72 ideas
1695 | Without extensive examination firm statements are hard, but studying the difficulties is profitable [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is hard to make firm statements on these questions without having examined them many times, but to have gone through the various difficulties is not unprofitable. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 08b23) | |
A reaction: Suggesting that philosophy is more like drawing the map than completing the journey. |
2666 | Carneades' pinnacles of philosophy are the basis of knowledge (the criterion of truth) and the end of appetite (good) [Carneades, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Carneades said the two greatest things in philosophy were the criterion of truth and the end of goods, and no man could be a sage who was ignorant of the existence of either a beginning of the process of knowledge or an end of appetition. | |
From: report of Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Academica II.09.29 | |
A reaction: Nice, but I would want to emphasise the distinction between truth and its criterion. Admittedly we would have no truth without a good criterion, but the truth itself should be held in higher esteem than our miserable human means of grasping it. |
1697 | The contrary of good is bad, but the contrary of bad is either good or another evil [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What is contrary to a good thing is necessarily bad, as we see with health and sickness. But the contrary of bad is sometimes good, sometimes not, as we see with excess, opposed by both deficiency and moderation. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 13b36) |
1698 | Both sides of contraries need not exist (as health without sickness, white without black) [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: With contraries it is not necessary if one exists for the other to exist too, for if everyone were well health would exist but not sickness, and if everything were white whiteness would exist but not black. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 14a06) |
11034 | The differentiae of genera which are different are themselves different in kind [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The differentiae of genera which are different and not subordinate one to the other are themselves different in kind. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 01b16) | |
A reaction: This seems to be indicating a category mistake, as he warns us not to attribute the wrong kind of differentiae to something we are picking out. |
18367 | A true existence statement has its truth caused by the existence of the thing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Whereas the true statement [that there is a man] is in no way the cause of the actual thing's existence, the actual thing does seem in some way the cause of the statement's being true. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 14b18) | |
A reaction: Armstrong offers this as the earliest statement of the truthmaker principle. Notice the cautious qualification 'seem in some way'. The truthmaker dependence seems even clearer in falsemaking, where the death of the man falsifies the statement. |
21390 | Future events are true if one day we will say 'this event is happening now' [Carneades] |
Full Idea: We call those past events true of which at an earlier time this proposition was true: 'They are present now'; similarly, we shall call those future events true of which at some future time this proposition will be true: 'They are present now'. | |
From: Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 9.23-8 | |
A reaction: This is a very nice way of paraphrasing statements about the necessity of true future contingent events. It still relies, of course, on the veracity of a tensed assertion |
21672 | We say future things are true that will possess actuality at some following time [Carneades, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Just as we speak of past things as true that possessed true actuality at some former time, so we speak of future things as true that will possess true actuality at some following time. | |
From: report of Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 11.27 | |
A reaction: This ducks the Aristotle problem of where it is true NOW when you say there will be a sea-fight tomorrow, and it turns out to be true. Carneades seems to be affirming a truth when it does not yet have a truthmaker. |
11033 | Predications of predicates are predications of their subjects [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Whenever one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, all things said of what is predicated will be said of the subject also. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 01b10) |
11044 | One is prior to two, because its existence is implied by two [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: One is prior to two because if there are two it follows at once that there is one, whereas if there is one there is not necessarily two. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 14a29) | |
A reaction: The axiomatic introduction of a 'successor' to a number does not seem to introduce this notion of priority, based on inclusiveness. Introducing order by '>' also does not seem to indicate any logical priority. |
11042 | Parts of a line join at a point, so it is continuous [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A line is a continuous quantity. For it is possible to find a common boundary at which its parts join together, a point. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 04b33) | |
