119 ideas
19693 | There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb] |
Full Idea: Aristotle takes wisdom to come in two forms, the practical and the theoretical, the former of which is good judgement about how to act, and the latter of which is deep knowledge or understanding. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Dennis Whitcomb - Wisdom Intro | |
A reaction: The interesting question is then whether the two are connected. One might be thoroughly 'sensible' about action, without counting as 'wise', which seems to require a broader view of what is being done. Whitcomb endorses Aristotle on this idea. |
2930 | The main aim of philosophy must be to determine the order of rank among values [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The future task of the philosophers is the solution of the problem of value, the determination of the order of rank among values. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§17 note) | |
A reaction: 'Determine' is presumably either a power struggle, or needs criteria by which to do the judging. |
9414 | Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities [Lowe, by Mumford] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics can be judged as the mapping of possibilities. | |
From: report of E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1) by Stephen Mumford - Laws in Nature 2.2 |
16414 | Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions [Lowe, by Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Lowe argues that the sciences need metaphysics to discharge the assumptions that they simply made at the outset. | |
From: report of E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998]) by Thomas Hofweber - Ambitious, yet modest, Metaphysics 1.2 | |
A reaction: Hofweber doesn't buy this, and neither do I. I don't think science 'needs' metaphysics (or barely needs it), but I do think metaphysics needs a fair degree of science. It is high-level abstraction based on the facts. |
8282 | Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Only metaphysics can vindicate a judgement that a caterpillar survives to become a butterfly, but a pig does not survive to become pork, or that water survives as ice, but that paper does not survive as ash. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 8.2) | |
A reaction: The works of Lowe, and other modern heroes, have shown that these real questions can be pursued intensively into areas where no scientist, or even theologian, would dare to tread. |
16127 | Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is [Lowe] |
Full Idea: I do not claim that metaphysics on its own can, in general, tell us what there is. Rather - to a first approximation - I hold that metaphysics by itself only tells us what there could be. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1.3) | |
A reaction: If there is going to be a modern defence of metaphysics, in an age dominated by empirical science, this sounds pretty good to me. Presumably it also says what there couldn't be. The challenge is to offer authority for any claims made. |
20143 | Scientific knowledge is nothing without a prior philosophical 'faith' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Strictly speaking there is no knowledge [science] without presuppositions; a philosophy, a 'faith', must always be there first of all, for knowledge to win from it a direction, a meaning, a limit, a method, a right to exist. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], III.§24) | |
A reaction: He sees philosophers as the creators of this faith, and laughs at anyone who tries to set philosophy on a scientific basis. |
1575 | For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle logos is the ability to speak rationally about, with the hope of attaining knowledge, questions of value. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.26 |
1589 | Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is the great theoretician who articulates a vision of a world in which natural and stable structures can be rationally discovered. His is the most optimistic and richest view of the possibilities of logos | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.95 |
23722 | Objectivity is not disinterestedness (impossible), but the ability to switch perspectives [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: 'Objectivity' should be understood not as 'contemplation without interest' (a non-concept and an absurdity), but as having in our power the ability to engage and disengage our 'pros' and 'cons'; we can use the difference in perspectives for knowledge. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], III.§12) | |
A reaction: Note that he will use perspectives to achieve knowledge. The idea that Perspectivalism is mere relativism is labelled as 'extreme' in Idea 4486. He is right that objectivity is a mental capacity and achievement of individuals. |
4417 | Only that which has no history is definable [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Only that which has no history is definable. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§13) | |
A reaction: Too subtle to evaluate! It sounds as if it could be right, that some things are definable, but when the accretions of human history are interwoven into an identity, we can forget it. |
8200 | Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine] |
Full Idea: A real definition, according to the Aristotelian tradition, gives the essence of the kind of thing defined. Man is defined as a rational animal, and thus rationality and animality are of the essence of each of us. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Willard Quine - Vagaries of Definition p.51 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 4385. Personally I prefer the Aristotelian approach, but we may have to say 'We cannot identify the essence of x, and so x cannot be defined'. Compare 'his mood was hard to define' with 'his mood was hostile'. |
4385 | Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, to give a definition one must first state the genus and then the differentia of the kind of thing to be defined. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.157 | |
A reaction: Presumably a modern definition would just be a list of properties, but Aristotle seeks the substance. How does he define a genus? - by placing it in a further genus? |
8262 | How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Nothing purely within the theory of meaning is capable of telling us which of two sentences which are paraphrases of one another more accurately reflects the ontological commitments of those who utter them. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 2.3) | |
A reaction: This is an attack on the semantic approach to ontology, associated with Quine. Cf. Idea 7923. I have always had an aversion to that approach, and received opinion is beginning to agree. "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio..." |
23715 | Psychologists should be brave and proud, and prefer truth to desires, even when it is ugly [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I hope [psychologists] are actually brave, generous, proud animals, who know how to control their own pleasure and pain and are taught to sacrifice desirability to truth, even a bitter, ugly, unchristian, immoral truth - Because there are such truths. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§01) | |
A reaction: A nice expression of Nietzsche's values, which makes truth central, contrary to the widespread modern view that he was the high priest of relativism. If you think that, read him more carefully. |
8315 | Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If facts are 'proposition-like' or 'thinkable' (we speak of 'knowing' or 'understanding' facts) might they not simply be true propositions? | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.2) | |
A reaction: They certainly can't be if we are going to use facts as what makes propositions true. The proposal would be empty without out some other account of truth (probably a dubious one). Facts are truth-makers? |
