4 ideas
| 22518 | The actual must be possible, because it occurred [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Actual events are evidently possible, otherwise they would not have occurred. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Poetics [c.347 BCE], 1451b18) | |
| A reaction: [quoted online by Peter Adamson] Seems like common sense, but it's important to have Aristotle assert it. |
| 7331 | A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic [Davidson, by Macey] |
| Full Idea: For a theory of meaning for a fragment of natural language, what Davidson requires, in effect, is that the sentences be translatable into the language of Frege's symbolic logic. | |
| From: report of Donald Davidson (In Defence of Convention T [1973]) by David Macey - Penguin Dictionary of Critical Theory | |
| A reaction: This assumes the adequacy of Fregean logic, which seems unlikely. Is this the culmination of Leibniz's dream of a fully logical language - so that anything that won't fit into our logical form is ruled (logical positivist style) as meaningless? |
| 16566 | Poetry is more philosophic than history, as it concerns universals, not particulars [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are rather of universals, whereas those of history are singulars. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Poetics [c.347 BCE], 1451b05) | |
| A reaction: Hm. Characters in great novels achieve universality by being representated very particularly. Great depth of mind seems required to be a poet, but less so for a historian (though there is, I presume, no upward limit on the possible level of thought). |
| 22908 | When one element contains the grounds of the other, the first one is prior in time [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: When one of two non-contemporaneous elements contains the grounds for the other, the former is regarded as the antecedent, and the latter as the consequence | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics [1715], p.201) | |
| A reaction: Bardon cites this passage of Leibniz as the origin of the idea that time's arrow is explained by the direction of causation. Bardon prefers it to the psychological and entropy accounts. |