A reaction: This appears to be the essential concept of a Dedekind cut. It seems to be an open question whether a cut defines a unique number, but a boundary seems to be intrinsically unique. Aristotle wins again. |
11041 | Some quantities are discrete, like number, and others continuous, like lines, time and space [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Of quantities, some are discrete, others continuous. ...Discrete are number and language; continuous are lines, surfaces, bodies, and also, besides these, time and place. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 04b20) | |
A reaction: This distinction seems to me to be extremely illuminating, when comparing natural numbers with real numbers, and it is the foundation of the Greek view of mathematics. |
11286 | Primary being must be more than mere indeterminate ultimate subject of predication [Politis on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: He criticises his 'Categories' view, because if primary being is simply the ultimate subject of predication the primary being is, in virtue of itself, something indeterminate; it would be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for primary being. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 7.5 | |
A reaction: Thus, Politis argues, primary being is essence in the later work. The words 'substance' and 'ousia' cause confusion here, and must be watched closely. Wedin argues that Aristotle merely develops his 'Categories' view, but most disagree. |
1700 | There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place. A change in our affections would be an example of alteration. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 15a13) |
1699 | A thing is prior to another if it implies its existence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: That from which the implication of existence does not hold reciprocally is thought to be prior. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 14a32) | |
A reaction: shadows and objects |
18366 | Of interdependent things, the prior one causes the other's existence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For of things which reciprocate as to implication of existence, that which is in some way the cause of the other's existence might reasonably by called prior by nature. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 14b12) | |
A reaction: Not so clear when you seek examples. The bus is prior to its redness, but you can't have a colourless bus, so being coloured is prior to being a bus. Aristotle's example is a man being prior to the truths about him. |
13121 | Substance,Quantity,Quality,Relation,Place,Time,Being-in-a-position,Having,Doing,Being affected [Aristotle, by Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's list of ten categories proved to be the most influential scheme found in his works: Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Being-in-a-position, Having, Doing, Being affected. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §01 |
3311 | The categories (substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time) peter out inconsequentially [Benardete,JA on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The Aristotelian schedule of categories - substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time, and so forth - appears to peter out inconsequentially. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.7 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 5544 for Kant's attempt to classify categories. Personally I like the way Aristotle's 'peter out'. That seems to me a more plausible character for good metaphysics. |
11035 | There are ten basic categories for thinking about things [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance or quantity or qualification or a relative or where or when or being-in-a-position or having or doing or being-affected. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 01b25) | |
A reaction: This sums up the earlier of Aristotle's two metaphysical view, and each of this categories is discussed in the present text. |
16116 | Aristotle derived categories as answers to basic questions about nature, size, quality, location etc. [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Aristotle seems to have worked out his list of categories by considering various questions that one might ask about a particular object, such as What is it? How big is it? How is it qualified? And Where is it? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance | |
A reaction: Of course, to think of his questions, Aristotle already had categories in his mind. How would he approach a proposal to recategorise reality more efficiently? |
21345 | Aristotle said relations are not substances, so (if they exist) they must be accidents [Aristotle, by Heil] |
Full Idea: Aristotle categorised relations as accidents - Socrates's whiteness, the sphericity of this ball - entities dependent on substances. Relations are not substances, so they must be, if anything at all, accidents. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], §7) by John Heil - Relations 'Historical' | |
A reaction: Heil says this thought encouraged anti-realist views of relations, which became the norm until Russell. |
16155 | Aristotle promoted the importance of properties and objects (rather than general and particular) [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: In 'Categories' Aristotle is taking a first step in making the distinction between objects and properties central to ontology. This plays virtually no role in Plato, and was overshadowed by the distinction between general and particular. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Individuals in Aristotle I | |