8319 | One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Where there is one-to-one correspondence there must certainly be countable, and therefore individuable items of some kind. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.6) | |
A reaction: Lowe is criticising precise notions of 'a fact'. We can respond by relaxing the notion of 'one-to-one', if critics are going to be fussy about exactly what the items are. "There is a huge wave coming" doesn't need a precise notion of a wave to be true. |
8309 | A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members [Lowe] |
Full Idea: A set is 'a number of things', not a 'collection'. Nothing literally 'collects' the members of a set, such as the set of planets of the sun, unless it be a Fregean 'concept' under which they fall. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.6) | |
A reaction: I'm tempted to say that the sun has collected a set of planets (they're the ones that rotate around it). Why can't we have natural sets, which have been collected by nature? A question of the intension, as well as the extension.... |
8322 | I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It is not clear to me that the empty set has well-defined identity-conditions. A set has these only to the extent that its members do - but the empty set has none. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 12.3 n8) | |
A reaction: The empty set is widely used by those who base their metaphysics of maths on sets. It defines zero, and hence is the starting poing for Peano's Postulates (Idea 5897). It might not have identity in itself, but you know where you have arrived after 2 - 2. |
13282 | Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle proposes to relativise unity and plurality, so that a single object can be both one (indivisible) and many (divisible) simultaneously, without contradiction, relative to different measures. Wholeness has degrees, with the strength of the unity. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.12 | |
A reaction: [see Koslicki's account of Aristotle for details] As always, the Aristotelian approach looks by far the most promising. Simplistic mechanical accounts of how parts make wholes aren't going to work. We must include the conventional and conceptual bit. |
4730 | For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Aristotle apparently believed that the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected the substance-accident nature of reality. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.4 | |
A reaction: We need not assume that Aristotle is wrong. It is a chicken-and-egg. There is something obvious about subject-predicate language, if one assumes that unified objects are part of nature, and not just conventional. |
8312 | It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If we take the existential quantifier to mean 'there is at least one thing that' then its value must qualify as one thing, individuable in principle. ...So I propose to read it as 'there is something that', which implies nothing about individuability. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11) | |
A reaction: All sorts of doubts about the existential quantifier seem to be creeping in nowadays (e.g. Ideas 6067, 6069, 8250). Personally I am drawn to the sound of 'free logic', Idea 8250, which drops existential claims. This would reduce metaphysical confusion. |
8297 | Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality [Lowe] |
Full Idea: My view is that numbers are universals, beings kinds of sets (that is, kinds whose particular instances are individual sets of appropriate cardinality). | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10) | |
A reaction: [That is, 12 is the set of all sets which have 12 members] This would mean, I take it, that if the number of objects in existence was reduced to 11, 12 would cease to exist, which sounds wrong. Or are we allowed imagined instances? |
8266 | Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous [Lowe] |
Full Idea: That one-to-one correlated sets of objects are equinumerous is a more sophisticated achievement than the simple ability to count sets of objects. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 2.9) | |
A reaction: This is an objection to Frege's way of defining numbers, in terms of equinumerous sets. I take pattern-recognition to be the foundation of number, and so spotting a pattern would have to precede spotting that two patterns were identical. |
8302 | Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another [Lowe] |
Full Idea: What is now known as Hume's Principle says the number of Fs is identical with the number of Gs if and only if the Fs and the Gs are one-to-one correlated with one another. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.3) | |
A reaction: This seems popular as a tool in attempts to get the concept of number off the ground. Although correlations don't seem to require numbers ('find yourself a partner'), at some point you have to count the correlations. Sets come first, to identify the Fs. |
8298 | Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa [Lowe] |
Full Idea: I favour an account of sets which sees them as being instances of numbers, thereby avoiding the unhelpful metaphor which speaks of a set as being a 'collection' of things. This reverses the normal view, which explains numbers in terms of sets. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10) | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 8297. Either a set is basic, or a number is. We might graft onto Lowe's view an account of numbers in terms of patterns, which would give an empirical basis to the picture, and give us numbers which could be used to explain sets. |
8311 | If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2 [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If 2 is a particular, 'adding' it to itself can, it would seem, only leave us with 2, not another number. (If 'Socrates + Socrates' denotes anything, it most plausibly just denotes Socrates). | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.7) | |
A reaction: This suggest Kant's claim that arithmetical sums are synthetic (Idea 5558). It is a nice question why, when you put two 2s together, they come up with something new. Addition is movement. Among patterns, or along abstract sequences. |
8310 | Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Does it really matter whether the numbers actually exist - in anything like the way in which it matters that space and time or persons actually exist? | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.6) | |
A reaction: Nice question! It might matter a lot. I take the question of numbers to be a key test case, popular with philosophers because they are the simplest and commonest candidates for abstract existence. The ontological status of values is the real issue. |
8321 | All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects [Lowe] |
Full Idea: One could argue that some abstract objects exist in all possible worlds (e.g. natural numbers) and that abstract objects always depend for their existence upon concrete objects, and conclude that some concrete objects exist in all possible worlds. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 12.1) | |
A reaction: We're all in the dark on this one, but I quite like this argument. I can't conceive of a reality that lacks natural numbers, and the truths that accompany them, and I personally think that numbers arise from the patterns of physical reality. |
8300 | Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) [Lowe] |
Full Idea: For some metaphysicians, possession of causal power is the very hallmark of real existence (and is one reason, for instance, why some have denied the existence of the void or absolute space). | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.2) | |
A reaction: You could try saying that space has the power of making movement possible. The 'hallmark' of something doesn't define what it is. Existence without causal power seems logically possible and imaginable, but unlikely. Epiphenomena have this problem. |
