51 ideas
19693 | There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb] |
Full Idea: Aristotle takes wisdom to come in two forms, the practical and the theoretical, the former of which is good judgement about how to act, and the latter of which is deep knowledge or understanding. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Dennis Whitcomb - Wisdom Intro | |
A reaction: The interesting question is then whether the two are connected. One might be thoroughly 'sensible' about action, without counting as 'wise', which seems to require a broader view of what is being done. Whitcomb endorses Aristotle on this idea. |
22115 | Wise people should contemplate and discuss the truth, and fight against falsehood [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The role of the wise person is to meditate on the truth, especially the truth regarding the first principle, and to discuss it with others, but also to fight against the falsity that is its contrary. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Contra Gentiles [1268], I.1.6), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 14 | |
A reaction: So nice to hear someone (from no matter how long ago) saying that wisdom is concerned with truth. If you lose your grip on truth (which many thinkers seem to have done) you must also abandon wisdom. Then fools rule. |
11147 | Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: Philosophers who oppose conceptual analysis identify their approach as being 'naturalistic'. Philosophy is supposed to be continuous with science, and philosophical theories are to be defended on explanatory grounds, not by a priori intuitions. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 5.2) | |
A reaction: [They cite Papineau 1993, Devitt 1996 aand Kornblith 2002] I think there is a happy compromise here. I agree that any philosophical knowledge should be continuous with science, but we shouldn't prejudge how the analytic branch of science is done. |
1575 | For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle logos is the ability to speak rationally about, with the hope of attaining knowledge, questions of value. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.26 |
1589 | Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is the great theoretician who articulates a vision of a world in which natural and stable structures can be rationally discovered. His is the most optimistic and richest view of the possibilities of logos | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.95 |
8200 | Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine] |
Full Idea: A real definition, according to the Aristotelian tradition, gives the essence of the kind of thing defined. Man is defined as a rational animal, and thus rationality and animality are of the essence of each of us. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Willard Quine - Vagaries of Definition p.51 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 4385. Personally I prefer the Aristotelian approach, but we may have to say 'We cannot identify the essence of x, and so x cannot be defined'. Compare 'his mood was hard to define' with 'his mood was hostile'. |
4385 | Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, to give a definition one must first state the genus and then the differentia of the kind of thing to be defined. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.157 | |
A reaction: Presumably a modern definition would just be a list of properties, but Aristotle seeks the substance. How does he define a genus? - by placing it in a further genus? |
13282 | Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle proposes to relativise unity and plurality, so that a single object can be both one (indivisible) and many (divisible) simultaneously, without contradiction, relative to different measures. Wholeness has degrees, with the strength of the unity. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.12 | |
A reaction: [see Koslicki's account of Aristotle for details] As always, the Aristotelian approach looks by far the most promising. Simplistic mechanical accounts of how parts make wholes aren't going to work. We must include the conventional and conceptual bit. |
4730 | For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Aristotle apparently believed that the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected the substance-accident nature of reality. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.4 | |
A reaction: We need not assume that Aristotle is wrong. It is a chicken-and-egg. There is something obvious about subject-predicate language, if one assumes that unified objects are part of nature, and not just conventional. |
13276 | The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's discussion of the unmoved mover and of the soul confirms the suspicion that form, when it is not thought of as the object represented in a definition, plays the role of the ultimate mereological atom within his system. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 6.6 | |
A reaction: Aristotle is concerned with which things are 'divisible', and he cites these two examples as indivisible, but they may be too unusual to offer an actual theory of how Aristotle builds up wholes from atoms. He denies atoms in matter. |
13277 | The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Thus in Aristotle we may think of an object's formal components as a sort of recipe for how to build wholes of that particular kind. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.5 | |
A reaction: In the elusive business of pinning down what Aristotle means by the crucial idea of 'form', this analogy strikes me as being quite illuminating. It would fit DNA in living things, and the design of an artifact. |
5991 | For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code] |
Full Idea: Aristotle thinks that in general we have knowledge or understanding when we grasp causes, and he distinguishes three fundamental types of knowledge - theoretical, practical and productive. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Alan D. Code - Aristotle | |
A reaction: Productive knowledge we tend to label as 'knowing how'. The centrality of causes for knowledge would get Aristotle nowadays labelled as a 'naturalist'. It is hard to disagree with his three types, though they may overlap. |
