72 ideas
19693 | There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb] |
Full Idea: Aristotle takes wisdom to come in two forms, the practical and the theoretical, the former of which is good judgement about how to act, and the latter of which is deep knowledge or understanding. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Dennis Whitcomb - Wisdom Intro | |
A reaction: The interesting question is then whether the two are connected. One might be thoroughly 'sensible' about action, without counting as 'wise', which seems to require a broader view of what is being done. Whitcomb endorses Aristotle on this idea. |
15357 | Philosophy is the most general intellectual discipline [Horsten] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is the most general intellectual discipline. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 05.1) | |
A reaction: Very simple, but exactly how I see the subject. It is continuous with the sciences, and tries to give an account of nature, but operating at an extreme level of generality. It must respect the findings of science, but offer bold interpretations. |
1575 | For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle logos is the ability to speak rationally about, with the hope of attaining knowledge, questions of value. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.26 |
1589 | Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is the great theoretician who articulates a vision of a world in which natural and stable structures can be rationally discovered. His is the most optimistic and richest view of the possibilities of logos | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.95 |
15352 | A definition should allow the defined term to be eliminated [Horsten] |
Full Idea: A definition allows a defined term to be eliminated in every context in which it appears. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 04.2) | |
A reaction: To do that, a definition had better be incredibly comprehensive, so that no nice nuance of the original term is thrown out. |
8200 | Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine] |
Full Idea: A real definition, according to the Aristotelian tradition, gives the essence of the kind of thing defined. Man is defined as a rational animal, and thus rationality and animality are of the essence of each of us. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Willard Quine - Vagaries of Definition p.51 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 4385. Personally I prefer the Aristotelian approach, but we may have to say 'We cannot identify the essence of x, and so x cannot be defined'. Compare 'his mood was hard to define' with 'his mood was hostile'. |
4385 | Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, to give a definition one must first state the genus and then the differentia of the kind of thing to be defined. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.157 | |
A reaction: Presumably a modern definition would just be a list of properties, but Aristotle seeks the substance. How does he define a genus? - by placing it in a further genus? |
15323 | Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension [Horsten] |
Full Idea: I take truth to be a property because the truth predicate has an extension - the collection of all true sentences - and this collection does not (unlike the 'extension' of 'exists') consist of everything, or even of all sentences. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 01.1) | |
A reaction: He concedes that it may be an 'uninteresting' property. My problem is always that I am unconvinced that truth is tied to sentences. I can make perfect sense of animal thoughts being right or wrong. Extension of mental propositions? |
15324 | Semantic theories of truth seek models; axiomatic (syntactic) theories seek logical principles [Horsten] |
Full Idea: There are semantical theories of truth, concerned with models for languages containing the truth predicate, and axiomatic (or syntactic) theories, interested in basic logical principles governing the concept of truth. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 01.1) | |
A reaction: This is the map of contemporary debates, which seem now to have given up talking about 'correspondence', 'coherence' etc. |
15374 | Truth has no 'nature', but we should try to describe its behaviour in inferences [Horsten] |
Full Idea: We should not aim at describing the nature of truth because there is no such thing. Rather, we should aim at describing the inferential behaviour of truth. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 10.2.3) |
15348 | Propositions have sentence-like structures, so it matters little which bears the truth [Horsten] |
Full Idea: It makes little difference, at least in extensional contexts, whether the truth bearers are propositions or sentences (or assertions). Even if the bearers are propositions rather than sentences, propositions are structured rather like sentences. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 02.4) | |
A reaction: The 'extensional' context means you are only talking about the things that are referred to, and not about the way this is expressed. I prefer propositions, but this is an interesting point. |
15333 | Modern correspondence is said to be with the facts, not with true propositions [Horsten] |
Full Idea: Modern correspondence theorists no longer take things to correspond to true propositions; they consider facts to be the truthmakers of propositions. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 02.1) | |
A reaction: If we then define facts as the way certain things are, independently from our thinking about it, at least we seem to be avoiding circularity. Not much point in correspondence accounts if you are not a robust realist (like me). [14,000th idea, 23/4/12!] |
15337 | The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts' [Horsten] |