8281 | Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The extreme views on change are the Heraclitan view - that every change brings into existence an entirely new entity, and destroys what existed before, and the Spinozan view - that all changes are phase changes within a single substance. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 8.2) | |
A reaction: The views in between are that bundles of properties shift their contents, or that many substances undergo changes in their properties. The unification of physics might be aiming to vindicate Spinoza. Temporal parts (Lewis) are close to Heraclitus. |
8270 | Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe] |
Full Idea: My own broadly Aristotelian view is that events are changes (and unchanges) in the properties and relations of persisting objects. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 4.4) | |
A reaction: This needs an account of what it is that persists, and the philosophers' (but not physicists') concept of 'substance' fills this role. It is rather hard to give identity-conditions for an event if it is an 'unchange'. How would you count such events? |
8308 | Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe] |
Full Idea: We must include events in our ontology because they figure indispensably in singular causal explanations. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.5) | |
A reaction: Hm. Spirits figure indispensably in supernatural explanations. It would be quite a task to prove that events really are indispensable to causal explanations. Why would nomological or counterfactual causal explanations not have the same need? |
8314 | Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Philosophers who invoke facts are divided over whether facts are wholly abstract entities or are complexes capable of containing concrete objects as constituents. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.2) | |
A reaction: If externalism about concepts was true (see Thought|Content|Broad Content), this would support the second (more concrete) view of facts. The correspondence theory of truth would love to plug belief into the concrete world. Me too. |
8316 | Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe] |
Full Idea: There is a difficulty for any view of facts which sees them as being wholly abstract entities, and yet also being causal relata; for it seems that only concrete entities, existing in time and space, can enter into causal relations. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.3) | |
A reaction: There seems a lot of ambiguity in the air here, between epistemology and ontology (surprise!). I take causation to be a physical activity in the concrete world. Our understanding of it is expressed with abstractions. 'Fact' seems to have two meanings. |
8318 | The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe] |
Full Idea:
The most notorious problem besetting the view that facts are structured complexes of constituents is the question of what it is that binds the supposed constituents into the fact. The ordered triple |
|
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.5) | |
A reaction: Lowe denies that facts are complex entities on this basis. You only have the problem if Mars and its redness are two 'things'. If redness is intrinsically a dependent item, we may escape. I wish they wouldn't use colours as examples. See Idea 5456. |
8323 | It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Although 'fact' is grammatically a count noun, it strikes us as being at best whimsical to talk about enumerating facts - to talk, for instance, about how many facts I learned today before breakfast. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 12.4) | |
A reaction: I always liked the question 'how many facts are there in this room?' One might make a serious attempt to decide how many facts I learned before breakfast, and reach a reasonable approximation, especially if one didn't open the newspaper. |
8313 | Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Facts seem to be indispensable as truth-makers and perhaps as causal relata, ..but if we must only include in our ontology things for which we can state a criterion of identity (Quine), ..we seem to be faced with a dilemma. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11) | |
A reaction: Lowe proposes to relax the identification requirement (see Idea 8312). This seems a good strategy. An awful lot of strange philosophy arises from insisting on strict conditions for our understanding, and then finding everywhere failure to achieve it. |
8258 | Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe] |
Full Idea: One of the chief rivals to my own substance-based ontology is the view that holds facts or states of affairs to be the building-blocks of the world. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], Pref) | |
A reaction: I think I side with Lowe, even though I am uneasy about the gap between the philosopher's 'substance' and the basic entities of physics. Facts are hard to individuate, and seem to be composed of more basic elements. |
8301 | Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Some abstract objects, notably certain universals, need to be invoked for explanatory purposes, even if it cannot be said that they themselves possess causal powers or enter into causal relations. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.2) | |
A reaction: I am unconvinced that an entity with no causal powers could be any kind of explanation, given that, by definition, it can't do anything. You would have to think that the world of pure reason functioned without the aid of causal powers. |
8283 | Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Ontological categories should not be confused with natural kinds: for natural kinds can only be differentiated in a principled way relative to an accepted framework of ontological categories. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 8.2) | |
A reaction: I presume that the natural kinds are likely to be contingent facts about the actual world (though they may entail necessary laws), whereas I like to think, unfashionably, that categories aim at deconstructing the mind of God (roughly). |
8284 | The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Some metaphysicians take the highest division to be between abstract and concrete entities, others take it to be between universals and particulars (my own preference, though it is not crucial), and others between necessary and contingent entities. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 8.3) | |
A reaction: The first division may be blurred, and I am doubtful about universals, so I favour the third. Intuition tells me that there is nothing more basic than the distinction between what is true in all worlds and what is only true in some. The former is bedrock. |
13122 | Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete [Lowe, by Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: Lowe's Ontological Categories: ENTITIES - {Universals - [Kinds - (Non-natural)(Natural)] [Properties, Relations]} {Particulars - [Abstracta - (Sets)(others)] [Concreta - (Objects)(Non-Objects)]} etc | |
From: report of E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], p.181) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §01 | |
A reaction: [my linear representation of a tree diagram; bracket-styles show levels] Lowe's levels below these divide according to whether things are 'substances' or not. I've heard Kit Fine tease Lowe for being too simplistic about ontology. |
8273 | Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: "The Thames is broad in London" might be taken as 'The Thames is broad-in-London', or as 'The Thames is-in-London broad', or as 'The Thames-in-London is broad'. I would urge the superiority of the second one, as an analysis of the normal meaning. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 5.8) | |
A reaction: He uses the example to attack the perdurance view of objects (i.e. the third analysis). I think I agree with Lowe, but I'm not sure, and I just love the example. Read the second as 'The Thames is (in London) broad'? 'Is' of existence, or predication? |