11239 | The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of a priori truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11240. |
23312 | Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is a rationalist …but reason for him is a disposition which we only acquire over time. Its acquisition is made possible primarily by perception and experience. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Rationalism p.173 | |
A reaction: I would describe this process as the gradual acquisition of the skill of objectivity, which needs the right knowledge and concepts to evaluate new experiences. |
11141 | Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: A growing number of philosophers are attracted to modified forms of empiricism, emphasizing psychological relations between the conceptual system and perceptual and motor states, not semantic relations. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 3.2) | |
A reaction: I suddenly spot that this is what I have been drifting towards for some time! The focus is concept formation, where the philosophers need to join forces with the cognitive scientists. |
16111 | Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Since Aristotle generally prefers a metaphysical theory that accords with common intuitions, he frequently relies on facts about language to guide his metaphysical claims. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.5 | |
A reaction: I approve of his procedure. I take intuition to be largely rational justifications too complex for us to enunciate fully, and language embodies folk intuitions in its concepts (especially if the concepts occur in many languages). |
16971 | Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik] |
Full Idea: Plato's unity of science principle states that all - legitimate - sciences are ultimately about the Forms. Aristotle's principle states that all sciences must be, ultimately, about substances, or aspects of substances. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], 1) by Julius Moravcsik - Aristotle on Adequate Explanations 1 |
11243 | Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle things which explain (the explanantia) are facts, which should not be associated with the modern view that says explanations are dependent on how we conceive and describe the world (where causes are independent of us). | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.1 | |
A reaction: There must be some room in modern thought for the Aristotelian view, if some sort of robust scientific realism is being maintained against the highly linguistic view of philosophy found in the twentieth century. |
3320 | Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: The standard Aristotelian doctrine of species and genus in the theory of anything whatever involves specifying what the thing is in terms of something more general. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.10 |
12000 | Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung] |
Full Idea: The view that essential properties are those in virtue of which other significant properties of the subjects under investigation can be explained is encountered repeatedly in Aristotle's work. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation IV | |
A reaction: What does 'significant' mean here? I take it that the significant properties are the ones which explain the role, function and powers of the object. |
20700 | Without God's influence every operation would stop, so God causes everything [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: If God's divine influence stopped, every operation would stop. Every operation, therefore, of everything is traced back to him as cause. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Contra Gentiles [1268], III.67), quoted by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 3 'Freedom' | |
A reaction: If the systematic interraction of mind and body counts as an 'operation', then this seems to imply Occasionalism. |
11142 | Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: It is claimed, on the basis of empirical research, that the type of body that an organism has profoundly affects it cognitive operations and the way it conceptualises the world. We can't assume that human minds could inhere in wildly different body types. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 3.2) | |
A reaction: Sounds interesting. They cite Lawrence Shapiro 2004. It needs a large effort of imagination to think how a snake or whale or albatross might conceptualise the world, in relation to their bodies. |
23300 | Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
Full Idea: Aristotle, and also the Stoics, denied rationality to animals. …The Platonists, the Pythagoreans, and some more independent Aristotelians, did grant reason and intellect to animals. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Denial' | |
A reaction: This is not the same as affirming or denying their consciousness. The debate depends on how rationality is conceived. |
11121 | Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The language of thought is taken to have subject/predicate form and include logical devices, such as quantifiers and variables. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 1.1) |
11120 | Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The three main options for the ontological status of concepts are to identify them with mental representations, or with abilities, or with Fregean senses. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 1) |
11122 | A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: It may be possible to have propositional attitudes without having the mental representations tokened in one's head. ...We may say a chess-playing computer thinks it should develop its queen early, though we know it has no representation with that content. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [Thye cite Dennett - who talks of the 'intentional stance'] It is, of course, a moot point whether we would attribute a propositional attitude (such as belief) to a machine once we knew that it wasn't representing the relevant concepts. |