A reaction: Frede says he gets in a tangle because he mixes the earlier and the new views. Because we are nowadays in a total muddle about properties, I'm thinking we should go back to the earlier view! Modern commentators make him a trope theorist. |
11032 | Some things said 'of' a subject are not 'in' the subject [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Of things there are, some are said of a subject, but are not in any subject. For example, man is said of a subject, the individual man, but is not in any subject. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 01a20) | |
A reaction: See? 'Being a man' is not a property of a man! Only the properties which are 'in' the man are properties of the man. The rest are things which are said 'of' men, usually as classifications. A classification is not a property. |
11038 | We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is reasonable that, after the primary substances, their species and genera should be the only other things called (secondary) substances. For only they, of things predicated, reveal the primary substance. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 02b29) | |
A reaction: This is the key passage in all of Aristotle for sortal essentialists like Wiggins, especially the word 'only'. I take it that this observation is superseded by the Metaphysics. Definition is the route to substance (which involves general terms). |
16739 | Four species of quality: states, capacities, affects, and forms [Aristotle, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: In Categories 8 there are four species of qualities: States and conditions, Natural capacities and incapacities, Affective qualities or affections, and Shape and external form. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], Ch.8) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.5 |
11037 | Colour must be in an individual body, or it is not embodied [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Colour is in body and therefore also in an individual body; for were it not in some individual body it would not be in body at all. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 02b02) | |
A reaction: This may be just a truism, or it may be the Aristotelian commitment to universals only existing if they are instantiated. |
16154 | Aristotle gave up his earlier notion of individuals, because it relied on universals [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: In 'Metaphysics' Aristotle abandons the notion of an individual which he had relied on in the 'Categories', since it presupposes that there are general things, that there are universals. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Individuals in Aristotle Intro | |
A reaction: Ah, very illuminating. So all the way through we have a concept of individuals, first relying on universals, and then relying on hylomorphism? I suppose a bundle theory of individuals would need universals. |
12351 | Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
Full Idea: The reason Aristotle gives for calling species and genera substances is that of what is predicated only they reveal what the primary substance is. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 02b29-37) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance III.6 | |
A reaction: Thus we should not be misled into thinking that the genus and species ARE the essence. We edge our way towards the essence of an individual by subdividing its categories. |
1694 | Substances have no opposites, and don't come in degrees (including if the substance is a man) [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There is nothing contrary to substances,…. and a substance does not admit of a more and a less. If this substance is a man, it will not be more a man or less a man either than itself or than another man. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 03b33) |
16091 | Is primary substance just an ultimate subject, or some aspect of a complex body? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: 'Categories' treats something's being an ultimate subject as a test for being a primary substance, but it does not treat its primary objects as complex bodies consisting of matter and form. In that case, is the composite or a feature the ultimate subject? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Gill is trying to throw light on the difference between 'Categories' and 'Metaphysics'. Once you have hylomorphism (form-plus-matter) you have a new difficulty in explaining unity. The answer is revealed once we understand 'form'. |
11280 | Primary being is 'that which lies under', or 'particular substance' [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: In 'Categories' Aristotle argues the primary being (proté ousia) is the ultimate subject of predication (to hupokeimenon, meaning 'that which lies under'), nowadays referred to as the 'particular substance' view. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 4.4 | |
A reaction: Politis says that Aristotle shifts to the quite different view in 'Metaphysics', that primary being is essence, rather than mere subject of predication. |
11040 | A single substance can receive contrary properties [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It seems distinctive of substance that what is numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries. ...For example, an individual man - one and the same - becomes pale at one time and dark at another. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 04a10/20) |