8285 | I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers call particularised properties of objects 'tropes', but I prefer the older term 'mode' (or 'individual accident'), because this term rightly has the implication that such entities are existentially dependent ones, depending on objects. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 8.3) | |
A reaction: A nice illustration of the fact that philosophical terminology is not as metaphysically innocent as it sometimes pretends to be. I agree with Lowe. |
8295 | Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Why cannot a certain trope 'float free' of the trope-bundle to which it belongs and migrate to another bundle? | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.8) | |
A reaction: Tropes are said to be dependent on their possessors, but at the same time to exist as particulars. Lowe's suggestion is that you can't have it both ways. A particular sphericity with no sphere does not even make sense. |
8286 | Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects [Lowe] |
Full Idea: I do not believe that tropes or modes can have well-defined or fully determinate identity-conditions, and hence do not believe that they should be thought of as 'objects'. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 8.3) | |
A reaction: Lowe's account would still allow them to be 'entities'. Any proposal that they have an existence of their own, apart from the objects on which they depend, sounds very misguided. We won't make progress if we don't identify the real properties. |
8294 | How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It seems that tropes are identity-dependent upon their possessors, but it is difficult to square this claim with the thesis that the possessors of tropes are themselves just bundles of tropes. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.8) | |
A reaction: This circularity in all attempts to individuate tropes is Lowe's main reason for rejecting them. It does seem that the sphericity of a ball must be either identified against other (universal) sphericities, or by the sphere that has the property. |
8296 | Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If a round ball fits snugly into a round piece of plaster, do they contain the same roundness trope, or do they contain numerically distinct but exactly similar and coinciding roundness tropes? | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.8) | |
A reaction: A microscope would distinguish them, and they are made of different types of matter. Is a hole in a piece of paper a circular cut and a circular area of space? Neither example looks good for tropes. |
8288 | Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not [Lowe] |
Full Idea: I want to distinguish 'substantial' universals from 'non-substantial' universals. The former are denoted by sortal terms, such as 'statue' and 'tiger', whereas the latter are denoted by adjectival terms, such as 'red' and 'spherical'. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.3) | |
A reaction: It is an interesting question whether or not (assuming you are committed to universals) a universal necessarily implies an associated substance. If a property is a power, it must be a power of something. Nominalists will deny his distinction. |
8293 | Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature [Lowe] |
Full Idea: I base my case for realism about universals on the need to explain the status of natural laws. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.6) | |
A reaction: I need black magic to explain why my watch has disappeared. The key question, then, would be what we understand by the 'laws of nature'. I am inclined to think that scientific essentialism (qv) can build laws out of natural kinds. Idea 6614. |
8307 | Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe] |
Full Idea: A particular is something (not necessarily an object) which instantiates but is not itself instantiated. Universals, on the other hand, necessarily have instances (or, at least, are instantiable). | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.4) | |
A reaction: This is Lowe's proposal for distinction. It at least establishes the direction of dependency, but I find the notion of 'instantiation' to be as obscure and problematic as the Platonic notion of 'partaking' (see in Ontology|Universals|Platonic Forms). |
16130 | To be an object at all requires identity-conditions [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The only metaphysically defensible notion of an object is precisely that of an entity which possesses determinate identity-conditions. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1.3) | |
A reaction: I think he includes abstract objects in this. I suspect this view of muddling epistemology and ontology. Or overemphasising our conventions, rather than reality. |
8265 | Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Whether objects of a given kind should be thought actually to exist should, in general, be taken to turn on considerations of whether an inclusion of such objects in one's ontology has explanatory value. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 2.3) | |
A reaction: Blatantly fictional objects, such as fairies, might have wonderful explanatory value (they place dewdrops on flowers). Our ontological commitments cannot be decided one at a time, because consistency of the whole picture is the key value. |
8275 | Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects [Lowe] |
Full Idea: I distinguish objects as those entities - whether abstract or concrete, universal or particular - which possess fully determinate identity-conditions, but there are, or may be, entities other than objects. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 7) | |
A reaction: A wave on the sea is a candidate for being an entity but not an object. The distinction is probably not quite common usage, but it strikes as one which philosophers should universally adopt. Lots of entities, and some of them are objects. |
8267 | Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality [Lowe] |
Full Idea: An obvious suggestion is that concrete objects are denizens of space-time, and hence subject to causality, though Hale objects that languages are plausibly abstract and yet undergo change and so presumably exist in time. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 2.10) | |
A reaction: The identity-conditions for a language are pretty loose. Choosing a counterexample from the mental life of human beings begs a billion questions. I can't think of a problem case beyond the world of human culture. |
8263 | An object is an entity which has identity-conditions [Lowe] |
Full Idea: To be an object is simply to be an entity possessing determinate identity-conditions. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 2.3) | |
A reaction: This is a nice clear-cut claim, which sounds good, except that there may be a blurring of ontology and epistemology. Presumably the conditions are for the concept, not for an actual act of identification. Maybe we are too stupid to conceive them. |
8268 | Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity [Lowe] |
Full Idea: There can be determinate countability even where there is not determinate identity; it is not in dispute that there are two electrons in the shell of a neutral helium atom, even though the identity of electrons is not determinate. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 3.3) | |
A reaction: If the electrons could merge like water drops, we would be unable to say when they became one object. You can roughly count waves on the sea, but when you seek an exact total, the identity problem intrudes and prevents precise counting. |
8303 | Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Criteria of identity never unambiguously determine the kind of objects to which they apply, since many different types of objects can be governed by the same criteria. Cats and dogs share the criterion of identity for animals in general. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.3) | |