11124 | Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: A standard criticism is that the mental representation view of concepts creates just another item whose significance bears explaining. Either we have a vicious regress, or we might as well explain external language directly. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 1.2) | |
A reaction: [They cite Dummett, with Wittgenstein in the background] I don't agree, because I think that explanation of concepts only stops when it dovetails into biology. |
11123 | Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The view that concepts are abilities (e.g. found in Brandom, Dummett and Millikan) would say that the concept CAT amounts to the ability to discriminate cats from non-cats and to draw certain inferences about cats. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 1.2) | |
A reaction: Feels wrong. The concept is what makes these abilities possible, but it seems rather behaviourist to identify the concept with what is enabled by the concept. You might understand 'cat', but fail to recognise your first cat (though you might suspect it). |
11125 | The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The abilities view of concepts, by its rejection of mental representation, is ill-equipped to explain the productivity of thought; and it can say little about mental processes. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 1.2) | |
A reaction: The latter point arises from its behaviouristic character, which just gives us a black box with some output of abilities. In avoiding a possible regress, it offers no explanation at all. |
11140 | Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The structures of concepts are invoked to explain typicality effects, reflective categorization, cognitive development, reference determination, and compositionality. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.5) |
11128 | Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The classical theory is that a concept has a definitional structure in that it is composed of simpler concepts that express necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under the concept, the stock example being unmarried and a man for 'bachelor'. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.1) | |
A reaction: This is the background idea to philosophy as analysis, and it makes concepts essentially referential, in that they are defined by their ability to pick things out. There must be some degree of truth in the theory. |
11130 | Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The classical view is challenged by the discovery that certain categories are taken to be more typical, with typicality widely correlating with other data. Apples are judged to be more typical of (and have more common features with) fruit than plums are. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.1) | |
A reaction: This discovery that people use prototypes in thinking has been the biggest idea to ever hit the philosophy of concepts, and simply cannot be ignored (as long as the research keeps reinforcing it, which I believe it does). The classical view might adapt. |
11129 | The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The appeal of the classical theory of concepts is that it offers unified treatments of concept acquisition (assembling constituents), categorization (check constituents against target), and reference determination (whether they apply). | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.1) | |
A reaction: [See Idea 11128 for the theory] As so often, I find myself in sympathy with the traditional view which has been relegated to ignominy by our wonderful modern philosophers. |
11131 | It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: In the light of problems such as the definition of knowledge, many philosophers now take seriously the possibility that our concepts lack definitional structure. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.1) | |
A reaction: This challenges the classical view, that there are precise conditions for each concept. That view would obviously be in difficulties with atomic concepts, so our account of those might be applied all the way up. |
11132 | The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: In the prototype theory of concepts, a lexical concept has probabilistic structure in that something falls under it if it satisfies a sufficient number of properties encoded by the constituents. It originates in Wittgenstein's 'family resemblance'. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.2) | |
A reaction: It would seem unlikely to be a matter of the 'number' of properties, and would have to involve some notion of what was essential to the prototype. |
11133 | Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: On the prototype theory, categorization is to be understood as a similarity comparison process, where similarity is computed as a function of the number of constituents that two concepts hold in common. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.2) | |
A reaction: Again it strikes me that 'computing' similarity by mere 'number' of shared constituents won't do, as there is a prior judgement about which constituents really matter, or are essential. That may even be hard-wired. |
11134 | People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: When it comes to more reflexive judgements, people go beyond the outcome of a similarity comparison. Even children say that a dog surgically altered to look like a raccoon is still a dog. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.2) | |
A reaction: We can defend the theory by not underestimating people so much. Most categorisation is done on superficial grounds, but even children know there may be hidden similarities (behind the mask, under the bonnet) which are more important. |
11135 | Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: An objection to the prototype view concerns compositionality. A complex concept often has emergent properties, as when it seems that 'pet fish' encodes for brightly coloured, which has no basis in the prototypes for 'pet' or 'fish'. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.2) | |
A reaction: I would take 'pet fish' to work like a database query. 'Fish' has a very vague prototype, and then 'pet fish' narrows the search to fish which are appropriate to be pets. We might say that the prototype is refined, or the Mk 2 prototype appears. |