16140 | Secondary substances do have subjects, so they are not ultimate in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: The concept of substance applies to secondary substances only with some deletions; ..it is not true that they have no subjects, and hence they are not ultimate subjects for all other elements of the ontology. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V | |
A reaction: It increasingly strikes that to treat secondary substance (roughly, species) as essence is a shocking misreading of Aristotle. Frede says they are substances, because they do indeed 'underlie'. |
10965 | In earlier Aristotle the substances were particulars, not kinds [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
Full Idea: In 'Metaphysics' Aristotle changed his view, as in 'Categories' the substances, the basic realities, were particular items, notably individual men, horses, cabbages etc. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Hugh Lawson-Tancred - Introductions to 'Metaphysics' p.178 | |
A reaction: The charge is that having successfully rebelled against Plato, Aristotle gradually succumbed to his teacher's influence, and ended up with a more platonist view. For anti-platonists like myself, the 'Categories' seems to be the key text. |
11036 | A 'primary' substance is in each subject, with species or genera as 'secondary' substances [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A substance, in its most primary sense, is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual man or horse. The species in which things primarily called substances are, are called secondary substances, as are the genera. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 02a11) | |
A reaction: This distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' substances is characteristic of Aristotle's earlier metaphysical view, with the later view (more unified and Platonic) in the 'Metaphysics'. |
8287 | Earlier Aristotle had objects as primary substances, but later he switched to substantial form [Aristotle, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: In 'Categories' primary substances are individual concrete objects, such as a particular horse, whereas in 'Metaphysics' such things are combinations of matter and substantial form, with the latter being the primary substances. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 9.1 | |
A reaction: Lowe claims there is no real difference. Aristotle came to think that matter was not part of primary substance, so the shift seems to be that substance was concrete, but then he decided it was abstract. Physicists will prefer 'Metaphysics'. |
12350 | Things are called 'substances' because they are subjects for everything else [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is because the primary substances are subjects for everything else that they are called substances [ousiai] most strictly. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 03a04) | |
A reaction: This points to a rather minimal account of substance, as possibly the 'bare particular' which has no other role than to have properties. This expands in 'Metaphysics' to be matter which has form, making properties possible. |
11039 | A primary substance reveals a 'this', which is an individual unit [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Every substance seems to signify a certain 'this'. As regards the primary substances, it is indisputably true that each of them signifies a certain 'this'; for the thing revealed is individual and numerically one. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 03b10) | |
A reaction: The notion of 'primary' substance is confined to this earlier metaphysics of Aristotle. |
12361 | Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
Full Idea: The primacy of 'Categories' primary substances is a kind of ontological primacy, whereas the primacy of form is a kind of structural or explanatory primacy. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance X.9 | |
A reaction: 'Structural' and 'explanatory' sound very different, since the former sounds ontological and the latter epistemological (and more subjective). |
3315 | Aristotle denigrates the category of relation, but for modern absolutists self-relation is basic [Benardete,JA on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle denigrates the whole category of relations, but modern logical absolutists single out self-relation (in the mode of identity) as metaphysically privileged. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.8 | |
A reaction: I think this refers to Plantinga and Merrihew Adams, who make identity-with-itself the basic component of individual existences. |
15825 | Carneades denied the transitivity of identity [Carneades, by Chisholm] |
Full Idea: Carneades denied the principle of the transitivity of identity. | |
From: report of Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE], fr 41-42) by Roderick Chisholm - Person and Object 3.1 | |
A reaction: Chisholm calls this 'extreme', but I assume Carneades wouldn't deny the principle in mathematics. I'm guessing that he just means that nothing ever stays quite the same. |
21389 | Carneades distinguished logical from causal necessity, when talking of future events [Long on Carneades] |
Full Idea: From 'E will take place is true' it follows that E must take place. But 'must' here is logical not causal necessity. It is a considerable achievement of Carneades to have distinguished these two senses of necessity. | |
From: comment on Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]) by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 3 | |