A reaction: So how do you individuate the type of an object? You could identify 'the thing I dug up yesterday' without being able to individuate it. You can individuate 'the cleverest person in Britain' without being able to identify them. |
8292 | Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence [Lowe] |
Full Idea: What really makes for the diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time location, from which their difference in component matter at any time merely follows as a consequence. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.5) | |
A reaction: I daresay this is how we manage to identify the diversity of a pair of tigers (epistemology), but is that what their diversity consists in (ontology)? That they employ different matter seems relevant. If you feed one, the other stays hungry (causation). |
8291 | Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind [Lowe] |
Full Idea: A principle of individuation tells us what is to count as one instance of a given kind, such as one ship. A criterion of identity is what makes for the identity or diversity of items of a given kind, to distinguish this ship from that ship. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.5) | |
A reaction: So individuation picks out type/qualitative identity, and identifying picks out token/numerical identity. This agrees with Idea 7926, but is a shift from the usage Lowe mentions in Idea 8290. Common usage makes the technical terms unclear. |
16128 | A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects [Lowe] |
Full Idea: A 'substance' might be defined to be an object which does not depend for its existence upon any other object (where dependency is defined in terms of necessity. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1.3) | |
A reaction: I'm inclined to leave out 'substance', which has too much historical baggage, and talk of minimal things having 'identity', and proper things having 'essence'. |
13276 | The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's discussion of the unmoved mover and of the soul confirms the suspicion that form, when it is not thought of as the object represented in a definition, plays the role of the ultimate mereological atom within his system. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 6.6 | |
A reaction: Aristotle is concerned with which things are 'divisible', and he cites these two examples as indivisible, but they may be too unusual to offer an actual theory of how Aristotle builds up wholes from atoms. He denies atoms in matter. |
13277 | The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Thus in Aristotle we may think of an object's formal components as a sort of recipe for how to build wholes of that particular kind. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.5 | |
A reaction: In the elusive business of pinning down what Aristotle means by the crucial idea of 'form', this analogy strikes me as being quite illuminating. It would fit DNA in living things, and the design of an artifact. |
8279 | The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It is not at all clear that the identity of a composite object can be fixed by the identity of its original composition, since there are good grounds for claiming that the reverse is in fact the case. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 7.5) | |
A reaction: That is, how could you identify the origin if you didn't know what it was that had originated? Nice point. See also Idea 8274. Vicars must make sure they baptise the right baby. |
8271 | An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The 'endurance' view is that an object persists by being 'wholly present' at more than one time, and the 'perdurance' view is that an object has different temporal parts which exist at different times. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 5) | |
A reaction: It is tempting to say that only a philosopher would come up with a view as bizarre as the second one. Trying to imagine God's view of time has led to a lot of confusion. Endurance seems to need substance, so bundle views of objects encourage perdurance. |
8272 | How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The temporal parts approach to identity appears to be viciously circular, for how are the 'temporal parts' of tomatoes to be individuated and identified save by reference to the very tomatoes of which they are parts? | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 5.3) | |
A reaction: (This attacks the 'perdurance' view - Idea 8271) Something wrong here. Isn't Lowe begging the question, by assuming that a tomato at an instant IS the tomato? To know what a tomato is, you must spend time with it. |
8305 | A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe] |
Full Idea: As Locke clearly understood, one must first have a clear conception of what kind of object one is dealing with in order to extract a criterion of identity for objects of that kind from that conception. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.3) | |
A reaction: Archaeologist face objects which they can number, remember and take pride in, without having a clue what kind of thing they are dealing with. The two processes may not be entirely distinct. |
8290 | One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter [Lowe] |
Full Idea: One venerable tradition, exemplified in Aquinas, has it that matter is the 'principle of individuation', that is, that all that can be guaranteed to distinguish two concrete thing of the same kind is the different matter of which they are composed. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.5) | |
A reaction: This seems to be 'identity-conditions' rather than 'individuation', according to Idea 7926. The problem would be how to identify that particular matter, apart from its composing that particular object. Replacing planks on a ship seems unimportant. |
15079 | 'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws [Lowe] |
Full Idea: I can accept 'conceptual' necessity, as long as it is only identified with 'narrow' logical necessity. For I take it that the 'conceptually' necessary is that which is true solely in virtue of concepts together with the laws of logic. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1.4) | |
A reaction: In the narrow version of logical necessity (Idea 8260) some definitions are required in addition to the mere laws of logic. This implies that the concepts are dependent of definitions, which is a bit restrictive. Aren't we allowed undefined concepts? |
16063 | Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: Lowe (1998) defines metaphysical necessity in terms of logical necessity 'broadly contrued'. | |
From: report of E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998]) by Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM - The Impossibility of Superdupervenience n 3 | |
A reaction: [I seem to have missed this simple thought in Lowe 1998 - must revisit]. Both metaphysical and logical necessity can be taken as 'true in all possible worlds', but that doesn't make them the same truths. |
8260 | Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds) [Lowe] |
Full Idea: 'Strict' logical necessity is true by the laws of logic alone; 'narrow' logical necessity is true by the laws of logic plus definitions of non-logical terms; 'broad' logical necessity is true in every possible world where the laws of logic hold. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1.4) | |
A reaction: Lowe then says the third is close to 'metaphysical' necessity. I am unable to distinguish the third from the first. You can't claim that a logical implication holds in this world, but not in another possible world which has the same rules of implication. |
16131 | The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit [Lowe] |
Full Idea: What is 'metaphysically' possible hinges …on the question of whether acceptable metaphysical principles and categories permit the existence of some state of affairs. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1.3) | |
