49 ideas
19693 | There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb] |
Full Idea: Aristotle takes wisdom to come in two forms, the practical and the theoretical, the former of which is good judgement about how to act, and the latter of which is deep knowledge or understanding. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Dennis Whitcomb - Wisdom Intro | |
A reaction: The interesting question is then whether the two are connected. One might be thoroughly 'sensible' about action, without counting as 'wise', which seems to require a broader view of what is being done. Whitcomb endorses Aristotle on this idea. |
18290 | But what is the reasoning of the body, that it requires the wisdom you seek? [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There is more reason in your body than in your best wisdom. For who knows for what purpose your body requires precisely your best wisdom? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.05) | |
A reaction: Lovely question. For years I've paid lip-service to wisdom as the rough aim of all philosophy. Not quite knowing what wisdom is doesn't bother me, but knowing why I want wisdom certainly does, especially after this idea. |
18303 | Reject wisdom that lacks laughter [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Let that wisdom be false to us that brought no laughter with it! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 3.12.23) |
1575 | For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle logos is the ability to speak rationally about, with the hope of attaining knowledge, questions of value. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.26 |
1589 | Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is the great theoretician who articulates a vision of a world in which natural and stable structures can be rationally discovered. His is the most optimistic and richest view of the possibilities of logos | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.95 |
8200 | Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine] |
Full Idea: A real definition, according to the Aristotelian tradition, gives the essence of the kind of thing defined. Man is defined as a rational animal, and thus rationality and animality are of the essence of each of us. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Willard Quine - Vagaries of Definition p.51 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 4385. Personally I prefer the Aristotelian approach, but we may have to say 'We cannot identify the essence of x, and so x cannot be defined'. Compare 'his mood was hard to define' with 'his mood was hostile'. |
4385 | Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, to give a definition one must first state the genus and then the differentia of the kind of thing to be defined. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.157 | |
A reaction: Presumably a modern definition would just be a list of properties, but Aristotle seeks the substance. How does he define a genus? - by placing it in a further genus? |
18305 | To love truth, you must know how to lie [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Inability to lie is far from being love of truth. ....He who cannot lie does not know what truth is. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 4.13.9) |
13282 | Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle proposes to relativise unity and plurality, so that a single object can be both one (indivisible) and many (divisible) simultaneously, without contradiction, relative to different measures. Wholeness has degrees, with the strength of the unity. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.12 | |
A reaction: [see Koslicki's account of Aristotle for details] As always, the Aristotelian approach looks by far the most promising. Simplistic mechanical accounts of how parts make wholes aren't going to work. We must include the conventional and conceptual bit. |
4730 | For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Aristotle apparently believed that the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected the substance-accident nature of reality. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.4 | |
A reaction: We need not assume that Aristotle is wrong. It is a chicken-and-egg. There is something obvious about subject-predicate language, if one assumes that unified objects are part of nature, and not just conventional. |
13276 | The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's discussion of the unmoved mover and of the soul confirms the suspicion that form, when it is not thought of as the object represented in a definition, plays the role of the ultimate mereological atom within his system. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 6.6 | |
A reaction: Aristotle is concerned with which things are 'divisible', and he cites these two examples as indivisible, but they may be too unusual to offer an actual theory of how Aristotle builds up wholes from atoms. He denies atoms in matter. |
13277 | The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Thus in Aristotle we may think of an object's formal components as a sort of recipe for how to build wholes of that particular kind. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.5 | |
A reaction: In the elusive business of pinning down what Aristotle means by the crucial idea of 'form', this analogy strikes me as being quite illuminating. It would fit DNA in living things, and the design of an artifact. |
5991 | For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code] |
Full Idea: Aristotle thinks that in general we have knowledge or understanding when we grasp causes, and he distinguishes three fundamental types of knowledge - theoretical, practical and productive. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Alan D. Code - Aristotle | |
A reaction: Productive knowledge we tend to label as 'knowing how'. The centrality of causes for knowledge would get Aristotle nowadays labelled as a 'naturalist'. It is hard to disagree with his three types, though they may overlap. |
11239 | The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of a priori truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11240. |
23312 | Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is a rationalist …but reason for him is a disposition which we only acquire over time. Its acquisition is made possible primarily by perception and experience. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Rationalism p.173 | |
A reaction: I would describe this process as the gradual acquisition of the skill of objectivity, which needs the right knowledge and concepts to evaluate new experiences. |
16111 | Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Since Aristotle generally prefers a metaphysical theory that accords with common intuitions, he frequently relies on facts about language to guide his metaphysical claims. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.5 | |