A reaction: Personally I am inclined to think 'necessity' is univocal, and does not have two senses. What Carneades has nicely done is distinguish the two different grounds for the necessities. |
23308 | Reasoning relates to understanding as time does to eternity [Boethius, by Sorabji] |
Full Idea: Boethius says that reasoning [ratiocinatio] is related to intellectual understanding [intellectus] as time to eternity, involving as it does movement from one stage to another. | |
From: report of Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], 4, prose 6) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Shifting' | |
A reaction: This gives true understanding a quasi-religious aura, as befits a subject which is truly consoling. |
5771 | Knowledge of present events doesn't make them necessary, so future events are no different [Boethius] |
Full Idea: Just as the knowledge of present things imposes no necessity on what is happening, so foreknowledge imposes no necessity on what is going to happen. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], V.IV) | |
A reaction: This, I think, is the key idea if you are looking for a theological answer to the theological problem of free will. Don't think of God as seeing the future 'now'. God is outside time, and so only observes all of history just as we observe the present. |
21671 | Voluntary motion is intrinsically within our power, and this power is its cause [Carneades, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Voluntary motion possesses the intrinsic property of being in our power and of obeying us, and its obedience is not uncaused, for its nature is itself the cause of this. | |
From: report of Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 11.25 | |
A reaction: To say that actions arise from our 'intrinsic power' is not much of an explanation, but it is still informative - that you should study the intrinsic powers of humans if you want to explain it. |
5767 | Rational natures require free will, in order to have power of judgement [Boethius] |
Full Idea: There is freedom of the will, for it would be impossible for any rational nature to exist without it. Whatever by nature has the use of reason has the power of judgement to decide each matter. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], V.II) | |
A reaction: A view taken up by Aquinas (Idea 1849) and Kant (Idea 3740). The 'power of judgement' pinpoints the core of rationality, and it is not clear how a robot could fulfil such a power, if it lacked consciousness. Does a machine 'judge' barcodes? |
5768 | God's universal foreknowledge seems opposed to free will [Boethius] |
Full Idea: God's universal foreknowledge and freedom of the will seem clean contrary and opposite. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], V.III) | |
A reaction: The original source of the great theological and philosophical anguish over free will. The problem is anything which fixes future facts, be it oracular knowledge or scientific prediction. Personally I think free will was an invention by religions. |
21391 | Some actions are within our power; determinism needs prior causes for everything - so it is false [Carneades, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Now something is in our power; but if everything happens as a result of destiny all things happen as a result of antecedent causes; therefore what happens does not happen as a result of destiny. | |
From: report of Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 14.31 | |
A reaction: This invites the question of whether some things really are 'in our power'. Carneades (as expressed by Cicero) takes that for granted. Our 'power' may be antecedent causes in disguise. |
5769 | Does foreknowledge cause necessity, or necessity cause foreknowledge? [Boethius] |
Full Idea: Does foreknowledge of the future cause the necessity of events, or necessity cause the foreknowledge? | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], V.III) | |
A reaction: An intriguing question, though not one that bothers me. I don't understand how foreknowledge causes necessity, unless God's vision of the future is a kind of 'freezing ray'. Even the gods must bow to necessity (Idea 3016). |
21674 | Even Apollo can only foretell the future when it is naturally necessary [Carneades, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Carneades used to say that not even Apollo could tell any future events except those whose causes were so held together that they must necessarily happen. | |
From: report of Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 14.32 | |
A reaction: Carneades is opposing the usual belief in divination, where even priests can foretell contingent future events to some extent. Careneades, of course, was defending free will. |
12349 | Only what can be said of many things is a predicable [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
Full Idea: Aristotle reminds us that nothing is to count as predicable that cannot be said-of many things. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance III.1 | |
A reaction: Thus there wouldn't be any predicates if there were not universals. Could we have proper names for individual qualities (tropes), in the way that we have them for individual objects? |
11837 | Some predicates signify qualification of a substance, others the substance itself [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: 'White' signifies nothing but a qualification, whereas the species ('man') and the genus ('animal') mark off the qualification of substance - they signify substance of a certain qualification. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 03b18) | |