A reaction: Lowe breezes along with confident assertions like this. I once heard Kit Fine tease him for over-confidence. All you do is work out 'acceptable' principles and categories, and you've cracked it! |
8320 | Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Possible worlds, conceived of as abstracta, surely exist 'in every possible world'. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 12) | |
A reaction: A possible very infinite regress, if a particular possible world is distinguished from another only by being perceived from Actual Word 1 or Actual World 2.. How many possible worlds are there? The standard answer is 'lots', rather than infinity. |
5991 | For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code] |
Full Idea: Aristotle thinks that in general we have knowledge or understanding when we grasp causes, and he distinguishes three fundamental types of knowledge - theoretical, practical and productive. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Alan D. Code - Aristotle | |
A reaction: Productive knowledge we tend to label as 'knowing how'. The centrality of causes for knowledge would get Aristotle nowadays labelled as a 'naturalist'. It is hard to disagree with his three types, though they may overlap. |
4421 | Philosophers have never asked why there is a will to truth in the first place [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Both the earliest and most recent philosophers are all oblivious of how much the will to truth itself first requires justification: here there is a gap in every philosophy - how did this come about? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], III.§24) | |
A reaction: This seems to me a meta-philosophical question which will lead off into (quite interesting) cultural studies and (trite) evolutionary theory. Truth isn't a value, it is the biological function of brains. |
8280 | While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Although the appearance of distance and so of space may conceivably be no more than an appearance (as Berkeley held), the appearance of change and so of time cannot be no more than appearance - for the appearance of change involves change (in minds). | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 7.9) | |
A reaction: This would seem to place some sort of limit on idealism. Since it doesn't offer a barrier to solipsism, though, it is not much consolation. We mustn't forget that Parmenides and Zeno of Elea proved that change is just an illusion. |
11239 | The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of a priori truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11240. |
8276 | Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual [Lowe] |
Full Idea: I consider properties or qualities to be essentially adjectival rather than objectual in nature (and the same applies to relations, though they are adjectival to more than one object). | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 7.1) | |
A reaction: Personally I am inclined to say that properties are either real causal powers (functions of objects?), such as being sharp, or else they are subjective ways of distinguishing things (e.g. colours). Or fictions. 'Adjectival' is too vague. |
23312 | Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is a rationalist …but reason for him is a disposition which we only acquire over time. Its acquisition is made possible primarily by perception and experience. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Rationalism p.173 | |
A reaction: I would describe this process as the gradual acquisition of the skill of objectivity, which needs the right knowledge and concepts to evaluate new experiences. |
16111 | Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Since Aristotle generally prefers a metaphysical theory that accords with common intuitions, he frequently relies on facts about language to guide his metaphysical claims. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.5 | |
A reaction: I approve of his procedure. I take intuition to be largely rational justifications too complex for us to enunciate fully, and language embodies folk intuitions in its concepts (especially if the concepts occur in many languages). |
23719 | Forgetfulness is a strong positive ability, not mental laziness [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Forgetfulness is not just a vis inertiae, as superficial people believe, but is rather an active ability to suppress, positive in the strongest sense of the word. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§01) | |
A reaction: It is unimpressive when people remember small slights and grievances for a long time - and even being owed small sums - so the ability to forget such things is admirable. But wilfully forgetting some things is obviously shameful. |
4420 | There is only 'perspective' seeing and knowing, and so the best objectivity is multiple points of view [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective "knowing", and the more different eyes we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our "concept" of this thing, our "objectivity", be. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], III.§12) | |
A reaction: A very perceptive statement of the most plausible and sophisticated version of relativism. It is hard to see how we could distinguish multiple viewpoints from pure objectivity. |
16971 | Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik] |
Full Idea: Plato's unity of science principle states that all - legitimate - sciences are ultimately about the Forms. Aristotle's principle states that all sciences must be, ultimately, about substances, or aspects of substances. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], 1) by Julius Moravcsik - Aristotle on Adequate Explanations 1 |
11243 | Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle things which explain (the explanantia) are facts, which should not be associated with the modern view that says explanations are dependent on how we conceive and describe the world (where causes are independent of us). | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.1 | |
A reaction: There must be some room in modern thought for the Aristotelian view, if some sort of robust scientific realism is being maintained against the highly linguistic view of philosophy found in the twentieth century. |
3320 | Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: The standard Aristotelian doctrine of species and genus in the theory of anything whatever involves specifying what the thing is in terms of something more general. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.10 |
12000 | Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung] |
Full Idea: The view that essential properties are those in virtue of which other significant properties of the subjects under investigation can be explained is encountered repeatedly in Aristotle's work. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation IV | |
A reaction: What does 'significant' mean here? I take it that the significant properties are the ones which explain the role, function and powers of the object. |
4414 | Philosophers invented "free will" so that our virtues would be permanently interesting to the gods [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The philosophers invented "free will" - absolute human spontaneity in good and evil - to furnish a right to the idea that the interest of the gods in man, in human virtue, could never be exhausted. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§07) | |
A reaction: Wonderfully outrageous suggestion! If we had true metaphysical 'absolute' free will, we would be much more interesting, and have a much higher status in the cosmos. Nietzsche is probably right. |
8289 | The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The vulgar notion, propagated by some modern physicalist philosophers, that Cartesian souls are supposed to be made of some sort of ghostly, 'immaterial' stuff - a near contradiction in terms - is quite unwarranted. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.5) | |