Full Idea: The principle difficulty of the correspondence theory of truth is its vagueness. It is too vague to be called a theory until more information is given about what is meant by the terms 'correspondence' and 'fact'. Facts can involve a heavy ontology. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 02.1) | |
A reaction: I see nothing here to make me give up my commitment to the correspondence view of truth, though it sounds as if I will have to give up the word 'theory' in that context. Truth is so obviously about thought fitting reality that there is nothing to discuss. |
15334 | The coherence theory allows multiple coherent wholes, which could contradict one another [Horsten] |
Full Idea: The coherence theory seems too liberal. It seems there can be more than one systematic whole which, while being internally coherent, contradict each other, and thus cannot all be true. Coherence is a necessary but not sufficient condition for truth. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 02.1) | |
A reaction: This is a modern post-Tarski axiomatic truth theorist making very short work indeed of the coherence theory of truth. I take Horsten to be correct. |
15336 | The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B [Horsten] |
Full Idea: The pragmatic theory is unsatisfactory because usefulness is a relative notion. One theory can be useful to group A while being thoroughly impractical for group B. This would make the theory both truth and false. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 02.1) | |
A reaction: This objection, along with the obvious fact that certain falsehoods can be very useful, would seem to rule pragmatism out as a theory of truth. It is, in fact, an abandonment of truth. |
15354 | Tarski's hierarchy lacks uniform truth, and depends on contingent factors [Horsten] |
Full Idea: According to the Tarskian hierarchical conception, truth is not a uniform notion. ...Also Kripke has emphasised that the level of a token of the truth predicate can depend on contingent factors, such as what else has been said by a speaker. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 04.5) |
15340 | Tarski Bi-conditional: if you'll assert φ you'll assert φ-is-true - and also vice versa [Horsten] |
Full Idea: The axiom schema 'Sentence "phi;" is true iff φ' is the (unrestricted) Tarski-Biconditional, and is motivated by the thought that if you are willing to assume or outright assert that φ, you will assert that φ is true - and also vice versa. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 02.2) | |
A reaction: Very helpful! Most people are just bewildered by the Tarski bi-conditional ('"Snow is white"...), but this formulation nicely shows its minimal character while showing that it really does say something. It says what truths and truth-claims commit you to. |
15345 | Semantic theories have a regress problem in describing truth in the languages for the models [Horsten] |
Full Idea: Semantic theories give a class of models with a truth predicate, ...but Tarski taught us that this needs a more encompassing framework than its language...so how is the semantics of the framework expressed? The model route has a regress. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 02.3) | |
A reaction: [compressed] So this regress problem, of endless theories of truth going up the hierarchy, is Horsten's main reason for opting for axiomatic theories, which he then tries to strengthen, so that they are not quite so deflated. |
15332 | 'Reflexive' truth theories allow iterations (it is T that it is T that p) [Horsten] |
Full Idea: A theory of truth is 'reflexive' if it allows us to prove truth-iterations ("It is true that it is true that so-and-so"). | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 01.4) |
15346 | Axiomatic approaches to truth avoid the regress problem of semantic theories [Horsten] |
Full Idea: The axiomatic approach to truth does not suffer from the regress problem. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 02.3) | |
A reaction: See Idea 15345 for the regress problem. The difficulty then seems to be that axiomatic approaches lack expressive power, so the hunt is on for a set of axioms which will do a decent job. Fun work, if you can cope with it. |
15361 | A good theory of truth must be compositional (as well as deriving biconditionals) [Horsten] |
Full Idea: Deriving many Tarski-biconditionals is not a sufficient condition for being a good theory of truth. A good theory of truth must in addition do justice to the compositional nature of truth. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 06.1) |
15371 | An axiomatic theory needs to be of maximal strength, while being natural and sound [Horsten] |
Full Idea: The challenge is to find the arithmetically strongest axiomatical truth theory that is both natural and truth-theoretically sound. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 07.7) |
15350 | The Naďve Theory takes the bi-conditionals as axioms, but it is inconsistent, and allows the Liar [Horsten] |
Full Idea: The Naďve Theory of Truth collects all the Tarski bi-conditionals of a language and takes them as axioms. But no consistent theory extending Peano arithmetic can prove all of them. It is inconsistent, and even formalises the liar paradox. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 03.5.2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This looks to me like the account of truth that Davidson was working with, since he just seemed to be compiling bi-conditionals for tricky cases. (Wrong! He championed the Compositional Theory, Horsten p.71) |
15351 | Axiomatic theories take truth as primitive, and propose some laws of truth as axioms [Horsten] |
Full Idea: In the axiomatic approach we take the truth predicate to express an irreducible, primitive notion. The meaning of the truth predicate is partially explicated by proposing certain laws of truth as basic principles, as axioms. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 04.2) | |