A reaction: This is making a fundamental distinction between two different types of predication. I would describe them as one attributing a real property, and the other attributing a category (as a result of the properties). I don't think 'substance' helps here. |
5762 | The wicked want goodness, so they would not be wicked if they obtained it [Boethius] |
Full Idea: If the wicked obtained what they want - that is goodness - they could not be wicked. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], IV.II) | |
A reaction: This is a nice paradox which arises from Boethius being, like Socrates, an intellectualist. The question is whether the wicked want the good de re or de dicto. If they wanted to good de re (as its true self) they would obviously not be wicked. |
5770 | Rewards and punishments are not deserved if they don't arise from free movement of the mind [Boethius] |
Full Idea: If there is no free will, then in vain is reward offered to the good and punishment to the bad, because they have not been deserved by any free and willed movement of the mind. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], V.III) | |
A reaction: I just don't see why decisions have to come out of nowhere in order to have any merit. People are different from natural forces, because the former can be persuaded by reasons. A moral agent is a mechanism which decides according to reasons. |
5764 | When people fall into wickedness they lose their human nature [Boethius] |
Full Idea: When people fall into wickedness they lose their human nature. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], IV.III) | |
A reaction: This is a view I find quite sympathetic, but which is a million miles from the modern view. Today's paper showed a picture of a famous criminal holding a machine gun and a baby. We seem to delight in the idea that human nature is partly wicked. |
7398 | Carneades said that after a shipwreck a wise man would seize the only plank by force [Carneades, by Tuck] |
Full Idea: Carneades argued forcefully that in the event of a shipwreck, the wise man would be prepared to seize the only plank capable of bearing him to shore, even if that meant pushing another person off it. | |
From: report of Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.1 | |
A reaction: [source for this?] This thought seems to have provoked great discussion in the sixteenth century (mostly sympathetic). I can't help thinking the right answer depends on assessing your rival. Die for a hero, drown a nasty fool. |
5756 | Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing more to be desired [Boethius] |
Full Idea: Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing more to be desired. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], III.I) | |
A reaction: This sounds like the ancient 'eudaimonism' of Socrates and Aristotle, which might not be entirely compatible with orthodox Christianity. It is not true, though, that happy people lack ambition. To be happy, an unfilfilled aim may be needed. |
5763 | The bad seek the good through desire, but the good through virtue, which is more natural [Boethius] |
Full Idea: The supreme good is the goal of good men and bad men alike, and the good seek it by means of a natural activity - the exercise of virtue - while the bad strive to acquire it by means of their desires, which is not a natural way of obtaining the good. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], IV.II) | |
A reaction: Interesting here is the slightly surprising claim that the pursuit of virtue is 'natural', implying that the mere pursuit of desire is not. Doesn't nature have to be restrained to achieve the good? Boethius is in the tradition of Aristotle and stoicism. |
5759 | Varied aims cannot be good because they differ, but only become good when they unify [Boethius] |
Full Idea: The various things that men pursue are not perfect and good, because they differ from one another; ..when they differ they are not good, but when they begin to be one they become good, so it is through the acquisition of unity that these things are good. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], III.XI) | |
A reaction: This is a criticism of Aristotle's pluralism about the good(s) for man. Boethius' thought is appealing, and ties in with the Socratic notion that the virtues might be unified in some way. I think it is right that true virtues merge together, ideally. |
5754 | You can't control someone's free mind, only their body and possessions [Boethius] |
Full Idea: The only way one man can exercise power over another is over his body and what is inferior to it, his possessions. You cannot impose anything on a free mind. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], II.VI) | |
A reaction: Written, of course, in prison. Boethius had not met hypnotism, or mind-controlling drugs, or invasive brain surgery. He hadn't read '1984'. He hadn't seen 'The Ipcress File'. (In fact, he should have got out more…) |
21392 | People change laws for advantage; either there is no justice, or it is a form of self-injury [Carneades, by Lactantius] |
Full Idea: The same people often changed laws according to circumstances; there is no natural law. There is no such thing as justice or, if there is, it is the height of folly, since a man injures himself in taking thought for the advantage of others. | |
From: report of Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]) by Lactantius - Institutiones Divinae 5.16.4 | |