A reaction: I approve of his procedure. I take intuition to be largely rational justifications too complex for us to enunciate fully, and language embodies folk intuitions in its concepts (especially if the concepts occur in many languages). |
16971 | Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik] |
Full Idea: Plato's unity of science principle states that all - legitimate - sciences are ultimately about the Forms. Aristotle's principle states that all sciences must be, ultimately, about substances, or aspects of substances. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], 1) by Julius Moravcsik - Aristotle on Adequate Explanations 1 |
11243 | Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle things which explain (the explanantia) are facts, which should not be associated with the modern view that says explanations are dependent on how we conceive and describe the world (where causes are independent of us). | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.1 | |
A reaction: There must be some room in modern thought for the Aristotelian view, if some sort of robust scientific realism is being maintained against the highly linguistic view of philosophy found in the twentieth century. |
3320 | Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: The standard Aristotelian doctrine of species and genus in the theory of anything whatever involves specifying what the thing is in terms of something more general. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.10 |
12000 | Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung] |
Full Idea: The view that essential properties are those in virtue of which other significant properties of the subjects under investigation can be explained is encountered repeatedly in Aristotle's work. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation IV | |
A reaction: What does 'significant' mean here? I take it that the significant properties are the ones which explain the role, function and powers of the object. |
20757 | The powerful self behind your thoughts and feelings is your body [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Behind your thoughts and feelings stands a powerful commander, an unknown wise man - he is called a self. He lives in your body; he is your body. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], I.4), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 5 'Creature' | |
A reaction: I find Nietzsche's view of the self very congenial, though I tend to see the self as certain central functions of the brain. The brain is enmeshed in the body (as in the location of pains). |
18289 | Forget the word 'I'; 'I' is performed by the intelligence of your body [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: You say 'I' and you are proud of this word. But greater than this - although you will not believe in it - is your body and its great intelligence, which does not say 'I' but performs 'I'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.05) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure if I understand this, but I offer it as a candidate for the most profound idea ever articulated about personal identity. |
23300 | Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
Full Idea: Aristotle, and also the Stoics, denied rationality to animals. …The Platonists, the Pythagoreans, and some more independent Aristotelians, did grant reason and intellect to animals. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Denial' | |
A reaction: This is not the same as affirming or denying their consciousness. The debate depends on how rationality is conceived. |
17613 | We should judge principles by the science, not science by some fixed principles [Zermelo] |
Full Idea: Principles must be judged from the point of view of science, and not science from the point of view of principles fixed once and for all. Geometry existed before Euclid's 'Elements', just as arithmetic and set theory did before Peano's 'Formulaire'. | |
From: Ernst Zermelo (New Proof of Possibility of Well-Ordering [1908], §2a) | |
A reaction: This shows why the axiomatisation of set theory is an ongoing and much-debated activity. |
11240 | The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of analytic truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11239. |
18299 | The will is constantly frustrated by the past [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Powerless against that which has been done, the will is an angry spectator of all things past. The will cannot will backwards; that it cannot break time and time's desire - that is the will's most lonely affliction. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 2.20) |
18297 | We created meanings, to maintain ourselves [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Man first implanted values into things to maintain himself - he first created the meaning of things, a human meaning! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.16) | |
A reaction: It is certainly hard to see anything resembling values or meaning in the cosmos, if you remove the human beings. We should expect an evolutionary grounding in their explanation. |
6559 | Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge (and somewhat to my surprise), Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal; however, he all but says it. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1 | |
A reaction: When I read this I thought that this database would prove Fogelin wrong, but it actually supports him, as I can't find it in Aristotle either. Descartes refers to it in Med.Two. In Idea 5133 Aristotle does say that man is a 'social being'. But 22586! |
18293 | The noble man wants new virtues; the good man preserves what is old [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The noble man wants to create new things and a new virtue. The good man wants the old things and that the old things shall be preserved. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.09) | |
A reaction: There is a limit to how many plausible virtues the noble men can come up with. We may already have run out. Are we going to have to re-run the Iliad? |
18301 | We only really love children and work [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: One loves from the very heart only one's child and one's work. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 3.03) | |
A reaction: Very Nietzchean (and masculine?) to cite one's work. Rachmaninov said he was 85% musician and 15% human being, so I guess he loved music from the very heart. |
18307 | I want my work, not happiness! [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Do I aspire after happiness? I aspire after my work! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 4.20) | |
A reaction: I empathise with aspiring to do something, rather than be something. But what do we wish for our children? Happiness first, then achievement? |
18291 | Virtues can destroy one another, through jealousy [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Every virtue is jealous of the others, and jealousy is a terrible thing. Even virtues can be destroyed through jealousy. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.07) | |