A reaction: Judging by Horsten's book, this is a rather fruitful line of enquiry, but it still seems like a bit of a defeat to take truth as 'primitive'. Presumably you could add some vague notion of correspondence as the background picture. |
15367 | By adding truth to Peano Arithmetic we increase its power, so truth has mathematical content! [Horsten] |
Full Idea: It is surprising that just by adding to Peano Arithmetic principles concerning the notion of truth, we increase the mathematical strength of PA. So, contrary to expectations, the 'philosophical' notion of truth has real mathematical content. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 06.4) | |
A reaction: Horsten invites us to be really boggled by this. All of this is in the Compositional Theory TC. It enables a proof of the consistency of arithmetic (but still won't escape Gödel's Second). |
15373 | Axiomatic approaches avoid limiting definitions to avoid the truth predicate, and limited sizes of models [Horsten] |
Full Idea: An adequate definition of truth can only be given for the fragment of our language that does not contain the truth predicate. A model can never encompass the whole of the domain of discourse of our language. The axiomatic approach avoids these problems. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 10.1) |
15330 | Friedman-Sheard theory keeps classical logic and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
Full Idea: The Friedman-Sheard theory of truth holds onto classical logic and tries to construct a theory that is as strong as possible. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 01.4) |
15331 | Kripke-Feferman has truth gaps, instead of classical logic, and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
Full Idea: If we abandon classical logic in favour of truth-value gaps and try to strengthen the theory, this leads to the Kripke-Feferman theory of truth, and variants of it. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 01.4) |
15325 | Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept [Horsten] |
Full Idea: According to 'inferential deflationism', truth is a concept without a nature or an essence. This is betrayed by the fact that there are no unrestricted logical laws that govern the concept of truth. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 01.1) |
15356 | Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws [Horsten] |
Full Idea: Deflationism is not a theory of the laws of truth. It is a view on the nature and role of the concept of truth. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 05 Intro) |
15344 | Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth [Horsten] |
Full Idea: Contemporary deflationism about truth does not attempt to define truth, and does not rely on models containing the truth predicate. Instead they are interpretations of axiomatic theories of truth, containing only basic laws of truth. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 02.3) |
15368 | This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference [Horsten] |
Full Idea: On the conception of deflationism developed in this book, the prime positive role of the truth predicate is to serve as a device for expressing generalities, and an inferential tool. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 07.5) |
15358 | Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true [Horsten] |
Full Idea: Deflationism says the theory of truth does not have a substantial domain of its own. The domain of the theory of truth consists of the bearers of truth. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 05.1) | |
A reaction: The immediate thought is that truth also concerns falsehoods, which would be inexplicable without it. If physics just concerns the physical, does that mean that physics lacks its own 'domain'? Generalising about the truths is a topic. |
15359 | Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property [Horsten] |
Full Idea: The Deflationary view just says that instead of asserting a sentence, we can turn the sentence into an object and assert that this object has the property of truth. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 05.2.2) | |
A reaction: That seems to leave a big question hanging, which concerns the nature of the property that is being attributed to this object. Quine 1970:10-13 says it is just a 'device'. Surely you can rest content with that as an account of truth? |
15329 | Nonclassical may accept T/F but deny applicability, or it may deny just T or F as well [Horsten] |
Full Idea: Some nonclassical logic stays close to classical, assuming two mutually exclusive truth values T and F, but some sentences fail to have one. Others have further truth values such as 'half truth', or dialethists allow some T and F at the same time. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 01.2) | |
A reaction: I take that to say that the first lot accept bivalence but reject excluded middle (allowing 'truth value gaps'), while the second lot reject both. Bivalence gives the values available, and excluded middle says what has them. |
13282 | Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle proposes to relativise unity and plurality, so that a single object can be both one (indivisible) and many (divisible) simultaneously, without contradiction, relative to different measures. Wholeness has degrees, with the strength of the unity. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.12 | |
A reaction: [see Koslicki's account of Aristotle for details] As always, the Aristotelian approach looks by far the most promising. Simplistic mechanical accounts of how parts make wholes aren't going to work. We must include the conventional and conceptual bit. |
9463 | Classical logic is bivalent, has excluded middle, and only quantifies over existent objects [Jacquette] |