11136 | Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: Many patently complex concepts don't even have a prototype structure, such as 'Chairs that were purchased on a Wednesday'. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.2) | |
A reaction: [The example seems to be from Fodor] I disagree. If we accept the notion of 'refining' the prototype (see Idea 11135), then the compositionality of the expression will produce a genuine but very unusual prototype. |
11138 | The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: A problem with the theory theory of concepts is that it is holistic, saying a concept is determined by its role, not by its constituents. It then seems difficult for different people to possess the same concepts (or even the same person, over time). | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.3) | |
A reaction: This seems a good objection to any holistic account of concepts or meaning - spotted by Plato in motivating his theory of Forms, to give the necessary stability to communication. |
11137 | The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The theory theory of concepts says that terms are related as in a scientific theory, and that categorization resembles theorising. It is generally assumed that scientific terms are interdefined so that content is determined by its role in the theory. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.3) | |
A reaction: I never like this sort of account. What are the characteristics of the thing which enable it to fulfil its role? You haven't defined a car when you've said it gets you from A to B. |
11139 | Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: According to conceptual atomism, lexical concepts have no semantic structure, and the content of a concept isn't determined by its relation to other concepts but by its relations to the world. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.4) | |
A reaction: [They cite Fodor 1998 and Millikan 2000] I like the sound of that, because I take the creation of concepts to be (in the first instance) a response to the world, not a response to other concepts. |
11146 | People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: People seem to be able to formulate novel concepts which are left to be named later; the concept comes first, the name second. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 4.2) | |
A reaction: [This seems to have empirical support, and he cites Pinker 1994] I do not find this remotely surprising, since I presume that human concepts are a continuous kind with animal concepts, including non-conscious concepts (why not?). |
11240 | The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of analytic truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11239. |
6559 | Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge (and somewhat to my surprise), Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal; however, he all but says it. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1 | |
A reaction: When I read this I thought that this database would prove Fogelin wrong, but it actually supports him, as I can't find it in Aristotle either. Descartes refers to it in Med.Two. In Idea 5133 Aristotle does say that man is a 'social being'. But 22586! |
11150 | It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it. | |
From: Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) | |
A reaction: The epigraph on a David Chalmers website. A wonderful remark, and it should be on the wall of every beginners' philosophy class. However, while it is in the spirit of Aristotle, it appears to be a misattribution with no ancient provenance. |
3037 | Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Aristotle was asked how much educated men were superior to those uneducated; "As much," he said, "as the living are to the dead." | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 05.1.11 |
8660 | There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Aristotle developed his own distinction between potential infinity (never running out) and actual infinity (there being a collection of an actual infinite number of things, such as places, times, objects). He decided that actual infinity was incoherent. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 1.3 | |
A reaction: Friend argues, plausibly, that this won't do, since potential infinity doesn't make much sense if there is not an actual infinity of things to supply the demand. It seems to just illustrate how boggling and uncongenial infinity was to Aristotle. |
12058 | Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's conception of matter permits any kind of matter to become any other kind of matter. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Wiggins - Substance 4.11.2 | |
A reaction: This is obviously crucial background information when we read Aristotle on matter. Our 92+ elements, and fixed fundamental particles, gives a quite different picture. Aristotle would discuss form and matter quite differently now. |
15202 | Eternity coexists with passing time, as the centre of a circle coexists with its circumference [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The centre of a circle is directly opposite any designated point on the circumference. In this way, whatever is in any part of time coexists with what is eternal as being present to it even though past or future with respect to another part of time. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Contra Gentiles [1268], I.66), quoted by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 2 c | |
A reaction: A nice example of a really cool analogy which almost gets you to accept something which is actually completely incomprehensible. |
22729 | The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Aristotle said that the conception of gods arose among mankind from two originating causes, namely from events which concern the soul and from celestial phenomena. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], Frag 10) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Physicists (two books) I.20 | |
A reaction: The cosmos suggests order, and possible creation. What do events of the soul suggest? It doesn't seem to be its non-physical nature, because Aristotle is more of a functionalist. Puzzling. (It says later that gods are like the soul). |