A reaction: [An argument used by Carneades on his notorious 156BCE visit to Rome, where he argued both for and against justice] This is probably the right wing view of justice. Why give other people what they want, if it is at our expense? |
11043 | It is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 12b01) |
1696 | Change goes from possession to loss (as in baldness), but not the other way round [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Change occurs from possession to privation, but from privation to possession is impossible; one who has gone blind does not recover sight nor does a bald man regain his hair nor does a toothless man grow new ones. | |
From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 13a35) | |
A reaction: Although this seems like an insight into entropy, it isn't an accurate observation, since trees lose their leaves, and then regain them in spring. Maybe somewhere men regrow their hair each spring. |
16692 | Divine eternity is the all-at-once and complete possession of unending life [Boethius] |
Full Idea: Divine eternity is the all-at-once [tota simul] and complete possession of unending life. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], V.6), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.1 | |
A reaction: This is a famous definition, and 'tota simul' became the phrase used for 'entia successiva', such as a day, or the Olympic Games. |
5752 | Where does evil come from if there is a god; where does good come from if there isn't? [Boethius] |
Full Idea: A philosopher (possibly Epicurus) asked where evil comes from if there is a god, and where good comes from if there isn't. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], I.IV) | |
A reaction: A nice question. The best known answer to the first question is 'Satan'. Some would say that in the second case good is impossible, but I would have thought that the only possible answer is 'mankind'. |
5758 | God is the good [Boethius] |
Full Idea: God is the good. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], III.XI) | |
A reaction: This summary follows on from the rather dubious discussion in Idea 5757. If God IS the good, it is not clear how God could be usefully described as 'good'. We would know that he was good a priori, without any enquiry into his nature being needed. |
5757 | God is the supreme good, so no source of goodness could take precedence over God [Boethius] |
Full Idea: That which by its own nature is something distinct from supreme good, cannot be supreme good. ..It is impossible for anything to be by nature better than that from which it is derived, so that which is the origin of all things is supreme good. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], III.X) | |
A reaction: This is the contortion early Christians got into once they decided God had to be 'supreme' in the moral world (and every other world). Boethius allows a possible external source of all morality, but then has to say that this source is morally inferior. |
5760 | The power through which creation remains in existence and motion I call 'God' [Boethius] |
Full Idea: For this power, whatever it is, through which creation remains in existence and in motion, I use the word which all people use, namely God. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], III.XII) | |
A reaction: An interesting caution in the phrase 'whatever it is'. Boethius would have been very open-minded in discussion with modern science about the stability of nature. Personally I reject Boethius' theory, but don't have a better one. Cf Idea 1431. |
5753 | The regular events of this life could never be due to chance [Boethius] |
Full Idea: I could never believe that events of such regularity as we find in this life are due to the haphazards of chance. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], I.VI) | |
A reaction: It depends what you mean by 'chance'. Boethius infers a conscious mind, and presumes this to be God, but that is two large and unsupported steps. Modern atheists must acknowledge Boethius' problem. Why is there order? |
5765 | The reward of the good is to become gods [Boethius] |
Full Idea: Goodness is happiness, ..but we agree that those who attain happiness are divine. The reward of the good, then, is to become gods. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], IV.III) | |
A reaction: Kant offered a similar argument (see Idea 1455). Most of us are unlikely to agree with the second premise of Boethius' argument. The idea that we might somehow become gods gripped the imagination for the next thousand years. |
5761 | God can do anything, but he cannot do evil, so evil must be nothing [Boethius] |
Full Idea: 'There is nothing that an omnipotent power could not do?' 'No.' 'Then can God do evil?' 'No.' 'So evil is nothing, since that is what He cannot do who can do anthing.' | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], III.XII) | |
A reaction: A lovely example of the contortions necessary once you insist that God must be 'omnipotent', in some absolute sense of the term. Saying that evil is 'nothing' strikes me as nothing more than a feeble attempt to insult it. |
5766 | If you could see the plan of Providence, you would not think there was evil anywhere [Boethius] |
Full Idea: If you could see the plan of Providence, you would not think there was evil anywhere. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], IV.VI) | |
A reaction: This brings out the verificationist in me. See Idea 1467, by Antony Flew. Presumably Boethius would retain his faith as Europe moved horribly from 1939 to 1945, and even if the whole of humanity sank into squalid viciousness. |