Full Idea: Classical logic (of Whitehead, Russell, Gödel, Church) is a two-valued system of propositional and predicate logic, in which all propositions are exclusively true or false, and quantification and predication are over existent objects only. | |
From: Dale Jacquette (Intro to I: Classical Logic [2002], p.9) | |
A reaction: All of these get challenged at some point, though the existence requirement is the one I find dubious. |
15326 | Doubt is thrown on classical logic by the way it so easily produces the liar paradox [Horsten] |
Full Idea: Aside from logic, so little is needed to generate the liar paradox that one wonders whether the laws of classical logic are unrestrictedly valid after all. (Many theories of truth have therefore been formulated in nonclassical logic.) | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 01.2) | |
A reaction: Kripke uses Strong Kleene logic for his theory. The implication is that debates discussed by Horsten actually have the status of classical logic at stake, as well as the nature of truth. |
15341 | Deduction Theorem: ψ only derivable from φ iff φ→ψ are axioms [Horsten] |
Full Idea: The Deduction Theorem says ψ is derivable in classical predicate logic from ψ iff the sentence φ→ψ is a theorem of classical logic. Hence inferring φ to ψ is truth-preserving iff the axiom scheme φ→ψ is provable. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 02.2) | |
A reaction: Horsten offers this to show that the Tarski bi-conditionals can themselves be justified, and not just the rule of inference involved. Apparently you can only derive something if you first announce that you have the ability to derive it. Odd. |
4730 | For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Aristotle apparently believed that the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected the substance-accident nature of reality. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.4 | |
A reaction: We need not assume that Aristotle is wrong. It is a chicken-and-egg. There is something obvious about subject-predicate language, if one assumes that unified objects are part of nature, and not just conventional. |
15328 | A theory is 'non-conservative' if it facilitates new mathematical proofs [Horsten] |
Full Idea: A theory is 'non-conservative' if it allows us to prove mathematical facts that go beyond what the background mathematical theory can prove on its own. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 01.4) | |
A reaction: This is an instance of the relationship with mathematics being used as the test case for explorations of logic. It is a standard research method, because it is so precise, but should not be mistaken for the last word about a theory. |
15349 | It is easier to imagine truth-value gaps (for the Liar, say) than for truth-value gluts (both T and F) [Horsten] |
Full Idea: It is easier to imagine what it is like for a sentence to lack a truth value than what it is like for a sentence to be both truth and false. So I am grudgingly willing to entertain the possibility that certain sentences (like the Liar) lack a truth value. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 02.5) | |
A reaction: Fans of truth value gluts are dialethists like Graham Priest. I'm with Horsten on this one. But in what way can a sentence be meaningful if it lacks a truth-value? He mentions unfulfilled presuppositions and indicative conditionals as gappy. |
15366 | Satisfaction is a primitive notion, and very liable to semantical paradoxes [Horsten] |
Full Idea: Satisfaction is a more primitive notion than truth, and it is even more susceptible to semantical paradoxes than the truth predicate. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 06.3) | |
A reaction: The Liar is the best known paradox here. Tarski bases his account of truth on this primitive notion, so Horsten is pointing out the difficulties. |
15353 | The first incompleteness theorem means that consistency does not entail soundness [Horsten] |
Full Idea: It is a lesson of the first incompleteness theorem that consistency does not entail soundness. If we add the negation of the gödel sentence for PA as an extra axiom to PA, the result is consistent. This negation is false, so the theory is unsound. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 04.3) |
15355 | Strengthened Liar: 'this sentence is not true in any context' - in no context can this be evaluated [Horsten] |
Full Idea: The Strengthened Liar sentence says 'this sentence is not true in any context'. It is not hard to figure out that there is no context in which the sentence can be coherently evaluated. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 04.6) |
15364 | English expressions are denumerably infinite, but reals are nondenumerable, so many are unnameable [Horsten] |
Full Idea: The number of English expressions is denumerably infinite. But Cantor's theorem can be used to show that there are nondenumerably many real numbers. So not every real number has a (simple or complex name in English). | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 06.3) | |
A reaction: This really bothers me. Are we supposed to be committed to the existence of entities which are beyond our powers of naming? How precise must naming be? If I say 'pick a random real number', might that potentially name all of them? |
15360 | ZFC showed that the concept of set is mathematical, not logical, because of its existence claims [Horsten] |
Full Idea: One of the strengths of ZFC is that it shows that the concept of set is a mathematical concept. Many originally took it to be a logical concept. But ZFC makes mind-boggling existence claims, which should not follow if it was a logical concept. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 05.2.3) | |
A reaction: This suggests that set theory is not just a way of expressing mathematics (see Benacerraf 1965), but that some aspect of mathematics has been revealed by it - maybe even its essential nature. |
