causes little regret. |
| 8660 | There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle developed his own distinction between potential infinity (never running out) and actual infinity (there being a collection of an actual infinite number of things, such as places, times, objects). He decided that actual infinity was incoherent. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 1.3 | |
| A reaction: Friend argues, plausibly, that this won't do, since potential infinity doesn't make much sense if there is not an actual infinity of things to supply the demand. It seems to just illustrate how boggling and uncongenial infinity was to Aristotle. |
| 14032 | Totality has no edge; an edge implies a contrast beyond the edge, and there can't be one [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: The totality is unlimited. For what is limited has an extreme; but an extreme is seen in contrast to something else, so that since it has no extreme it has no limit. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 41) | |
| A reaction: I presume that the 'limit' is the edge, and the 'extreme' is what is beyond the edge. Why could not the extreme be nothingness, which then contrast dramatically with what exists? |
| 14033 | Bodies are unlimited as well as void, since the two necessarily go together [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: The number of bodies and the magnitude of the void are unlimited. If void were unlimited, and bodies limited, bodies move in scattered fashion with no support of checking collisions; in limited void, unlimited bodies would not have a place to be in. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 42) | |
| A reaction: Seems good. The point is that without collisions, bodies would not stop relative to one another, and combine to form the objects we perceive. Of course if the started off (anathema!) stuck together, they may not have dispersed yet. |
| 12058 | Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle's conception of matter permits any kind of matter to become any other kind of matter. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Wiggins - Substance 4.11.2 | |
| A reaction: This is obviously crucial background information when we read Aristotle on matter. Our 92+ elements, and fixed fundamental particles, gives a quite different picture. Aristotle would discuss form and matter quite differently now. |
| 14034 | There exists an infinity of each shape of atom, but the number of shapes is beyond our knowledge [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: For each type of shape there is an unlimited number of similar atoms, but with respect to the differences they are not simply unlimited but ungraspable. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 42) | |
| A reaction: Epicurus's view of the nature of atoms rests on his empiricism, so while he can reason from experience to how they must be, he admits (impressively) his ignorance of the full facts. He has arguments for the unlimited number. |
| 14035 | Atoms just have shape, size and weight; colour results from their arrangement [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: There are not even any qualities in atoms, except shape and size and weight; their colour changes according to the arrangement of the atoms. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 44 schol) | |
| A reaction: [This is quoted by a 'scholiast' - an early writer quoting from Epicurus's '12 Basic Principles'] He appears to have got this one wrong, as it is evidently the type of atom, as well as the arrangement, which contributes to the colour. |
| 14038 | There cannot be unlimited division, because it would reduce things to non-existence [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: One must eliminate unlimited division into smaller pieces (to avoid making everything weak and being forced in our comprehensive grasps of compound things to exhaust the things which exist by reducing them to non-existence). | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 56) | |
| A reaction: A basic argument for atoms, but it seems to rest on Zenonian paradoxes about infinite subdivision. An infinite subdivision of a unit doesn't seem to turn it into zero. |
| 14049 | We aim to know the natures which are observed in natural phenomena [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: Blessedness lies in knowing the natures which are observed in meteorological phenomena. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 78) | |
| A reaction: This pursuit of 'natures' seems to be at the heart of scientific essentialism. Epicurus demonstrates his proposal, by offering speculations about the natures of all sorts of phenomena (esp. in 'Letter to Pythocles'). |
| 14043 | The void cannot interact, but just gives the possibility of motion [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: The void can neither act nor be acted upon but merely provides the possibility of motion through itself for bodies. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 67) | |
| A reaction: Epicurus follows this with the anti-dualist Idea 14042, but he is at least offering the notion of something which exists without powers of causal interaction. Does space undermine the causal criterion for existence? |
| 14031 | Space must exist, since movement is obvious, and there must be somewhere to move in [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: If there did not exist that which we call void and space and intangible nature, bodies would not have any place to be in or move through, as they obviously do move. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 40) | |
| A reaction: The observation that 'they obviously do move' must be aimed at followers of Parmenides. The idea of the void seems to contain a Newtonian commitment to absolute space. |
| 14036 | There are endless cosmoi, some like and some unlike this one [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: There is an unlimited number of cosmoi, and some are similar to this one and some are dissimilar. | |
| From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 45) |
| 22729 | The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle said that the conception of gods arose among mankind from two originating causes, namely from events which concern the soul and from celestial phenomena. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], Frag 10) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Physicists (two books) I.20 | |
| A reaction: The cosmos suggests order, and possible creation. What do events of the soul suggest? It doesn't seem to be its non-physical nature, because Aristotle is more of a functionalist. Puzzling. (It says later that gods are like the soul). |