A reaction: A nice illustration of the service which can be offered by this database. See Idea 3423 for an illustration of the sort of thing which Lowe is attacking. See Idea 5011 for a quotation from Descartes on the subject. I leave the decision with my visitor... |
4419 | People who think in words are orators rather than thinkers, and think about facts instead of thinking facts [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Whoever thinks in words thinks as an orator and not as a thinker (it shows that he does not think facts, but only in relation to facts). | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], III.§08) | |
A reaction: Good. It is certainly not true that we have to think in words, or else animals wouldn't think. Good thinking should focus on reality, and be too fast for words to keep up. |
23300 | Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
Full Idea: Aristotle, and also the Stoics, denied rationality to animals. …The Platonists, the Pythagoreans, and some more independent Aristotelians, did grant reason and intellect to animals. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Denial' | |
A reaction: This is not the same as affirming or denying their consciousness. The debate depends on how rationality is conceived. |
8299 | Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts [Lowe] |
Full Idea: There are three conceptions of abstractness: 1) non-spatial entities, the opposite of 'concrete' (e.g. numbers and universals); 2) an entity logically incapable of a separate existence (e.g. an apple's colour); 3) Fregean abstractions from concepts. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.1) | |
A reaction: [Lowe p.218 explains the third one] Lowe rejects the third one, and it is a moot point whether the second one could actually be classed as an entity (do they have identity-conditions?), so the big issue is the first one. |
8306 | You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Although one can separate 'in thought' a direction from any line of which it is the direction, one cannot conceive of a direction existing in the absence of any line possessing that direction. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.3) | |
A reaction: Intriguing. If I ask you to imagine a line going in a certain direction, don't you need the direction before you can think of the line? 'That line is going in the wrong direction'. Maybe abstract ideas only exist 'in thought'. Lowe is a realist here. |
11240 | The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of analytic truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11239. |
4411 | It is a delusion to separate the man from the deed, like the flash from the lightning [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Just as the popular mind separates the lightning from its flash and takes the latter for a 'action', so they separate strength from expressions of strength, but there is no such substratum; the deed is everything. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§13) | |
A reaction: Of course, there is no reason why an analysis should not separate the doer and the deed (to explain, for example, a well-meaning fool), but it is a blunder to think of a human action as a merely physical event. |
3793 | We must question the very value of moral values [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We need a critique of moral values; the value of these values themselves must just be called in question. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], Pre f§3) | |
A reaction: But we must start somewhere with values, to avoid an infinite regress. |
6559 | Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge (and somewhat to my surprise), Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal; however, he all but says it. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1 | |
A reaction: When I read this I thought that this database would prove Fogelin wrong, but it actually supports him, as I can't find it in Aristotle either. Descartes refers to it in Med.Two. In Idea 5133 Aristotle does say that man is a 'social being'. But 22586! |
4408 | The concept of 'good' was created by aristocrats to describe their own actions [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The judgement 'good' did not first originate with those to whom goodness was shown! Rather it was the 'good' themselves, that is to say the noble, powerful, high-stationed and high-minded who established themselves and their action as good. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§02) | |
A reaction: This may be right, but not very profound. Virtually all concepts are created by the most educated classes. The first recipient of charity may not have had the concept, but they would have been gobsmacked by the novelty. |
23716 | A strong rounded person soon forgets enemies, misfortunes, and even misdeeds [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: To be unable to take his enemies, his misfortunes and even his misdeeds seriously for long - that is the sign of strong, rounded natures with a superabundance of power. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§10) | |
A reaction: An aspect of the 'higher man' that I don't recall being mentioned elsewhere. I basically approve of this, if it means not holding grudges, and living for the future rather than for the past. |
20129 | All animals strive for the ideal conditions to express their power, and hate any hindrances [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Every animal instinctively strives for an optimum of favourable conditions under which it can expend all its strength and achieve its maximal feeling of power; every animal abhors ...every hindrance that obstructs this path to the optimum. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], III.§07) | |
A reaction: This became the lynchpin of Nietzsche's account of the source of values. It is a highly naturalistic view, fitting it into evolutionary theory (thought running deeper than that), so I have a lot of sympathy with the view. |
3259 | Nietzsche rejects impersonal morality, and asserts the idea of living well [Nietzsche, by Nagel] |
Full Idea: Nietzsche's rejection of impersonal morality is an assertion of the dominance of the ideal of living well. | |
From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I) by Thomas Nagel - The View from Nowhere X.2 |
4409 | Only the decline of aristocratic morality led to concerns about "egoism" [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It was only when aristocratic value judgements declined that the whole antithesis of "egoistic" and "unegoistic" obtruded itself more and more on the human conscience. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§02) | |
A reaction: But Aristotle, who is no aristocrat, has a balanced and sensible view of 'egoism', where it isn't the patronising arrogance that Nietzsche seems to like, but a proper concern with one's own character. |
4416 | Basic justice is the negotiation of agreement among equals, and the imposition of agreement [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Justice on the elementary level is good will among parties of approximately equal power to come to terms with one another, and to compel parties of lesser power to reach a settlement among themselves. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§08) | |
A reaction: This pinpoints a key problem with the social contract as a moral theory - that it requires equals, and recognises only terror of superiors, and indifference to useless inferiors who have nothing to offer (paraplegics and animals). |
4418 | A masterful and violent person need have nothing to do with contracts [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: He who can command, he who is "master", he who is violent in act and bearing - what has he to do with contracts! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§17) | |
A reaction: The persistent problem with social contract theory is that those much stronger or much weaker seem to have no interest in morality at all, and yet they can all have standards of behaviour. |