15369 | Set theory is substantial over first-order arithmetic, because it enables new proofs [Horsten] |
Full Idea: The nonconservativeness of set theory over first-order arithmetic has done much to establish set theory as a substantial theory indeed. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 07.5) | |
A reaction: Horsten goes on to point out the price paid, which is the whole new ontology which has to be added to the arithmetic. Who cares? It's all fictions anyway! |
15370 | Predicativism says mathematical definitions must not include the thing being defined [Horsten] |
Full Idea: Predicativism has it that a mathematical object (such as a set of numbers) cannot be defined by quantifying over a collection that includes that same mathematical object. To do so would be a violation of the vicious circle principle. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 07.7) | |
A reaction: In other words, when you define an object you are obliged to predicate something new, and not just recycle the stuff you already have. |
15338 | We may believe in atomic facts, but surely not complex disjunctive ones? [Horsten] |
Full Idea: While positive and perhaps even negative atomic facts may be unproblematic, it seems excessive to commit oneself to the existence of logically complex facts such as disjunctive facts. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 02.1) | |
A reaction: Presumably it is hard to deny that very complex statements involving massive disjunctions can be true or false. But why does commitment to real facts have to involve a huge ontology? The ontology is just the ingredients of the fact, isn't it? |
15363 | In the supervaluationist account, disjunctions are not determined by their disjuncts [Horsten] |
Full Idea: If 'Britain is large' and 'Italy is large' lack truth values, then so must 'Britain or Italy is large' - so on the supervaluationist account the truth value of a disjunction is not determined by the truth values of its disjuncts. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 06.2) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 15362 to get the full picture here. |
15362 | If 'Italy is large' lacks truth, so must 'Italy is not large'; but classical logic says it's large or it isn't [Horsten] |
Full Idea: If 'Italy is a large country' lacks a truth value, then so too, presumably, does 'Italy is not a large country'. But 'Italy is or is not a large country' is true, on the supervaluationist account, because it is a truth of classical propositional logic. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 06.2) | |
A reaction: See also Idea 15363. He cites Fine 1975. |
13276 | The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's discussion of the unmoved mover and of the soul confirms the suspicion that form, when it is not thought of as the object represented in a definition, plays the role of the ultimate mereological atom within his system. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 6.6 | |
A reaction: Aristotle is concerned with which things are 'divisible', and he cites these two examples as indivisible, but they may be too unusual to offer an actual theory of how Aristotle builds up wholes from atoms. He denies atoms in matter. |
13277 | The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Thus in Aristotle we may think of an object's formal components as a sort of recipe for how to build wholes of that particular kind. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.5 | |
A reaction: In the elusive business of pinning down what Aristotle means by the crucial idea of 'form', this analogy strikes me as being quite illuminating. It would fit DNA in living things, and the design of an artifact. |
5991 | For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code] |
Full Idea: Aristotle thinks that in general we have knowledge or understanding when we grasp causes, and he distinguishes three fundamental types of knowledge - theoretical, practical and productive. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Alan D. Code - Aristotle | |
A reaction: Productive knowledge we tend to label as 'knowing how'. The centrality of causes for knowledge would get Aristotle nowadays labelled as a 'naturalist'. It is hard to disagree with his three types, though they may overlap. |
15372 | Some claim that indicative conditionals are believed by people, even though they are not actually held true [Horsten] |
Full Idea: In the debate about doxastic attitudes towards indicative conditional sentences, one finds philosophers who claim that conditionals can be believed even though they have no truth value (and thus are not true). | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 09.3) |
11239 | The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of a priori truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11240. |
23312 | Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is a rationalist …but reason for him is a disposition which we only acquire over time. Its acquisition is made possible primarily by perception and experience. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Rationalism p.173 | |
A reaction: I would describe this process as the gradual acquisition of the skill of objectivity, which needs the right knowledge and concepts to evaluate new experiences. |
16111 | Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Since Aristotle generally prefers a metaphysical theory that accords with common intuitions, he frequently relies on facts about language to guide his metaphysical claims. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.5 | |
A reaction: I approve of his procedure. I take intuition to be largely rational justifications too complex for us to enunciate fully, and language embodies folk intuitions in its concepts (especially if the concepts occur in many languages). |