A reaction: How much more subtle and plausible than the picture of accumulating virtues, like medals! Zarathustra says it is best to have just one virtue. |
18287 | People now find both wealth and poverty too much of a burden [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Nobody grows rich or poor any more: both are too much of a burden. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.01) | |
A reaction: True. Most people I know are just puzzled by people who actually seem to want to be extremely wealthy. |
18295 | If you want friends, you must be a fighter [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: If you want a friend, you must be willing to wage war for him: and to wage war, you must be capable of being an enemy. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.15) |
18286 | The greatest experience possible is contempt for your own happiness, reason and virtue [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: What is the greatest thing you can experience? It is the hour of the great contempt. The hour in which even your happiness grows loathsome to you, and your reason and your virtue also. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.01) | |
A reaction: This would be a transient state for Nietzsche, in which you realise the hollowness of those traditional ideas, and begin to seek something else. |
18296 | An enduring people needs its own individual values [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: No people could live without evaluating; but if it wishes to maintain itself it must not evaluate as its neighbour evaluates. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.16) | |
A reaction: Political philosophers say plenty about a 'people', but little about what unifies them, or about what keeps one people distinct from another. Most people's are proud of their local values. |
18294 | The state coldly claims that it is the people, but that is a lie [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The state is the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly it lies, too; and this lie creeps from its mouth: 'I, the state, am the people'. It is a lie! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.12) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as just as true even after everyone gets the vote. Rulers can't help gradually forgetting about the people. |
18304 | Saints want to live as they desire, or not to live at all [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: 'To live as I desire to live or not to live at all': that is what I want, that is what the most saintly man wants. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 4.09) | |
A reaction: [spoken by Zarathustra] |
18300 | Whenever we have seen suffering, we have wanted the revenge of punishment [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The spirit of revenge: my friends, that, up to now, has been mankind's chief concern; and where there was suffering, there was always supposed to be punishment. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 2.20) |
11150 | It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it. | |
From: Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) | |
A reaction: The epigraph on a David Chalmers website. A wonderful remark, and it should be on the wall of every beginners' philosophy class. However, while it is in the spirit of Aristotle, it appears to be a misattribution with no ancient provenance. |
3037 | Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Aristotle was asked how much educated men were superior to those uneducated; "As much," he said, "as the living are to the dead." | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 05.1.11 |
18302 | Man and woman are deeply strange to one another! [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Who has fully conceived how strange man and woman are to one another! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 3.10.2) |
8660 | There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Aristotle developed his own distinction between potential infinity (never running out) and actual infinity (there being a collection of an actual infinite number of things, such as places, times, objects). He decided that actual infinity was incoherent. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 1.3 | |
A reaction: Friend argues, plausibly, that this won't do, since potential infinity doesn't make much sense if there is not an actual infinity of things to supply the demand. It seems to just illustrate how boggling and uncongenial infinity was to Aristotle. |
12058 | Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's conception of matter permits any kind of matter to become any other kind of matter. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Wiggins - Substance 4.11.2 | |
A reaction: This is obviously crucial background information when we read Aristotle on matter. Our 92+ elements, and fixed fundamental particles, gives a quite different picture. Aristotle would discuss form and matter quite differently now. |
18292 | I can only believe in a God who can dance [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I should believe only in a God who understood how to dance. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.08) |
18298 | There can't be gods, because that leaves us nothing to create! [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: If there were gods, how could I endure not to be a god! Therefore there are no gods. ...For what would there be to create if gods - existed! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 2.02) | |
A reaction: [Zarathustra says this, not Nietzsche!] |
22729 | The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Aristotle said that the conception of gods arose among mankind from two originating causes, namely from events which concern the soul and from celestial phenomena. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], Frag 10) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Physicists (two books) I.20 | |
A reaction: The cosmos suggests order, and possible creation. What do events of the soul suggest? It doesn't seem to be its non-physical nature, because Aristotle is more of a functionalist. Puzzling. (It says later that gods are like the soul). |
18306 | We don't want heaven; now that we are men, we want the kingdom of earth [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We certainly do not want to enter into the kingdom of heaven: we have become men, so we want the kingdom of earth. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 4.18.2) |
18288 | Heaven was invented by the sick and the dying [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It was the sick and dying who despised the body and the earth and invented the things of heaven and the redeeming drops of blood. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.04) |