4407 | Plato, Spinoza and Kant are very different, but united in their low estimation of pity [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Plato, Spinoza, La Rochefoucauld, and Kant are four spirits very different from one another, but united in one thing: their low estimation of pity. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], Pref §5) | |
A reaction: Plato is no surprise, as virtually no Greeks value pity. Spinoza and Kant are interesting. Presumably Kant's 'contractualism' places respect far above pity, and is theoretical neglect of animals would fit. Remember Nietzsche embraced a horse in Turin. |
4415 | Guilt and obligation originated in the relationship of buying and selling, credit and debt [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The feeling of guilt, of personal obligation, had its origin in the oldest and most primitive personal relationship, that between buyer and seller, between creditor and debtor. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§08) | |
A reaction: In other words, lofty Kantian ideals started life in the grubby world of the Hobbesian social contract, and self-seeking has been disguised by idealism. Too harsh on Kant, who explains why contracts have force, not just convenience. |
23718 | If we say birds of prey could become lambs, that makes them responsible for being birds of prey [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Scientists …do not defend any belief more strongly than that the strong are free to be weak, and the birds of prey are free to be lambs: - in this way, they gain the right to make the birds of prey responsible for being birds of prey. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§13) | |
A reaction: This is a flat rejection of the Sartrean idea that we can what sort of person we want to be. He cares about birds of prey, but also lambs can't become eagles. I would say that adolescents have a reasonable degree of choice about what they will become. |
23717 | Modern nihilism is now feeling tired of mankind [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The sight of man now makes us tired - what is nihilism today if it is not that? …We are tired of man… | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§12) | |
A reaction: That is close to Hume's nihilist, who would destroy the world to protect his own finger from a scratch. The actor George Sanders committed suicide because he was bored. Don't ever think that Nietzsche was a nihilist, just because he mentions it a lot! |
23721 | Old tribes always felt an obligation to the earlier generations, and the founders [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Within the original tribal association the living generation always acknowledged a legal obligation towards the earlier generation, and in particular towards the earliest. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§19) | |
A reaction: This is still a factor in modern politics, though the people remember are either military heroes or the great figures of a particular political movement. We remember the big artists and personalities, but don't feel obligated to them. |
20142 | The state begins with brutal conquest of a disorganised people, not with a 'contract' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Some pack of blond beasts of prey, on a war footing, unscrupulously lays its dreadful paws on a populace which is shapeless. In this way the 'state' began on earth. I think I have dispensed with the fantasy which has it begin with a 'contract'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§17) | |
A reaction: [compressed] It is certainly likely that a tribe which got itself well organised and focused on some end would achieve total dominance over other tribes that just focus on food. |
23720 | Punishment makes people harder, more alienated, and hostile [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: On the whole, punishment makes men harder and colder, it concentrates, it sharpens the feeling of alienation; it strengthens the power to resist. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§14) | |
A reaction: If the school system involves routine harsh punishments, that means that the whole population ends up in that state. I would have thought that this was an obvious truth about punishment, but no one seems to want to face up to it. |
11150 | It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it. | |
From: Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) | |
A reaction: The epigraph on a David Chalmers website. A wonderful remark, and it should be on the wall of every beginners' philosophy class. However, while it is in the spirit of Aristotle, it appears to be a misattribution with no ancient provenance. |
3037 | Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Aristotle was asked how much educated men were superior to those uneducated; "As much," he said, "as the living are to the dead." | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 05.1.11 |
8660 | There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Aristotle developed his own distinction between potential infinity (never running out) and actual infinity (there being a collection of an actual infinite number of things, such as places, times, objects). He decided that actual infinity was incoherent. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 1.3 | |
A reaction: Friend argues, plausibly, that this won't do, since potential infinity doesn't make much sense if there is not an actual infinity of things to supply the demand. It seems to just illustrate how boggling and uncongenial infinity was to Aristotle. |
12058 | Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's conception of matter permits any kind of matter to become any other kind of matter. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Wiggins - Substance 4.11.2 | |
A reaction: This is obviously crucial background information when we read Aristotle on matter. Our 92+ elements, and fixed fundamental particles, gives a quite different picture. Aristotle would discuss form and matter quite differently now. |
8317 | To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Philosophers who have advocated facts as being causal relata have confused them with states, such as a stone's being heavy; they are guilty of confusing states of affairs with states of objects. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.3) | |
A reaction: A state of an object can be individuated rather more precisely than a fact or state of affairs. There are, of course, vast numbers of states of objects, but only a few states of affairs, involved in (say) the fall of the Berlin Wall. |
8269 | Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Points are limits of parts of space, in which case parts of space cannot be aggregates of them. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 3.9) | |
A reaction: To try to build space out of points (how many per cc?) is fairly obviously asking for trouble, but Lowe articulates nicely why it is a non-starter. |
22729 | The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Aristotle said that the conception of gods arose among mankind from two originating causes, namely from events which concern the soul and from celestial phenomena. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], Frag 10) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Physicists (two books) I.20 | |
A reaction: The cosmos suggests order, and possible creation. What do events of the soul suggest? It doesn't seem to be its non-physical nature, because Aristotle is more of a functionalist. Puzzling. (It says later that gods are like the soul). |
4410 | The truly great haters in world history have always been priests [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The truly great haters in world history have always been priests. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§07) | |
A reaction: Wicked, but it has a lot of truth. Priests have a lot to defend, and a lot of reasons for feeling threatened. |