16971 | Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik] |
Full Idea: Plato's unity of science principle states that all - legitimate - sciences are ultimately about the Forms. Aristotle's principle states that all sciences must be, ultimately, about substances, or aspects of substances. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], 1) by Julius Moravcsik - Aristotle on Adequate Explanations 1 |
11243 | Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle things which explain (the explanantia) are facts, which should not be associated with the modern view that says explanations are dependent on how we conceive and describe the world (where causes are independent of us). | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.1 | |
A reaction: There must be some room in modern thought for the Aristotelian view, if some sort of robust scientific realism is being maintained against the highly linguistic view of philosophy found in the twentieth century. |
3320 | Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: The standard Aristotelian doctrine of species and genus in the theory of anything whatever involves specifying what the thing is in terms of something more general. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.10 |
12000 | Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung] |
Full Idea: The view that essential properties are those in virtue of which other significant properties of the subjects under investigation can be explained is encountered repeatedly in Aristotle's work. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation IV | |
A reaction: What does 'significant' mean here? I take it that the significant properties are the ones which explain the role, function and powers of the object. |
23300 | Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
Full Idea: Aristotle, and also the Stoics, denied rationality to animals. …The Platonists, the Pythagoreans, and some more independent Aristotelians, did grant reason and intellect to animals. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Denial' | |
A reaction: This is not the same as affirming or denying their consciousness. The debate depends on how rationality is conceived. |
15347 | A theory of syntax can be based on Peano arithmetic, thanks to the translation by Gödel coding [Horsten] |
Full Idea: A notion of formal provability can be articulated in Peano arithmetic. ..This is surprisingly 'linguistic' rather than mathematical, but the key is in the Gödel coding. ..Hence we use Peano arithmetic as a theory of syntax. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 02.4) | |
A reaction: This is the explanation of why issues in formal semantics end up being studied in systems based on formal arithmetic. And I had thought it was just because they were geeks who dream in numbers, and can't speak language properly... |
11240 | The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of analytic truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11239. |
6559 | Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge (and somewhat to my surprise), Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal; however, he all but says it. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1 | |
A reaction: When I read this I thought that this database would prove Fogelin wrong, but it actually supports him, as I can't find it in Aristotle either. Descartes refers to it in Med.Two. In Idea 5133 Aristotle does say that man is a 'social being'. But 22586! |
11150 | It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it. | |
From: Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) | |
A reaction: The epigraph on a David Chalmers website. A wonderful remark, and it should be on the wall of every beginners' philosophy class. However, while it is in the spirit of Aristotle, it appears to be a misattribution with no ancient provenance. |
3037 | Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Aristotle was asked how much educated men were superior to those uneducated; "As much," he said, "as the living are to the dead." | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 05.1.11 |
8660 | There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Aristotle developed his own distinction between potential infinity (never running out) and actual infinity (there being a collection of an actual infinite number of things, such as places, times, objects). He decided that actual infinity was incoherent. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 1.3 | |
A reaction: Friend argues, plausibly, that this won't do, since potential infinity doesn't make much sense if there is not an actual infinity of things to supply the demand. It seems to just illustrate how boggling and uncongenial infinity was to Aristotle. |
12058 | Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's conception of matter permits any kind of matter to become any other kind of matter. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Wiggins - Substance 4.11.2 | |
A reaction: This is obviously crucial background information when we read Aristotle on matter. Our 92+ elements, and fixed fundamental particles, gives a quite different picture. Aristotle would discuss form and matter quite differently now. |
22729 | The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Aristotle said that the conception of gods arose among mankind from two originating causes, namely from events which concern the soul and from celestial phenomena. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], Frag 10) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Physicists (two books) I.20 | |
A reaction: The cosmos suggests order, and possible creation. What do events of the soul suggest? It doesn't seem to be its non-physical nature, because Aristotle is more of a functionalist. Puzzling. (It says later that gods are like the soul). |